


THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF
· WOODROW WILSON ·
COLLEGE AND STATE



Division E660

Section .W75

v.1

COLLEGE AND STATE
VOLUME ONE

2340 S STREET N W

26th February 1924

Dear sirs:

I am in receipt of your letter of February 18th, and it seems to me the work you propose doing in bringing out Mr. Wilson's public papers in a single adequate publication is most important.


At my request, Mr. Ray Stannard Baker and Prof. Wm. E. Dodd have assumed the task of bringing together Mr. Wilson's messages to the Congress, international notes, important public addresses, statements, and other public papers; in short, all the important public documents written by him, with brief explanatory notes where necessary.

This is the only authorized edition of Mr. Wilson's public utterances, and I have asked the editors to present them in a form to make them of the utmost permanent value to the general reading public as well as to historians and students of government.

Sincerely yours,


Edwin Bonning Wilson
(Mrs. Woodrow Wilson).

Harper & Brothers,
49 East 33d Street,
New York, N. Y.





Woodrow Wilson



WOODROW WILSON
Governor of New Jersey

Woodrow Wilson

The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson
Authorized Edition

COLLEGE AND STATE

*Educational, Literary and Political
Papers (1875-1913)*

BY
WOODROW WILSON

EDITED BY
RAY STANNARD BAKER AND WILLIAM E. DODD



IN TWO VOLUMES

VOLUME I

HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS
NEW YORK AND LONDON

MDCCCCXXV

COLLEGE AND STATE

Copyright, 1925
By Edith Bolling Wilson
Printed in the U. S. A.

M-2

PREFACE

"THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON" is the authorized collection, in six volumes, of the addresses, messages and other writings of President Wilson.

The first two volumes, here presented, cover the preparatory period of "College and State," from the earliest published writing, an essay on "Prince Bismarck," signed Atticus, prepared while Mr. Wilson was a sophomore at Princeton, to March 4, 1913, when he became President of the United States. None of these papers is included in any of Mr. Wilson's published books. The other four volumes of the series will contain Mr. Wilson's messages to Congress, and other great public papers of the Presidency, including the more important addresses, especially those made in Europe, and significant published letters.

For the preparation of this work Mrs. Woodrow Wilson placed at the disposal of the present editors all of the original manuscripts, proofs, and pamphlets, so far as they exist, of Mr. Wilson's addresses and messages: and others have been gathered from periodicals, from reports of meetings where he was a speaker, or from congressional or other documents preserved in the Library of Congress or in the Library of Princeton University. Although Mr. Wilson, during all these early years, was a busy college professor or president, and the author of a number of scholarly books, his output of articles and addresses was remarkably extensive and of the highest quality. Here he laid his intellectual foundations; here he expressed the principles and developed the policies which he was to apply in later years to the practical problems of the nation and of the world. The man was made intellectually when he en-

PREFACE

tered the Presidency: it is, indeed, the making of Woodrow Wilson that is the subject of these first two volumes.

But there is here an embarrassment of riches: such a wealth of these early writings and addresses that the editors, while able to include a large proportion of them, have still been forced to select. Mr. Wilson's three great interests were politics or government, education, religion. We have endeavored to include all of the most important and interpretive documents upon these subjects. Where he made many speeches upon topics in which he was deeply engaged, such as the preceptorial system at Princeton, or the campaign issues in New Jersey, we have chosen those which best and most completely exhibit his entire thought. To include all of the writings and addresses upon these subjects would needlessly overload a work of this kind. We have presented nearly all of his papers upon those thinkers and leaders who most influenced his thought and career, except those essays (as on Burke and Bagehot) which are already in Mr. Wilson's published books. These include the significant papers on Pitt, Bright, and Gladstone; Washington, Jefferson, Lee, Lincoln and Cleveland.

For the painstaking student who wishes to inquire further into Mr. Wilson's production, an exploration which will yield much of powerful or felicitous expression, we have appended a bibliography, originally made under the supervision of the Princeton University Library, corrected and brought up to date by Howard Seavoy Leach, librarian of Lehigh University. The earlier parts of this bibliography were examined by President Wilson personally. By a comparison of the papers published in these volumes with the bibliography, the student will easily discover what has been omitted. A comprehensive index is also provided, to enable the reader to find quickly the various utterances of President Wilson upon any given subject.

PREFACE

The editors wish to express their particular thanks to Mrs. Woodrow Wilson, at whose suggestion and request this work has been undertaken, and to A. R. Boyd and W. J. Ashley of the Library of Congress for their active assistance in the locating and photostating of material under their charge; James Thayer Gerould of the Princeton University Library, and Howard Seavoy Leach for similar services; Cyrus McCormick of Chicago for placing at our disposal certain papers which might otherwise have escaped attention; and Professor J. G. de Roulhac Hamilton of the University of North Carolina and Professor Alfred P. James of the University of Pittsburgh for assistance in securing material that came to their attention.

INTRODUCTION

WOODROW WILSON was born in Staunton, Virginia, on December 28, 1856. His family moved to Augusta, Georgia, the next year and, consequently, the early youth of the later President was spent in the beautiful old Southern town in the midst of the cotton belt. After the civil war Dr. Joseph Ruggles Wilson, the father, moved to Columbia, South Carolina, to become professor of theology in the school made famous by James H. Thornwell, one of the greatest preachers of his time. But Columbia and Augusta were different only in the intensity of their devotion to the cause of the South in the war between the sections.

The schools that gave Wilson his early training were conducted by masters engaged for their learning in the classics and paid out of the pockets of the patrons. Wilson was never in a public school. But the principal instructor of young Woodrow was Doctor Wilson himself, a master of English form and diction, as one notes from the sermons that have come down to us. Out of this environment of the old and broken South, of influential Presbyterian preachers and pedagogues of the old style, young Wilson was sent to Davidson College, North Carolina, literally a school of the prophets for the Presbyterian Church of the South, in the autumn of 1874. There he remained the better part of a year. In September, 1875, he went to Princeton, where he received the regular four years' college course of the time, mainly classical in its content.

From Princeton he went to the University of Virginia to "take law" under the greatest of all Southern teachers of that subject, Dr. John B. Minor. There Wilson finished his formal legal training and in 1882

INTRODUCTION

he began the practice of his profession in Atlanta. Already the young man had shown his interest in and fitness for public life, and to so impatient a youth law seemed tedious and slow. He abandoned the profession and renewed his studies at the new Johns Hopkins University in the autumn of 1882. During the succeeding eight years he was a student and a teacher, occupying positions in the faculties of Johns Hopkins, Bryn Mawr, and Wesleyan universities. In September, 1890, he became professor of jurisprudence in Princeton. There he and his wife, Ellen Axson, of Savannah, Georgia, a woman of similar Southern charm and background as her husband, made their home for the next twenty years, a remarkable home, simple, hospitable, and a center of intellectual and social interests where all the connections were ever at ease. From 1890 to 1910, Wilson remained at Princeton, first as a professor and then as president and professor for eight years; and two years as Governor of New Jersey brought him to the Presidency on March 4, 1913. These years of keen and active intellectual life made Mr. Wilson known to the country; they were the years of his great apprenticeship.

The output of these preparatory years was a body of literary material of great interest to any student of American history and institutions. A popular history of the United States and a life of George Washington were the most important, perhaps, though his little manual, *Division and Reunion*, was of great value in the way of a better interpretation of the national conflict about slavery. There were other books—*Congressional Government*, *The State*, *Mere Literature*, *An Old Master and Other Essays*, and *Constitutional Government in the United States*—which attest the industry and range of interest of their author, and a vast flow of articles and addresses not now accessible to the public. It is the purpose of the first two of these volumes of "The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson," now of-

INTRODUCTION

ferred to the public, to present the best of these early writings, addresses and messages in attractive and convenient form.

When scanned carefully these papers will, we think, illustrate admirably the growth of Woodrow Wilson as a thinker and indicate the range and character of his major interests. In one of the earliest statements we note a strong characteristic of the man:

It is not my purpose to represent any particular interest; no man with his senses about him would recommend perfect freedom of trade; protection is nothing more than a bounty and bounties enable manufacturers to build up interests; [that may have been permissible in times of war] but now that peace has come, the South will insist upon having the fruits of peace.¹

There was in this no dogmatic adherence to a doctrine, notwithstanding he and his section were identified with the ideal and the interest of free trade. Of similar tendency was his advocacy of a closer relation between the Executive and Congress in the national government. He was one of the first of American publicists to point out the weakness of the system of checks and balances so perfectly illustrated in the conduct of Congress and Presidents. His first article that secured a wide reading began very much as a similar study of our government might begin to-day:

Our patriotism seems of late to have been exchanging its wonted tone of confident hope for one of desponding solicitude. Anxiety about the future of our institutions seems to be daily becoming stronger in the minds of thoughtful Americans. . . . Both State and National legislatures are looked upon with nervous suspicion, and we hail an adjournment of congress as a temporary immunity from danger.²

In both of the statements from which the above quotations are taken there appears the strong note of in-

¹ *Report of the Tariff Commission*, 47th Cong., 2d Session, House Miscellaneous Documents, Vol. 3, pp. 1294-1297. September 22, 1882.

² *International Review*, August, 1879.

INTRODUCTION

terest in public questions. Of similar but more historic importance is the following striking summing up of the career and personality of Grover Cleveland, whom Wilson knew rather intimately and admired greatly:

We need not pretend to know what history shall say of Mr. Cleveland; we need not pretend that we can draw any common judgment of the man from the confused cries that now ring everywhere from friend and foe. We know only that he has played a great part; that his greatness is authenticated by the passion of love and hatred he has stirred up; that no such great personality has appeared in our politics since Lincoln; and that, either greater or less, his personality is his own, unique in the varied history of our government. He has made policies and altered parties after the fashion of an earlier age in our history, and the men who assess his fame in the future will be no partisans, but men who love candor, courage, honesty, strength, unshaken capacity, and high purpose such as his.¹

These quotations show the direction of Wilson's thought during the whole of his life, but as he rose to greater influence in the administration and guidance of Princeton, he tended to abandon political themes for education, education, to be sure, as a means of a better social and political order. When, therefore, the old college which he had known as a student was formally converted into a university and he was asked to take part in the proceedings, he made elaborate preparations and spoke to a vast audience on October 21, 1896, an audience of distinguished alumni and friends of the new university:

I have had sight of the perfect place of learning in my thought: a free place, and a various, where no man can be and not know with how great a destiny knowledge had come into the world—itself a little world; but not perplexed, living with a singleness of aim not known without; the home of sagacious men, hard-headed and with a will to know, debaters of the world's questions every day and used to the rough ways of democracy; and yet a place removed—calm science seated there, recluse, ascetic like a nun, not knowing that the world passes, not caring, if the truth but come in answer to her prayer; and Literature, walking within her open doors, in quiet chambers, with men of olden time, storied walls about her, and calm

¹ *The Atlantic Monthly*, March, 1897.

INTRODUCTION

voices infinitely sweet; a place where ideals are kept in heart in an air they can breathe; but no fool's paradise. A place where to hear the truth about the past and hold debate about the affairs of the present, with knowledge and without passion; like the world in having all men's life at heart, a place for men and all that concerns them; but unlike the world in its self-possession, its thorough way of talk, its care to know more than the moment brings to light; slow to take excitement, its air pure and wholesome with a breath of faith; every eye within it bright in the clear day and quick to look toward heaven for the confirmation of its hope. Who shall show us the way to this place?¹

This was the ideal, an ideal college life, devotion to learning and the public interest, never realized anywhere on earth. But Wilson was nothing if not an idealist. As the years passed at Princeton and the professor of jurisprudence came to be recognized by his fellows, and by the trustees as well, as the foremost teacher of his subject perhaps in the country, there was an insistent demand that he be made president to succeed Doctor Patton, who retired in June, 1902. Wilson was chosen and forthwith he began the campaign of education that made Princeton a subject of discussion wherever educators were assembled. He began his fateful career as president of Princeton University with zeal and energy. Before the end of December, 1902, he had formulated his first measure of reform. It was the tutorial system:

Gentlemen, if we could get a body of such tutors at Princeton we could transform the place from a place where there are youngsters doing tasks to a place where there are men doing thinking, men who are conversing about the things of thought, men who are eager and interested in the things of thought.²

Seven short years followed. Wilson gathered millions of dollars for his new ventures in education; he set up the preceptorial system and more than doubled

¹ *Princeton Sesquicentennial*, October 21, 1896.

² From his first important speech to the Eastern alumni of Princeton, New York, December 9, 1902. In *Princeton Alumni Weekly*, December 13, 1902.

INTRODUCTION

the number of instructors; and finally he sought to bring all the classmen and the clubs that were based on ideas of social separateness into common association. On this hard proposition of democracy and co-operation he failed. Slowly the students learned to resist him. Then some professors resented his growing prestige and sweeping control of all the life of the place. And finally the alumni reached a state of divided allegiance which threatened his sources of financial supplies. But before 1910 his influence and his career at Princeton had become known throughout the country. Other teachers and leaders in the field of education were profoundly influenced, albeit little official sympathy was expressed. The bearings of his work were tending more and more toward social and political issues; and it was clear that he was reapproaching his earlier realm of thought—politics.

In plain realization of this tendency of his life he said at the University of North Carolina on the occasion of the celebration of the anniversary of the birth of Robert E. Lee:

This man was not great because he was born of a soldier and bred in a school of soldiers, but because, of whomsoever he may have been born, howsoever he was bred, he was a man who saw his duty, who conceived it in high terms, and who spent himself, not upon his own ambitions, but in the duty that lay before him. . . . Now, what does it mean that General Lee is accepted as a national hero? It means simply this delightful thing, that there are no sections in this country any more; that we are a nation and are proud of all the great heroes whom the great processes of our national life have elevated into conspicuous places of fame. . . . I spoke just now in disparagement of the vocation of an orator. I wish there were some great orator who could go about and make men drunk with this spirit of self-sacrifice. I wish there were some man whose tongue might every day carry abroad the golden accents of that creative age in which we were born a nation; accents which would ring like tones of reassurance around the whole circle of the globe, so that America might again have the distinction of showing men the way, the certain way, of achievement and of confident hope.¹

¹ *The Journal of Social Forces*, March, 1924.

INTRODUCTION

In these last lines one readily notes the prophecy of his own future. That some one might again show the way, the way of achievement and of hope. Had he not closed his famous address to his Princeton friends in 1896 with this fond hope as applied to the realm of education? Now it is the way of the whole world upon which the true orator and leader of men would cast his helpful light. He was hardly through with the task in North Carolina and the South before we find him in Chicago on the occasion of the celebration of the hundredth anniversary of the birth of Abraham Lincoln, declaring before a distinguished Northern audience:

The most valuable thing about Mr. Lincoln was that in the midst of the strain of war, in the midst of the crash of arms, he could sit quietly in his room and enjoy a book that led his thoughts off from everything American; could wander in fields of dreams, while every other man was hot with the immediate contest. Always set your faith in a man who can withdraw himself, because only the man who can withdraw himself can see the stage; only the man who can withdraw himself can see affairs as they are.

And so the lesson of this day is faith in the common product of the nation; the lesson of this day is [that] the future as well as the past leadership of men, wise men, has come from the people. We should not be Americans deserving to call ourselves the fellow-countrymen of Lincoln if we did not feel the compulsion that his example lays upon us—the compulsion not to heed him merely but to look to our own duty, to live every day as if that were the day upon which America was to be reborn and remade.¹

In these addresses he is not so much the historian as he had been in his earlier writings; he is no longer the leader of a reform movement in an American university. He is making his appeal to men everywhere to remake their country and vaguely conscious of that destiny which beckons him first to the Governorship of New Jersey, then to the Presidency of the United States, and finally to that greater stage of the modern

¹ *Abraham Lincoln, The Tribute of a Century*, edited by Nathan Williams MacChesney, pp. 4-30.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
FIRST STATEMENT ON THE TARIFF QUESTION	89
Testimony of "Mr. Woodrow Wilson of Atlanta" before the Tariff Commission, Atlanta session, September 22, 1882. Mr. Wilson was then practicing law in Atlanta. Report of the Tariff Commission, Vol. 2, pp. 1294-1297; 47th Congress, 2d Session, House Miscellaneous Documents, Vol. 3.	
COMMITTEE OR CABINET GOVERNMENT?	95
Written while Mr. Wilson was a student at Johns Hopkins. The <i>Overland Monthly</i>, January, 1884, Series 2, Vol. 3, pp. 17-33.	
THE STUDY OF ADMINISTRATION	130
Written while Mr. Wilson was a teacher at Bryn Mawr. From the <i>Political Science Quarterly</i>, June, 1887, Vol. 2, pp. 197-222.	
BRYCE'S "AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH"	159
A review of James Bryce's <i>The American Commonwealth</i> in the <i>Political Science Quarterly</i>, March, 1889, Vol. 4, pp. 153-169. Written while Mr. Wilson was teaching at Wesleyan College.	
THE ONE-HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE INAUGURATION OF GEORGE WASHINGTON	179
Address delivered April 30, 1889 (place not given). From original manuscript in Mr. Wilson's handwriting: in Mrs. Wilson's possession.	
A SYSTEM OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW	187
A review of <i>Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law</i> by John W. Burgess. From the <i>Atlantic Monthly</i>, May, 1891, Vol. 67, pp. 694-699. Written during Mr. Wilson's first year at Princeton as a professor.	
MR. CLEVELAND'S CABINET	198
The <i>Review of Reviews</i> (American), April, 1893, Vol. 7, pp. 286-297.	

CONTENTS

	PAGE
SHOULD AN ANTECEDENT LIBERAL EDUCATION BE REQUIRED OF STUDENTS IN LAW, MEDICINE AND THEOLOGY?	223
World's Fair, Chicago, 1893. International Congress of Education. Wilson's answer to the query, delivered July 26, 1893. From the <i>Proceedings</i> of the International Congress of Education of the World's Columbian Exposition. New York, 1894, pp. 112-117.	
THE LEGAL EDUCATION OF UNDERGRADUATES	232
Address before the American Bar Association, Saratoga Springs, August 23, 1894. Taken from the <i>Report</i> of the Seventeenth Annual Meeting, pp. 439-451. Philadelphia, 1894.	
UNIVERSITY TRAINING AND CITIZENSHIP	246
From <i>The Forum</i>, September, 1894, Vol. 18, pp. 107-116. Walter H. Page was then editor of <i>The Forum</i>.	
PRINCETON IN THE NATION'S SERVICE	259
From <i>The Forum</i>, December, 1896, Vol. 22, pp. 447-466. An oration delivered at the Princeton Sesquicentennial celebration, October 21, 1896.	
MR. CLEVELAND AS PRESIDENT	286
From the <i>Atlantic Monthly</i>, March, 1897, Vol. 79, pp. 289-300. Walter H. Page was then editor of the <i>Atlantic Monthly</i>.	
THE MAKING OF THE NATION	310
From the <i>Atlantic Monthly</i>, July, 1897, Vol. 80, pp. 1-14.	
LEADERLESS GOVERNMENT	336
Address before the Virginia State Bar Association, August 4, 1897. James E. Goode Printing Company, Richmond, 1897.	
THE PURITAN	360
Speech before the New England Society of New York City, December 22, 1900. Proceedings printed by William Green, New York, 1900, pp. 39-49.	

CONTENTS

	PAGE
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE SOUTHERN STATES . . .	368
From the <i>Atlantic Monthly</i> , January, 1901, Vol. 87, pp. 1-15.	
DEMOCRACY AND EFFICIENCY	396
From the <i>Atlantic Monthly</i> , March, 1901, Vol. 87, pp. 289-299.	
THE IDEALS OF AMERICA	416
From the <i>Atlantic Monthly</i> , December, 1902, Vol. 90, pp. 721-734. This article appeared the first year Mr. Wilson was president of Princeton.	
PRINCETON FOR THE NATION'S SERVICE	443
Inaugural Address as president of Princeton Uni- versity, October 25, 1902. From the <i>Princeton</i> <i>Alumni Weekly</i> , November 1, 1902, Vol. 3, No. 6, pp. 89-98.	
PRINCETON IDEALS	462
Delivered at Princeton dinner at the Waldorf-Astoria, December 9, 1902. From the <i>Princeton Alumni</i> <i>Weekly</i> , December 13, 1902, Vol. 3, pp. 199-204. Reported stenographically and corrected by Mr. Wilson.	
THE YOUNG PEOPLE AND THE CHURCH	474
An Address delivered before the Fortieth Annual Convention of the Pennsylvania State Sabbath-school Association at Pittsburgh, October 13, 1904. The Sunday School Times Co., Philadelphia, 1905.	
THE PRINCETON PRECEPTORIAL SYSTEM	487
From <i>The Independent</i> , August 3, 1905, Vol. 59, pp. 239-240.	
THE PRECEPTORIAL SYSTEM	491
Address before the Western Association of Princeton Clubs at Cleveland, Ohio, May 19, 1906. From the <i>Princeton Alumni Weekly</i> , June 2, 1906, Vol. 6, pp. 651-655.	
REPORT ON THE SOCIAL CO-ORDINATION OF THE UNI- VERSITY	499
Submitted to the trustees of Princeton University, June 10, 1907. From <i>Princeton Alumni Weekly</i> , June 12, 1907, Vol. 7, pp. 606-615.	

COLLEGE AND STATE

PRINCE BISMARCK

MR. WILSON'S FIRST ARTICLE, WRITTEN WHEN TWENTY-ONE YEARS OLD, A SOPHOMORE AT PRINCETON, SIGNED "ATTICUS." FROM THE "NASSAU LITERARY MAGAZINE," NOVEMBER, 1877, VOL. XXXIII, NO. 2; PP. 118-127.

FEW centuries seem to have been more fruitful in crises, in revolutions and counter-revolutions, in the establishment, convulsion, and overthrow of empires and kingdoms than our own. From the period upon the teeming pages of whose history falls the glitter of the first and great Napoleon's sword to that which witnessed the sudden downfall of the third Napoleon, innovation and revolution have been the rule rather than the exception in Europe. With Thiers passed away the last of those illustrious men who figured amid the memorable events which crowded upon one another in rapid succession after the great revolution and its attending convulsions. With the appearance of Bismarck upon the political stage began the rule of a new line of statesmen. Stern Time had superseded Thiers. Upon his will had hung the destinies of France. He had seen his country at the zenith of her glory; he lived to see her in deepest degradation at the feet of Bismarck. He lingered only long enough to see his country once more recover some of her wonted energy and then reluctantly made way for a younger generation of statesmen.

The death of Thiers has naturally led us to think of those whom he has left behind him in the field of European politics. And upon the character and life of Bismarck, now the foremost figure of Europe, we would

dwell for a little. We may, from the vantage ground of disinterested observation, be able, in the light of the eventful sixty-two years of his life, to estimate his merits without the hatred of the Austrian, the fear-begotten bitterness of the Frenchman, or the prejudice of the Englishman, to warp our judgment.

Perhaps nothing would have appeared more improbable to the ordinary observer of thirty-five years ago than that the unpromising young aristocrat, the young man only now and then exchanging the pleasures of the hunting field and the drinking-bout for the moody perusal of miscellaneous literature and abstruse philosophy, the young Bismarck, would before his sixtieth year make himself the virtual master of Europe. In the youthful Bismarck, describing in frequent and characteristic letters to his sister, "the farce of shooting the fox," which he daily performed in company with his old and then somewhat simple-minded father, there appeared few indications of that power of intellect and that force of purpose which characterize his later manhood. Occasionally, indeed, he lets fall some expression of discontent at the narrowness of his circle of vision and the petty character of the daily events of his life; but there were, so far as we can learn, no croppings out of that genius now so greatly feared and so justly admired. He seemed, unlike his ancestors, destined to pass his life in the humble position of a country squire, until in 1847 he was called upon to take his place as a representative in his provincial Diet.

The notable year 1848 was the first year of Bismarck's public life. Every one is familiar with the revolutions which then convulsed the eastern portion of Europe; every one remembers with what startling rapidity the revolutionary spirit spread into every corner of Europe. We can easily conceive that it was a time when every patriotic Prussian must have been filled with the gravest apprehensions with regard to his country's future. France seemed to weather the storm

with unsapped strength and undiminished resources, while the apparent success of the revolution made every sovereign of Europe tremble on his throne. Russia was then little less than Dictatress of Europe. Austria was supreme in the councils of the Confederation and seemed likely to hold Prussia in perpetual subordination, and the safety of Prussia, which seemed to the more conservative threatened by the somewhat revolutionary tendencies of the Prussian Liberals, apparently depended upon the continuance of this subordination. Prussia was thus surrounded by powerful states of no very friendly character at the same time that she found herself obliged to fight a domestic enemy in the shape of radicalism. Entering public life at such a time and under such circumstances, Bismarck, with his aristocratic and monarchical sympathies, naturally saw only the dangers of what he regarded as a menacing spirit of democracy, and we find him standing up in the Prussian Assembly and, even after the humiliation of Olmutz, boldly advocating Prussian subserviency to the house of Hapsburg. He looked with deep apprehension at the alarming spread of revolutionary principles and was naturally convinced that a close alliance with Austria was the only means by which these principles could be successfully combated. Seeing the many dangers which threatened the interests of the Confederation, he felt that Austrian domination alone could fend off these dangers from Germany and saw nothing but frivolity and "revolutionary enterprise" in all schemes for the deliverance of Schleswig-Holstein. But eight years at Frankfort in the midst of all kinds of petty, partisan struggles and contemptible efforts to secure influence by improper means, revealed to Bismarck the "utter nullity" of the German Confederation and taught him to regard with hatred and distrust the Austria of whose power he had so lately been the eager defender. By affording him an insight into the affairs of Germany and by revealing to him the extent of

Austria's power and the direction in which it was all exerted, his stay at Frankfort proved eminently useful to Bismarck. It imparted to his views of European relations and of the possibilities of Prussia that breadth and grasp which have ever since characterized them. Bismarck's early political career was such as to render him peculiarly fit for that authority with which he was destined to be invested, and it was well for Prussia that when, in 1862, a crisis of supreme importance came she could avail herself of the services of Bismarck's clear eye and trained hand. The Crimean war and the international complications which sprung from it had caused the opening of a widening breach between Russia and Austria. Napoleon was plotting against Austria for the purpose of promoting Italian unity and, in his eagerness for the friendship of Russia, was unconsciously playing into the hands of Gortschakoff. The Prussian nation was deeply agitated by the fierce contention of parties and the angry antagonism of king and parliament, at the same time that the French papers seemed eager to thrust a splendid destiny upon Prussia by loudly calling upon her to unify and thus save Germany. Bismarck seems to have quickly and skilfully availed himself of all the golden opportunities which, amid such confusion of interests, offered themselves for the aggrandizement of Prussia. Beyond all opposition in parliament and all antagonism in the king's closet, he seems to have seen some prospect of an immediate realization of those hopes which he had so long cherished with reference to the increase of Prussian influence and the ultimate humiliation of Austria. He probably felt that in his own powers lay many bright possibilities; and, acting with his usual decision and energy he commenced with a firm and skilled hand to steadily lay the foundations of Prussia's future power and greatness. The late Prussian plenipotentiary to the Federal Diet was not long in making himself dic-

tator of Europe; the keen diplomatist soon proved himself the master-statesman.

Events called into action the man from whose will so many events have sprung. In 1862, when every rumor indicated a close alliance between Russia, Prussia, and France, and every circumstance seemed to be calling upon Prussia for immediate and energetic action, William had need to call into his counsels a vigorous mind, and it did not long remain doubtful to whom the position of chief adviser belonged by right of statesmanlike genius. Bismarck's character and commanding talents rendered him a necessity to the king. In his new position, which proved to be the most responsible in Europe, he acted with a boldness and energy combined with foresight and prudence which have made him the most prominent figure in modern history. To sketch his career since 1862 would be to recapitulate the history of Europe for the last fifteen years and such a sketch cannot be attempted here. It will be our aim simply to delineate with all possible care his mental and moral character.

We can form no just conception of Bismarck's capacities as a statesman by comparing him with any of those great English statesmen to whom we have been wont to accord a large place in our notice and admiration, or with any of those honored men and able statesmen who brought our republic in safety and honor through the storms of her early existence. Neither those talents so necessary to the English statesman as a leader of Parliament nor those peculiar gifts always to be found in the guide of popular opinion and guard of popular institutions are necessary to the Prussian statesman. All the energies of the English or American statesman must be spent in governing great popular assemblies, in manipulating parties, in directing and controlling popular opinion. The Prussian statesman, on the other hand, must exert all his powers in rendering himself supreme in the royal closet; his power does not

depend upon popular assemblies whose favor he must win and whose support he must command, but rests entirely with his royal master; he is comparatively independent of party relations and ties. Besides great intellect, the English statesman must have eloquence and tact; in the Prussian statesman eloquence and tact are nothing unless accompanied by marked administrative and diplomatic talents and a controlling influence over the royal mind. The triumphs of the English statesman are gained upon the floor of parliament; those of the Prussian statesman are won in the cabinet of his King. The powers of the English statesman are apt to be dwarfed in being so constantly exercised for the acquirement of nothing more than skill in dialectic fence; intrigue is apt to bemean the powers and sully the character of the Prussian statesman. For all the officers of the Prussian ministry are directly responsible to the king alone, and the prime minister, exercising no direct supervision over them, must control his subordinates through the king, their common master. And, while many a triumph over external difficulties and opponents, many a master-stroke of policy, and many a victory in war have all combined to attest the pre-eminence of his genius, Bismarck's character is not altogether free from the stain which intrigue invariably brings. In his dealings with the diplomatic world or even with his royal master he has not always proved himself above deceit. But still he may justly be regarded as a grand type of his class of statesmen—men of independent conviction, full of self-trust, and themselves the spirit of their country's institutions. In Bismarck are united the moral force of Cromwell and the political shrewdness of Richelieu; the comprehensive intellect of Burke, without his learning, and the diplomatic ability of Talleyrand, without his coldness. In haughtiness, a rival of Chatham; in devotion to his country's interests, a peer of Hampden; in boldness of speech,

and action, an equal of Brougham, Bismarck's qualities are in most unique combination.

Though intensely German in all his tastes and peculiarities, Bismarck is by no means distinguished for those acquirements so much valued by Germans. In proficiency in purely literary fields he can stand no comparison with his friend and ally, Gortschakoff. But, while ranking with few of his many eminent contemporaries in literary power, he stands among them all without a peer in those powers of cool judgment, quick determination, and masterly execution which make up the statesman's character. But he is a Prussian and his talents are such as are usually met with in the chief officer of state in a virtually unlimited monarchy. All his faculties seem moulded for administration and legislation, for framing statutes, negotiating treaties and organizing armies. And the singleness of his aim has concentrated his powers. The extension and firm establishment of Prussian empire has all along been the cause for which and under whose inspiration he has accomplished by a few master-strokes such enterprises as would have been regarded as chimerical by a more timid or less commanding genius. In 1866 one short week saw the humiliation of Austria and the thwarting of France. The pleasing results of that stupendous week's work were the transformation of Prussia's former strategic weakness into actual strength by making her territory one compact mass and the consequent increase of Prussian influence in Europe. A campaign of almost unrivalled brilliancy and rapidity then brought proud France to the feet of Prussia, exposing the "misunderstood incapacity" of Napoleon and adding the smiling fields of Alsace and Lorraine to the already powerful kingdom; and the victor of Sedan ended his course of victory by placing an emperor's crown upon the brow of his King.

Ever since his contact with Austrian intrigue at Frankfort-on-the-Main caused the scales to fall from

his eyes, all Bismarck's public actions have been indicative of keenness of insight, clearness of judgment, and promptness of decision. As a member of the Federal Diet, he quickly and accurately divined the motives and aims of Austria and promptly and providently arrayed himself in direct opposition to them. He saw that more than ordinary influence was to belong to the clear-sighted man who then represented Russia in Frankfurt, and, with his keen eye on the future, successfully cultivated the friendship of the great Gortschakoff. He seems to have been the first to perceive the true weakness of Napoleon's character and the real emptiness of all his schemes for Italian unity and for the general good of mankind. His penetrating glance discovered the really feeble condition of Austria and detected the gullibility of Napoleon. He had learned many an useful lesson in the severe school of diplomacy in which he had studied. No tricks of policy, no subtleties of diplomacy could mislead one who gained his early experience among political tricksters and who is himself the keenest of diplomatists. His keenness of insight, begetting vivid conceptions of every position in all its bearings, has mapped out before him every possible line of action; his clearness of judgment has, with almost unerring accuracy, pointed out the one which might be most advantageously adopted.

Bismarck's vivid conceptive powers are naturally combined with an impulsiveness which, if not checked by judgment and restrained by circumstances, might betray him into rashness. But, being under the constant necessity of carefully thinking out every line of action and laboriously planning every mode of execution, in order that his measures may be acceptable to his royal master, every tendency to rashness has been counter-balanced and neutralized by the necessity for deliberation. And, though the great chancellor often chafes fiercely under the restraints thus imposed upon him, he, nevertheless, owes to this very restraint much of his

success. William has always yielded in more important matters to the genius of his great subject, but frequently only after long and severe struggles, which have greatly worn upon the chancellor at the same time that they have purged his schemes of every rash element. The King possesses more force of moral character and stubbornness of will than clearness of intellectual insight, and his favor, often so hard to win, is therefore essential even to the all-powerful Bismarck. Only an unconquerable energy and an indomitable will have prevented the premier from retiring from a position necessarily so harassing. Obstacles seem only to whet his activity and increase his power.

With unmeasured energy and surprising power of concentration are combined the firmness, the quickness of resolve, and the ability for prompt action so necessary to leaders. But Bismarck's firmness, while pointed with intrepidity, is disfigured by harshness. Nothing could be harsher than his means of removing from his path some antagonist or rival and he has often proved unscrupulous in the use of these means. But our condemnation of Bismarck's occasional bad faith should be surrounded by many qualifications and explanations. We can never justify the wilful disregard of justice or the wilful breaking of faith. But in a man who is conscious of great powers, whose mind is teeming and overflowing with great political plans and dreaming of grand national triumphs, and who, withal, is hampered on every side by almost every circumstance of his surroundings we can at least understand an occasional breach of honor, and, in the presence of so many grand and peerless qualities and so many noble purposes, can perhaps forgive a want of integrity which so seldom exhibits itself. And even when uprightness is wanting in his purposes or in his choice of means, its place is filled by uncommon wisdom in action.

Burke has somewhere spoken of what, in his usually happy manner, he has styled "retrospective wisdom and

historic patriotism"; of these the wisdom and patriotism of Bismarck are the direct opposites. His is the wisdom that penetrates and provides for the future; his is the patriotism that impels him to exhibit his love for his country in constant endeavors to secure for her permanent power and prosperity.

The history of modern times furnishes few examples of such minds as that of this now famous German. We can find on record few instances in which a comparatively small and virtually dependent kingdom has been raised in eight years to the proud place of a first-class power by the genius of a single man. Few indeed are the modern statesmen who have possessed even a small part of Bismarck's creative power backed and pointed by his insight and energy. The man who has of late modified and directed the whole course of European events; the man who was able to destroy the power of Austria, humble France, unify Germany, endow Prussia with immense and unwonted strength, and command the uniform support of Russia; the man who was bold enough to take all temporal power from the German Roman Catholic Church in the face of so many thousands of German Roman Catholics; the man who, by mere genius and force of character, has attained the proudest position in all Europe, will not soon be forgotten. Prussia will not soon find another Bismarck.

ATTICUS.

WILLIAM EARL CHATHAM

PRIZE ESSAY. SIGNED "THOMAS W. WILSON, '79, OF N. C." FROM THE "NASSAU LITERARY MAGAZINE," OCTOBER, 1878, VOL. XXXIV, NO. 3, PP. 99-105.

BENEATH Westminster Abbey's arched roof, with commanding mien, haughty features, and gesture of authority, stands the statue of Chatham. Visitors to the venerable old church may see in the hard lines of the cold marble the lifeless yet life-like reproduction of the striking form of the great statesman; but to all who have learned, in the pages of history, to comprehend the character and work of Chatham, this piece of stone must seem to fall very far short of bringing before their imaginations the real person of the great Commoner. A skillful sculptor might trace the lines of cunning policy and of secret scheming, the habitual air of authority upon the face of a Metternich, and we would recognize the man himself in his effigy; he might chisel the marks of cruel purpose, of uncurbed and defiant ambition, of pitiless despotism upon the spare visage of a Richelieu and we could wish for no better reminder of the man; he might preserve the deep-cut wrinkles that spoke of thought, the firmly-set mouth that indicated an inflexible determination, upon the open countenance of a Hampden; but the marble must have the warmth of life infused into it by the hand of God before it could resemble the dwelling of Chatham's high-wrought, passionate, many-sided nature.

It is indeed the diversity of his genius which first strikes us as we look back to the elder Pitt. In him consummate powers kept company with small weaknesses, strong wisdom stood side by side with weak

folly, truthfulness and earnestness were contrasted with affectation and pedantry. To the careless student of history Pitt's character, made up as it was of qualities the very opposites of each other, might at first seem to have been inconsistent with itself. But it was a character of great power, because in reality of singular unity. His many talents, his capacity for good, his capacity for evil, his wisdom, his folly, his strength, his weakness, apparently at war among themselves, were reconciled and brought into harmony by the concentrating power of strong convictions. Prior to a thoughtful investigation of the history of his times, however, there would seem to be some cause for surprise that such a man as Pitt should have risen to the head of the state when he did; for few men's tempers ever clashed more roughly with their surroundings, ever sympathized less with the tastes and tendencies of the day, than did the temper of the great Commoner. Indeed he harmonized with his age in nothing but in affectation, and even his affectation had an earnestness and a frankness about it which did not belong to the all-pervading affectation of the society around him. He was in everything enthusiastically earnest, and his age laughed at earnestness; he was vehement, and his age affected coldness and indifference; he was sternly virtuous, scorning corruption, and his age was skeptical of virtue, nursing corruption; he had eager, burning beliefs and was actuated by a warm love for principle, and his age delighted in doubtings and questionings, was guided by no principle save that of expediency; he was used constantly and confidently to appeal to the higher, brighter, purer instincts of human nature, and his age doubted the existence of any such instincts, nay, even argued from its own experience that all human nature was low and pulseless. He stood, in fact, almost alone—above the masses who, from sheer admiration, supported him, and in their enthusiasm idolized him; separated by all his tastes and sympathies

from those classes of society with which he was naturally thrown by virtue of his high public station.

That a man thus isolated from his fellows should wield undisputed power over them seems at first beyond explanation. But as we study his character more closely the mystery which hangs around his ability to exercise unquestioned authority over those who were entirely out of sympathy with him clears rapidly away. The elements of his power are not far to seek. They lay almost altogether within himself. Outwardly he was every inch a leader. Every attitude, every gesture, each play of feature, each tone of voice bore witness of a will that must be master. And men were speedily convinced of the depth and strength of the nature thus outwardly shadowed forth. They bowed to a will which itself bent to no obstacle; they feared, even while they sneered at, the personal purity which gave such a keen edge to his attacks upon corrupt opponents. Their hearts instinctively warmed toward a man whose patriotism was so real. Selfish policies fell beneath the onsets of a man whose great intellect gave such resistless force to the convictions he so boldly avowed.

Pitt's nature was so passionate as to be almost tragic, rendering his career an essentially dramatic one. Passion indeed was the ground-work of his character; and because, led on by ardor, he trod steadily onward toward the ends he had marked out for himself, the name of Chatham has become to Englishmen a synonym of the highest statesmanship. And certainly, if we conceive of statesmanship as being that resolute and vigorous advance towards the realization of high, definite, and consistent aims which issues from the unreserved devotion of a strong intellect to the service of the state and to the solution of all the multiform problems of public policy, Pitt's statesmanship was of the highest order. His devotion to his country's service was as intense as it was entire; and the intellect whose every power he brought to bear upon the direction of her af-

fairs compassed its duty with a vigor commensurate with its colossal proportions. To enquire why Pitt so completely identified himself with the fortunes of England would be an invidious task. The motives which prompt to great deeds are often as hidden as the deeds themselves are conspicuous. Pitt's self-love was boundless, and small men can, therefore, see nothing in his high aims but an inordinate desire to gratify ambition, to exalt self. But to those who believe that there is some nobility in human nature, and especially to those who can see how small a part of his real character Pitt's egotism constituted, his ardent, absorbing patriotism is sufficient cause for the belief that there was much of true disinterestedness in his great career.

Each quality of Pitt's mind bespoke the ardor of his nature. Even his affectation and his pedantry, like his love and determination and pride, had caught the hue of passion. It was impossible for such a man to espouse any cause with coldness. With him every act must be an act of warm enthusiasm. His mind was strong and clear, his will was unswerving, his convictions were uncompromising, his imagination was powerful enough to invest all plans of national policy with a poetic charm, his confidence in himself was implicit, his love for his country was real and intense. Of course, then, he entered into the realities of public life with all the vigor of a large and earnest soul, with all the keen interest imparted by a vivid imagination, and it is not strange that his policy was well-defined and determined, straightforward and brilliant. The startling, far-reaching results of his administration, moulding the future history of the world, were such as appealed to the admiration and won the approbation of a people the very marrow of whose nature is a spirit of adventure, enterprise, conquest. What could be more impressive than a policy which, in winning India for the English Crown, built a great empire in the far East; in driving the French from America, made our great republic a possibility in

the far West; and, in lending constant and effective aid to Prussia's great Frederick, prepared the destiny of her greater Bismarck? Such having been the work of the elder Pitt, Englishmen may justly regard him as high among the greatest statesmen of a great race. And yet his errors were many and grave. They were, however, such as are incident upon a policy whose authors seek, with whole-souled ardor, with keen enthusiasm, to carry out great principles in all their integrity. Such a policy is always admirable in the abstract, but, in practice, is seldom safe. In a free government, founded upon public opinion, the governmental machinery is so nicely balanced, opposite parties, opposing forces of thought, generally exercise powers so nearly equal, that great principles must be worked out cautiously, step by step, seldom attaining triumphant ascendancy by a course of uninterrupted success—by only a few bold and rapid strokes. Public opinion must not be outstripped, but kept pace with. Time, indeed, has traced out to their end all the greater lines of policy which in their beginnings bore indications of the strokes of Pitt's decided hand. But he had lain in his grave many years before some of the most prominent measures which he had advocated were carried out in their fullness; and during his lifetime, while he was still a power in the state, even his towering influence fell powerless when he sought to force his country to follow the paths of foreign policy which he had cleared for her, and which he had shown to be the only roads to honor and safety. The enormous strain which war had brought upon the Treasury was thought to be cause for serious alarm, and the reaction thus brought about, seconded by the sinister influence of an unscrupulous king, thrust a ruinous peace upon the country. Pitt left the Cabinet to be re-stricken by the disease which finally sapped the strength of his imperial intellect. His life drew rapidly toward its close; but he had done enough to set a seal to his fame—enough to mark *that* as the highest type

of statesmanship which, with conscientious purity, by an undeviating course, with cool judgment and prompt determination, with a bright hope and a passionate patriotism, overpowering opposition, subordinating party to national interests, constantly and confidently seeks to build a great policy upon broad, deep, homogeneous principles. Such, with all its small follies and minor inconsistencies, despite disfiguring arrogance and overbearing pride, was the statesmanship of William Pitt.

If, because his statesmanship was whole-souled and dazzlingly successful, we do not wonder that William Pitt has been considered worthy of a place among the very first of English statesmen, still less can we be surprised that he has been called the first of Parliamentary orators. If the passionate intensity which entered so largely into the texture of his character lent so much of force, so much brilliant boldness, to his plans of administration, what masterly power must it have imparted to his oratory! Passion is the pith of eloquence. But it alone cannot make the consummate orator; for while it gives strength, it may be rugged and cumbersome. Imagination must be present to give it wings and a graceful flight. And one of the most striking features of Pitt's mind was "a poetic imaginativeness" which set his words fairly aglow with beauty. While vivid passion blazed out in his orations, the reality of the convictions he so fearlessly uttered hid the exaggeration of his diction, transfiguring all that was bombastic and ungraceful, and clothing with real grace his theatrical airs. Unfortunately our only trustworthy information concerning his oratorical powers comes from meagre tradition. Those who had seen his noble figure in striking action, his eagle eye alight with the thoughts that stirred within him, have left us only some scanty outlines of his more brilliant thoughts and most memorable flights of rhetoric. The main bodies of all his great speeches, these thoughts which constituted the warp and woof of his masterly statements of political truths and his moving

appeals in behalf of a broad, patriotic, and consistent state policy, are irretrievably lost to us. But, aside from the unanimous testimony of his contemporaries, the fragmentary utterances which we know to have fallen from his own lips bear ample witness to his unrivalled powers, being laden, even for us, with much of their old potency. Even upon the printed page, the echo of his impassioned accents seems yet to linger about his words. Although in his youthful studies of Demosthenes he had failed to catch the great Athenian's purity of style, he recognized, as the movings of a kindred spirit, his burning vehemence. Athens had at times responded as one man to the rapid, vehement, cogent sentences of Demosthenes; the British Parliament, the English nation, harkened with glad eagerness to the organ tones of Pitt's eloquence, and dared not disobey.

William Pitt was the second of that long line of great commoners of which gifted, wise, unscrupulous Robert Walpole was the first, and which has moulded English policy down to the day of shrewd, fickle, brilliant, plausible Benjamin Disraeli. In one respect Pitt resembled the now exalted Jew: he had an unhesitating, almost boundless confidence in himself, in the wisdom of his own aims. But Beaconsfield loves and has confidence in himself alone; Pitt loved and trusted the English people as well—for he was himself an Englishman!

With Pitt's acceptance of an earldom not only his official power but also much of his innate greatness passed away. Disease had unmanned him, and he refused to aid his country at a time of sorest need, thus, in a moment of folly, well nigh undoing the great work of a memorable lifetime. William Pitt was a noble statesman; the Earl of Chatham was a noble ruin. But in his death we catch a faint glimmer of his old manhood. Under the deepening shadow of a gathering storm we obtain a last glimpse of Chatham, as he stands, himself a wreck, holding up before a blind Min-

istry a picture of the dark ruin which was awaiting them. With some of his old haughtiness the austere old man rises to answer one who had dared to reply to him, and falls, never to rise again.

CABINET GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

WRITTEN WHILE WILSON WAS A SENIOR AT PRINCETON AND PUBLISHED IN THE "INTERNATIONAL REVIEW," AUGUST, 1879, VOL. VI, PP. 46-163. IT IS A CURIOUS FACT, RECALLED DURING THE LATER YEARS OF WILSON'S LIFE, THAT HENRY CABOT LODGE WAS EDITOR OF THE "INTERNATIONAL REVIEW" AND THUS BECAME THE PUBLISHER OF THE FUTURE PRESIDENT'S FIRST ARTICLE.

OUR patriotism seems of late to have been exchanging its wonted tone of confident hope for one of desponding solicitude. Anxiety about the future of our institutions seems to be daily becoming stronger in the minds of thoughtful Americans. A feeling of uneasiness is undoubtedly prevalent, sometimes taking the shape of a fear that grave, perhaps radical, defects in our mode of government are militating against our liberty and prosperity. A marked and alarming decline in statesmanship, a rule of levity and folly instead of wisdom and sober forethought in legislation, threaten to shake our trust not only in the men by whom our national policy is controlled, but also in the very principles upon which our Government rests. Both State and National legislatures are looked upon with nervous suspicion, and we hail an adjournment of Congress as a temporary immunity from danger. In casting about for the chief cause of the admitted evil, many persons have convinced themselves that it is to be found in the principle of universal suffrage. When Dr. Woolsey, in his admirable work on Political Science, speaks with despondency of the influence of this principle upon our

political life, he simply gives clear expression to misgivings which he shares with a growing minority of his countrymen. We must, it is said, purge the constituencies of their ignorant elements, if we would have high-minded, able, worthy representatives. We see adventurers, who in times of revolution and confusion were suffered to climb to high and responsible places, still holding positions of trust; we perceive that our institutions, when once thrown out of gear, seem to possess no power of self-readjustment,—and we hasten to cast discredit upon that principle the establishment of which has been regarded as America's greatest claim to political honor,—the right of every man to a voice in the Government under which he lives. The existence of such sentiments is in itself an instructive fact. But while it is indisputably true that universal suffrage is a constant element of weakness, and exposes us to many dangers which we might otherwise escape, its operation does not suffice alone to explain existing evils. Those who make this the scapegoat of all our national grievances have made too superficial an analysis of the abuses about which they so loudly complain.

What is the real cause of this solicitude and doubt? It is, in our opinion, to be found in the absorption of all power by a legislature which is practically irresponsible for its acts. But even this would not necessarily be harmful, were it not for the addition of a despotic principle which it is my present purpose to consider.

At its highest development, *representative* government is that form which best enables a free people to govern themselves. The main object of a representative assembly, therefore, should be the discussion of public business. They should legislate as if in the presence of the whole country, because they come under the closest scrutiny and fullest criticism of all the representatives of the country speaking in open and free debate. Only in such an assembly, only in such an atmosphere of publicity, only by means of such a vast

investigating machine, can the different sections of a great country learn each other's feelings and interests. It is not enough that the general course of legislation is known to all. Unless during its progress it is subjected to a thorough, even a tediously prolonged, process of public sifting, to the free comment of friend and foe alike, to the ordeal of battle among those upon whose vote its fate depends, an act of open legislation may have its real intent and scope completely concealed by its friends and undiscovered by its enemies, and it may be as fatally mischievous as the darkest measures of an oligarchy or a despot. Nothing can be more obvious than the fact that the very life of free, popular institutions is dependent upon their breathing the bracing air of thorough, exhaustive, and open discussions, or that select Congressional committees, whose proceedings must from their very nature be secret, are, as means of legislation, dangerous and unwholesome. Parliaments are forces for freedom; for "talk is persuasion, persuasion is force, the one force which can sway freemen to deeds such as those which have made England what she is," or our English stock what it is.

Congress is a deliberative body in which there is little real deliberation; a legislature which legislates with no real discussion of its business. Our Government is practically carried on by irresponsible committees. Too few Americans take the trouble to inform themselves as to the methods of Congressional management; and, as a consequence, not many have perceived that almost *absolute* power has fallen into the hands of men whose irresponsibility prevents the regulation of their conduct by the people from whom they derive their authority. The most important, most powerful man in the government of the United States in time of peace is the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Instead of being merely an executive officer, whose principal duties are those immediately connected with the administration of the rules of order, he is a potent party chief, the only chief

of any real potency,—and must of necessity be so. He must be the strongest and shrewdest member of his party in the lower House; for almost all the real business of that House is transacted by committees whose members are his nominees. Unless the rules of the House be suspended by a special two-thirds vote, every bill introduced must be referred, without debate, to the proper Standing Committee, with whom rests the privilege of embodying it, or any part of it, in their reports, or of rejecting it altogether. The House very seldom takes any direct action upon any measures introduced by individual members; its votes and discussions are almost entirely confined to committee reports and committee dictation. The whole attitude of business depends upon forty-seven Standing Committees. Even the discussions upon their directive reports are merely nominal,—liberal forms, at most. Take, as an example of the workings of the system, the functions and privileges of the Committee of Ways and Means. To it is intrusted the financial policy of the country; its chairman is, in reality, our Chancellor of the Exchequer. With the aid of his colleagues he determines the course of legislation upon finance; in English political phrase, he draws up the *budget*. All the momentous questions connected with our finance are debated in the private sessions of this committee, and there only. For, when the budget is submitted to the House for its consideration, only a very limited time is allowed for its discussion; and, besides the member of the committee to whom its introduction is intrusted, no one is permitted to speak save those to whom he through courtesy yields the floor, and who must have made arrangements beforehand with the Speaker to be recognized. Where, then, is there room for thorough discussion,—for discussion of any kind? If carried, the provisions of the budget must be put into operation by the Secretary of the Treasury, who may be directly opposed to the principles which it embodies. If lost, no one save Con-

gress itself is responsible for the consequent embarrassment into which the nation is brought,—and Congress as a body is not readily punishable.

It must at once be evident to every thinking man that a policy thus regulated cannot be other than vacillating, uncertain, devoid of plan or consistency. This is certainly a phase of representative government peculiar to ourselves. And yet its development was most natural and apparently necessary. It is hardly possible for a body of several hundred men, without official or authoritative leaders, to determine upon any line of action without interminable wrangling and delays injurious to the interests under their care. Left to their own resources, they would be as helpless as any other mass meeting. Without leaders having authority to guide their deliberations and give a definite direction to the movement of legislation; and, moreover, with none of that sense of responsibility which constantly rests upon those whose duty it is to work out to a successful issue the policies which they themselves originate, yet with full power to dictate policies which others must carry into execution,—a recognition of the need of some sort of leadership, and of a division of labor, led to the formation of these Standing Committees, to which are intrusted the shaping of the national policy in the several departments of administration, as well as the prerogatives of the initiative in legislation and leadership in debate. When theoretically viewed, this is an ingenious and apparently harmless device, but one which, in practice, subverts that most fundamental of all the principles of a free State,—the right of the people to a potential voice in their own government. Great measures of legislation are discussed and determined, not conspicuously in public session of the people's representatives, but in the unapproachable privacy of committee rooms.

But what less imperfect means of representative government can we find without stepping beyond the bounds

of a true republicanism? Certainly none other than those which were rejected by the Constitutional Convention. When the Convention of 1787, upon the submission of the report of the Committee of Detail, came to consider the respective duties and privileges of the legislative and executive departments, and the relations which these two branches of the Government should sustain towards each other, many serious questions presented themselves for solution. One of the gravest of these was, whether or not the interests of the public service would be furthered by *allowing some of the higher officers of State to occupy seats in the legislature*. The propriety and practical advantage of such a course were obviously suggested by a similar arrangement under the British Constitution, to which our political fathers often and wisely looked for useful hints. But since the spheres of the several departments were in the end defined with all the clearness, strictness, and care possible to a written instrument, the opinion prevailed among the members of the Convention that it would be unadvisable to establish any such connection between the Executive and Congress. They thought, in their own fervor of patriotism and intensity of respect for written law, that paper barriers would prove sufficient to prevent the encroachments of any one department upon the prerogatives of any other; that these vaguely broad laws—or principles of law—would be capable of securing and maintaining the harmonious and mutually helpful co-operation of the several branches; that the exhibition of these general views of government would be adequate to the stupendous task of preventing the legislature from rising to the predominance of influence, which, nevertheless, constantly lay within its reach. But, in spite of constitutional barriers, the legislature has become the imperial power of the State, as it must of necessity become under every representative system; and experience of the consequences of a complete separation of the legislative and

executive branches long since led that able and sagacious commentator upon the Constitution, Chief-Justice Story, to remark that, "if it would not have been safe to trust the heads of departments, as representatives, to the choice of the people, as their constituents, it would have been at least some gain to have allowed them seats, like territorial delegates, in the House of Representatives, where they might freely debate without a title to vote." In short, the framers of the Constitution, in endeavoring to act in accordance with the principle of Montesquieu's celebrated and unquestionably just political maxim,—that the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a free State should be *separate*,—made their separation so complete as to amount to *isolation*. To the methods of representative government which have sprung from these provisions of the Constitution, by which the Convention thought so carefully to guard and limit the powers of the legislature, we must look for an explanation, in a large measure, of the evils over which we now find ourselves lamenting.

What, then, is Cabinet government? What is the change proposed? Simply to give to the heads of the Executive departments—the members of the Cabinet—seats in Congress, with the privilege of the initiative in legislation and some part of the unbounded privileges now commanded by the Standing Committees. But the advocates of such a change—and they are now not a few—deceive themselves when they maintain that it would not necessarily involve the principle of ministerial responsibility,—that is, the resignation of the Cabinet upon the defeat of any important part of their plans. For, if Cabinet officers sit in Congress as official representatives of the Executive, this principle of responsibility must of necessity come sooner or later to be recognized. Experience would soon demonstrate the practical impossibility of their holding their seats, and continuing to represent the Administration, after

they had found themselves unable to gain the consent of a majority to their policy. Their functions would be peculiar. They would constitute a link between the legislative and executive branches of the general Government, and, as representatives of the Executive, must hold the right of the initiative in legislation. Otherwise their position would be an anomalous one indeed. There would be little danger and evident propriety in extending to them the first right of introducing measures relative to the administration of the several departments; and they could possess such a right without denying the fullest privileges to other members. But, whether granted this initiative or not, the head of each department would undoubtedly find it necessary to take a decided and open stand for or against every measure bearing upon the affairs of his department, by whomsoever introduced. No high-spirited man would long remain in an office in the business of which he was not permitted to pursue a policy which tallied with his own principles and convictions. If defeated by both Houses, he would naturally resign; and not many years would pass before resignation upon defeat would have become an established precedent,—and resignation upon defeat is the essence of responsible government. In arguing, therefore, for the admission of Cabinet officers into the legislature, we are logically brought to favor *responsible Cabinet government* in the United States.

But, to give to the President the right to choose whomsoever he pleases as his constitutional advisers, after having constituted Cabinet officers *ex officio* members of Congress, would be to empower him to appoint a limited number of representatives, and would thus be plainly at variance with republican principles. The highest order of responsible government could, then, be established in the United States only by laying upon the President the necessity of selecting his Cabinet from among the number of representatives already chosen by the people, or by the legislatures of the States.

Such a change in our legislative system would not be so radical as it might at first appear: it would certainly be very far from revolutionary. Under our present system we suffer all the inconveniences, are hampered by all that is defective in the machinery, of responsible government, without securing any of the many benefits which would follow upon its complete establishment. Cabinet officers are now appointed only with the consent of the Senate. Such powers as a Cabinet with responsible leadership must possess are now divided among the forty-seven Standing Committees, whose prerogatives of irresponsible leadership savor of despotism, because exercised for the most part within the secret precincts of a committee room, and not under the eyes of the whole House, and thus of the whole country. These committees, too, as has been said, rule without any of that freedom of public debate which is essential to the liberties of the people. Their measures are too often mere partisan measures, and are hurried through the forms of voting by a party majority whose interest it is that all serious opposition, all debate that might develop obstructive antagonism, should be suppressed. Under the conditions of Cabinet government, however, full and free debates are sure to take place. For what are these conditions? According as their policy stands or falls, the ministers themselves stand or fall; to the party which supports them each discussion involves a trial of strength with their opponents; upon it depends the amount of their success as a party; while to the opposition the triumph of ministerial plans means still further exclusion from office, their overthrow, accession to power. To each member of the assembly every debate offers an opportunity for placing himself, by able argument, in a position to command a place in any future Cabinet that may be formed from the ranks of his own party; each speech goes to the building up (or the tearing down) of his political fortunes. There is, therefore, an absolute certainty that

every phase of every subject will be drawn carefully and vigorously, will be dwelt upon with minuteness, will be viewed from every possible standpoint. The legislative, holding full power of final decision, would find itself in immediate contact with the executive and its policy. Nor would there be room for factious government or factious opposition. Plainly, ministers must found their policies, an opposition must found its attacks, upon well-considered principles; for in this open sifting of debate, when every feature of every measure, even to the motives which prompted it, is the subject of outspoken discussion and keen scrutiny, no chicanery, no party craft, no questionable principles can long hide themselves. Party trickery, legislative jobbery, are deprived of the very air they breathe,—the air of secrecy, of concealment. The public is still surprised whenever they find that dishonest legislation has been allowed to pass unchallenged. Why surprised? As things are, measures are determined in the interests of corporations, and the suffering people know almost nothing of them until their evil tendencies crop out in actual execution. Under lobby pressure from interested parties, they have been cunningly concocted in the closest sessions of partisan committees, and, by the all-powerful aid of party machinery, have been hurried through the stages of legislation without debate; so that even Press correspondents are often as ignorant of the real nature of such special measures as the outside public. Any searching debate of such questions would at once have brought the public eye upon them, and how could they then have stood? Lifting the lid of concealment must have been the discovery to all concerned of their unsavory character. Light would have killed them.

We are thus again brought into the presence of the cardinal fact of this discussion,—that *debate* is the essential function of a popular representative body. In the severe, distinct, and sharp enunciation of underlying principles, the unsparing examination and telling criti-

cism of opposite positions, the careful, painstaking unravelling of all the issues involved, which are incident to the free discussion of questions of public policy we see the best, the only effective, means of educating public opinion. Can any one suppose for one moment that, in the late heated and confused discussions of the Bland silver bill, the Western papers would have had any color of justification in claiming that the Resumption Act of 1875 was passed secretly and without the knowledge of the people, if we had then had responsible government? Although this all-important matter was before the country for more than a year; was considered by two Congresses, recommended by more than one Congressional committee; was printed and circulated for the perusal of the people; was much spoken of, though little understood by the Press at the time,—the general mass of our population knew little or nothing about it, for it elicited almost no statesmanlike comment upon the floor of Congress, was exposed to none of the analysis of earnest debate. What, however, would have been its history under a well-ordered Cabinet government? It would have been introduced—if introduced at all—to the House by the Secretary of the Treasury as a part of the financial policy of the Administration, supported by the authority and sanction of the entire Cabinet. At once it would have been critically scanned by the leaders of the opposition; at each reading of the bill, and especially in Committee of the Whole, its weak points would have been mercilessly assailed, and its strong features urged in defence; attacks upon its principle by the opposition would have been met by an unequivocal avowal of "soft money" principles from the majority; and, defended by men anxious to win honors in support of the ministry, it would have been dissected by all those who were at issue with the financial doctrines of the majority, discussed and re-discussed until all its essential, all its accidental features, and all its remotest tendencies had been dinned into the

public ear, so that no man in the nation could have pretended ignorance of its meaning and object. The educational influence of such discussions is two-fold, and operates in two directions,—upon the members of the legislature themselves, and upon the people whom they represent. Thus do the merits of the two systems—Committee government and government by a responsible Cabinet—hinge upon this matter of a full and free discussion of all subjects of legislation; upon the principle stated by Mr. Bagehot, that “free government is self-government,—a government of the people by the people.” It is perhaps safe to say, that the Government which secures the most thorough discussions of public interests,—whose administration most nearly conforms to the opinions of the governed,—is the freest and the best. And certainly, when judged by this principle, government by irresponsible Standing Committees can bear no comparison with government by means of a responsible ministry; for, as we have seen,—and as others besides Senator Hoar have shown,—its essential feature is a vicious suppression of debate.

Only a single glance is necessary to discover how utterly Committee government must fail to give effect to public opinion. In the first place, the exclusion of debate prevents the intelligent formation of opinion on the part of the nation at large; in the second place, public opinion, when once formed, finds it impossible to exercise any immediate control over the action of its representatives. There is no one in Congress to speak for the nation. Congress is a conglomeration of inharmonious elements; a collection of men representing each his neighborhood, each his local interest; an alarmingly large proportion of its legislation is “special”; all of it is at best only a limping compromise between the conflicting interests of the innumerable localities represented. There is no guiding or harmonizing power. Are the people in favor of a particular policy,—what means have they of forcing it upon the sovereign

legislature at Washington? None but the most imperfect. If they return representatives who favor it (and this is the most they can do), these representatives being under no directing power will find a mutual agreement impracticable among so many, and will finally settle upon some policy which satisfies nobody, removes no difficulty, and makes little definite or valuable provision for the future. They must, indeed, be content with whatever measure the appropriate committee chances to introduce. Responsible ministries, on the other hand, form the policy of their parties; the strength of their party is at their command; the course of legislation turns upon the acceptance or rejection by the Houses of definite and consistent plans upon which they determine. In forming its judgment of their policy, the nation knows whereof it is judging; and, with biennial Congresses, it may soon decide whether any given policy shall stand or fall. The question would then no longer be, What representatives shall we choose to represent our chances in this haphazard game of legislation? but, What plans of national administration shall we sanction? Would not party programmes mean something then? Could they be constructed only to deceive and bewilder?

But, above and beyond all this, a responsible Cabinet constitutes a link between the executive and legislative departments of the Government which experience declares in the clearest tones to be absolutely necessary in a well-regulated, well-proportioned body politic. None can so well judge of the perfections or imperfections of a law as those who have to administer it. Look, for example, at the important matter of taxation. The only legitimate object of taxation is the support of Government; and who can so well determine the requisite revenue as those who conduct the Government? Who can so well choose feasible means of taxation, available sources of revenue, as those who have to meet the practical difficulties of tax-collection? And what surer guar-

antee against exorbitant estimates and unwise taxation than the necessity of full explanation and defence before the whole House? The same principles, of course, apply to all legislation upon matters connected with any of the Executive departments.

Thus, then, not only can Cabinet ministers meet the needs of their departments more adequately and understandingly, and conduct their administration better than can irresponsible committees, but they are also less liable to misuse their powers. Responsible ministers must secure from the House and Senate an intelligent, thorough, and practical treatment of their affairs; must vindicate their principles in open battle on the floor of Congress. The public is thus enabled to exercise a direct scrutiny over the workings of the Executive departments, to keep all their operations under a constant stream of daylight. Ministers could do nothing under the shadow of darkness; committees do all in the dark. It can easily be seen how constantly ministers would be plied with questions about the conduct of public affairs, and how necessary it would be for them to satisfy their questioners if they did not wish to fall under suspicion, distrust, and obloquy.

But, while the people would thus be able to defend themselves through their representatives against malfeasance or inefficiency in the management of their business, the heads of the departments would also have every opportunity to defend their administration of the people's affairs against unjust censure or crippling legislation. Corruption in office would court concealment in vain; vicious trifling with the administration of public business by irresponsible persons would meet with a steady and effective check. The ground would be clear for a manly and candid defence of ministerial methods; wild schemes of legislation would meet with a cold repulse from ministerial authority. The salutary effect of such a change would most conspicuously appear in the increased effectiveness of our now crumbling civil, mili-

tary, and naval services; for we should no longer be cursed with tardy, insufficient, and misapplied appropriations. The ministers of War, of the Navy, of the Interior, would be able to submit their estimates in person, and to procure speedy and regular appropriations; and half the abuses at present connected with appropriative legislation would necessarily disappear with the present committee system. Appropriations now, though often inadequate, are much oftener wasteful and fraudulent. Under responsible government, every appropriation asked by an Executive chief, as well as the reasons by which he backed his request, would be subjected to the same merciless sifting processes of debate as would characterize the consideration of other questions. Always having their responsible agents thus before them, the people would at once know how much they were spending, and for what it was spent.

When we come to speak of the probable influence of responsible Cabinet government upon the development of statesmanship and the renewal of the now perishing growth of statesmanlike qualities, we come upon a vital interest of the whole question. Will it bring with it worthy successors of Hamilton and Webster? Will it replace a leadership of trickery and cunning device by one of ability and moral strength? If it will not, why advocate it? If it will, how gladly and eagerly and imperatively ought we to demand it! The most despotic of Governments under the control of wise statesmen is preferable to the freest ruled by demagogues. Now, there are few more common, and perhaps few more reasonable, beliefs than that at all times, among the millions of population who constitute the body of this great nation, there is here and there to be found a man with all the genius, all the deep and strong patriotism, all the moral vigor, and all the ripeness of knowledge and variety of acquisition which gave power and lasting fame to the greater statesmen of our past history. We bewail and even wonder at the fact that

these men do not find their way into public life, to claim power and leadership in the service of their country. We naturally ascribe their absence to the repugnance which superior minds must feel for the intrigues, the glaring publicity, and the air of unscrupulousness and even dishonesty which are the characteristics, or at least the environments, of political life. In our disappointment and vexation that they do not, even at the most distressing sacrifice of their personal convenience and peace, devote themselves to the study and practice of statecraft, we turn for comfort to reread history's lesson,—that many countries find their greatest statesmen in times of extraordinary crisis or rapid transition and progress; the intervals of slow growth and uninteresting everyday administration of the government being noted only for the elevation of mediocrity, or at most of shrewd cunning, to high administrative places. We take cold consolation from the hope that times of peril—which sometimes seem close enough at hand—will not find us without strong leaders worthy of the most implicit confidence. Thus we are enabled to arrive at the comfortable and fear-quieting conclusion that it is from no fault of ours, certainly from no defects in our forms of government, that we are ruled by scheming, incompetent, political tradesmen, whose aims and ambitions are merely personal, instead of by broad-minded, masterful statesmen, whose sympathies and purposes are patriotic and national.

To supply the conditions of statesmanship is, we conclude, beyond our power; for the causes of its decline and the means necessary to its development are beyond our ken. Let us take a new departure. Let us, drawing light from every source within the range of our knowledge, make a little independent analysis of the conditions of statesmanship, with a view to ascertaining whether or not it is in reality true that we cannot contribute to its development, or even perchance give it a perennial growth among us. We learn from a critical

survey of the past, that, so far as political affairs are concerned, great critical epochs are the man-making epochs of history, that revolutionary influences are man-making influences. And why? If this be the law, it must have some adequate reason underlying it; and we seem to find the reason a very plain and conspicuous one. Crises give birth and a new growth to statesmanship because they are peculiarly periods of action, in which talents find the widest and the freest scope. They are periods not only of action, but also of unusual opportunity for gaining leadership and a controlling and guiding influence. It is opportunity for transcendent influence, therefore, which calls into active public life a nation's greater minds,—minds which might otherwise remain absorbed in the smaller affairs of private life. And we thus come upon the principle,—a principle which will appear the more incontrovertible the more it is looked into and tested,—that governmental forms will call to the work of administration able minds and strong hearts constantly or infrequently, according as they do or do not afford them at all times an opportunity of gaining and retaining a commanding authority and an undisputed leadership in the nation's councils. Now it certainly needs no argument to prove that government by supreme committees, whose members are appointed at the caprice of an irresponsible party chief, by seniority, because of reputation gained in entirely different fields, or because of partisan shrewdness, is not favorable to a full and strong development of statesmanship. Certain it is that statesmanship has been steadily dying out in the United States since that stupendous crisis during which its government felt the first throbs of life. In the government of the United States there is no place found for the leadership of men of real ability. Why, then, complain that we have no leaders? The President can seldom make himself recognized as a leader; he is merely the executor of the sovereign legislative will; his Cabinet officers are little more

than chief clerks, or superintendents, in the Executive departments, who advise the President as to matters in most of which he has no power of action independently of the concurrence of the Senate. The most ambitious representative can rise no higher than the chairmanship of the Committee of Ways and Means, or the Speakership of the House. The cardinal feature of Cabinet government, on the other hand, is responsible leadership,—the leadership and authority of a small body of men who have won the foremost places in their party by a display of administrative talents, by evidence of high ability upon the floor of Congress in the stormy play of debate. None but the ablest can become leaders and masters in this keen tournament in which arguments are the weapons, and the people the judges. Clearly defined, definitely directed policies arouse bold and concerted opposition; and leaders of oppositions become in time leaders of Cabinets. Such a recognized leadership it is that is necessary to the development of statesmanship under popular, republican institutions; for only such leadership can make politics seem worthy of cultivation to men of high mind and aim.

And if party success in Congress—the ruling body of the nation—depends upon power in debate, skill and prescience in policy, successful defence of or attacks upon ruling ministries, how ill can contending parties spare their men of ability from Congress! To keep men of the strongest mental and moral fibre in Congress would become a party necessity. Party triumph would then be a matter of might in debate, not of supremacy in subterfuge. The two great national parties—and upon the existence of two great parties, with clashings and mutual jealousies and watchings, depends the health of free political institutions—are dying for want of unifying and vitalizing principles. Without leaders, they are also without policies, without aims. With leaders there must be followers, there must be parties. And with leaders whose leadership was earned

in an open war of principle against principle, by the triumph of one opinion over all opposing opinions, parties must from the necessities of the case have definite policies. Platforms, then, must mean something. Broken promises will then end in broken power. A Cabinet without a policy that is finding effect in progressive legislation is, in a country of frequent elections, inviting its own defeat. Or is there, on the other hand, a determined, aggressive opposition? Then the ministry have a right to ask them what they would do under similar circumstances, were the reins of government to fall to them. And if the opposition are then silent, they cannot reasonably expect the country to intrust the government to them. Witness the situation of the Liberal party in England during the late serious crisis in Eastern affairs. Not daring to propose any policy,—having indeed, because of the disintegration of the party, no policy to propose,—their numerical weakness became a moral weakness, and the nation's ear was turned away from them. Eight words contain the sum of the present degradation of our political parties: *No leaders, no principles; no principles, no parties.* Congressional leadership is divided infinitesimally; and with divided leadership there can be no great party units. Drill in debate, by giving scope to talents, invites talents; raises up a race of men habituated to the methods of public business, skilled parliamentary chiefs. And, more than this, it creates a much-to-be-desired class who early make attendance upon public affairs the business of their lives, devoting to the service of their country all their better years. Surely the management of a nation's business will, in a well-ordered society, be as properly a matter of life-long training as the conduct of private affairs.

These are but meagre and insufficient outlines of some of the results which would follow upon the establishment of responsible Cabinet government in the United States. Its establishment has not wanted more

or less outspoken advocacy from others; nor, of course, have there been lacking those who are ready to urge real or imaginary objections against it, and proclaim it an exotic unfit to thrive in American soil. It has certainly, in common with all other political systems, grave difficulties and real evils connected with it. Difficulties and evils are inseparable from every human scheme of government; and, in making their choice, a people can do no more than adopt that form which affords the largest measure of real liberty, whose machinery is least imperfect, and which is most susceptible to the control of their sovereign will.

Few, however, have discovered the real defects of such a responsible government as that which I now advocate. It is said, for instance, that it would render the President a mere figurehead, with none of that stability of official tenure, or that traditional dignity, which is necessary to such figureheads. Would the President's power be curtailed, then, if his Cabinet ministers simply took the place of the Standing Committees? Would it not rather be enlarged? He would then be in fact, and not merely in name, the head of the Government. Without the consent of the Senate, he now exercises no sovereign functions that would be taken from him by a responsible Cabinet.

The apparently necessary existence of a partisan Executive presents itself to many as a fatal objection to the establishment of the forms of responsible Cabinet government in this country. The President must continue to represent a political party, and must continue to be anxious to surround himself with Cabinet officers who shall always substantially agree with him on all political questions. It must be admitted that the introduction of the principle of ministerial responsibility might, on this account, become at times productive of mischief unless the tenure of the presidential office were made more permanent than it now is. Whether or not the presidential term should, under such a change of

conditions, be lengthened would be one of several practical questions which would attend the adoption of a system of this sort. But it must be remembered that such a state of things as now exists, when we find the Executive to be of one party and the majority of Congress to be of the opposite party, is the exception, by no means the rule. Moreover we must constantly keep before our minds the fact that the choice now lies between this responsible Cabinet government and the rule of irresponsible committees which actually exists. It is not hard to believe that most presidents would find no greater inconvenience, experience no greater unpleasantness, in being at the head of a Cabinet composed of political opponents than in presiding, as they must now occasionally do, over a Cabinet of political friends who are compelled to act in all matters of importance according to the dictation of Standing Committees which are ruled by the opposite party. In the former case, the President may, by the exercise of whatever personal influence he possesses, affect the action of the Cabinet, and, through them, the action of the Houses; in the latter he is absolutely helpless. Even now it might prove practically impossible for a President to gain from a hostile majority in the Senate a confirmation of his appointment of a strongly partisan Cabinet drawn from his own party. The President must now moreover, acting through his Cabinet, simply do the bidding of the committees in directing the business of the departments. With a responsible Cabinet—even though that Cabinet were of the opposite party—he might, if a man of ability, exercise great power over the conduct of public affairs; if not a man of ability, but a *mere* partisan, he would in any case be impotent. From these considerations it would appear that government by Cabinet ministers who represent the majority in Congress is no more incompatible with a partisan Executive than is government by committees representing such a majority. Indeed, a partisan President might well prefer leg-

isolation through a hostile body at whose deliberations he might himself be present, and whose course he might influence, to legislation through hostile committees over whom he could have no manner of control, direct or indirect. And such conditions would be exceptional.

But the encroachment of the legislative upon the executive is deemed the capital evil of our Government in its later phases; and it is asked, Would not the power of Congress be still more dangerously enlarged, and these encroachments made easier and surer, by thus making its relations with the Executive closer? By no means. The several parts of a perfect mechanism must actually interlace and be in strong union in order mutually to support and check each other. Here again permanent, dictating committees are the only alternative. On the one hand, we have committees directing policies for whose miscarriage they are not responsible; on the other, we have a ministry asking for legislation for whose results they are responsible. In both cases there is full power and authority on the part of the legislature to determine all the main lines of administration: there is no more real control of Executive acts in the one case than in the other; but there is an all-important difference in the character of the agents employed. When carrying out measures thrust upon them by committees, administrative officers can throw off all sense of responsibility; and the committees are safe from punishment, safe even from censure, whatever the issue. But in administering laws which have passed under the influence of their own open advocacy, ministers must shoulder the responsibilities and face the consequences. We should not, then, be giving Congress powers or opportunities of encroachment which it does not now possess, but should, on the contrary, be holding its powers in constant and effective check by putting over it responsible leaders. A complete separation of the executive and legislative is not in accord with the true spirit of those essentially English institutions of which our Gov-

ernment is a characteristic offshoot. The Executive is in constant need of legislative co-operation; the legislative must be aided by an Executive who is in a position intelligently and vigorously to execute its acts. There must needs be, therefore, as a binding link between them, some body which has no power to coerce the one and is interested in maintaining the independent effectiveness of the other. Such a link is the responsible Cabinet.

Again, it is objected that we should be cursed with that instability of government which results from a rapid succession of ministries, a frequent shifting of power from the hands of one party to the hands of another. This is not necessarily more likely to occur under the system of responsibility than now. We should be less exposed to such fluctuations of power than is the English government. The elective system which regulates the choice of United States Senators prevents more than one third of the seats becoming vacant at once, and this third only once every two years. The political complexion of the Senate can be changed by a succession of elections.

But against such a responsible system the alarm-bell of *centralization* is again sounded, and all those who dread seeing too much authority, too complete control, placed within the reach of the central Government sternly set their faces against any such change. They deceive themselves. There could be no more despotic authority wielded under the forms of free government than our national Congress now exercises. It is a despotism which uses its power with all the caprice, all the scorn for settled policy, all the wild unrestraint which mark the methods of other tyrants as hateful to freedom.

Few of us are ready to suggest a remedy for the evils all deplore. We hope that our system is self-adjusting, and will not need our corrective interference. This is a vain hope! It is no small part of wisdom to know

how long an evil ought to be tolerated, to see when the time has come for the people, from whom springs all authority, to speak its doom or prescribe its remedy. If that time be allowed to slip unrecognized, our dangers may overwhelm us, our political maladies may prove incurable.

JOHN BRIGHT

AN ORATION DELIVERED BEFORE THE JEFFERSON SOCIETY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA AND PUBLISHED IN THE "UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA MAGAZINE," MARCH, 1880, VOL. XIX, 354-370. WILSON WAS THEN A POST-GRADUATE STUDENT.

IN every effort of comprehension we are made painfully conscious of the narrow compass of man's boasted powers of mind. As, when we stand before some one of the greater masterpieces of architecture and bestow our admiration upon its grand outlines, its multiform and uniform strength and grace, its swift and high-bending arches, its massive supports, its slender summits, we miss the careful carving of its cornices, the laborious polish of its marbles, or the modest beauty of the exquisite forms of stone, which in cold counterfeit of man, guard its portals or stand their solemn, silent sentry on its towers—so, when we contemplate the great movements of recorded history and attempt to take in the broader scope of events and follow the main lines of civilization's "journey with the sun," we overlook, in our wide survey, the inner lives of individual nations, the special workings of separate forces, the events of individual epochs, the controlling influence of individual men—in our endeavor to put ourselves in sympathy with *mankind* we have ceased to sympathize with *man*. The reverse is scarcely less true. If we would bestow our attention upon some *one* event, we find ourselves divorcing it from its necessary connection with *other* events and regarding it in nakedness and isolation. If we could study the character of some one *man*, though that man be our nearest neighbor or our

closest friend, we are in constant danger of separating *him* from his surroundings, holding him responsible for what circumstances have made him, reckoning him debased by frailties not his own, or exalted by greatness which was not born with him but thrust upon him. Fortunately, however, when we seek to familiarize ourselves with the characters of those men whom it is our habit to call *great*—such men as have led thought or conceived philosophies or framed policies—we are relieved from this embarrassment by one saving circumstance: we find every truly great man identified with some special cause. His purposes are steadfastly set in some definite direction. The career which he works out for himself constitutes so intimate a part of the history of his times that to dissociate *him* from his surroundings were as impossible as it would be undesirable.

It is, then, under peculiar advantages that we undertake an examination of the character and career of John Bright. Certainly no man ever won for himself a more definite position or a more certain place than has he. He has attained to honored age, absolutely without deviation from the principles of his youth. His life has inseparably interwoven itself with all the greater events of later English history. His name has become synonymous with liberalism. Since his entrance into public life, no great political reform has been accomplished which he has not powerfully helped to triumphant completion. Not since then has there been any considerable scheme of political reformation which has not been set to the music of his eloquence—or any great cause of advancement which has not been at some point carried on the shoulders of his strength.

From his very birth he has imbibed free political principles. He was born some sixty-nine years ago in the busy village of Rochdale, and was bred in the most thriving parts of thrifty Lancashire—the modern home of liberal politics in England. For modern English liberalism seems to have been born in the manufacturing

districts, in the inner heart of Britain, in those busy counties in which Nottingham, Sheffield, Leeds, Manchester and Liverpool are clustered. Nothing could have been more natural than that the clouds of conservative prejudice should have first broken away in these homes of industry. As civilization advances and the steps of commerce quicken, men are more and more massed in great centres of industrial enterprises; and it is in these, where similarity of occupation, activity of intercourse and community of feeling kindle quick sympathy among large bodies of men and rouse to active intelligence whole classes of society, that broad and generous ideas of governmental polity find their firmest rootage and their sunniest seasons. It were next to impossible that such principles should find their earliest acceptance in agricultural communities or rural neighborhoods. There, where every condition of disintegration, and not one of union, is present, combined and aggressive action is looked for in vain. Political purposes are not there easily communicated; new political doctrines are not there readily sown. There men's thoughts run as slowly as their plows; men's purposes are as sluggish as their beasts of burden. It were perhaps equally idle to look for political impulse to come from the mining districts. There, where every day is spent away from the light of the sun, men's minds seem as ill-lighted as the deep galleries in which they wearily ply the pick. Their only reform is in riot. They crave license, not liberty.

Trade, indeed, is the great nurse of liberal ideas. Men who deal with all the world *cannot* sympathize with those whose thoughts do not reach beyond the limits of their own immediate neighborhood. The ordinary English farmer knows no world greater or more remote than the nearest market town. The English manufacturer sells his goods in Calcutta, in Valparaiso, in Hong Kong, it may be. When he wishes to buy, the cheapest market is the nearest; when he desires to sell,

the dearest is the nearest. Accordingly when we see the cotton printers and spinners of Manchester the first to uphold the doctrines and spread the gospel of Free Trade, we find no room for surprise. The earliest stirring of the great agitation which looked towards the establishment of Free Trade, were felt about the year 1836. Manchester and her industrial sisters had recently been enfranchised by the Reform Act of 1832, and the famous Anti-Corn-Law League was one of the first and greatest manifestations of the potential influence which the manufacturing and trading classes were beginning to assume. This stupendous Free Trade movement found its ablest directors and its foremost leaders amongst the merchants of Manchester and its vicinity—leaders who afterwards became the doctors of what came to be known as the “Manchester School” of politicians. Zeal for rational principles of trade changed simple unambitious men of business into diligent politicians, transformed them into orators, exalted them into statesmen. Foremost among these, by reason of zeal, by reason of worth, by reason of intelligence, was Richard Cobden, a cotton-printer of Manchester. His exalted character and persuasive eloquence made him the directing genius of the great drama of agitation set afoot by the League. In economical legislation his talents proved themselves beyond comparison brilliant and sovereign. But it was not permitted him long to survive the great League he had so successfully led. His life ended suddenly upon the triumphant completion of his life-work. He died the greatest apostle of Free Trade—and men now scarcely remember that he was anything else.

The name of John Bright was scarcely less prominently connected with the work and mission of the League than that of Cobden. *His* first step in public life was, like Cobden's, a step to the leadership of the forces of Free Trade. It were not possible or desirable upon this occasion to consider in detail, or even in

general outline, those Corn Laws against which the League organized its forces. Suffice it to say that, passed in 1815, their effect had been virtually to exclude all foreign corn from the markets of Great Britain, under the silly pretence of "protecting" home produce, and that it was against this short-sighted policy that the forces of Free Trade made their determined stand. Never before or since has peaceful political agitation been more thoroughly organized or more shrewdly conducted. Every mail-bag that left Manchester was full to overflowing with Free Trade tracts; no conceivable method of schooling the people in the doctrines of sound economy was neglected. From channel to channel, from Tweed to Thames, its principles were preached with all the dint of demonstration, all the power of persuasion, all the energy of eloquence. Immense bazaars evidenced its enterprise and contributed to its wealth. Unrivalled fairs and unnumbered mass-meetings drove its designs to completion. It was a vast movement of thought. Every day added to its increasing strength. Every wind brought news of its accumulating triumphs. It was in this work that Mr. Bright first tried his mettle. It was in this cause that he first developed his genius for affairs. His singleness of aim and energy of purpose and nobility of conception first discovered themselves in the direction and control of this stupendous machinery of propagandism. His character is of strong and elastic fibre such as is toughened and strengthened by every test. It partakes of all the sober thoughtfulness, the warm and intense earnestness, and the noble straightforwardness of that sturdy sect, the Quakers, from whose loins he is sprung—that sect which long ago, under the energetic leadership of that sterling pioneer and singularly genuine man, William Penn, penetrated the wilds of our thriving northern neighbor and laid the first foundations of that illustrious commonwealth whose unsurpassed industries are driving European manufacturers from their own markets. Mr.

Bright carried to the public platform and into Parliament a political creed no less simple and no less openly avowed than the religious creed of his sect. And this creed was perfected before it was promulgated. Not until his thirtieth year did he actively participate in public affairs. His liberalism was then mature. His opinions were full-grown and fruiting. His convictions were rooted and grounded in his very nature. And these convictions are vivid beliefs such as constitute the very essence of practical statesmanship, when united, as they are in him, with an undeviating purpose and a will which knows no discouragement and no defeat. These are rare gifts to be crowned with the rarer gift of eloquence. The campaigns of the League were preëminently speech-making campaigns. The gospel of Free Trade was a preached gospel. Every public hall in England had rung with the appeals of its heralds and the cheers of its disciples. In this school was Mr. Bright trained. In the proclamation of this gospel were first developed his marvellous powers of public speech—powers which were first manifested in broken sentences and harsh tones, giving little promise of those grand passages of eloquence and that voice of unrivalled sweetness, variety and strength which have since won for him a place among the very greatest of English orators. These powers were not slow of growth. They grew with his energy and kept pace with his purposes. No orator ever more signally illustrated the truth that eloquence is not of the lips alone. Eloquence is never begotten by empty pates. Grovelling minds are never winged with high and worthy thoughts. Eloquence consists not in sonorous sound or brilliant phrases. *Thought* is the fibre, thought is the *pith*, of eloquence. Eloquence lies in the thought, not in the throat. It was as the expression of his high impulses and strong purposes and sagacious plans and noble courage that John Bright's oratory became a tremendous agency in the world of politics. It is persuasion inspired by conviction. "Out of

the abundance of his heart" his mouth speaks. Public speech was the instrumentality by means of which his mind struck its overwhelming blows at political prejudice. His words were tapers, which, lit at the fire of his convictions, first made visible and then dispelled the darkness of political selfishness and social tyranny. He has, moreover, the physical, as well as the mental and spiritual, gifts of the orator. His frame is large and strong; his face is open, truthful and attractive; his features are clearly-cut and mobile—almost articulately expressive. No storm of indignation or scorn sweeps through his mind that does not throw its deep shadows across his face; no bright hope or light humor plays through his thoughts but looks cheerily out at his eyes; no firm resolve possesses his heart but speaks in his dilated nostril or straight-set lip; no passion burns within him but vibrates in the silvery tones of his voice. His voice, indeed, is his most perfect physical gift. It is described by those who have heard him speak as for the most part calm and measured in its tones, but with peculiar vibrations of unspeakable power, answering to the movements of scorn, indignation, pathos, or pity that stir his thoughts. It has been likened, in its play of varied tones, to a peal of bells. It is such a voice as easily finds its way to the hearts of listening multitudes—such as reaches with easy compass the farthest limits of vast assemblies—such as relieves statistics of their monotony and sets argument to music. In words which the late Lord Lytton used concerning Ireland's great orator, we might say, when standing beneath the sounds of his voice as they rose to the rafters of Manchester's great Free Trade Hall, and fell thence on the ears of the eager listeners who filled the vast spaces of its floor:

"And as I thought, rose the sonorous swell
As from some church tower swings the silvery bell;
Aloft and clear from airy tide to tide,
It glided easy as a bird may glide.

To the last verge of that vast audience sent,
It played with each wild passion as it went;
Now stirred the uproar—now the murmur stilled,
And sobs or laughter answered as it willed.
Then did I know what spells of infinite choice
To rouse or lull has the sweet human voice.
Then did I learn to seize the sudden clue
To the grand, troublous life antique—to view
Under the rock-stand of Demosthenes,
Unstable Athens heave her noisy seas.”

I suppose that it is Mr. Bright's supreme self-restraint that is the chief charm of his delivery. The broad, and *silent* river is more suggestive of power than the hurrying, *noisy* mountain stream which every pebble makes boisterous or complaining. The deep and *quiet* breathings of the sea seem more impressive evidence of strength than the spray that is dashed on high as if the monster were shaking his huge sides with laughter. The heavy storm-cloud is more imposing and awe-striking as it sweeps the distant horizon with its quick flames, uttering its thunders in suppressed mutterings, and rolling its billowy lengths in majestic panorama before our eyes, than when it overspreads the entire sky in wild outbreak, deafening us with its sudden peals and drenching us with its hasty rains. So the orator who maintains complete sovereignty over his emotions is a thousandfold more powerful and impressive than he who “saws the air” and “tears a passion to tatters.” Emotional demonstrations should come from his audience, not from the orator himself. So, we read of Mr. Bright that he seldom gesticulates; he never shouts. His passions he never allows to master him. He holds himself well in hand. Even at his moments of greatest power and most consummate achievement he is speaking calmly, but not without the deepest emotion—it is, as has been beautifully said, the calmness of white heat.

Mr. Bright's diction is as self-restrained as the orator himself. It is characterized by simple dignity and

supple strength. It has none of the superb imagery or the sublime plenitude of Burke's gorgeous rhetoric; it has none of the pithy passion and "pregnant brevity" of Chatham's oratorical sword-thrusts; it has none of the smiling smoothness of Canning's bright sentences. But it has the Saxon bone and sinew. It is lithe and muscular. It is straightforward and natural, but not rugged. It is scholarly, but never pedantic. His refined taste and natural good sense put him above the silly affectation of mere rhetorical glitter. He has escaped that error which so many have allowed to possess them—the error of confounding sound with sense, of reckoning eloquence by the number of syllables. His sentences have the easy, spontaneous flow of conversation; yet they follow each other in close connection, hastening the progress of the thought and clearing the way for the apprehension. The power of his style is indisputable. Even upon the printed page it retains its sovereignty. One has but to read it to feel its charm. The periods are often unskillfully turned. The clauses are sometimes loosely thrown together. There is no dash or swiftness in the movement of the style. And yet, although you cannot always admire it from an artistic point of view, you must always allow its power to engage the attention and to lead the thoughts. It is, undoubtedly, what he says, rather than his manner of saying it, that gives him his supreme control over his hearers and his readers. Yet we are fain to admit, that nobility of sentiment seems all the more noble, strength of principle all the stronger, and mastery of thought all the more masterful when conveyed in a style of such simplicity and clearness that not crystal itself could transmit the light of thought more cloudlessly.

Mr. Bright never received a classical education. In breadth of scholarship he cannot, of course, be for a moment compared with Mr. Gladstone, with acrid Robert Lowe, with Sir William Harcourt, or with several of the more prominent and gifted Conservatives.

But his attainments as an *English* scholar are preëminent. Our own language has been the special object of his untiring study. The rich stores of our own English literature he has explored with careful research. The Bible, Milton, and Shakespeare have been his most constant companions. And is not this fact pregnant with suggestion? From these noble sources have come, no doubt, his simplicity of creed, his earnest morality, his singleness of principle, his steadfastness of purpose, his breadth of sympathy. From the Bible his unhesitating truthfulness and exalted sentiment; from Milton, his quiet, brave integrity; from Shakespeare, his knowledge of English human nature and his touching eloquence! His character illustrates with peculiar aptness that striking remark of Richter's: "Feelings come and go like light troops following the victory of the present; but principles, like troops of the line, are undisturbed and stand fast."

As I have already said, Mr. Bright's liberalism had attained its growth before he entered public life. His convictions were matured. His purposes were definitely formed. He started, consequently, some forty years in advance of his age—and this fact exposed him to the flings of the unthinking—to the ridicule of the majority of his countrymen, who could not keep pace with his thoughts or sympathize with his designs. Like all who have dared to anticipate the growth of wisdom, or ventured to hasten on before the slow-advancing forces of public opinion, he was assailed with the bitter taunt of *radicalism*. To this day you may hear the echoes of the fierce accusations which were long ago hurled at him by haughty, hating Tories whose hatred was born of fear. You may hear heedless observers even *now* speak of John Bright as "the great radical." His voice was raised at first, as now, always in behalf of the people, and men were quick to call him "agitator" and "demagogue." No one, however, who knows anything clearly about the actual history of events in

England since the formation of the Anti-Corn-Law League can now seriously entertain any other opinion of Mr. Bright than that his statesmanship has been as consummate as his oratory. Take down a volume of his speeches and look over the table of subjects upon which he has most frequently and most powerfully spoken. He has identified himself with every enlightened and subsequently triumphant view of policy both at home and abroad. Free Trade, an extended and purified suffrage, a just and liberal land system, a perfected finance, a worthy, manly, Christian foreign and colonial policy—all have found in him a steady friend and an unwearied advocate. Look further than the index to his speeches. Follow the lines of his eminently statesmanlike plans of administration—plans, almost all of which have now come to their full harvest—and then tell me if you do not find in these at once the seeds and fruits of an enlightened *conservatism*. Wisdom is always conservative. John Bright a demagogue and a radical! If constant and consistent support of the policy dictated by a clear-sighted liberalism, if a strenuous and unyielding opposition to the encroachments of power, and the oppressions of prejudice, and the tyranny of wealth, be demagoguery, then has he indeed been the chiefest of demagogues! If an early and clear recognition of those principles of administrative reform which have now received the sanction of law and the vindication of experience be radicalism, then has he indeed been the fiercest of radicals. It is matter of demonstration that he has uniformly been found among the earliest and most ardent supporters of all those great measures which are now regarded as the most admirable fruits of the legislation of Great Britain during the last forty years. And his view has gone still further. He has looked beyond the present even and has from the very beginning of his career been eager to urge and powerful to prove essential such a change in the laws regulating the tenure of English land as would remove

the unhappy restraints of primogeniture and facilitate the breaking up of the vast single estates which now damn England to agricultural stagnation—such a change as would make possible the creation of numerous small estates and the existence of a large and enlarging class of small land-owners—a yeomanry not less glorious than that of bright days of power long gone by: days when stout bowstrings sped victorious arrows on many a field of battle—a yeomanry such as would build up old England in strength, infuse new youth into her political system, and secure to her a fresh lease of power and influence. Such a change must come, if England is not to die: and its coming will be but a fresh vindication of John Bright's political prescience and far-reaching statesmanship. He is always pressing on to those great reforms which he knows the future must bring forth.

Well, his countrymen are tardily coming to understand Mr. Bright. Now that they have come to think in most points as he has all his life been thinking, they cannot well *help* understanding him. He has been translated into their own thoughts and desires. The "Times" newspaper, for many years his most uncompromising foe and loudest denouncer, has now much generous praise for the man and much genuine respect for his opinions. But it exclaims with impatient self-complacency, that he is still bigoted, intolerant of everything that savors of opposition to the hitherto triumphant progress of liberal ideas! He cannot, it complains, give his opponents their due meed of credit and praise. He can see nothing good in whatsoever comes from the Conservative party. The "Times" is not far wrong. Mr. Bright *is* positive and obstinate in his opposition to the policy of the present conservative government—to the Beaconsfieldism of these later days of brilliant failure abroad. Tolerance is an admirable intellectual gift: but it is of little worth in politics. Politics is a war of *causes*; a joust of principles. Gov-

ernment is too serious a matter to admit of meaningless courtesies. In this grand contestation of warring principles he who doubts is a laggard and an impotent. Shall we condemn the statesman because in this intense strife, in which he fights, not for empty formulas or unpractical speculations, but for the triumph of those principles which are in his eyes vitally essential to the welfare of the State in whose service he is spending and being spent—because in the very heat of this battle he does not stop to weigh out careful justice to his foe? He grants him all the privileges, he extends to him all the courtesies, of war. He acknowledges, it may be, his integrity of character and his uprightness of purpose. But is he to stultify himself by praising that against which he vehemently protests and strenuously fights? Absolute identity with one's cause is the first and great condition of successful leadership. It is that which makes the statesman's plans clear-cut and decisive, his purposes unhesitating—it is that which makes him a leader of States and a maker of history. I would not for a moment be understood as seeking to lend any color of justification to that most humiliating and degrading precept, "Party, right or wrong." This is the maxim of knaves, or of fools. The idea *I* would press upon you is as far separated from this as is the east from the west. I would urge that entire identity with the cause—with the principle—you espouse wherein alone abide strength and the possibility of success. Party? What is it? It is only a convenient—it may be an accidental—union of those who hold certain great leading principles in common. It is a mere outward sign of agreement. Is it the *party*, then, to which men of thought owe and pay allegiance? No. It is to the *principles*, of which party is the embodiment. The man, therefore, who adheres to any party after it has ceased to avow the principles which to him are dear and in his eyes are vital; the man who follows the leadings of a party which seems to him to be going wrong, is acting a lie,

and has lost either his wit or his virtue. With wicked folly such as this Mr. Bright most assuredly cannot be charged. Never until very recent years has he acknowledged fealty to either of the great parties which divide English public opinion. Hitherto he has himself led a small detached party of progress. Only within the last few years has he announced his adherence to the Liberal party. That great party has come to adopt all the greater of those principles whose promotion has been his life-work—and now that his principles are its principles, he is a Liberal.

I have not attempted to sketch the career of John Bright. I have advisedly avoided doing so—not only because the materials for such a sketch are meagre and insufficient, but also because such a sketch would involve a review of all the political movements that have stirred England since 1840—a review which might prove tedious and would certainly too far trespass upon your patience. I have sought simply to display the more conspicuous traits of his character: to represent him as possessing in an eminent degree those qualities of eloquence and single-minded devotion which are the only lasting powers in the warfare of politics: such qualities as the great statesmen of our Revolution so gloriously exemplified: such qualities as Webster and Calhoun so nobly illustrated.

But I am conscious that there is one point at which Mr. Bright may seem to you to stand in need of defence. He was from the very first a resolute opponent of the cause of the Southern Confederacy. Will you think that I am undertaking an invidious task, if I endeavor to justify him in that opposition? I yield to no one precedence in love for the South. But *because* I love the South, I rejoice in the failure of the Confederacy. Suppose that secession had been accomplished? Conceive of this Union as divided into two separate and independent sovereignties! To the seaports of her northern neighbor the Southern Confederacy could have

offered no equals; with her industries she could have maintained no rivalry; to her resources she could have supplied no parallel. The perpetuation of slavery would, beyond all question, have wrecked our agricultural and commercial interests, at the same time that it supplied a fruitful source of irritation abroad and agitation within. We cannot conceal from ourselves the fact that slavery was enervating our Southern society and exhausting to Southern energies. We cannot conceal from ourselves the fact that the Northern union would have continued stronger than we, and always ready to use her strength to compass our destruction. With this double certainty, then, of *weakness* and *danger*, our future would have been more than dark—it would have been inevitably and overwhelmingly disastrous. Even the damnable cruelty and folly of reconstruction was to be preferred to helpless independence. All this I can see at the same time that I recognize and pay loving tribute to the virtues of the leaders of secession, to the purity of their purposes, to the righteousness of the cause which they thought they were promoting—and to the immortal courage of the soldiers of the Confederacy. But Mr. Bright viewed the struggle as a foreigner. He was not intimately enough acquainted with the facts of our national history or with the original structure of our national government to see clearly the force or the justice of the doctrine of States Rights. That doctrine to him appeared a mere subtlety—a mere word-quibble. He saw and appreciated only the general features of the struggle. Its object was none other than the severance of a union which he saw was essential to the prosperity of the South no less, nay, even more, than to the progress of the North—its severance for the avowed purpose of perpetuating an institution which *we* now acknowledge to have been opposed to the highest interests of society. Surely we cannot say that he erred in withstanding a suicidal course such as this. However much he may have mistaken the pur-

poses of secession and the characters of its leaders—and he did sadly mistake these—he at least saw what *we* now see to have been to our truest interest; and no one who will examine his public utterances on the subject can fail to be convinced that he opposed the efforts of the Confederacy for the sake of the South, no less than for that of the North. He was a friend of the Union, not a partisan of the abolitionists. When others were predicting the destruction of the Union he exclaimed in sudden eloquence: “I cannot believe, for my part, that such a fate will befall that fair land, stricken though it now is with the ravages of war. I cannot believe, for my part, that civilization, in its journey with the sun, will sink into endless night in order to gratify the ambition of the leaders of this revolt, who seek to ‘wade through slaughter to a throne, and shut the gates on mercy to mankind.’ I have another and far brighter vision before my gaze. It may be but a vision; but I will cherish it. I see one people, and one language, and one law, and one faith over all that wide continent, the home of freedom, and a refuge for the oppressed of every race and of every clime.” Have we not abundant reason to thank God that this happy vision has been realized; that union *still* binds us together in strength, and that the fresh promptings of brotherly love are leading us on to a still closer union in which all that is dark in the past shall be forgotten, all that was wrong forgiven, and the future shall be ripe with promise of achievements as yet unequalled?

I am fully aware that I have laid myself open to the charge of having pronounced an eulogy upon John Bright. I have not stopped to display those small faults of temper and those minor deflections from principle which mar his life as like faults mar every human life. I have allowed myself to believe that these things may be left out of our estimate of the great orator and statesman without violence to justice or infidelity to truth. I have ventured to utter the few poor sen-

tences and inadequate thoughts to which you have been so indulgent as to listen, with this single intent: that the unhesitating truthfulness, the exalted sentiment, the quiet, brave integrity, the broad sympathy, the sincere purpose, and the splendid daring of devotion which seem to adorn the character of John Bright may be to you as, I trust, they have been in some sort to myself, a pattern and an inspiration. The lesson of his life is not far to seek or hard to learn. It is, that duty lies wheresoever truth directs us; that statesmanship consists, not in the cultivation and practice of the arts of intrigue, nor in the pursuit of all the crooked intricacies of the paths of party management, but in the lifelong endeavor to lead first the attention and then the will of the people to the acceptance of truth in its applications to the problems of government; that not the adornments of rhetoric, but an absorbing love for justice and truth and a consuming, passionate devotion to principle are the body and soul of eloquence; that complete identification with some worthy cause is the first and great prerequisite of abiding success. Such are the crowning ornaments of the character of him in whom the elements are so mixed "that Nature might stand up and say to all the world, This was a man." Such are the gifts and graces we must foster; such is the panoply of moral strength we must wear—we who are the builders of our country's future—if we are to preserve our institutions from the consuming rusts of corruption, to shield our liberties from the designs of enemies within the gates, and to set our faces towards the accomplishment of that exalted destiny which has been the happiest, brightest dream of generations lately passed away, and which may, we still may trust, be the crowning experience of generations soon to wake.

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN AMERICA

WOODROW WILSON ON THE NEGATIVE OF A DEBATE ON THE QUERY: "IS THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ELEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES A MENACE TO AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS?" FROM THE "UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA MAGAZINE," APRIL, 1880, PP. 448-450.

MR. BRUCE having concluded, the Secretary read the first gentleman's name on the negative, and Mr. Wilson came forward to reply to the argument of Mr. Bruce as well as to open for the negative.

Mr. Wilson said that this was a discussion which called in question the vitality of Anglo-Saxon institutions; of institutions which had stood the tests of centuries. The object of the opposite side (the affirmative) was to prove "that it is in the power, as, in their opinion, it is in the desire of the Jesuits of the country to overturn" these institutions which have so long stood against all assailing forces. In this debate we should, he said, have nothing to do with Roman Catholicism as a religion: we were to deal with it as a *policy*. He maintained that its political ascendancy over Anglo-Saxon peoples was made violently improbable by all teachings of history. He entered into a brief sketch of the history of Roman Catholic dominion, showing how in the past it had been bounded by the Rhine and the Weser, never having found firm rootage among the German races. "Where Roman generals had found abiding victory impossible, Romish priests found enduring success scarcely less impracticable." The priestly polity had gained no permanent foothold in Northern Germany, and had been predominant as a political

power in England whither the sturdy races of North Germany had migrated, only until the breaking away of the feudal system and the full growth of the national spirit. The exemption of the Teutonic races from papal dominion had, he said, been no mystery. Their very natures, their most characteristic institutions, were utterly incompatible with the rule of Rome. The Romish Church could, he continued, maintain its supremacy only over those nations whose governments were centralized, and where the seat of power could be successfully won and held. As an example he adduced France, which had been under the Romish yoke until it had put on habits of self-government. He recounted the manner in which Romanism had been hunted from self-governed England, and asked if the success of papal aggression was to be greater here in America where self-government had obtained its highest development? This question was, he declared, answered by Dr. Brownson, an eminent Roman Catholic of New England, who had admitted the teachings of his church to be utterly incompatible with American civilization, and its success a return to second childhood; by Mr. Cartwright, who had shown that all the governments of Europe were arraying themselves against the Society of Jesus; by Lord John Russell, who had shown how all the nations of the Continent had rejected the doctrines of the Syllabus; by the Roman Catholic bishops of the United States who had protested against the claim of infallibility and temporal power, asking "how they are going to live under the free constitution of their Republic and maintain their position of equality with their fellow-citizens after committing themselves" to these principles; and by the leaders of the Liberal Catholics who were raising the standard of revolt within the church's own pale. These were, he said, the teachings of the past and the signs of the present: but the question was (Mr. Wilson said) one entirely of the future. The dangers of the situation are, he was free to admit, very

grave: the aggressive claims of the Papal authorities no one can deny—and they had, as Mr. Gladstone had so well shown, grown and accumulated since the Middle Ages. All the proofs of insolent pretensions heaped up by the other side he fully allowed: their premises were unimpeachable but their conclusions utterly unwarrantable. The question was whether America was to be Romanized or Rome Americanized? He had shown the answer of the past: that of the present was no less satisfactory and conclusive. In proof of this he quoted several exceedingly striking cases in which the pretensions of the Romish authorities to the control of civil affairs by interference with the civil rights of Romish communicants had been summarily met and punished in the law courts of several States. These were the lessons of the law that had met the priestly powers at every turn. They were hedged about with the courts of law and told so far shall thou go and no step further. Such were the corroborations of the past which gave confidence to American statesmen and meaning to the opposition of American Roman Catholics to the aggressions of the Papal See. He did not anticipate the victory of Rome because the danger was proclaimed and we forearmed; because of the historical prejudices against Roman Catholic authority which were peculiar to our race; because of our spreading and enlarging and strengthening common-school system which is throwing about us the safeguards of enlightenment; because of the unassailable defences of *self-government*. Our liberties are safe until the memories and experiences of the past are blotted out and the *Mayflower* with its band of pilgrims forgotten; until our public-school system has fallen into decay and the nation into ignorance; until legislators have resigned their functions to ecclesiastical powers and their prerogatives to priests.

MR. GLADSTONE: A CHARACTER SKETCH

THIS ARTICLE SIGNED "ATTICUS" WAS PUBLISHED IN THE "UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA MAGAZINE," APRIL, 1880, VOL. XIX, PP. 401-426. ON THE PRECEDING PAGE OF THE MAGAZINE, WHICH GIVES THE TABLE OF CONTENTS, "BY WOODROW WILSON" IS INSERTED OPPOSITE THE TITLE "MR. GLADSTONE: CHARACTER SKETCH."

THERE is something passing strange in the presumption of those who undertake to write the biographies of living men; and yet one cannot help admiring their audacity and thanking them for their doing. For there is an indescribable charm about such works. Our interest in the characters and careers of men who have, so to speak, shared our times with us, and who are still active forces in the world, is naturally livelier than those from whom we are separated by long spaces of time, whom historians have canonized, and whose memory, even in the thoughts of the vast majority of their own countrymen, is grown as dim as their biographies are dusty. These latter do not seem so nearly of our own flesh and blood. Our sympathy with men whose deeds are of the present moment, whose names are every day set in the newspapers, or vibrated along the wires with the news of the hour, is prompt; our curiosity concerning them and their doings is alert; our appetite for every bit of information regarding them is keen; and we devour what is written about them with a zest such as accompanies our perusal of few other books.

In writing a biography of Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Barnet Smith has, therefore, accomplished a work which is

both indiscreet and acceptable. In publishing a work which seems to be receiving the praise of critics of every type and temper, he appears to me to have proved at once his intrepidity, his indelicacy, and his shrewd appreciation of the public taste. I have not yet been able to obtain a copy of Mr. Smith's book; but, following afar off the example of Gibbon, who represents himself as always, before opening any book which he was about to read, sitting himself down to write all that he knew and thought about the subject of which it treated, and that also of Mr. John Morley, who, himself in imitation of Gibbon, prepared his mind for the perusal of Trevelyan's *Life of Macaulay* by writing his admirable essay on the character and genius of the brilliant historian, I sit down to formulate the few crude impressions which have been made upon my mind by the character and career of the great member for Midlothian.

Every one is, of course, more or less familiar with the principal events of Mr. Gladstone's life. Rumors, at least, of so large a career must have found their way to every corner of the world where any news is ever allowed to come. One could hardly avoid knowing the main outlines of a life which has filled and is filling so large a space in the history of so great a nation as our kinsmen beyond the sea. And news of Mr. Gladstone has long been peculiarly abundant. Even the editors of country newspapers, in displaying to their admiring readers the political situation of England, with all the temerity of ignorance and all the wordy reserve of those who are under the driving necessity of filling space without saying anything, handle his name with careless familiarity. His fame has introduced him into the pages of a novel, even, where his name has, doubtless, smiled to find itself.

Mr. Gladstone has himself done much to acquaint the whole English-speaking world with his thoughts and purposes. Literary labors have filled all the intervals

of his active work in Parliament and on the hustings. He has written almost as incessantly as he has spoken—has written not only upon themes political, but upon problems of physics, subtle questions of literary criticism, debatable church dogmas, clouded ecclesiastical history, and mooted matters of ethics as well. He has spread all the lineaments of his mind upon printed pages. One might, I suppose, trace all the principal steps of his mental progress in his published writings, beginning with the essay on Church and State and coming down to his latest contribution to the discussion of the borough franchise. For through all these writings run sincerity and candor, like the outcroppings of veins of precious ore. He never clouds his convictions with vague expressions. No one is more fearless than he in emphasizing the variance between the mature liberalism of his age and the idealistic toryism of his youth. And it is just this transparent candor and thoroughgoing good faith that make what he has written so valuable an aid in the study of his character.

His occasional and miscellaneous writings have recently been collected and published in a set of neat little volumes entitled "Gleanings of Past Years." The publication of a series of essays from the pen of a great living statesman would under any circumstances be a notable event in the literary world. We turn to the perusal of such writings with the eagerness and zeal which naturally spring from the interest we have learned to feel in their author as we have watched his conspicuous career and traced his ruling influence in the counsels of his country. And, indeed, Mr. Gladstone's essays are not of such a character as to win very wide popularity entirely on their own intrinsic merits. They borrow greatness from the hand that wrought them. Mr. Gladstone's written style is ponderous. It has little of that bright glow which so lights up and beautifies his speeches; there is none of the swift strength and conquering dash which are the power of his oratory.

It is at once a curious and an instructive fact to students of many of the greater orators, that the mastery of thought, of expression, and of method which makes their onset so terrible and their influence so imperial on the platform or in the Senate, deserts them in the closet; and they take up their pens only to multiply stiff phrases and awkward periods. That Mr. Gladstone is not without power even in the use of the pen is abundantly proven by the moving and moulding influence of his great political pamphlets; and these recently collected literary miscellanies have much strength both of thought and of rhetoric. But, as compared with his speeches, they seem of small value; and we are, therefore, inclined at first to think that they might, without risk of injustice, be neglected in our estimate of his intellectual gifts. They are as immeasurably inferior to his many masterful speeches in the House of Commons as is Charles Fox's "History of England" to his great argument on the Westminster Scrutiny.

Still, their value as contributions to the question to which they relate is unquestionable; and their value as contributions to his mental history is, as I have already intimated, inestimable. We would by no means be willing to lose even these lesser works of the greatest English Liberal. They throw a side light upon his character which adds much to its distinctness. His character is one of such grand proportions, of so complex a structure, and of so unique a build that we cannot fully appreciate it until we have viewed it from both sides, and in all lights. And I do not know of any one among modern statesmen whose character is worthier of the study and the imitation of the young men of a free country than is Mr. Gladstone's. His life has been one continuous advance, not towards power only—fools may be powerful; knaves sometimes rule by the knack of their knavery—but towards truth also the while.

William Ewart Gladstone was born in Liverpool in the year 1809. He comes of sturdy Scotch stock;

and his mind and body alike are cast out of strong Scotch stuff. We can easily imagine what sort of youth his was. He must have been a sober, thoughtful boy, full of spirits without being boisterous; eager and impetuous without being imperious; a leader in sport as in study; straightforward in everything, even in his hatreds; half-souled in nothing, not even in his faults. He is old now; he is turned of seventy, and these are still the leading traits of his character—traits which bear the ratification of a long and intensely-lived life; which may almost be said to bear the seal of completion. For his active life may reasonably be thought to be rapidly nearing its close. And it is because we thus stand near his grave that we may venture an estimate of his character. The few years that remain to him cannot materially change a character which has been *a-making* for seventy years of busy living.

And just here we seem to have happened upon the chiefest and most instructive peculiarity of his career: his convictions have steadily grown towards truth, as the flower grows towards the sun; his character has developed and gathered strength year by year and day by day, slowly, as the oak waxes great and strong. He has all his life been *a-making*. His character will not be entirely complete until death has placed the capstone.

It has been remarked as an interesting circumstance that the county Lancashire has produced three of the most eminent English statesmen of later years, the late Earl Derby, Mr. Gladstone, and Mr. Bright; and it may, further, prove worthy of at least a passing notice that these three men have each typified in his career a prominent phase of later political history. Lord Derby was a living type of that reaction against liberalism which followed upon the accomplishment of the first decisive measures of parliamentary reform and the repeal of the Corn Laws. Sprung from a family all of whose traditions were strongly Whig, he was among the first to join the revolt against triumphant

Whigism. Mr. Gladstone's career from its first chapter to its last, illustrates the breaking away of the older forms of English Conservatism and the advance of English public opinion to higher plains of principle and freer and more rational methods of policy. In his youth an unbending tory, he stands in his old age in the forefront of liberalism. Mr. Bright, in his freedom of faculty, his fearless spirit of inquiry, and his creed of common-sense, is a conspicuous type of the spirit of the England of to-day.

Perhaps the most vital characteristic of Mr. Gladstone's nature is his keen poetical sensibility. By poetical sensibility I do not mean an imaginativeness which clothes all the common concerns of life with poetical forms or weds the mind to those things which are picturesque rather than to matters of practical business, to fancies rather than to the interests of ordinary everyday life, to images rather than to fertile purposes. I mean, rather, breadth of sympathy such as enables its possessor to take in the broader as well as the pettier concerns of life, with unconscious ease of apprehension and unfailing precision of judgment; to identify himself with interests far removed from the walks of his own life; to throw himself, as if by instinct, on that side of every public question which, in the face of present doubts, is in the long run to prove the side of wisdom and of clear-sighted policy; such a sympathy as makes a knowledge of men in him an *intuition* instead of an experience. Such a faculty is preëminently poetical, raising men above experience, as it seems to do, and enabling them to guide the policy of a government, almost before they can be truly said to have learned to manage the affairs of their own households. And yet it is quite as evidently an intensely practical faculty. Great statesmen seem to direct and rule by a sort of power to put themselves in the place of the nation over whom they are set, and may thus be said to possess the souls of poets at the same time that they display

the coarser sense and the more vulgar sagacity of practical men of business.

Had Mr. Gladstone not been endowed with these peculiarities of disposition, he would in all probability have remained unknown to the world, obscurely entrenched behind the unqualified dogmas of his early toryism, whence no one in the hurry of the liberal triumphs which have since been accomplished would have troubled himself to dislodge him. His early education was such, one would have thought, as totally to unfit him for active participation in public affairs. Six years he had spent at Eton in the study of Horace, Virgil and Homer. By the latter all the poetical depths of his nature were strongly stirred. In the superb imagery of the blind bard, and in his vigorous sympathy with man and with nature, young Gladstone's mind found what was but fuel to its own flames. From Eton he went to Oxford and there passed through further drill in the classics and the abstract mathematics. From Oxford he went almost immediately to Parliament. He entered public life with no experience but in poetical feeling and in abstract thought, and with no opinions but those of stubborn conservatism in which he had from his early youth been schooled by his father. He launched himself in public life by writing a pamphlet which was at once a manifestation of his poetical feeling and a vindication of his traditionary tory principles. In this pamphlet he sought to bolster up the union of Church and State by founding it upon a divine foreordination which had constituted the State a moral being, in conscience bound to uphold the true faith by the strength of its temporal arm and to aid in the dissemination of the verities of the true religion by the sanction of its laws and the active coöperation of its ministers. But he did not allow himself to remain long bound by the shackles which he had forged for himself, and for all who might be ready to follow him, in his argument on Church and State. He had com-

menced life with predilections simply, not with intelligent convictions. His first contact with the cooler atmosphere of practical politics, however, roused him to a new activity. His idealistic theories of state action were dispelled by the necessity for resolving the actual problems of administration as mists are chased from the valleys by the sun.

Mr. Gladstone's mind embodies in strange, and on the whole grand, combination the faculty of poetic sympathy which I have already indicated and the colder qualities of reason. His reason leads and his catholic sympathy impels. When once contact with the practical problems of government had begun to break away the foundations of his early ardent, air-built theories, the progress of transition was rapid and certain. He came gradually to allow full credit to the severe and inexorable processes of his keenly logical mind. And as soon as his mind was awakened his sympathetic affections enlisted his whole nature in the search after truth, fusing his reasonings and communicating their heat to the powers of his will. He was fairly launched on his voyage towards the farthest waters of liberalism. His future course was inevitable. Henceforward he became the embodiment of the liberal tendencies of his nation.

The stages of this development are easy to trace. As long as Mr. Gladstone remained a "private member" of the House of Commons, speaking from the back benches, unemployed in solving the practical problems of actual administration, left to the guidance of his uncorrected, untutored theories, he continued wedded to his speculative opinions. For nine years, from 1832 to 1841, he stood steadily by that transcendental theory of government which, in 1838, he published to the world in his pamphlet on Church and State. For a few months in 1834 he had held office as under-secretary for the colonies in the short-lived, makeshift ministry of Sir Robert Peel. But this short experience has not been sufficient to break in upon his speculations. During

this period of preparation, we find him withstanding with his usual vehement determination all attacks on the property of the Irish Church, setting his face sternly against the abolition of religious tests in the Universities, and opposing with consistent zeal the removal of the civil disabilities of the Jews. Whenever his carefully avowed opinions were put to the test, he was ready to uphold them to the last iota.

But in 1841 he was called to the duties of active administration, taking office under Sir Robert Peel, first as Vice-President and, later, as President of the Board of Trade. He was rudely shaken from his reveries by the urgent duties and active business of his official trust. The education of his youth—the education of the schools—was corrected by the education of hard work. The student was awakened to the actual direction of practical affairs. His abstract theories broke at once and completely down. Actual contact with urgent, crowding questions of practical legislation roused his mind from its ideal fancies and addressed it to the real work of government. Among the measures introduced by the ministry of Sir Robert Peel were what are known as the Maynooth College grant and the Queen's University Bill. The Maynooth Bill proposed to add to the grant which had already been made to the Roman Catholic College of Maynooth, an institution founded specially for the education of young men for the Roman Catholic priesthood; the Queen's University Bill embraced a scheme for "establishing in Ireland three colleges, one in Cork, the second in Belfast and the third in Galway, and to affiliate these to a new University to be called the 'Queen's University in Ireland.' The teaching in these colleges was to be purely secular." Manifestly both these measures were utterly incompatible with the pronounced convictions of the young President of the Board of Trade. The first proposed to extend the aid of the State to the maintenance of a religion which was not its own—which

had for generations been at open enmity with that Church which he had declared it to be the sacred duty of the State to cherish and maintain to the exclusion of every other; the second founded what the opponents of the scheme derisively denominated "godless colleges" under the care and sanction of public law. The first gave support to an alien church; the second excluded all religion from a State institution. Upon the introduction of these measures into Parliament, Mr. Gladstone immediately resigned his position in the Cabinet. But he supported both bills. He had resigned not because he could not give his assent to the actions of his colleagues, but because he wished his change of opinion to be raised above all suspicion of interested motives. He wished to proclaim his change of ground and at the same time to demonstrate his own sincerity. He would not have it thought that his convictions were altered from love of office. He was convinced, not seduced. The fact that his roused faculties had discovered to him the fact that his former position was no longer tenable. He found his principles irreconcilably at war with all the stronger tendencies, with all the healthier impulses of the day. And he quickly and bravely acknowledged the discovery. "He was not," he protested, "to fetter his judgment as a member of Parliament by a deference to abstract theories." Upon this ground his mind began its searching and fearless examination of all the principles he had hitherto confessed. Once enlisted in this pursuit of truth his eager mind found it impossible to stop at half measures. He cut himself loose, not suddenly, but surely, from the preconceived prejudices of his inexperienced years and addressed himself to the task of rational resolution of the problems of government. As far as I can see, the transition was a short one. His liberalism matured and strengthened rapidly. He at once placed himself at the side of those men against whom he had heretofore contended. His conversion was not an isolated one.

He left the Conservative ranks with his great master, Sir Robert Peel. He had joined Peel in dealing the blow of Free Trade at the Tories; and both men alike now fell under the hatred of the "betrayed" party. Their companionship in liberalism would probably have been continued had not death put a sudden period to the life of the master, and left the pupil to the devices of his own mind.

Mr. Gladstone exhibited at every turn his changed views. In 1841 he strenuously opposed the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, which forbade Roman Catholic Bishops to assume local titles within the kingdom, as a silly act of mere intolerance. In 1852 he took office, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the Aberdeen Coalition ministry, sitting beside Russell and Palmerston. Later, from 1860-1866, he devoted his magnificent financial talents to the service of a thoroughgoing Liberal administration, carrying out the economical policy of the party whose principles had now finally enlisted him in its service, in a series of budgets unrivalled in their display of knowledge and ability. And finally, within our own easy recollection, from November, 1868, to February, 1874, he, as Prime Minister, led Parliament through that period of magnificent legislation during which the Irish Church was disestablished; the tenure of Irish land was made freer and juster; cheap education was secured to all the population of the kingdom; purchase in the army, with all its attendant abuses and corruption, was abolished; the endowed schools were reformed and reconstructed; religious tests were done finally away with at the universities! and all the serious complications of foreign affairs were amicably and honorably resolved—a period which enthusiastic liberals have, not without some show of truth, exultingly called the "golden period" of English liberalism.

Many persons would be inclined to reckon his an inconsistent course. I cannot so regard it. His career seems to me to have been what it has been principally

because of the unhesitating logic of his mind and the simple candor of his nature. When he had been roused from the dreams and speculations of his student mood, and had begun to think and act in the temper of a practical man of business, his keen perceptions, his quiet determination, and his resolute conscientiousness irresistibly urged him to the acceptance of the farthest conclusions of his reason. Few men stand in their old age where they stood in their youth. The untested opinions of the early life do not always or often stand the trial of experience. In public life especially, so varied and varying are the conditions of government, their purposes must be trimmed to possibilities. Men who have early given their undivided attention to practical affairs and who enter public life, if they enter it at all, long after the temper and habits of the schools have worn off, are generally among the few who begin their career with fixed opinions and matured convictions, which no change of circumstance can alter, and no discouragement defeat. Such a man was Richard Cobden; such a man is John Bright. The latter has passed through a long period of public service with unaltered views, and has lived to see his earliest avowed principles receive the amplest vindication and the fullest ratification. And yet his career has in reality fewer elements of grandeur, no greater flavor of sincerity, and no more of the rigor of consistency than distinguish Mr. Gladstone's life. The contrast between these two men is a remarkable and instructive one. The resemblances between their characters are equally interesting. Both are preëminent in eloquence; both are conspicuous for the noble sincerity and high-strung morality of their characters; both are engaged heart and soul in the pursuit of the highest interests of their country; and both find these interests wrapped up in the principles of the Liberal party which they lead. But, though they both now stand together, in close friendship and common leadership, they have reached their present position

by very different, widely separated, ways. Their minds are of different cast. Mr. Gladstone has reasoned his way to the light; Mr. Bright seems to have been born in the light. Mr. Bright began in practice, Mr. Gladstone in study. Study has brightened and expanded Mr. Bright's faculties; practice has collected and concentrated and directed Mr. Gladstone's powers. The one is a man of intuitions, arriving at his conclusions apparently without the aid of laborious processes of ratiocination; the other is a man of large heart and larger reason, quickly and fearlessly, though carefully and cautiously, following the steps of his logic. The one has been all along advanced; the other, advancing. The one has led—led thought; the other has commanded—commanded legislatures and cabinets.

The question of consistency is not a question of absolute fixedness of opinion. One can hardly help pitying one who is incapable of changing his opinions; though, of course, it is scarcely less difficult to withhold one's admiration from that man who has all along adopted the conclusions of truth. It seems to me that right and truth are the proper standards in this matter. He who proves his mind so free from the shackles of prejudice and the blinds of bigotry as to be ready at every turn to abandon its former positions of error or mistake for the new positions of truth and right, and who, moreover, follows the leadings of his progressing convictions without thought of turning back, is no less consistent—consistent with the true standards of consistency—than is he who has from the first occupied the advanced posts of inquiry whither the other has just arrived. If immutability of belief be the criterion of consistency, then let us taunt scientists with fickleness because their investigations have brought them far beyond where they were, even within the short memory of men; let us sneer at all governments which are not despotisms; let us laugh at civilization because it did not stop in the darkness of the middle ages.

Our own century, though perhaps not so deeply scarred by revolutions as many of those which have preceded it, has been richer than they in true political progress. Old systems have been purified; new systems have been set up. Europe has already gone far towards the abandonment of her old despotisms. Austria and Hungary are struggling towards the full and final establishment of free institutions, based upon a limitation of royal power; Germany has vested in a freely elected representative body much real authority; France is experiencing for the first time in her history, and after many blind searchings for liberty, the blessings of a rational system of government, which, though defective in parts, is based upon well-tested principles; even the hideous outbreaks of violence by which Russian nihilism is disgracing itself are manifestations of a revolt against absolutism which has the germs of honorable patriotism in it. In England reform has made such rapid strides that the Conservatives of to-day stand about where the Liberals, or Whigs, of fifty years ago stood. Parliamentary representation has been thoroughly reformed; the suffrage has been extended as far as prudence permitted; the prerogatives of the Crown seem to have been finally hedged about with every safeguard that the most suspicious patriot could demand; commerce has been freed from harassing restrictions; in everything English statesmen seem to have turned their faces towards the light of practical wisdom instead of hiding them longer in the darkness of prejudice. And it is just this spirit of advance, this emancipation from the narrow views of policy which have heretofore too often influenced British legislation, which is, as I have already said, typified in Mr. Gladstone's career. Once an eloquent advocate of the union of Church and State, he has himself disestablished the Church of Ireland, and startled his countrymen with hints of the advisability and probable necessity of separating the Church of England from the Crown; at one time an unbending

tory, he has assisted in rudely breaking down some of the most cherished principles of the tory creed by the establishment of free trade; he has flung tolerance in their intolerant faces; he has overwhelmed their schemes of extended dominion by proving them plans for multiplying the burdens of an already overburdened kingdom; he has laughed to scorn the doctrine that concessions to foreign powers when England is in the wrong are inconsistent with British dignity; that only arrogant pretensions are consistent with British prestige; that England is to interpose in behalf of tyranny and despotism whenever Russia, or any other one of her "natural enemies," espouses the cause of self-government and freedom. And in all these things he has been true to his principles. Not even his bitterest foes have ever breathed any suspicion of his insincerity. His aim has always been to serve justice and truth, and in his search for these he has not hesitated or been ashamed to abandon the crude theories of his youth for the more rational principles to which the experience of his maturer years has brought him.

It is hard satisfactorily to analyze such a character as Mr. Gladstone's. Its structure is so complex that one is puzzled to know where its mainspring is to be found. His mind has all the indescribable attributes of genius, and consequently baffles all investigation of its constitution. Some clue to its qualities might be found in the subjects of study to which he has most constantly devoted his attention. The poems of Homer, as they were the companions of his Eton days, have also been the objects of his life-long study. He has pondered nothing more thoroughly than the conceptions of the blind bard, whose creations are to him as real as though they were flesh and blood. He seems to have found exquisite enjoyment in exploring the recondite subtleties of the Greek language, and inexhaustible pleasure in the possession of that "golden key that could unlock the treasures of antiquity, of a musical and prolific lan-

guage that gives a soul to the objects of sense, and a body to the abstractions of philosophy." He has undoubtedly found in this harmonious instrument of thought a spirit akin to his own. It is his power to give "a soul to the objects of sense" that has made him one of the greatest financiers the world has produced; and it is his capacity for giving a body, not to the abstractions of philosophy, but to the higher impulses of the English race that has given him his power on the platform and his preëminence in Parliament.

It is only by indirect clues such as this that we can find our way to the secrets of a nature such as Mr. Gladstone's. For the principal qualities of his mind are warrior qualities—the qualities which display themselves in action. We know little clearly of the characters of the great soldiers of history, save only their battle-field traits. It is what they did rather than what they were that constitutes their fame. So Mr. Gladstone's life has been eminently one of bold action, and it is by his deeds that we are obliged to read the character of the doer. His mind is habitually militant, and all that he has written and said, save only his Homeric criticisms, has been written and said not so much to communicate thoughts as to urge arguments and impart purposes. His has been a greatness of deed, a greatness embodied in acts of Parliament and measured by epochs of national progress; a greatness of imperial administrative talent and of sovereign constructive ability. Of course the greatness is in the man himself and it is his nature which thus towers above the ordinary level of mankind. It is the grandeur of the statesman that makes his statesmanship grand, just as, to liken the finite to the infinite, it is the sublimity of the divine power that gives grandeur to the works of nature. It is Mr. Gladstone's lofty qualities of heart, his earnest and practical piety, and his magnificent gifts of intellect that lend distinguished merit to his acts of legislation. But men find it hard to separate him from what

he has done just as they find it hard to know anything of Wellington but that he won Waterloo, or of Marlborough than that he won Blenheim. And when one sits down, pen in hand, to write of the character of a great statesman his view is apt to be confined to volumes of statutes and minutes of parliamentary proceedings. This genius of acting is no more to be defined than it is to be acquired. And so far are we from being able to appreciate the nature of men from what we see them do in public, that we are surprised to learn that Macaulay had intense domestic affections and was capable of romping with children and of devoting himself to the quiet, unpretentious offices of love in the service of his sister—that he did anything but entertain others with brilliant passages of conversation, bright, incisive essays, overflowing with information and keen criticism, and with picturesque history, full of paradox tricked out in charming rhetoric. So far are we from being able to interpret the characters of men by the greater works of their hands, that we seem to see only the sterner, more practical side of Mr. Gladstone's nature when we regard only his public acts, and find it next to impossible to conceive of him as calming his leisure moments by drawing forth soothing harmony from an organ, as busying his great mind, in intervals of rest, with the practical work of a farm—as doing anything but gravely deliberating upon the great affairs of national administration or passing busy nights in Parliament in the eager contest of debate or the earnest work of legislation.

If, because of the masterful success of his financial administration and the consummate ability of his government, we do not wonder that his countrymen have accorded Mr. Gladstone a prominent place among the very first of English statesmen, still less can we be surprised, in view of his wonderful gifts, that he has won a place among the greatest orators. If the passionate intensity, which enters so largely into the texture of

his character, lends so much of force, so much brilliant boldness, to his plans of administration, what overwhelming power it must impart to his oratory! Passion is the pith of eloquence. Not the passion which hurries into extravagance, nor that which spends itself in vehement utterance and violent gesticulation, but that which stirs the soul with enthusiasm for the truth and zeal for its proclamation. It is this that marks the difference between the accomplished speaker and the consummate orator. The difference lies not so much in the diversity of intellectual gift as in the texture of soul. Both England and America are full of good speakers. Every country where discussion holds a place as one of the chief factors of government and where the lecture platform and the electoral hustings, as well as the pulpit and the bar, afford ample opportunity for the cultivation and display of the art of public speech, can boast hosts of pleasing and popular speakers. But in the United States no man is now recognized as the greatest orator in the nation, no one has had to fall upon his shoulders the mantle of Henry, of Clay, or of Webster; and in England only two of a nation of lawyers and of public men are universally acknowledged to have had their lips touched with the fire of the highest eloquence. In this rare preëminence Mr. Bright and Mr. Gladstone stand alone, differing from other orators not in felicity of rhetoric, purity of diction, and mastery of thought, so much as in mental temper. As steel differs from steel in temper, so are the minds of these men of finer metal than those of their rivals in oratory. The instrument they use is not a keen rapier of wit, which can cut floating veils of fancy with delightful skill, or flash the sharp destruction of satire from its burnished blade—such are the tricks of Beaconsfield's brilliant oratory; nor is it of the ordinary steel of striking rhetoric, sharp phrase, and keen argument—of such are the weapons which Robert Lowe and Sir William Harcourt employ. It is a two-edged

sword that can split fine hairs of distinction with no less precision than it can search out the heart of an opponent's plea, that can make the dexterous passes of dialectic fence with the same readiness with which it can cleave the defences of prejudice.

It is as an orator that Mr. Gladstone most forcibly appeals to our imaginations. He has certainly been one of the most prolific of English orators. The streams of his eloquence are perennial. His speeches extend their influence beyond the hour of their speaking, their charm beyond the tones of the speaker's voice. They move when read only less than they moved when heard. Even when set in the cold and quiet print they seem full of life and warmth and vigor. When reading a report of one of his great arguments one seems to catch the spirit of the "cheers" which break the column with their parentheses, and to hear echoed plaudits in his own heart. It is not every one, however, I imagine, that would enjoy a perusal of Mr. Gladstone's speeches. A literary critic could scarcely commend their structure; tastes of super-refinement and exalted ideals would hardly find room for admiration of their plans. Theirs is not the beauty of form or of movement, of grace or of symmetry; but the beauty of grand proportions and of rugged strength—that beauty which approaches to grandeur: to a grandeur which is not the grandeur of art, but the grandeur of nature. To one who can enter into the spirit of that keen warfare between principles, the warfare of political discussion, there is real music in these speeches—more than in the measured beauty of Ruskin's exquisite style or in the bolder strains of Caning's ornate rhetoric. For one whose imagination is roused more quickly by the tread of armies and the strokes of the sword in battle than by the quiet loveliness of green fields or the majestic sweep of some silent river which does not rebel against its banks, these speeches must possess a powerful attraction. The progress of Mr. Gladstone's arguments is like the sweep-

ing flight of an eagle from crag to crag and summit to summit.

The style of these speeches is peculiar—peculiarly vicious according to the judgment of some. Certainly it is not a style such as would provoke imitation. The sentences, most of them, are long, clause being heaped on clause, parenthesis added to parenthesis, until the very skill of the orator in extricating himself successfully and grammatically excites our wondering admiration. Their strength is a compound strength; the strength of accumulated force. Every now and then, however, the light and heat of these sentences are focused in a single phrase: their meaning concentrated in one short period which must have struck the hearer like a sudden blow. And the meaning of the orator shines clearly through his most involved sentences. They sometimes seem interminable, but they seldom seem obscure. They are powerful weapons in Mr. Gladstone's hands; they could scarcely be handled by any other. Bruce's sword was powerful to work destruction in Bruce's hands; to others its weight would have been but a burden. I suppose that these massive sentences are the natural extemporaneous expression of a mind which is full to overflowing.

But Mr. Gladstone's spoken style is not uniform—not uniform even in its defects, still less in its beauties. His genius as an orator most conspicuously manifests itself in his power of adapting his style to the audience he is addressing. One day he is speaking to a meeting of the most intelligent and learned members of his constituency, and his style is one of measured calmness, his treatment following the leadings of a strict, though eloquent, logic. The next day, perhaps, he meets the farmers of the countryside upon the hustings, and the style is changed. It is aflame with earnest persuasion and glowing with passionate sentiment. He is speaking like an Englishman to Englishmen, with eager patriotism and a fire of high resolve. He is convincing

his hearers by persuading them. There is always, however, whatever the audience he is addressing, the same foundation of conviction and the same transparency of truth. Though the treatment be diverse, there is no diversity in the beliefs, no crookedness in the counsels, of the orator. The soil may differ, now spread in calm beauty, now piled in great heights, but under all and supporting all are the primitive, unchanging granite veins of conviction.

According to all accounts, the delivery of the orator is in keeping with the style of the orations, is chiefly marked by its power. The personal appearance of the speaker strikes the eye. A London correspondent of the *Philadelphia Press* has thus happily described Mr. Gladstone as he looks since age has begun to creep upon him: "In personal appearance Mr. Gladstone is an active, lithe, muscular man, rather tall, and of well-proportioned frame. His face and figure have that clear-cut contour which generally indicates several generations of intellectual activity and personal leadership. * * * The face is scholarly, cultivated, its outlines boldly defined by the meagreness of muscle which distinguishes the intellectual athlete. There is not an ounce of superfluous flesh on it. The thin lip and well cut mouth and chin betoken firmness, determination, and endurance. Seventy summers have sat lightly on him, but the years have brought their blessing of rest, and his face in general wears the repose of strength and experience, strongly lined with the record of struggle and thought." I do not suppose that photographs and engravings can convey any very faithful portraiture of such a face. Still all photographs of Mr. Gladstone display the same general cast of feature, and satisfy more or less precisely the description of the correspondent. It is altogether a remarkable face, and the features seem such as would be modified by every current of feeling. The deep eye and quivering muscles answer to every tone of the marvellous voice. If Bright's voice rings like a peal of

bells, Gladstone's pierces like a trumpet call or thrills with tones like an organ's.

Upon the hustings Mr. Gladstone overwhelms opposition and seldom fails to compel victory. Once or twice he has had to meet vast assemblages of excited and angered men on Blackheath, who greeted him with jeers and hisses; but never did he fail to change their jeers into cheers, their hisses into applause, their anger into enthusiasm, their enmity into support. At first his voice was raised in accents of conciliation which calmed the passions of his hearers as they rung out above all the fierce vociferations of excited hatred; at last the same voice's calls of command and persuasion were borne aloft above the resounding echoes of redoubled cheers. The exordium broke like harshest discord on the ears of the listener; to the peroration their own approving cheers were the inspiring refrain.

But it is in Parliament that Mr. Gladstone's eloquence is said to be most masterful. There his victories have been unnumbered, his first triumph dating from that memorable night in November, 1852, which has so often been the theme of description; that night when first he was pitted against Disraeli in the direct combat of debate; that night on which, by one splendid leap, he attained to the highest achievements of eloquence. The memory of that night must often recur to men who then sat in Parliament as among their most stirring recollections. It was an occasion of crisis. In February, 1852, the government of Lord John Russell had been broken by the clash of factions in the House of Commons. The storms of 1847, when the great Free Trade victory had been won, had not yet cleared finally away, and Parliament was divided into several hostile and jarring parties: into Peelites, protectionists and Whigs. Even in the Whig ranks there was defection and division. Palmerston had been dismissed from the Foreign Office and driven into opposition. Ever since the entrance of the Russell ministry

into office their administration had been characterized by hesitation, vacillation, and general ineffectiveness. Their fall in February, 1852, was therefore natural, though at the time not generally expected. They were succeeded by a ministry under the leadership of Lord Derby, in which Mr. Disraeli held the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer and fulfilled the functions of leader of the House of Commons. But if Lord John Russell had been harassed by the cross fire of irreconcilable factions, much more was Lord Derby fettered by the uncertain support of a makeshift coalition. An appeal was taken to the country in behalf of the new government, and the new government was condemned. The new Parliament met in November, 1852. It speedily became evident that the new ministers must go. The first important business of the session was Mr. Disraeli's financial statement. Driven about by the winds of faction, anxious to conciliate two discordant interests, that of the tory farmers who were clamoring for protection, and that of the Free Traders who were demanding a formal sanction of their policy, the Chancellor of the Exchequer submitted a budget which satisfied nobody. He was immediately attacked by an overwhelming force of Free Traders, Whigs and Peelites, and the great debate to which I have alluded set in. It has been described as a splendid display. On that November night, in a House full to overflowing with eager and excited listeners—members who were unable to find seats on the floor, gathering without the bar or in the galleries of the House—Mr. Gladstone won his first great victory over his life-long opponent. Mr. Disraeli had spoken long and with consummate skill: with all the vigor of desperation and all the eloquence of determination. It was past midnight, the clock upon the towers of St. Stephen's had struck the hour of two, when Mr. Gladstone, without previous preparation, sprang to the floor to answer him. The cheers which had followed Mr. Disraeli's strangely

powerful defence had scarcely died away when Mr. Gladstone rose. It would be a bold pen indeed that would essay a description of the place and the scene. And yet it was a scene upon which the imagination would fain linger. The hall of the House of Commons is not a large one. The cushioned benches on which the members are crowded rise in close series on either side of a central aisle at one end of which stands the Speaker's chair. Below his chair are the seats of the clerks and the broad table at either side of which, on the front benches nearest the Speaker, sit the Ministry, and the leaders of the Opposition, the former to the Speaker's right, the latter to his left. Above the rear benches and over the outer aisles of the House, beyond "the bar," hang deep galleries. It seems a place intended for hand-to-hand combats; and on that chill, damp November morning, it witnessed a combat such as had seldom awakened its echoes before. The slender form of the eager orator rose in striking outline and bold relief from amidst the mass of earnest, upturned faces; from amongst the figures bent in postures of absorbed attention; from beneath the forms which leaned from the galleries as if intent to lose not one syllable of the speaker's rushing speech, not one accent of the voice which was ringing its magnificent changes on the sentiments of his heart. For two hours did that marvellous voice fill the crowded spaces with its silvery vibrations, now breaking the hushed stillness of the chamber with its stirring tones, anon raising its clearer peals above the resounding cheers of the fired audience. The orator's own apparent calmness was in strange contrast with the strong excitement of his hearers. His eye was touched, no doubt, with fire, and his lips livid with expression in their quivering partings; but his nerves were steadied like iron; only an occasional twitching of the muscles of his face to indicate the stupendous movings of the spirit within. It seems to have been with him one of those supreme moments when all the ner-

vous tremors of self-consciousness are gone from the presence of the exalting and transforming inspiration of a cause. If Mr. Disraeli had dazzled, Mr. Gladstone had triumphed. The House divided about four o'clock, and the government was left in a minority of nineteen.

This was, as I have said, the first of Mr. Gladstone's great oratorical triumphs. It won for him an undisputed primacy among English orators. Afterwards Englishmen came to regard John Bright as the greatest of English orators; but by none other in his own day, if even by him, has Mr. Gladstone been eclipsed. Gladstone and Bright will probably be remembered by future generations as peers, rather than as rivals, in eloquence. Certainly no man was ever more unfailingly and uniformly eloquent than Mr. Gladstone. Even during his service as Prime Minister, when the requirements of the daily conduct of business in the House of Commons called him daily and hourly to his feet, his reputation for eloquence never dimmed. His very explanations of matters of dry routine business made members turn interested and attentive towards himself. His poetic sensibilities manifested themselves here in communicating to matters of form and legislative detail, the life and light of his own mind. If he was sometimes betrayed by the very facility with which he could speak into weary lengths of explanation and perplexing fullness of statement, there were at least corresponding lengths of interest and compensating plenitude of illustration. He seemed sometimes to waste his riches on trivial subjects; but when the subject was great the orator was supreme. He exalted matters of detail; but he at least never failed to master in all their breadth and scope the great concerns of national legislation and to magnify his consummate powers by the skill of his dealings with the weightier interests of the great empire he was set to rule.

The astonishing achievements and successes of Mr.

Gladstone's Midlothian campaign—the news of whose triumphant issue has just reached us as I write—seem a fitting culmination to his career as a statesman. His party is victorious and the very mention of his name is cheered by vast mass-meetings in every part of the kingdom. Beaconsfield is beaten; the brilliant reign of charlatanry is at an end; and the future lies with that great party whose loved and trusted leader is Mr. Gladstone. Providence has been pleased to brighten his declining years with a new assurance of victory to the cause in whose name he has spent the magnificent energies of his nature; and if this be the last work of his life, surely no happier time could come for the closing scenes of the career of a man whose fame has not been bounded by continents or seas; whose works have been the works of progress; whose impulses have been the impulses of nobility; whose purposes have been the purposes of patriotism; whose days have been blessed by a genius which has been fired by devotion, tempered by discretion, purified by piety, and sanctified by love.

ATTICUS.

FIRST STATEMENT ON THE TARIFF QUESTION

TESTIMONY OF MR. WOODROW WILSON OF ATLANTA, BEFORE THE TARIFF COMMISSION, ATLANTA SESSION, SEPTEMBER 22, 1882. MR. WILSON WAS THEN PRACTICING LAW IN ATLANTA. FORTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS, 2D SESSION, HOUSE MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS, VOL. III; REPORT OF THE TARIFF COMMISSION, VOL. II, PP. 1294-1297.

Mr. WOODROW WILSON, of Atlanta, said:

It is not my purpose to represent or advocate any particular interest, but only to say a few words upon the general issues before you on the subject of protection or free trade. This question of the tariff is one which has been under consideration in Congress for 90 odd years. Early in the century protection was introduced for the purpose of fostering new manufactures in this country. That system was continued down to the time of the war; but since the war it has been upheld professedly for the purpose of raising revenue, and to enable the government to recover from the indebtedness caused by the war. Free trade, therefore, has been a slumbering question, but it will soon become one of the leading questions in all political discussions, because, now that peace has come, the people of the South will insist upon having the fruits of peace, and not being kept down under the burdens of war.

As you have already been told, there is a great deal of ignorance and indifference in regard to these questions in the South. The people here have been content to let things remain as they were. Probably this has

resulted from the fact that the tariff is an indirect way of placing taxes upon the people, and they do not feel the immediate effects of it. But when the farmers and others begin to investigate these matters, they soon discover that they are, after all, paying these duties for the benefit of a few manufacturing classes. When a farmer discovers that he can buy a jack-knife of English manufacture for \$1.30, while he has to pay \$2 for a knife of American manufacture of the same quality, in order that the American manufacturer of cutlery may compete on equal terms with the British, then he feels that he has a personal interest in these subjects.

In thinking of this matter of indirect taxation, I am reminded of one of the few playful passages which illumine the utterances of Mr. Gladstone. In introducing his "budget" in 1861, he referred to direct and indirect taxation, and called them two sisters, the daughters of necessity and invention, one indeed more open and direct than the other, her sister more shy and insinuating; but he said that, as chancellor of the exchequer, he felt bound to pay his addresses to both. We have these two charming sisters in America, but they cannot be said to be the daughters of necessity and invention; they are rather the daughters of invention and monopoly. The necessities of our government are the necessities of the revenue; and it is well known that our government is not embarrassed from any necessities of revenue; on the contrary, it has an immense surplus. It is undoubtedly a part of true wisdom that the taxes laid by the general government should be indirect taxes. The province of direct taxation should be left to the States, and in order that the two systems may not clash and overburden the people, it is a part of wise policy that the national government shall make the most of its taxation indirect.

No man with his senses about him would recommend perfect freedom of trade in the sense that there should be no duties whatever laid on imports. The only thing

that free traders contend for is, that there shall be only so much duty laid as will be necessary to defray the expenses of the government, reduce the public debt, and leave a small surplus for accumulation. But that surplus should be so small that it will not lead to jobbery and corruption of the worst sort.

We often hear the question asked by the advocates of protection whether it is a wise and consistent public policy for us to be dependent for supplies upon foreign governments. That was asked in reference to cotton-ties. It was said that the cotton-tie was manufactured almost wholly in England, and the question was put to the witness, "Is it a part of wise policy that we should be dependent on England for our cotton-ties?" In other words, we fear dependence on foreign manufacturers. Now, gentlemen, what does that mean? There is no danger in time of peace in being dependent on foreign manufacturers, because, if they raise their prices, the inevitable result will be that Americans will go into the manufacture and undersell them, and their prices must come down again. Therefore we are in no danger in time of peace. So that the argument of the protectionist must be a war argument. Of course, if a war should occur between this country and Great Britain, it would be greatly to the disadvantage of our southern cotton-balers to be dependent entirely on the English manufacturer for their cotton-ties. So that the protectionist advocates a system which prepares for war, while it has not any consideration for the requirements of the country in time of peace. I ask, is it worth while during fifty years of peace to provide by taxation for one year of war? Is it wise and just to tax the people for a contingency so that millions may be accumulated in the Treasury from the tax on these cotton-ties in order that war at some distant period, which no man sees, may be provided for? War will cost a great deal when it comes; let it not be costing us in the mean time.

Another stronghold of the protectionists is the question of wages. They say, "How can we compete with the foreigners when the remuneration of labor is so much lower in foreign countries than in our own country?" Well, we can compete with them just as we do in regard to agricultural products. Of course every gentleman knows that our principal agricultural products have no duty imposed upon them. English wheat and other produce may come into our markets free of duty, and there is a freedom of trade in that regard, so far as the farmer is concerned.

By Commissioner GARLAND:

Question. Do I understand you to say that there is no duty on wheat?—Answer. So I understand by looking at the last returns.

Commissioner GARLAND. Such is not my understanding.

Commissioner OLIVER. Wheat pays 20 cents a bushel, and the farmers have been asking us to keep that duty on, because they say otherwise it would be imported from Manitoba.

The WITNESS. Then I was misinformed. But it is a well-known fact that there is a greater disparity in the wages paid for agricultural labor in this country and in England than there is between wages paid in other industries, and although the duties on these agricultural products are lower, our competition with foreigners in this regard is more successful. In other words, we make up for the high price of our wages by the fertility of our land. There is no land in the world that can compare in fertility with the land of the West, and the consequence is, we have an immense advantage in that regard. We have advantages also in other industries, such as in mining and in cotton productions. These are compensations which are provided, and which no human laws can take away.

There are positive grounds, however, upon which

protection can be objected to. It is understood that the protective tariff policy was adopted in this country in the beginning on the idea advocated by John Stuart Mill and one or two other eminent writers on the subject in England, who said that a new country might with advantage protect its infant industries, provided the tariff which was laid for that purpose was merely a temporary expedient for building up those industries. It was upon that idea that America first established this protective system. What has been the result? These infant industries at first were protected by very small duties, but, instead of growing into manhood and strength, they have gone in to weaker decrepitude. They have needed more and more protection as years have gone on, until the climax has been reached at the present time. That ought to overthrow the whole doctrine in itself. But the danger in imposing protective duties is, that when the policy is once embarked upon, it cannot be easily receded from. Protection is nothing more than a bounty, and when we offer bounties to manufacturers they will enter into industries and build up interests, and when at a later day we seek to overthrow this protective tariff, we must hurt somebody, and of course there is objection. They will say, "Thousands of men will be thrown out of employment, and hundreds of people will lose their capital." This seems very plausible; but I maintain that manufacturers are made better manufacturers whenever they are thrown upon their own resources and left to the natural competition of trade rather than when they are told, "You shall be held in the lap of the government, and you need not stand upon your feet." Such theories discourage skill, because it puts all industries upon an artificial basis. The basis that they rest upon is not that of the skill of the manufacturer; it is because the bounty of the government is put on his trade which enables him to get more for an inferior article than a foreigner could get for a better article.

Protection also hinders commerce immensely. The English people do not send as many goods to this country as they would if the duties were not so much, and in that way there is a restriction of commerce, and we are building up manufactories here at the expense of commerce. We are holding ourselves aloof from foreign countries in effect, and saying, "We are sufficient to ourselves; we wish to trade, not with England, but with each other." I maintain that it is not only a pernicious system, but a corrupt system.

By Commissioner GARLAND:

Q. Are you advocating the repeal of all tariff laws?
—A. Of all protective tariff laws; of establishing a tariff for revenue merely. It seems to me very absurd to maintain that we shall have free trade between different portions of this country, and at the same time shut ourselves out from free communication with other producing countries of the world. If it is necessary to impose restrictive duties on goods brought from abroad, it would seem to me, as a matter of logic, necessary to impose similar restrictions on goods taken from one State of this Union to another. That follows as a necessary consequence; there is no escape from it.

H. Mis. 6—82

COMMITTEE OR CABINET GOVERNMENT?

WRITTEN WHILE MR. WILSON WAS A STUDENT AT
JOHNS HOPKINS. FROM THE "OVERLAND
MONTHLY," JANUARY, 1884; SERIES 2, VOL. III,
17-33.

"The only conceivable basis for government in the New World is the national will; and the political problem of the New World is how to build a strong, stable, enlightened, and impartial government on that foundation."—Goldwin Smith.

"A humorist of our own day has laughed at Parliaments as 'talking shops,' and the laugh has been echoed by some who have taken humour for argument. But talk is persuasion, and persuasion is force; and the one force which can sway free men to deeds such as those which have made England what she is."—J. R. Green.

THE House of Representatives is a superlatively noisy assembly. Other legislative bodies are noisy, but not with the noise of the House of Representatives. We are told that the slightest cause of excitement will set the French National Assembly frantically agog; that the English House of Commons is often loud voiced in its disorderly demonstrations; and that even our stolid cousins, the Germans, do not always refrain from guttural clamor when in Reichstag assembled. Our own House of Representatives, however, indulges in a confusion peculiar to itself. Probably the representatives themselves soon became accustomed to the turmoil in which they are daily constrained to live, and are seldom heedful of the extreme disorder which prevails about them; but a visitor to the House of Representatives experiences upon entering its galleries for the first time sensations which it is not easy to define or to describe.

The hall of the House is large beyond the expectation of the visitor. For each of the three hundred and

twenty-five Representatives there is provided a roomy desk, and an easy, revolving chair—a chair about which there is space ample enough for the stretching of tired legislative legs in any position of restful extension that may suit the comfort of the moment. The desks and seats stand around the Speaker's chair in a great semicircle, ranged in rows which radiate from that seat of authority as a center. Here and there a broad aisle runs between two rows of seats, from the circumference of the semicircle to the roomy spaces about the clerk's and Speaker's desks. Outside the seats, and beyond the bar which surrounds them, are other broad, soft-carpeted spaces; and still there is room, beyond these again, for deep galleries to extend on every side their tiers of benches, before the limiting walls of the vast hall are reached. Overhead, framed by the polished beams which support them, are great squares of ground glass, through which a strong light falls on the voting and vociferating magnates below.

One would suppose that it would require a great deal of noise to fill that great room. Filled it is, though, during the sittings of the House. It is not the noises of debate, but the incessant and full-volumed hum of conversation, and the sharp clapping of hands that strikes the ear. The clapping of hands is not sustained and concerted, but desultory, like a dropping fire of musketry; for these gentlemen in their easy chairs are not applauding any one—they are only striking their palms together as a signal-call to the young pages who act as messengers and errand-boys, and who add the confusion of movement to the confusion of sound, as they run hither and thither about the hall. Members, too, stroll about, making friendly visits to the desks of acquaintances, or holding informal consultations with friends and colleagues. When in their seats, they seem engrossed in assorting documents, in writing letters, or in reading newspapers, whose stiff rattle adds variety to the prevailing disorder.

Some business is evidently going on the while; though the onlooker in the gallery must needs give his closest attention in order to ascertain just what is being done. Now and again a member rises and addresses the chair, but his loudest tones scarcely reach the galleries in the form of articulate speech; and the responsive rulings of the Speaker are not so distinctly audible as are the ineffectual rappings of his restless gavel. Naturally, therefore, very few members try to speak. They do not covet an opportunity to do so, in a hall which none but the clearest and strongest voice could fill, even if the silence of attention were vouchsafed. However frequent one's visits to the capitol, he will seldom find the House engaged in debate. When some member, more daring, more determined, more hardy, or more confident than the rest, does essay to address the House, he generally finds that it will not listen, and that he must content himself with such audience as is given him by those in his immediate neighborhood, who are so near him that they cannot easily escape listening. His most strenuous efforts will not avail to make members in distant seats conscious that he is on the floor. They are either indifferent to what he is saying, or prefer to read it in the "Record" to-morrow.

This, then, is seemingly a most singular assembly. It seldom engages in lengthy debate, being apparently content to leave that dignified and generally unexciting exercise to the Senate; whose hall is, because of its smaller size, better suited for such employments, and where greater decorum prevails. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the careless manners of the House betoken idleness. Its sessions are, on the contrary, generally quite busy. It has been known to pass thirty-seven pension bills at one sitting. The chief end of its rules is expedition in business, and such wholesale legislation is, accordingly, not only possible but usual; for, be it remembered, the House does not have to digest its schemes of legislation. It has standing commit-

tees which do its digesting for it. It deliberates in fragments, through small sections of its membership, and when it comes together as a whole, votes upon the bills laid before it by these authoritative committees, with scant measure of talk.

It is this plan of entrusting itself to the guidance of various small bodies of its members that distinguishes our House of Representatives from the other great legislative bodies of the world. It is not peculiar in being omnipotent in all national affairs; the Commons of England and the Assembly of France are equally omnipotent; but it is peculiar in being awkward at exercising its omnipotence. Though, as a matter of fact, above the Executive in undisputed supremacy; though the President and his Cabinet are its servants; though they must collect and expend the public revenues as it directs; must observe its will in all dealings with foreign States, are dependent upon it for means to support both army and navy—nay, even for means to maintain the departments themselves; though they are led by it in all the main paths of their policies, and must obey its biddings even in many of the minor concerns of every-day business; though whenever it chooses to interfere, it is powerful to command: it is altogether dissociated from the Executive in its organization, and is often mightily embarrassed in wielding its all-embracing authority. It directs the departments; but it stands outside of them, and can know nothing clearly of their operation.

Its immediate agents in its guidance of executive affairs are its standing committees. Constrained to provide for itself leaders of some sort or other, Congress has found them in certain small and select bodies of men, to whom it has entrusted the preparation of legislation. It could not undertake to consider separately each of the numberless bills which might be brought in by its members. If it were to undertake to do so, its docket would become crowded beyond all hope of clearance, and its business fall appallingly into arrears. It must

facilitate its business by an apportionment of labor, and by dividing make possible the task of digesting this various matter.

Accordingly, it has set up numerous standing committees, whose duty it is to prepare legislation and to act as its immediate agents in all its dealings with the executive departments. The Secretary of the Treasury must heed the commands of the Finance Committee of the Senate and the Ways and Means Committee of the House; the Secretary of State must in all things regard the will of the Foreign Affairs Committees of both Houses; the Secretary of the Interior must suffer himself to be bidden, now by the Committees on Indian Affairs, now by those on the Public Lands, and again by those on Patents. The Secretary of War must assiduously do service to the Committees on Military Affairs; to still other committees the Postmaster-General must render homage; the Secretary of the Navy must wear the livery of the Committees on Naval Affairs; and the Attorney-General must not forget that one or more of these eyes of the Houses are upon him. There are Committees on Appropriations, Committees on the Judiciary, Committees on Banking and Currency, Committees on Manufactures, Committees on Railways and Canals, Committees on Pensions and on Claims, Committees on Expenditures in the several Departments, and on the Expenditures on Public Buildings, committees on this and committees on that, committees on every conceivable subject of legislation.

And these standing committees are very selfish.

Congress, by spoiling them with petting, has made them exacting. It indulges their every whim; for the rules of the House of Representatives provide for the expedition of business by securing beyond a peradventure the supremacy of its committees. Full of puzzling intricacies and complicated checks as these rules seem, this is their very simple purpose. There must be the utmost possible limitation of debate. Every session, of

course, a great many bills, sometimes several thousand, are introduced by individual members and there is not time to discuss or even to vote upon them all. Accordingly, the right of individual representatives to have their proposals separately considered must be sacrificed to the common convenience. The bills which are sent by scores to the clerk's desk every week when the roll of States is called are, therefore, all sent to the standing committees. Scarcely a topic can be touched which does not fall within the province of one or another of these committees, and so no bill escapes commitment.

But a bill committed is a bill doomed. Suppose, for example, that the Appropriations Committee has fifty or a hundred bills referred to it—and that would doubtless be much fewer than usual—how can there be a separate report upon each? Time would not serve for such an undertaking. The committee must simply reject utterly most of the bills, and, having from the remainder culled the provisions they like, frame for submission to the House a comprehensive scheme of their own.

As a rule, therefore, the debates of the House of Representatives are confined to the reports of the committees, and even upon these reports the House does not care to spend much time. Consequently, its debates upon their contents can seldom with strict accuracy be called debates of the House. They are in the House, but not of it. The period of debate and the number of speakers are usually limited by rule. So long a time, and so long only, is devoted to each discussion, and during that time the members of the reporting committee are accorded right of precedence for the presentation of their views upon the subject in hand, other members gaining the floor only when committeemen are courteous enough to give way to them.

The House makes its nearest approach to business debate when in Committee of the Whole. Then some-

thing like free and effective discussion takes place. Even then, however, members are not given unlimited scope. They must not talk longer than five minutes at a time. Though the House is no longer the House, and has put on the free habits of committee work, it still retains its predilections, and still binds itself by rules which are stingy of time to those who would speak. Five-minute speeches, moreover, gain little more attention than is vouchsafed to the one-hour speeches of committeemen during a regular session; for the Committee of the Whole is no better listener than its other self, the House. Members are almost quite as noisy and inattentive as when the Speaker is in his chair.

The conclusion of the whole matter, then, is that legislation is altogether in the hands of the standing committees. In matters of finance, the Committee of Ways and Means is, to all intents and purposes, the whole House; on questions affecting the national judiciary the Judiciary Committee practically dictates the decision of the whole House; when expenditures have received the approval of the Appropriations Committee, they have virtually received the sanction of the whole House; the recommendations of the Committee on Naval Affairs are as a matter of course the will of the whole House; and so on, from the beginning to the end of every chapter of legislation. All the House's work is done in the committee rooms. When measures issue thence, only the formality of a vote in regular session—a vote often given without debate—is needed to erect them into bills, acts of the House of Representatives.

By whom, then, it becomes interesting to inquire, are these masterful committees named? And what is the rule of their organization? The privilege and duty of their appointment are vested in the Speaker, and by such investiture Mr. Speaker is constituted the most powerful functionary in the government of the United States. For what can he not accomplish through this

high prerogative? He may, of course, discharge his exalted trust with honor and integrity: but consider the temptations which must overcome him if he be not made of the staunchest moral stuff. Is the public treasury full, and is he bent by conviction or by personal interest toward certain great schemes of public expenditure? With how strong a hand must he restrain his inclinations if he would deny himself the privilege, which he can enjoy without authoritative contradiction from any one, of constituting men of like mind with himself a controlling majority of the Appropriations Committee? Has he determined opinions upon questions of revenue and taxation which he has reason to fear will not be the opinions which are likely to prevail in the House? Who, if he do not prevent himself, will prevent him from naming those of the same opinion a ruling number on the Committee of Ways and Means? Has he friends whose influence was potential in bringing about his elevation to the chair? Who will be surprised if he give those friends the most coveted chairmanships? Does one of these friends feel a special interest in building up the navy? That friend will consider Mr. Speaker a shameless ingrate if his gratitude do not move him to the bestowal of a place of highest authority on both Naval and Appropriations Committees.

As a matter of fact—unless many outrageous calumnies are allowed to run abroad unchallenged—very few Speakers forbid their own personal preferences and predilections a voice in the appointment of committees. Many Speakers are men of strong individuality and resolute purpose, who have won their position by dominant force of will; and such men are sure to make themselves seen and felt in the composition of the committees. They are acknowledged autocrats. Other Speakers, on the other hand, are mere puppets—obscure men who have been raised to the chair by accidents, such as sometimes foist third-rate politicians into the Presi-

dency—men whom caucuses have hit upon simply because they could not agree on anybody else. Such men appoint committees as others suggest. They go as they are led. In their appointments only those are favored who have established a claim upon their gratitude, or an influence over their irresponsible wills, or those who are nominated to their favor by an irresistible custom of the House.

But, turning from Mr. Speaker to his nominees, it is proper to ask: How and where are the proceedings of the committees conducted? With a simple organization of chairman and clerk, each committee sits in a room apart in comparative privacy, no one who is not on its roll being expected to be present uninvited. To assist it in its determinations, it may invite the presence of any executive officer of the government—though it does not appear that it has power to compel his attendance—and it often allows the advocates of special measures to present their arguments at length before it. But any committee that pleases may shut its doors against all comers and sit in absolute secrecy. On what grounds a committee acted is seldom clearly made known to the public. Why this or that bill, which was introduced by some member and referred without debate to the committee, was rejected by it no one can easily tell. The minutes of the committee, if any were kept, are not accessible, and all that appears from the journals of the House is that the committee, when it reported, said nothing of the bill in question. The public, in short, can know little or nothing about the motives or the methods of the standing committees: and yet all legislation may be said to originate with them, and to pass through all its stages under their direction.

The feature, therefore, which distinguishes our national legislation from that of other nations is, that it is the fruit of this unique system of committee government, which we may claim the credit of having invented.

In our Federal relations, we are directed by laws issuing from the privacy of irresponsible committees, and promulgated without debate. These committees are the wheels of the American system: but it is not in them that its motive power resides. We have not seen the whole of our machinery of government until we have visited that caucus where all the fires of legislative action are kindled.

There are caucuses and caucuses, separating themselves into two principal kinds, nominating and legislative. Of the first sort are those small bodies, too often bands of schemers and office-holders, of idlers and small "bosses," which meet in every election district, however little, to nominate candidates for local offices; those larger bodies, which generally work themselves into a heat of vexation and intrigue in naming insignificant men for State offices; and those great stormy conventions whose frenzy gives birth to a "ticket" for President and Vice-President of the Union. All office-holders, from town-clerks through Congressmen to Presidents, are children of caucuses of this pattern. But these are not the caucuses with which we are now most concerned; these are not the caucuses which immediately dominate legislation. Of such authority is the caucus legislative, the deliberative party committee. Representatives of the same party, when assembled in Congress or in State Legislature, feel bound to do whatever they do in most inviolate concert: so they whip themselves together into deliberative caucus. If any doubt at any time arise as to the proper course to be taken in regard to any pending measure, there must be secret consultations in supreme party caucus, in order that each partisan's conscience may be relieved of all suspicion of individual responsibility, and the forces of the party concentrated against the time for actual voting. The congressional caucus rooms are the central chambers of our Constitution.

The caucus was a natural and legitimate, if not

healthy offspring of our peculiar institutions. Legislative caucuses and even nominating caucuses were necessitated by the complete separation of the legislative and executive departments of our government. By reason of that separation Congress is made supreme within the sphere of the Federal authority. There is none to compete with it. To it belongs the hand of power—the power of the purse and of the law—and it has naturally stretched forth that hand to brush away all obstacles to the free exercise of its sovereignty. But, although always master, it was at first, as has been said, embarrassed to find efficient means of exercising its mastery. It was, from the beginning, a rather numerous body, and in order to rule with vigor it was necessary that it should itself be ruled. It was, however, so organized, and so isolated from the other branches of the Federal system, as to render any authoritative personal leadership impracticable. There could scarcely be in either House any man or body of men able from sheer supremacy of genius or influence of will to guide its actions and command its deliberations. Some man of brilliant argumentative gifts and conspicuous sagacity might gain temporary sway by reason of his eloquence or a transient authority by virtue of his wisdom; but, however transcendent his talents, however indisputable his fitness for the post, he could never constitute himself the *official* leader of the Legislature; nor could his fellow members ever invest him with the rights of command. Manifestly, however, the House must have leadership of some kind. If no one man could receive the office of command, it must be given to sub-committees—to bodies small enough to be efficient, and yet so numerous that predominant power would be within the reach of no one of them. In such bodies, accordingly, it was vested; and so birth was given to that government by committees which now flourishes in such luxuriant vigor.

But that very feature of committee government

which makes it seem to many persons the best conceivable legislative mechanism, is the principal cause of its clumsiness, and is that which makes the congressional caucus an absolute necessity. It is because the committees are too numerous to combine for purposes of rule; because they cannot act in concert; because there is and can be no coöperation amongst them; because, instead of acting together, they must frequently work at cross-purposes; because there can be no unity or consistency in their policy; because they are disintegrate particles of an inharmonious whole, that the deliberative party caucus exists and is all-powerful. If either of the national parties is to follow any distinct line of action, it must make its determinations independently of its representatives on the committees, who cannot act with that oneness of purpose which is made possible only by pre-vised combination. The party itself must come together in committee whenever, in critical seasons of doubt, it is necessary to assure itself of its own unity of purpose. It does so come together, and its deliberations are known as the sittings of a caucus. Such, therefore, was the natural and inevitable generation of the caucus legislative.

How the caucus legislative grew strong and bold, and how finally it has usurped the highest seats of government, or how the nominating caucus had its birth and growth, it is not in this place needful to relate. Suffice it to say that, as everybody knows, it has at length come to pass, by reason of the power of caucuses, that we are governed by a narrow oligarchy of party managers, that we have no great harmonious party majorities, that factions are supreme; factions manipulating caucuses and managing conventions; factions sneaking in committee rooms and pulling the wires that move Mr. Speaker; factions in the President's closet and at governors' ears; that cliques scheme and "bosses" manage.

None can doubt, therefore, that we are fallen upon

times of grave crisis in our national affairs, and none can wonder that disgust for our present system speaks from the lips of citizens respectable both for numbers and for talents. Every day we hear men speak with bitter despondency of the decadence of our institutions, of the incompetence of our legislators, of the corruption of our public officials, even of the insecurity of our liberties. Nor are these the notes of a tocsin which peals in the ears of only a few panic-struck brains. The whole nation seems at times to be vaguely and inarticulately alarmed, restlessly apprehensive of some impending calamity. Not many years ago it required considerable courage to question publicly the principles of the Constitution; now, whenever the veriest scribbler shoots his small shafts at that great charter, many wise heads are wagged in acquiescent approval. It is too late to laugh at these things. When grave, thoughtful, perspicacious and trusted men all around us agree in deriding those "Fourth of July sentiments" which were once thought to hallow the lips of our greatest orators and to approve the patriotism of our greatest statesmen, it will not do for us, personifying the American eagle, to flap wing and scream out incoherent disapproval. If we are to hold to the old faith, we must be ready with stout reasons wherewith to withstand its assailants. It will not suffice to say, "These are the glorious works of our revered ancestors; let not profane voices be lifted up against them, nor profane hands seek to compass their destruction." Men whose patriotism is as undoubted and as indubitable as our own are lightly and freely flinging their taunts at these sacred institutions of ours, and it must be that they represent a large body of our countrymen who believe that corruption and personal ambition are converting the public service into a money-making trade.

Already discussion of the evils that beset and distress us is assuming definite shape and uttering a determined voice. Incoherent grumblings and passionate appeals

are giving place to calm suggestions of remedy and distinct plans of reform. Echoes of such discussion have been heard even beyond the sea, so loud and bold have they grown, and foreigners are pricking up their ears to hear what it is that we are about to do. They realize that great changes are a-making.

Of all the suggestions that have been ventured, the one which we can best afford to ignore is that one which is most frequently made, that by some ingenious nineteenth-century device political parties be altogether ousted from our system. This is much too weak a pill against the earthquake. It is sadly true—let it be admitted—that in this country party government has of late years sunk into a degradation at once pitiable and disastrous. But party government is inseparable from representative government. Representative government is, indeed, only another name for government by partisan majorities. When the people govern, they must govern by majorities. Majorities rule in municipal, in State, and in national affairs alike. Representative government is government by majorities, and government by majorities is party government, which up to the present date is the only known means of self-government. It is the embodiment of that habit of popular rule which is the peculiar glory of our race, which is surrounded by so great traditions, and hallowed by so glorious memories.

In political action, as in all other action, men must join hand and purpose. "Burke admitted that when he saw a man acting a desultory and disconnected part in public life with detriment to his fortune, he was ready to believe such a man to be in earnest though not ready to believe him to be in the right. In any case he lamented to see rare and valuable qualities squandered away without any public utility. He admitted, moreover, on the other hand, that people frequently acquired in party confederacies a narrow, bigoted, and proscriptive spirit. But where duty renders a critical situation a

necessary one, it is our business to keep free from the evils attendant upon it, and not to fly from the situation itself. It is surely no very rational account of a man that he has always acted right, but has taken special care to act in such a manner that his endeavors could not possibly be productive of any consequence. . . . When men are not acquainted with each other's principles, nor experienced in each other's talents, nor at all practiced in their mutual habitudes and dispositions by joint efforts of business; no personal confidence, no friendship, no common interest subsisting among them; it is evidently impossible that they can act a public part with uniformity, perseverance, and efficacy." "He pointed out to emulation the Whig junto who held so close together in the reign of Anne—Sunderland, Godolphin, Somers and Marlborough—who believed 'that no men could act with effect who did not act in concert; that no men could act in concert who did not act with confidence; that no men could act with confidence who were not bound together by common opinions, common affections, and common interests.' " ¹

What we stand in need of, therefore, is party responsibility, and not the abolition of parties. Provided with parties in abundance, and entertained with many nice professions of political principle, we lack party responsibility. American parties are seldom called to account for any breach of their engagements, how solemnly soever those engagements may have been entered into. They thrive as well on dead issues as on living principles. Are not campaigns still yearly won with the voice of war-cries which represent only bygone feuds, and which all true men wish were as silent as the lips that first gave them utterance? "Platforms" are built only for conventions to sit on, and fall into decay as of course when conventions adjourn. Such parties as we have, parties with worn-out principles and without definite policies, are unmitigated nuisances. They are

¹ Morley's Burke (Eng. Men of Letters Series), pp. 52, 53.

savory with decay, and rank with rottenness. They are ready for no service, but to be served. Their natural vocation is to debauch the public morals, to corrupt and use the people; and the people's only remedy is a stern and prompt exercise of their sovereign right. These parties must be roughly shaken out of their insolence, and made to realize that they are only servants, and, being servants, will be expected and required to act with trustworthiness, with all honesty and all fidelity.

But how? There is much talk afloat about the duty of good citizens to go to the "primaries" and withstand in force the iniquities of the mercenaries of machine government. Many voices are uttering very manly calls upon public opinion to assert itself and make exercise of its sovereignty; but they do not advise this multitudinous monarch—the people—how it is to act. Everybody admires outspoken denunciations of wrong, and applauds exhortations to turn again to virtue and to rectitude; but very few care to go into an undiscovered country unless they be guided. The reform of government is not an everyday business, and one would like to be taught the out-of-the-way trade. We are enjoined to the work, but no one will lead or direct. One would suppose that it must be, after all, that the means of reform are so obvious that its advocates do not deem it necessary to point them out. The people must make imperative demand to be better governed, that is all.

But there's the rub, the trouble, and the puzzle. This very demand seems to be daily a-making. There is every reason to believe that the public mind is already quite made up. So stiffly does the breeze of opinion set towards reform that nearly all the political papers of the country have long since gotten well before it; even the one-time open pirates of the spoils system busily trimming their sails, and none so bold as to beat up directly against it. Besides, those who are striving with all their breath to blow this wind into still fiercer blasts, complaisantly tell us that all who are still essaying to

weather it are fast losing heart. Or, the metaphor changed, it may be said that the people has declared its will; that the land is full of heralds whose loud voices proclaim its decree. The winds seem to be bringing to each community from every quarter of the land the news that upon this great question the whole country is agreed. The nation is of one mind. What then? Has the blow been struck? Do the rulers hear the voice of their overlord, and is reform already inaugurated, or do we still wait for its coming? "If it were done when 'tis done, then 'twere well it were done quickly."

The fact is, that in this matter, as in so many others, public opinion seems to be in danger of being disappointed of its omnipotence. Those who enjoy the spoils system love the caucus, and do not readily bend the knee to the people; and those who hope some day to come in for the favors of that system, themselves equally in love with the caucus, cautiously draw rein, and will not lead the hunters who would pursue it to its destruction. Public opinion, meanwhile, is left to hum and haw in distressing embarrassment over the question, What is to be done? How is the popular will to enforce its authority? What advantage is there in being unanimous?

It is only by making parties responsible for what they do and advise that they can be made safe and reliable servants. It is plain to see that this caucus on which our present party system rides is a very ugly beast, and a very unmanageable one. He cannot be driven with a chirp, nor commanded with a word. He will obey only the strong hand, and heed only the whip. To rail at him is of no good. He must be taken sternly in hand, and be harnessed, whether he will or no, in our service. Our search must be for the bit that will curb and subdue him.

In seeking an escape from the perplexity, manifestly the safest course is to content ourselves with traveling ways already trodden, and look to the precedents of

our own race for guidance. Let, therefore, the leaders of parties be made responsible. Let there be set apart from the party in power certain representatives who, leading their party and representing its policy, may be made to suffer a punishment which shall be at once personal and vicarious when their party goes astray, or their policy either misleads or miscarries. This can be done by making the leaders of the dominant party in Congress the executive officers of the legislative will; by making them also members of the President's Cabinet, and thus at once the executive chiefs of the departments of State and the leaders of their party on the floor of Congress; in a word, by having done with the standing committees, and constituting the Cabinet advisers both of the President and of Congress. This would be Cabinet government.

Cabinet government is government by means of an executive ministry chosen by the chief magistrate of the nation from the ranks of the legislative majority—a ministry sitting in the legislature and acting as its executive committee; directing its business and leading its debates; representing the same party and the same principles; “bound together by a sense of responsibility and loyalty to the party to which it belongs,” and subject to removal whenever it forfeits the confidence and loses the support of the body it represents. Its establishment in the United States would involve, of course, several considerable changes in our present system. It would necessitate, in the first place, one or two alterations in the Constitution. The second clause of Section Six, Article I, of the Constitution runs thus: “No Senator or Representative shall, during the term for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased, during such time; and no person holding any office under the United States shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office.” Let the

latter part of this clause read: "And no person holding any other than a Cabinet office under the United States shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office," and the addition of four words will have removed the chief constitutional obstacle to the erection of Cabinet government in this country. The way will have been cleared, in great part at least, for the development of a constitutional practice, which, founded upon the great charter we already possess, might grow into a governmental system at once strong, stable, and flexible. Those four words being added to the Constitution, the President might be authorized and directed to choose for his Cabinet the leaders of the ruling majority in Congress; that Cabinet might, on condition of acknowledging its tenure of office dependent on the favor of the Houses, be allowed to assume those privileges of initiative in legislation and leadership in debate which are now given, by an almost equal distribution, to the standing committees; and Cabinet government would have been instituted.

To insure the efficiency of the new system, however, additional amendments of the Constitution would doubtless be necessary. Unless the President's tenure of office were made more permanent than it now is, he could not fairly be expected to exercise that impartiality in the choice of ministers, his legislative advisers and executive colleagues, which would be indispensable to good government under such a system; and no executive Cabinet which was dependent on the will of a body subject to biennial change—and which, because it is elected for only two years, is the more apt to be ruled by the spirit of faction and caught by every cunningly-devised fable—could have that sense of security without which there can be neither steadiness of policy nor strength of statesmanship. It must become necessary to lengthen both presidential and congressional terms. If the President must expect his authority to end within the short space of four years, he

must be excused for caprice in the choice of his Secretaries. If no faithfulness and diligence of his can extend the period of his official authority by even so much as a single week, it cannot be reasonable to expect him to sacrifice his will to the will of others, or to subordinate his wishes to the public good during the short season of that brief authority's secure enjoyment. And, if Cabinets be vouchsafed but two years in which to mature the policies they may undertake, they cannot justly be blamed for haste and improvidence. They could not safely be appointed, or safely trusted to rule after appointment, under a system of quadrennial presidencies and biennial legislatures. Unless both presidential and congressional terms were extended, government would be both capricious and unstable. And they could be the more easily extended, because to lengthen them would be to change no *principle* of the Constitution. The admission of members of Congress to seats in the Cabinet would be the only change of principle called for by the new order of things.

Cabinet government has in it everything to recommend it. Especially to Americans should it commend itself. It is, first of all, the simplest and most straightforward system of party government. It gives explicit authority to that party majority which in any event will exercise its implicit powers to the top of its bent; which will snatch control if control be not given it. It is a simple legalization of fact; for, as every one knows, we are not free to choose between party government and no-party government. Our choice must be between a party that rules by authority and a party that, where it has not a grant of the right to rule, will make itself supreme by stratagem. It is not parties in open and legitimate organization that are to be feared, but those that are secretly banded together, begetters of hidden schemes and ugly stratagems.

Cabinet government would, moreover, put the necessary bit in the mouth of beast caucus, and reduce him

to his proper service; for it would secure open-doored government. It would not suffer legislation to skulk in committee closets and caucus conferences. Light is the only thing that can sweeten our political atmosphere—light thrown upon every detail of administration in the departments; light diffused through every passage of policy; light blazed full upon every feature of legislation; light that can penetrate every recess or corner in which any intrigue might hide; light that will open to view the innermost chambers of government, drive away all darkness from the treasury vaults, illuminate foreign correspondence, explore national dockyards, search out the obscurities of Indian affairs, display the workings of justice, exhibit the management of the army, play upon the sails of the navy, and follow the distribution of the mails—and of such light Cabinet government would be a constant and plentiful source. For, consider the conditions of its existence. Debate would be the breath of its nostrils: for the ministers' tenure of office would be dependent on the vindication of their policy. No member of a Cabinet who had identified himself with any pending measure could with self-respect continue in office after the majority, whose representative he would be, had rejected that measure by a formal and deliberate vote. If, under such circumstances, he did not at once resign, he would forfeit all claim to manly independence. For him to remain in office would be to consent to aid in administering a policy of which he was known to disapprove, and thus to lose the respect of all honorable opponents and the support of all conscientious friends. It would be sacrificing principle to an unworthy love of office; preferring mere place to integrity; openly professing willingness to do the bidding of opponents rather than forego the empty honors of conspicuous station held without conspicuous worth. A man who held an office thus would soon be shamed into retirement; or, were no place left

for shame, would be driven from his authority by a scorn-laden vote.

Moreover, the members of the Cabinet would always be *united* in their responsibility. They would stand or fall together in the event of the acceptance or rejection of any measure to which they had given their joint support. Otherwise, they would be no better leaders than the present standing committees; the differences, the disputes, and the antagonisms of the council-board would be renewed and reheated in the debates on the floor of Congress; the country would be scandalized at seeing ministers cross swords in open contention; personal spites would flame out in public between uncongenial ministers; there would be unseemly contests for the leadership. An ununited Cabinet could offer neither effectual guidance to the Houses nor intelligible advice to the Executive. United responsibility is indispensable in Cabinet government, because, without it, such government lacks its most admirable and valuable, its quintessential feature: namely, responsible leadership. Every deliberative body should have an accepted and responsible leader, and a legislative body without such a leader must dissipate its power like an unbanked stream. And a Cabinet that leads must be itself led, and act as if with one mind; else legislation will drift as helplessly and as carelessly as it does now, under the committees, for want of some one influence to guide it.

A ministry united in action and in responsibility for their acts, must, manifestly, rule by debate. Their power and success would depend on the ascendancy of their policy, and the ascendancy of their policy would depend on the suffrage of the Houses. That policy must be vindicated in the eyes of Representatives and people alike. Defeat on a measure of importance would bring the necessity of resignation, and resignation would mean the incoming of the opposition leaders to power and authority. Debate would, therefore, of course be sought by Ministry and Opposition alike—by the one,

that the triumph of their party might be approved a righteous triumph; by the other, that that triumph might be changed into defeat, and they themselves snatch victory and command. What greater earnest of sincerity and fidelity could there be than such a system as this? No minister could afford to ignore his party's pledges. Abandoned party platforms would furnish fine material for stout party coffins, and the ranks of the Opposition would supply hosts of eager undertakers. How could a Cabinet face the ordeal of debate, after ignoring its promises and violating its engagements? And yet, how could it escape that trial when the Opposition were demanding debate, and to decline it would be of all confessions the most craven? Always eager to assail the ministers, the champions of the Opposition would have an unquenchable zeal for the fight, and no Ministry could afford to refuse them battle.

It becomes every citizen to bethink himself how essential a thing to the preservation of liberty in the republic is free and unrestricted debate in the representative body. It requires the fire of the universal criticism of the press not only, but the intenser flame of expert criticism as well, to test the quality and burn away the crudities of measures which have been devised in the seclusion of the study, or evolved from the compromises of disagreeing committeemen. The press is irresponsible, and often—too often—venally partisan. But representatives must criticise legislation in their own proper persons, and in the presence of the knowledge that constituencies have ears, and that by any blunder of judgment, or meanness of sentiment, the fairest reputation may be stained and the safest prospects blasted. It is good for these things to be done in the glare of publicity. When legislation consists in the giving of a silent judgment upon the suggestions of committees, or of caucuses which meet and conclude in privacy, law-making may easily become a fraud. A great self-governing people should as soon think of entrusting their

sovereign powers to a secret council, as to a representative assembly which refuses to make debate its principal business. It is only when the whole nation is audience to their deliberations that legislators will give heed to their ways.

Very much good might be done by insisting upon debates upon the reports of the standing committees under our present system. But there is no use insisting. No one would care much for such debates. They would mean very little. The rejection of a report would have no other result than to give its subject-matter back to the defeated committee for reconsideration, or, possibly, to postpone the question indefinitely. The committee would not even feel the rebuff. No one committee-man would feel responsible for the result. Neither party would feel rebuked, for each committee is made up of members from both sides of the House. It is because of these inconveniences and these feelings that committees generally have their own way. It is most convenient to let them guide, and little can be gained by opposing them.

There is much object and rare sport, on the other hand, in assailing a responsible Ministry. They will die game at least. They will not tamely suffer themselves to be ousted of their authority. Then, too, they do represent a party: they represent the very pick and flower of their party. In their defeat or victory, the whole army of their co-partisans suffer rout or enjoy success. Between the majority whom they represent and the minority to whom they are opposed, every debate must become a contest for ascendancy, and the introduction of each measure must open up long series of eager and anxious combat.

Here, then, is surely everything that could be desired in the way of a bit for ugly beast caucus. Party interests would constrain the nominating caucus to make choice of men fitted for the work of legislation. In a body whose chief function is debate, neither the sup-

porters nor the opponents of a responsible Cabinet can afford to have many weaklings; still less can they afford to have spokesmen whose integrity is under a cloud of suspicion. Thorough debate can unmask the most plausible pretender. The leaders of a great legislative assembly must daily show of what mettle they are. Besides meeting many watchful adversaries in debate, they must prove themselves "able to guide the House in the management of its business, to gain its ear in every emergency, to rule it in its hours of excitement." Rhetorical adroitness, dialectic dexterity, even passionate declamation, cannot shield them from the scrutiny to which their movements will be subjected at every turn of the daily proceedings. The air is too open for either stupidity or indirection to thrive. Charlatans cannot long play statesmen successfully when the whole country is sitting as critic. And in Congress itself a single quick and pointed and well-directed question from a keen antagonist may utterly betray any minister who has aught to conceal. Even business routine will tear away any thin covering of plausibility from the shams of dishonest policy. There is nothing so wholesome as having public servants always on public trial.

Since, then, victory must generally rest with those who are vigorous in debate and strong in political principle, it would be imperatively necessary for each party to keep on the floor of Congress the ablest men they could draw into their ranks. To stand the tests of discussion they must needs have champions strong of intellect, pure of reputation, exalted in character, and cogent in speech: and to this imperious necessity beast caucus must yield himself subject. Nominating conventions would hardly dare, under such circumstances, to send to Congress scheming wire-pullers or incompetent and double-faced tricksters, who would damn their party by displays of folly and suspicions of corruption. How could such men lead a minority against a powerful

ministry, or face the bitter taunts of opponents and the scornful distrust of fellow-partisans?

But more than this: a new caucus-master would be raised up in the elevation and instruction of public opinion. Free and prolonged congressional debates, conducted on the one side by men eager and able in attack, and on the other by men equally quick and strong in defense, would do more towards informing and instructing public opinion than the press unaided can ever do. Men do not often read newspapers which profess political doctrines or acknowledge party connections different from their own. They read altogether on one side and they read in colors. No staunch Republican paper will often venture to exhibit the flaws in Republican principles; and the paper which is not stalwartly partisan will surely have a small subscription list. Democratic papers must hold up Democratic dogmas in the lights most favorable to them, and in such lights only, else good Democrats will not patronize them. So it is that men read in colors—some in Democratic tints, some in Republican tints, a select few in neutral tints, and none at all in the clear, dry, uncolored light of truth. It must, however, be different were all political interest to center in the debates of the legislature. Still men would read their party papers as before—perhaps even more assiduously and loyally than ever—but into whatever paper they might look there must have crept therein at least a skeleton of the great debates at the capital, and the whole text of the speeches of the party leaders; and these would, of course, be carefully scanned by every reader who had any thought for the government—as diligently read on the one side as on the other. It would be understood by all that on these debates hung all the issues of national policy, and that unless these tournaments were watched one could not forecast anything concerning the political morrow, or think anything definitely concerning the next campaign.

How much more information regarding the questions

of the day can be gained from such debates than from the editorials and correspondence of the press! For such debates are led by men whose chief business it is to study the subjects on which they speak; whose chief desire it is to exhibit each topic of discussion in every phase that it can possibly assume; whose personal authority as men of understanding or of reputation depends on the mastery of principle and of detail they display in these legislative contests; whose fame as orators depends on the clearness of statement, the cogency of reason, the elevation of sentiment, and the ardor of patriotism with which they present their cause and enforce their principles; and whose success as men of affairs, whose dearest ambition as public men, must be achieved or blasted according as they acquit themselves well or ill in the eyes of the nation. Responsible government would transform Congress into a grand national inquisition; for under such a system the ministers are always present to be taxed with questions, and no detail of administration can be kept back when any one in either House chooses to ask about it, and insists upon particular information. Are the navy estimates before the House? Yonder sits a watchful member who has a pigeon-hole in his memory—or, at least, in his desk—for all the items of every appropriation bill that has been passed during the last ten years; and he is on his feet every half hour with several pointed queries to put to the head of the department. “What, Mr. Secretary, does this item mean? Is not this a much larger amount than we gave you last year for the same purpose? Does the Administration mean to put the navy on a war footing, that it asks so much? Why do you come to us again for money to complete those new frigates? How did it happen that your original estimates fell so far short? Has there been a sudden rise in provisions, that you ask more for victualing the fleet this year than you did a year ago? What is the idea of the department in buying less ammunition this

year than heretofore, notwithstanding the fact that you are putting more vessels than ever into service?" What patience of spirit and diligence in business must Mr. Secretary exhibit to reply to all these vexing interrogations with satisfactory fullness, and at the same time with unruffled equanimity!

Public opinion, informed by such proceedings, could easily control, as supreme "boss," the "bosses" of the caucus. Whilst the nominating caucus would be brought into servitude by such a government, the legislative caucus would be killed. Its occupation would be gone. How could there be any necessity for a party often to confer in secret, and constantly to marshal itself for the contests of policy, when under the recognized leadership of a Ministry whose principles are well known and whose course is easily forecast, or even when united and organized in well-understood opposition? The occasion for caucus conferences would no longer exist. Parties could act in concert without them. They could follow distinct lines of policy without resorting to this clumsy and artificial method of manufacturing unanimity. They would have capable and trustworthy leaders under whom to act, and definite, well-recognized principles to advance. They would represent ideas; and would not be bent upon being supreme for mere supremacy's sake.

Of course, no interest is felt now in the debates which take place at Washington, because nothing depends upon them, and the administration of the government is not in the least perceptible degree affected by them. No newspaper cares to print even the chief speeches of a session, because there are no leaders who speak with authority. Seeing this, an observant Englishman—Mr. Dale, of Birmingham—has acutely remarked, that "the Americans care very little about politics, but a great deal about politicians." There are under our system no ordinary means by which the national parties can be united on grounds of distinct and consistent policy, so

that there is of course nothing in our political contests to excite any lasting interest in the principles involved. How can any one be interested in parties that have no complexion; which are one thing to-day, another to-morrow, taking their color from the times? Lookers-on can understand, however, the aspirations of this or that politician for office, and they are interested in the contest. The rivalry is entertaining. The race is diverting and exciting. Now and then, it is true, great questions do engage the public attention. At some crisis, when some overshadowing issue has aroused the sentiment of the constituencies and forces itself forward at the election, candidates are asked with interest and emphasis what their position is with regard to it. But generally politicians need no creed, and can safely rely for success on their personal popularity, or on an indefinite thing called their "record."

But Cabinet government would not only instruct public opinion and elevate Congress into a great deliberative body; it would also set up a higher standard of effectiveness in the executive departments. The ministers, being also the chief officers of the departments, must be able to discern much more readily and clearly than could the most diligent and inquisitive standing committees, the lines of administration which are practicable, and means of management which are available. They know the daily perplexities of departmental business, and can appreciate the complexity of the executive machinery. They are in a position to weigh the thousand minor considerations which must sway the determination of administrative officers in the conduct of their official business, and have every means of ascertaining those necessities of the departments which it is the province of legislation to supply. They are not outsiders, as the committees are, and have, therefore, the incalculable advantage of knowing both the needs of the departments and the temper of the assembly they are leading; being thus enabled to conform legislation at

once to the requirements of government, and to the sentiments of the public; to be both prompt and prudent, both liberal and economical.

Nor would such a union of legislative and executive functions in a single Cabinet committee either jeopardize the independence of the Executive, or derogate from the privileges of the Legislature. As chiefs of the executive bureau, the ministers would have a personal interest in preserving the prerogatives of the Executive; and as official leaders of their party in Congress, they would be zealous to protect the rights and vindicate the authority of the Houses. They *would* not infringe the powers of the Executive, and they *could* not coerce Congress if they would. They would be simply the intelligent counselors of the latter, not its masters; its accountable guides and servants, not its autocrats.

Even the imperfect view of the conditions of Cabinet government that I have been able to give here in these limited magazine spaces is sufficient to make it clear why the establishment of such a system in this country would necessitate a lengthening of the legislative term. Biennial elections to the lower House serve well enough under our present form of government. Even the oft-repeated contests for the Speakership, and the frequent reconstructions of the committees which are attendant upon the reorganizations of the House; even the insecurity of tenure which makes the representative office a station less of usefulness than of profit, and the derangements of business which are incident upon quick recurring elections, do not altogether condemn the system. It is well enough that representatives should have a continuing sense of constant dependence on the approving judgments of their constituents. If there is to be no other feature of responsibility than this in our government, by all means let this be retained. But with Cabinet government, biennial elections would prove a source of too great instability. Each election would decide an issue between parties; would determine which

should have power and enjoy ascendancy; and no Ministry would care to inaugurate a policy which might be broken down at the end of two years. A Cabinet coming into office at a crisis, or bringing with them many promises of great things to be accomplished, might be ousted at the end of two brief years, before their schemes had fairly matured, by a wave of opposition raised by the natural and transient disappointment of the country, that everything promised had not *already* been done. Ministers would not plan for so short a future. They would not have the nerve. They would legislate from hand to mouth. "A mind free from the sense of insecurity is as necessary for great works of statesmanship as for great works of poetry." Biennial elections would be too much like biennial convulsions. Their quick recurrence would keep the country in a fever of political excitement, which would either warm into riot or waste into exhaustion and indifference.

With the responsible chiefs of administration always under the public eye, the permanence and success of civil service reform ought to be assured. They could be cited for every violation of its principles, and for every deviation from its proper practices. Their own mastery would depend upon the efficiency of the administration, and the efficiency of the administration would depend upon the maintenance of true business principles in the manning of the departments; or, in other words, upon the rigid observance of the doctrines of civil service reform.

The uncertainty of their own tenure of office would offer no contradiction to these doctrines. Beyond question, the greater part of the affairs of the departments is altogether outside of politics. The collection and ordinary disbursements of the revenue, the general superintendence of the army and navy, the regulation of the mail service, the administration of justice—all the usual and daily functions of the executive departments—what concern have they with party questions? In these things

business capacity and honest diligence are all that are wanted. Political belief does not affect an officer's efficiency any more than his religious belief might. This is the oft-established principle which lies at the source of the great movement towards civil service reform, in which all the currents of public opinion are now united, in a tide before which the stoutest dykes of party custom and party interest have gone down. It is now universally seen and acknowledged that the public service to be efficient should be non-partisan; and that so far as the nation at large is concerned, it can make no possible difference whether the rank and file of its servants entertain this, that, or the other political creed. Not in one office out of five thousand can opinion affect a man's value as a business agent of the government. But there are executive offices which are political. Those ministers who direct the general policy of the government—if any such there be—must represent the party dominant in the State, just as the standing committees which now stand in the place of such ministers are, properly and as a matter of course, representatives of the ruling majority.

Much might be made of the objection that ministers acting thus as both executive officers and legislative leaders, absorbed as they would be in the business of the Houses and in the marshaling of their party forces in the daily tilt of debate, could not have the leisure to master properly their duties as heads of the departments, and would inevitably fall short of fulfilling their official trusts. This objection is an evident and a weighty one. It must, however, be remembered at every turn in the endeavor to solve this tremendous and perplexing problem of government, that we are commanded by the inexorable necessity of compromise. We must take the least imperfect thing we can get; and surely it is far better to have the business of the executive departments directed by men who know something of their interests, rather than by men who know noth-

ing of those interests: by men who are in constant, intimate, and authoritative communication with subordinates who spend their lives in close and exclusive attention to departmental affairs, rather than by men who can command no such means of information; by men whose personal interests, nay, whose very ambition, must unite them in behalf of good administration; and who are able, therefore, and willing to agree upon a definite, uniform, and consistent policy, rather than by several scores of men divided into numerous, disconnected, and inharmonious committees who cannot coöperate, and who are only too often indifferent as to the results of measures they ignorantly recommend.

So long as we have representative government, so long will the Legislature remain the imperial and all-overshadowing power of the State: and so long as it does remain such a power, it will be impossible to check its encroachments and curb its arrogance, and at the same time preserve the independence of the Executive, without joining these two great branches of government by some link, some bond of connection, which, whilst not consolidating them, will at least neutralize their antagonisms, and, possibly, harmonize their interests. A Cabinet-committee would constitute such a bond; for it would, as we have seen, be a body which, from its very nature and offices, would be at once jealous of the pretensions of the Houses and responsible for the usurpations of the Executive; interested, and therefore determined, to yield not a jot of their lawful executive authority, and yet bound to admit every just claim of power on the part of their legislative colleagues.

That must be a policy of wisdom and prudence which puts the executive and legislative departments of government into intimate sympathy, and binds them together in close coöperation. The system which embodies such a policy in its greatest perfection must be admired of all statesmen and coveted of all misgoverned peoples. The object of wise legislation is the

establishment of equal rights and liberties amongst the citizens of the State, and its chief business, the best administration of government. Legislatures have it constantly in charge, and specially in charge, to facilitate administration: and that charge can be best fulfilled, of course, when those who make and those who administer the laws are in closest harmony. The executive agents of government should stand at the ear of the Legislature with respectful suggestions of the needs of the administration, and the Legislature should give heed to them, requiring of them, the while, obedience and diligence in the execution of its designs. An Executive honored with the confidence of the Legislature, and a Legislature confiding itself with all fullness of trust, yet with all vigilance, to the guidance of an Executive acknowledging full responsibility to the representatives of the people for all its acts and all its counsels: this is a picture good to look upon—a type of effective and beneficent self-government. The changes in our form of government which the establishment of such a system would involve are surely worth making if they necessitate no sacrifice of principle.

It cannot be too often repeated, that while Congress remains the supreme power of the State, it is idle to talk of steadying or cleansing our politics without in some way linking together the interests of the Executive and the Legislature. So long as these two great branches are isolated, they must be ineffective just to the extent of the isolation. Congress will always be master, and will always enforce its commands on the administration. The only wise plan, therefore, is to facilitate its direction of the government, and to make it at the same time responsible, in the persons of its leaders, for its acts of control, and for the manner in which its plans and commands are executed. The only hope of wrecking the present clumsy misrule of Congress lies in the establishment of responsible Cabinet government. Let the interests of the Legislature

be indissolubly linked with the interests of the Executive. Let those who have authority to direct the course of legislation be those who have a deep personal concern in building up the executive departments in effectiveness, in strengthening law, and in unifying policies; men whose personal reputation depends upon successful administration, whose public station originates in the triumph of principles, and whose dearest ambition it is to be able to vindicate their wisdom and maintain their integrity.

Committee government is too clumsy and too clandestine a system to last. Other methods of government must sooner or later be sought, and a different economy established. First or last, Congress must be organized in conformity with what is now the prevailing legislative practice of the world. English precedent and the world's fashion must be followed in the institution of Cabinet government in the United States.

THE STUDY OF ADMINISTRATION

WRITTEN WHILE MR. WILSON WAS A TEACHER AT BRYN MAWR. FROM THE "POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY," JUNE, 1887, VOL. II, PP. 197-222.

I SUPPOSE that no practical science is ever studied where there is no need to know it. The very fact, therefore, that the eminently practical science of administration is finding its way into college courses in this country would prove that this country needs to know more about administration, were such proof of the fact required to make out a case. It need not be said, however, that we do not look into college programmes for proof of this fact. It is a thing almost taken for granted among us, that the present movement called civil service reform must, after the accomplishment of its first purpose, expand into efforts to improve, not the *personnel* only, but also the organization and methods of our government offices: because it is plain that their organization and methods need improvement only less than their *personnel*. It is the object of administrative study to discover, first, what government can properly and successfully do, and, secondly, how it can do these proper things with the utmost possible efficiency and at the least possible cost either of money or of energy. On both these points there is obviously much need of light among us; and only careful study can supply that light.

Before entering on that study, however, it is needful:

I. To take same account of what others have done in the same line; that is to say, of the history of the study.

II. To ascertain just what is its subject-matter.

III. To determine just what are the best methods by which to develop it, and the most clarifying political conceptions to carry with us into it.

Unless we know and settle these things, we shall set out without chart or compass.

I.

The science of administration is the latest fruit of that study of the science of politics which was begun some twenty-two hundred years ago. It is a birth of our own century, almost of our own generation.

Why was it so late in coming? Why did it wait till this too busy century of ours to demand attention for itself? Administration is the most obvious part of government; it is government in action; it is the executive, the operative, the most visible side of government, and is of course as old as government itself. It is government in action, and one might very naturally expect to find that government in action had arrested the attention and provoked the scrutiny of writers of politics very early in the history of systematic thought.

But such was not the case. No one wrote systematically of administration as a branch of the science of government until the present century had passed its first youth and had begun to put forth its characteristic flower of systematic knowledge. Up to our own day all the political writers whom we now read had thought, argued, dogmatized only about the *constitution* of government; about the nature of the state, the essence and seat of sovereignty, popular power and kingly prerogative; about the greatest meanings lying at the heart of government, and the high ends set before the purpose of government by man's nature and man's aims. The central field of controversy was that great field of theory in which monarchy rode tilt against democracy, in which oligarchy would have built for itself strongholds of privilege, and in which tyranny sought oppor-

tunity to make good its claim to receive submission from all competitors. Amidst this high warfare of principles, administration could command no pause for its own consideration. The question was always: Who shall make law, and what shall that law be? The other question, how law should be administered with enlightenment, with equity, with speed, and without friction, was put aside as "practical detail" which clerks could arrange after doctors had agreed upon principles.

That political philosophy took this direction was of course no accident, no chance preference or perverse whim of political philosophers. The philosophy of any time is, as Hegel says, "nothing but the spirit of that time expressed in abstract thought"; and political philosophy, like philosophy of every other kind, has only held up the mirror to contemporary affairs. The trouble in early times was almost altogether about the constitution of government; and consequently that was what engrossed men's thoughts. There was little or no trouble about administration,—at least little that was heeded by administrators. The functions of government were simple, because life itself was simple. Government went about imperatively and compelled men, without thought of consulting their wishes. There was no complex system of public revenues and public debts to puzzle financiers; there were, consequently, no financiers to be puzzled. No one who possessed power was long at a loss how to use it. The great and only question was: Who shall possess it? Populations were of manageable numbers; property was of simple sorts. There were plenty of farms, but no stocks and bonds; more cattle than vested interests.

I have said that all this was true of "early times"; but it was substantially true also of comparatively late times. One does not have to look back of the last century for the beginnings of the present complexities of trade and perplexities of commercial speculation,

nor for the portentous birth of national debts. Good Queen Bess, doubtless, thought that the monopolies of the sixteenth century were hard enough to handle without burning her hands; but they are not remembered in the presence of the giant monopolies of the nineteenth century. When Blackstone lamented that corporations had no bodies to be kicked and no souls to be damned, he was anticipating the proper time for such regrets by full a century. The perennial discords between master and workmen which now so often disturb industrial society began before the Black Death and the Statute of Laborers; but never before our own day did they assume such ominous proportions as they wear now. In brief, if difficulties of governmental action are to be seen gathering in other centuries, they are to be seen culminating in our own.

This is the reason why administrative tasks have nowadays to be so studiously and systematically adjusted to carefully tested standards of policy, the reason why we are having now what we never had before, a science of administration. The weightier debates of constitutional principle are even yet by no means concluded; but they are no longer of more immediate practical moment than questions of administration. It is getting to be harder to *run* a constitution than to frame one.

Here is Mr. Bagehot's graphic, whimsical way of depicting the difference between the old and the new in administration:

In early times, when a despot wishes to govern a distant province, he sends down a satrap on a grand horse, and other people on little horses; and very little is heard of the satrap again unless he send back some of the little people to tell what he has been doing. No great labour of superintendence is possible. Common rumour and casual report are the sources of intelligence. If it seems certain that the province is in a bad state, satrap No. 1 is recalled, and satrap No. 2 sent out in his stead. In civilized countries the process is different. You erect a bureau in the province you want to govern; you make it write letters and copy letters; it sends home eight

reports *per diem* to the head bureau in St. Petersburg. Nobody does a sum in the province without some one doing the same sum in the capital, to "check" him, and see that he does it correctly. The consequence of this is, to throw on the heads of departments an amount of reading and labour which can only be accomplished by the greatest natural aptitude, the most efficient training, the most firm and regular industry.¹

There is scarcely a single duty of government which was once simple which is not now complex; government once had but a few masters; it now has scores of masters. Majorities formerly only underwent government; they now conduct government. Where government once might follow the whims of a court, it must now follow the views of a nation.

And those views are steadily widening to new conceptions of state duty; so that, at the same time that the functions of government are every day becoming more complex and difficult, they are also vastly multiplying in number. Administration is everywhere putting its hands to new undertakings. The utility, cheapness, and success of the government's postal service, for instance, point towards the early establishment of governmental control of the telegraph system. Or, even if our government is not to follow the lead of the governments of Europe in buying or building both telegraph and railroad lines, no one can doubt that in some way it must make itself master of masterful corporations. The creation of national commissioners of railroads, in addition to the older state commissions, involves a very important and delicate extension of administrative functions. Whatever hold of authority state or federal governments are to take upon corporations, there must follow cares and responsibilities which will require not a little wisdom, knowledge, and experience. Such things must be studied in order to be well done. And these, as I have said, are only a few of the doors which are being opened to offices

¹ Essay on Sir William Pitt.

of government. The idea of the state and the consequent ideal of its duty are undergoing noteworthy change; and "the idea of the state is the conscience of administration." Seeing every day new things which the state ought to do, the next thing is to see clearly how it ought to do them.

This is why there should be a science of administration which shall seek to straighten the paths of government, to make its business less unbusinesslike; to strengthen and purify its organization, and to crown its duties with dutifulness. This is one reason why there is such a science.

But where has this science grown up? Surely not on this side the sea. Not much impartial scientific method is to be discerned in our administrative practices. The poisonous atmosphere of city government, the crooked secrets of state administration, the confusion, sinecurism, and corruption ever and again discovered in the bureaus at Washington forbid us to believe that any clear conceptions of what constitutes good administration are as yet very widely current in the United States. No; American writers have hitherto taken no very important part in the advancement of this science. It has found its doctors in Europe. It is not of our making; it is a foreign science, speaking very little of the language of English or American principle. It employs only foreign tongues; it utters none but what are to our minds alien ideas. Its aims, its examples, its conditions, are almost exclusively grounded in the histories of foreign races, in the precedents of foreign systems, in the lessons of foreign revolutions. It has been developed by French and German professors, and is consequently in all parts adapted to the needs of a compact state, and made to fit highly centralized forms of government; whereas, to answer our purposes, it must be adapted, not to a simple and compact, but to a complex and multiform state, and made to fit highly decentralized forms of

government. If we would employ it, we must Americanize it, and that not formally, in language merely, but radically, in thought, principle, and aim as well. It must learn our constitutions by heart; must get the bureaucratic fever out of its veins; must inhale much free American air.

If an explanation be sought why a science manifestly so susceptible of being made useful to all governments alike should have received attention first in Europe, where government has long been a monopoly, rather than in England or the United States, where government has long been a common franchise, the reason will doubtless be found to be twofold: first, that in Europe, just because government was independent of popular assent, there was more governing to be done; and, second, that the desire to keep government a monopoly made the monopolists interested in discovering the least irritating means of governing. They were, besides, few enough to adopt means promptly.

It will be instructive to look into this matter a little more closely. In speaking of European governments I do not, of course, include England. She has not refused to change with the times. She has simply tempered the severity of the transition from a polity of aristocratic privilege to a system of democratic power by slow measures of constitutional reform which, without preventing revolution, has confined it to paths of peace. But the countries of the continent for a long time desperately struggled against all change, and would have diverted revolution by softening the asperities of absolute government. They sought so to perfect their machinery as to destroy all wearing friction, so to sweeten their methods with consideration for the interests of the governed as to placate all hindering hatred, and so assiduously and opportunely to offer their aid to all classes of undertakings as to render themselves indispensable to the industrious. They did at last give the people constitutions and the

franchise; but even after that they obtained leave to continue despotic by becoming paternal. They made themselves too efficient to be dispensed with, too smoothly operative to be noticed, too enlightened to be inconsiderately questioned, too benevolent to be suspected, too powerful to be coped with. All this has required study; and they have closely studied it.

On this side the sea we, the while, had known no great difficulties of government. With a new country, in which there was room and remunerative employment for everybody, with liberal principles of government and unlimited skill in practical politics, we were long exempted from the need of being anxiously careful about plans and methods of administration. We have naturally been slow to see the use or significance of those many volumes of learned research and painstaking examination into the ways and means of conducting government which the presses of Europe have been sending to our libraries. Like a lusty child, government with us has expanded in nature and grown great in stature, but has also become awkward in movement. The vigor and increase of its life have been altogether out of proportion to its skill in living. It has gained strength, but it has not acquired deportment. Great, therefore, as has been our advantage over the countries of Europe in point of ease and health of constitutional development, now that the time for more careful administrative adjustments and larger administrative knowledge has come to us, we are at a signal disadvantage as compared with the transatlantic nations; and this for reasons which I shall try to make clear.

Judging by the constitutional histories of the chief nations of the modern world, there may be said to be three periods of growth through which government has passed in all the most highly developed of existing systems, and through which it promises to pass in all the rest. The first of these periods is that of absolute

rulers, and of an administrative system adapted to absolute rule; the second is that in which constitutions are framed to do away with absolute rulers and substitute popular control, and in which administration is neglected for these higher concerns; and the third is that in which the sovereign people undertake to develop administration under this new constitution which has brought them into power.

Those governments are now in the lead in administrative practice which had rulers still absolute but also enlightened when those modern days of political illumination came in which it was made evident to all but the blind that governors are properly only the servants of the governed. In such governments administration has been organized to subserve the general weal with the simplicity and effectiveness vouchsafed only to the undertakings of a single will.

Such was the case in Prussia, for instance, where administration has been most studied and most nearly perfected. Frederick the Great, stern and masterful as was his rule, still sincerely professed to regard himself as only the chief servant of the state, to consider his great office a public trust; and it was he who, building upon the foundations laid by his father, began to organize the public service of Prussia as in very earnest a service of the public. His no less absolute successor, Frederic William III, under the inspiration of Stein, again, in his turn, advanced the work still further, planning many of the broader structural features which give firmness and form to Prussian administration to-day. Almost the whole of the admirable system has been developed by kingly initiative.

Of similar origin was the practice, if not the plan, of modern French administration, with its symmetrical divisions of territory and its orderly gradations of office. The days of the Revolution — of the Constituent Assembly — were days of constitution-*writing*, but they can hardly be called days of constitution-*making*.

The Revolution heralded a period of constitutional development,—the entrance of France upon the second of those periods which I have enumerated,—but it did not itself inaugurate such a period. It interrupted and unsettled absolutism, but did not destroy it. Napoleon succeeded the monarchs of France, to exercise a power as unrestricted as they had ever possessed.

The recasting of French administration by Napoleon is, therefore, my second example of the perfecting of civil machinery by the single will of an absolute ruler before the dawn of a constitutional era. No corporate, popular will could ever have effected arrangements such as those which Napoleon commanded. Arrangements so simple at the expense of local prejudice, so logical in their indifference to popular choice, might be decreed by a Constituent Assembly, but could be established only by the unlimited authority of a despot. The system of the year VIII was ruthlessly thorough and heartlessly perfect. It was, besides, in large part, a return to the despotism that had been overthrown.

Among those nations, on the other hand, which entered upon a season of constitution-making and popular reform before administration had received the impress of liberal principle, administrative improvement has been tardy and half-done. Once a nation has embarked in the business of manufacturing constitutions, it finds it exceedingly difficult to close out that business and open for the public a bureau of skilled, economical administration. There seems to be no end to the tinkering of constitutions. Your ordinary constitution will last you hardly ten years without repairs or additions; and the time for administrative detail comes late.

Here, of course, our examples are England and our own country. In the days of the Angevin kings, before constitutional life had taken root in the Great Charter, legal and administrative reforms began to proceed with

sense and vigor under the impulse of Henry II's shrewd, busy, pushing, indomitable spirit and purpose; and kingly initiative seemed destined in England, as elsewhere, to shape governmental growth at its will. But impulsive, errant Richard and weak, despicable John were not the men to carry out such schemes as their father's. Administrative development gave place in their reigns to constitutional struggles; and Parliament became king before any English monarch had had the practical genius or the enlightened conscience to devise just and lasting forms for the civil service of the state.

The English race, consequently, has long and successfully studied the art of curbing executive power to the constant neglect of the art of perfecting executive methods. It has exercised itself much more in controlling than in energizing government. It has been more concerned to render government just and moderate than to make it facile, well-ordered, and effective. English and American political history has been a history, not of administrative development, but of legislative oversight,—not of progress in governmental organization, but of advance in law-making and political criticism. Consequently, we have reached a time when administrative study and creation are imperatively necessary to the well-being of our governments saddled with the habits of a long period of constitution-making. That period has practically closed, so far as the establishment of essential principles is concerned, but we cannot shake off its atmosphere. We go on criticizing when we ought to be creating. We have reached the third of the periods I have mentioned,—the period, namely, when the people have to develop administration in accordance with the constitutions they won for themselves in a previous period of struggle with absolute power; but we are not prepared for the tasks of the new period.

Such an explanation seems to afford the only escape

from blank astonishment at the fact that, in spite of our vast advantages in point of political liberty, and above all in point of practical political skill and sagacity, so many nations are ahead of us in administrative organization and administrative skill. Why, for instance, have we but just begun purifying a civil service which was rotten full fifty years ago? To say that slavery diverted us is but to repeat what I have said—that flaws in our Constitution delayed us.

Of course all reasonable preference would declare for this English and American course of politics rather than for that of any European country. We should not like to have had Prussia's history for the sake of having Prussia's administrative skill; and Prussia's particular system of administration would quite suffocate us. It is better to be untrained and free than to be servile and systematic. Still there is no denying that it would be better yet to be both free in spirit and proficient in practice. It is this even more reasonable preference which impels us to discover what there may be to hinder or delay us in naturalizing this much-to-be-desired science of administration.

What, then, is there to prevent?

Well, principally, popular sovereignty. It is harder for democracy to organize administration than for monarchy. The very completeness of our most cherished political successes in the past embarrasses us. We have enthroned public opinion; and it is forbidden us to hope during its reign for any quick schooling of the sovereign in executive expertness or in the conditions of perfect functional balance in government. The very fact that we have realized popular rule in its fullness has made the task of *organizing* that rule just so much the more difficult. In order to make any advance at all we must instruct and persuade a multitudinous monarch called public opinion,—a much less feasible undertaking than to influence a single monarch called a king. An individual sovereign will adopt a simple

plan and carry it out directly: he will have but one opinion, and he will embody that one opinion in one command. But this other sovereign, the people, will have a score of differing opinions. They can agree upon nothing simple: advance must be made through compromise, by a compounding of differences, by a trimming of plans and a suppression of too straightforward principles. There will be a succession of resolves running through a course of years, a dropping fire of commands running through a whole gamut of modifications.

In government, as in virtue, the hardest of hard things is to make progress. Formerly the reason for this was that the single person who was sovereign was generally either selfish, ignorant, timid, or a fool,—albeit there was now and again one who was wise. Nowadays the reason is that the many, the people, who are sovereign have no single ear which one can approach, and are selfish, ignorant, timid, stubborn, or foolish with the selfishnesses, the ignorances, the stubbornnesses, the timidities, or the follies of several thousand persons,—albeit there are hundreds who are wise. Once the advantage of the reformer was that the sovereign's mind had a definite locality, that it was contained in one man's head, and that consequently it could be gotten at; though it was his disadvantage that that mind learned only reluctantly or only in small quantities, or was under the influence of some one who let it learn only the wrong things. Now, on the contrary, the reformer is bewildered by the fact that the sovereign's mind has no definite locality, but is contained in a voting majority of several million heads; and embarrassed by the fact that the mind of this sovereign also is under the influence of favorites, who are none the less favorites in a good old-fashioned sense of the word because they are not persons but preconceived opinions; *i.e.*, prejudices which are not to be reasoned with because they are not the children of reason.

Wherever regard for public opinion is a first prin-

ciple of government, practical reform must be slow and all reform must be full of compromises. For wherever public opinion exists it must rule. This is now an axiom half the world over, and will presently come to be believed even in Russia. Whoever would effect a change in a modern constitutional government must first educate his fellow-citizens to want *some* change. That done, he must persuade them to want the particular change he wants. He must first make public opinion willing to listen and then see to it that it listen to the right things. He must stir it up to search for an opinion, and then manage to put the right opinion in its way.

The first step is not less difficult than the second. With opinions, possession is more than nine points of the law. It is next to impossible to dislodge them. Institutions which one generation regards as only a makeshift approximation to the realization of a principle, the next generation honors as the nearest possible approximation to that principle, and the next worships as the principle itself. It takes scarcely three generations for the apotheosis. The grandson accepts his grandfather's hesitating experiment as an integral part of the fixed constitution of nature.

Even if we had clear insight into all the political past, and could form out of perfectly instructed heads a few steady, infallible, placidly wise maxims of government into which all sound political doctrine would be ultimately resolvable, *would the country act on them?* That is the question. The bulk of mankind is rigidly unphilosophical, and nowadays the bulk of mankind votes. A truth must become not only plain but also commonplace before it will be seen by the people who go to their work very early in the morning; and not to act upon it must involve great and pinching inconveniences before these same people will make up their minds to act upon it.

And where is this unphilosophical bulk of mankind

more multifarious in its composition than in the United States? To know the public mind of this country, one must know the mind, not of Americans of the older stocks only, but also of Irishmen, of Germans, of negroes. In order to get a footing for new doctrine, one must influence minds cast in every mould of race, minds inheriting every bias of environment, warped by the histories of a score of different nations, warmed or chilled, closed or expanded by almost every climate of the globe.

So much, then, for the history of the study of administration, and the peculiarly difficult conditions under which, entering upon it when we do, we must undertake it. What, now, is the subject-matter of this study, and what are its characteristic objects?

II.

The field of administration is a field of business. It is removed from the hurry and strife of politics; it at most points stands apart even from the debatable ground of constitutional study. It is a part of political life only as the methods of the counting-house are a part of the life of society; only as machinery is part of the manufactured product. But it is, at the same time, raised very far above the dull level of mere technical detail by the fact that through its greater principles it is directly connected with the lasting maxims of political wisdom, the permanent truths of political progress.

The object of administrative study is to rescue executive methods from the confusion and costliness of empirical experiment and set them upon foundations laid deep in stable principle.

It is for this reason that we must regard civil service reform in its present stages as but a prelude to a fuller administrative reform. We are now rectifying methods of appointment; we must go on to adjust executive functions more fitly and to prescribe better

methods of executive organization and action. Civil service reform is thus but a moral preparation for what is to follow. It is clearing the moral atmosphere of official life by establishing the sanctity of public office as a public trust, and, by making the service unpartisan, it is opening the way for making it businesslike. By sweetening its motives it is rendering it capable of improving its methods of work.

Let me expand a little what I have said of the province of administration. Most important to be observed is the truth already so much and so fortunately insisted upon by our civil service reformers; namely, that administration lies outside the proper sphere of *politics*. Administrative questions are not political questions. Although politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices.

This is distinction of high authority; eminent German writers insist upon it as of course. Bluntschli,¹ for instance, bids us separate administration alike from politics and from law. Politics, he says, is state activity "in things great and universal," while "administration, on the other hand," is "the activity of the state in individual and small things. Politics is thus the special province of the statesman, administration of the technical official." "Policy does nothing without the aid of administration"; but administration is not therefore politics. But we do not require German authority for this position; this discrimination between administration and politics is now, happily, too obvious to need further discussion.

There is another distinction which must be worked into all our conclusions, which, though but another side of that between administration and politics, is not quite so easy to keep sight of; I mean the distinction between *constitutional* and administrative questions, between those governmental adjustments which are

¹ Politik, S. 467.

essential to constitutional principle and those which are merely instrumental to the possibly changing purposes of a wisely adapting convenience.

One cannot easily make clear to every one just where administration resides in the various departments of any practicable government without entering upon particulars so numerous as to confuse and distinctions so minute as to distract. No lines of demarcation, setting apart administrative from non-administrative functions, can be run between this and that department of government without being run up hill and down dale, over dizzy heights of distinction and through dense jungles of statutory enactment, hither and thither around "ifs" and "buts," "whens" and "howevers," until they become altogether lost to the common eye not accustomed to this sort of surveying, and consequently not acquainted with the use of the theodolite of logical discernment. A great deal of administration goes about *incognito* to most of the world, being confounded now with political "management," and again with constitutional principle.

Perhaps this ease of confusion may explain such utterances as that of Niebuhr's: "Liberty," he says, "depends incomparably more upon administration than upon constitution." At first sight this appears to be largely true. Apparently facility in the actual exercise of liberty does depend more upon administrative arrangements than upon constitutional guarantees; although constitutional guarantees alone secure the existence of liberty. But—upon second thought—is even so much as this true? Liberty no more consists in easy functional movement than intelligence consists in the ease and vigor with which the limbs of a strong man move. The principles that rule within the man, or the constitution, are the vital springs of liberty or servitude. Because dependence and subjection are without chains, are lightened by every easy-working device of considerate, paternal government, they are not

thereby transformed into liberty. Liberty cannot live apart from constitutional principle; and no administration, however perfect and liberal its methods, can give men more than a poor counterfeit of liberty if it rest upon illiberal principles of government.

A clear view of the difference between the province of constitutional law and the province of administrative function ought to leave no room for misconception; and it is possible to name some roughly definite criteria upon which such a view can be built. Public administration is detailed and systematic execution of public law. Every particular application of general law is an act of administration. The assessment and raising of taxes, for instance, the hanging of a criminal, the transportation and delivery of the mails, the equipment and recruiting of the army and navy, etc., are all obviously acts of administration; but the general laws which direct these things to be done are as obviously outside of and above administration. The broad plans of governmental action are not administrative; the detailed execution of such plans is administrative. Constitutions, therefore, properly concern themselves only with those instrumentalities of government which are to control general law. Our federal Constitution observes this principle in saying nothing of even the greatest of the purely executive offices, and speaking only of that President of the Union who was to share the legislative and policy-making functions of government, only of those judges of highest jurisdiction who were to interpret and guard its principles, and not of those who were merely to give utterance to them.

This is not quite the distinction between Will and answering Deed, because the administrator should have and does have a will of his own in the choice of means for accomplishing his work. He is not and ought not to be a mere passive instrument. The distinction is between general plans and special means.

There is, indeed, one point at which administrative

studies trench on constitutional ground—or at least upon what seems constitutional ground. The study of administration, philosophically viewed, is closely connected with the study of the proper distribution of constitutional authority. To be efficient it must discover the simplest arrangements by which responsibility can be unmistakably fixed upon officials; the best way of dividing authority without hampering it, and responsibility without obscuring it. And this question of the distribution of authority, when taken into the sphere of the higher, the originating functions of government, is obviously a central constitutional question. If administrative study can discover the best principles upon which to base such distribution, it will have done constitutional study an invaluable service. Montesquieu did not, I am convinced, say the last word on this head.

To discover the best principle for the distribution of authority is of greater importance, possibly, under a democratic system, where officials serve many masters, than under others where they serve but a few. All sovereigns are suspicious of their servants, and the sovereign people is no exception to the rule; but how is its suspicion to be allayed by *knowledge*? If that suspicion could but be clarified into wise vigilance, it would be altogether salutary; if that vigilance could be aided by the unmistakable placing of responsibility, it would be altogether beneficent. Suspicion in itself is never healthful either in the private or in the public mind. *Trust is strength* in all relations of life; and, as it is the office of the constitutional reformer to create conditions of trustfulness, so it is the office of the administrative organizer to fit administration with conditions of clear-cut responsibility which shall insure trustworthiness.

And let me say that large powers and unhampered discretion seem to me the indispensable conditions of responsibility. Public attention must be easily directed, in each case of good or bad administration, to just the

man deserving of praise or blame. There is no danger in power, if only it be not irresponsible. If it be divided, dealt out in shares to many, it is obscured; and if it be obscured, it is made irresponsible. But if it be centred in heads of the service and in heads of branches of the service, it is easily watched and brought to book. If to keep his office a man must achieve open and honest success, and if at the same time he feels himself entrusted with large freedom of discretion, the greater his power the less likely is he to abuse it, the more is he nerved and sobered and elevated by it. The less his power, the more safely obscure and unnoticed does he feel his position to be, and the more readily does he relapse into remissness.

Just here we manifestly emerge upon the field of that still larger question,—the proper relations between public opinion and administration.

To whom is official trustworthiness to be disclosed, and by whom is it to be rewarded? Is the official to look to the public for his meed of praise and his push of promotion, or only to his superior in office? Are the people to be called in to settle administrative discipline as they are called in to settle constitutional principles? These questions evidently find their root in what is undoubtedly the fundamental problem of this whole study. That problem is: What part shall public opinion take in the conduct of administration?

The right answer seems to be, that public opinion shall play the part of authoritative critic.

But the *method* by which its authority shall be made to tell? Our peculiar American difficulty in organizing administration is not the danger of losing liberty, but the danger of not being able or willing to separate its essentials from its accidents. Our success is made doubtful by that besetting error of ours, the error of trying to do too much by vote. Self-government does not consist in having a hand in everything, any more than housekeeping consists necessarily in cooking din-

ner with one's own hands. The cook must be trusted with a large discretion as to the management of the fires and the ovens.

In those countries in which public opinion has yet to be instructed in its privileges, yet to be accustomed to having its own way, this question as to the province of public opinion is much more readily soluble than in this country, where public opinion is wide awake and quite intent upon having its own way anyhow. It is pathetic to see a whole book written by a German professor of political science for the purpose of saying to his countrymen, "Please try to have an opinion about national affairs"; but a public which is so modest may at least be expected to be very docile and acquiescent in learning what things it has *not* a right to think and speak about imperatively. It may be sluggish, but it will not be meddlesome. It will submit to be instructed before it tries to instruct. Its political education will come before its political activity. In trying to instruct our own public opinion, we are dealing with a pupil apt to think itself quite sufficiently instructed beforehand.

The problem is to make public opinion efficient without suffering it to be meddlesome. Directly exercised, in the oversight of the daily details and in the choice of the daily means of government, public criticism is of course a clumsy nuisance, a rustic handling delicate machinery. But as superintending the greater forces of formative policy alike in politics and administration, public criticism is altogether safe and beneficent, altogether indispensable. Let administrative study find the best means for giving public criticism this control and for shutting it out from all other interference.

But is the whole duty of administrative study done when it has taught the people what sort of administration to desire and demand, and how to get what they demand? Ought it not to go on to drill candidates for the public service?

There is an admirable movement towards universal political education now afoot in this country. The time will soon come when no college of respectability can afford to do without a well-filled chair of political science. But the education thus imparted will go but a certain length. It will multiply the number of intelligent critics of government, but it will create no competent body of administrators. It will prepare the way for the development of a sure-footed understanding of the general principles of government, but it will not necessarily foster skill in conducting government. It is an education which will equip legislators, perhaps, but not executive officials. If we are to improve public opinion, which is the motive power of government, we must prepare better officials as the *apparatus* of government. If we are to put in new boilers and to mend the fires which drive our governmental machinery, we must not leave the old wheels and joints and valves and bands to creak and buzz and clatter on as the best they may at bidding of the new force. We must put in new running parts wherever there is the least lack of strength or adjustment. It will be necessary to organize democracy by sending up to the competitive examinations for the civil service men definitely prepared for standing liberal tests as to technical knowledge. A technically schooled civil service will presently have become indispensable.

I know that a corps of civil servants prepared by a special schooling and drilled, after appointment, into a perfected organization, with appropriate hierarchy and characteristic discipline, seems to a great many very thoughtful persons to contain elements which might combine to make an offensive official class,—a distinct, semi-corporate body with sympathies divorced from those of a progressive, free-spirited people, and with hearts narrowed to the meanness of a bigoted officialism. Certainly such a class would be altogether hateful and harmful in the United States. Any measures cal-

culated to produce it would for us be measures of reaction and of folly.

But to fear the creation of a domineering, illiberal officialism as a result of the studies I am here proposing is to miss altogether the principle upon which I wish most to insist. That principle is, that administration in the United States must be at all points sensitive to public opinion. A body of thoroughly trained officials serving during good behavior we must have in any case: that is a plain business necessity. But the apprehension that such a body will be anything un-American clears away the moment it is asked, What is to constitute good behavior? For that question obviously carries its own answer on its face. Steady, hearty allegiance to the policy of the government they serve will constitute good behavior. That *policy* will have no taint of officialism about it. It will not be the creation of permanent officials, but of statesmen whose responsibility to public opinion will be direct and inevitable. Bureaucracy can exist only where the whole service of the state is removed from the common political life of the people, its chiefs as well as its rank and file. Its motives, its objects, its policy, its standards, must be bureaucratic. It would be difficult to point out any examples of impudent exclusiveness and arbitrariness on the part of officials doing service under a chief of department who really served the people, as all our chiefs of departments must be made to do. It would be easy, on the other hand, to adduce other instances like that of the influence of Stein in Prussia, where the leadership of one statesman imbued with true public spirit transformed arrogant and perfunctory bureaus into public-spirited instruments of just government.

The ideal for us is a civil service cultured and self-sufficient enough to act with sense and vigor, and yet so intimately connected with the popular thought, by means of elections and constant public counsel, as to

find arbitrariness or class spirit quite out of the question.

III.

Having thus viewed in some sort the subject-matter and the objects of this study of administration, what are we to conclude as to the methods best suited to it—the points of view most advantageous for it?

Government is so near us, as much a thing of our daily familiar handling, that we can with difficulty see the need of any philosophical study of it, or the exact point of such study, should it be undertaken. We have been on our feet too long to study now the art of walking. We are a practical people, made so apt, so adept in self-government by centuries of experimental drill that we are scarcely any longer capable of perceiving the awkwardness of the particular system we may be using, just because it is so easy for us to use any system. We do not study the art of governing; we govern. But mere unschooled genius for affairs will not save us from sad blunders in administration. Though democrats by long inheritance and repeated choice, we are still rather crude democrats. Old as democracy is, its organization on a basis of modern ideas and conditions is still an unaccomplished work. The democratic state has yet to be equipped for carrying those enormous burdens of administration which the needs of this industrial and trading age are so fast accumulating. Without comparative studies in government we cannot rid ourselves of the misconception that administration stands upon an essentially different basis in a democratic state from that on which it stands in a non-democratic state.

After such study we could grant democracy the sufficient honor of ultimately determining by debate all essential questions affecting the public weal, of basing all structures of policy upon the major will; but we would have found but one rule of good administration

for all governments alike. So far as administrative functions are concerned, all governments have a strong structural likeness; more than that, if they are to be uniformly useful and efficient, they *must* have a strong structural likeness. A free man has the same bodily organs, the same executive parts, as the slave, however different may be his motives, his services, his energies. Monarchies and democracies, radically different as they are in other respects, have in reality much the same business to look to.

It is abundantly safe nowadays to insist upon this actual likeness of all governments, because these are days when abuses of power are easily exposed and arrested, in countries like our own, by a bold, alert, inquisitive, detective public thought and a sturdy popular self-dependence such as never existed before. We are slow to appreciate this; but it is easy to appreciate it. Try to imagine personal government in the United States. It is like trying to imagine a national worship of Zeus. Our imaginations are too modern for the feat.

But, besides being safe, it is necessary to see that for all governments alike the legitimate ends of administration are the same, in order not to be frightened at the idea of looking into foreign systems of administration for instruction and suggestion; in order to get rid of the apprehension that we might perchance blindly borrow something incompatible with our principles. That man is blindly astray who denounces attempts to transplant foreign systems into this country. It is impossible: they simply would not grow here. But why should we not use such parts of foreign contrivances as we want, if they be in any way serviceable? We are in no danger of using them in a foreign way. We borrowed rice, but we do not eat it with chopsticks. We borrowed our whole political language from England, but we leave the words "king" and "lords" out of it. What did we ever originate, except the action

of the federal government upon individuals and some of the functions of the federal supreme court?

We can borrow the science of administration with safety and profit if only we read all fundamental differences of condition into its essential tenets. We have only to filter it through our constitutions, only to put it over a slow fire of criticism and distill away its foreign gases.

I know that there is a sneaking fear in some conscientiously patriotic minds that studies of European systems might signalize some foreign methods as better than some American methods; and the fear is easily to be understood. But it would scarcely be avowed in just any company.

It is the more necessary to insist upon thus putting away all prejudices against looking anywhere in the world but at home for suggestions in this study, because nowhere else in the whole field of politics, it would seem, can we make use of the historical, comparative method more safely than in this province of administration. Perhaps the more novel the forms we study the better. We shall the sooner learn the peculiarities of our own methods. We can never learn either our own weaknesses or our own virtues by comparing ourselves and ourselves. We are too used to the appearance and procedure of our own system to see its true significance. Perhaps even the English system is too much like our own to be used to the most profit in illustration. It is best on the whole to get entirely away from our own atmosphere and to be most careful in examining such systems as those of France and Germany. Seeing our own institutions through such *media*, we see ourselves as foreigners might see us were they to look at us without preconceptions. Of ourselves, so long as we know only ourselves, we know nothing.

Let it be noted that it is the distinction, already drawn, between administration and politics which makes the comparative method so safe in the field of adminis-

tration. When we study the administrative systems of France and Germany, knowing that we are not in search of *political* principles, we need not care a peppercorn for the constitutional or political reasons which Frenchmen or Germans give for their practices when explaining them to us. If I see a murderous fellow sharpening a knife cleverly, I can borrow his way of sharpening the knife without borrowing his probable intention to commit murder with it; and so, if I see a monarchist dyed in the wool managing a public bureau well, I can learn his business methods without changing one of my republican spots. He may serve his king; I will continue to serve the people; but I should like to serve my sovereign as well as he serves his. By keeping this distinction in view,—that is, by studying administration as a means of putting our own politics into convenient practice, as a means of making what is democratically politic towards all administratively possible towards each,—we are on perfectly safe ground, and can learn without error what foreign systems have to teach us. We thus devise an adjusting weight for our comparative method of study. We can thus scrutinize the anatomy of foreign governments without fear of getting any of their diseases into our veins; dissect alien systems without apprehension of blood-poisoning.

Our own politics must be the touchstone for all theories. The principles on which to base a science of administration for America must be principles which have democratic policy very much at heart. And, to suit American habit, all general theories must, as theories, keep modestly in the background, not in open argument only, but even in our own minds,—lest opinions satisfactory only to the standards of the library should be dogmatically used, as if they must be quite as satisfactory to the standards of practical politics as well. Doctrinaire devices must be postponed to tested practices. Arrangements not only sanctioned by conclusive experience elsewhere but also congenial to American

habit must be preferred without hesitation to theoretical perfection. In a word, steady, practical statesmanship must come first, closet doctrine second. The cosmopolitan what-to-do must always be commanded by the American how-to-do-it.

Our duty is, to supply the best possible life to a *federal* organization, to systems within systems; to make town, city, county, state, and federal governments live with a like strength and an equally assured healthfulness, keeping each unquestionably its own master and yet making all interdependent and coöperative, combining independence with mutual helpfulness. The task is great and important enough to attract the best minds.

This interlacing of local self-government with federal self-government is quite a modern conception. It is not like the arrangements of imperial federation in Germany. There local government is not yet, fully, local *self-government*. The bureaucrat is everywhere busy. His efficiency springs out of *esprit de corps*, out of care to make ingratiating obeisance to the authority of a superior, or, at best, out of the soil of a sensitive conscience. He serves, not the public, but an irresponsible minister. The question for us is, how shall our series of governments within governments be so administered that it shall always be to the interest of the public officer to serve, not his superior alone but the community also, with the best efforts of his talents and the soberest service of his conscience? How shall such service be made to his commonest interest by contributing abundantly to his sustenance, to his dearest interest by furthering his ambition, and to his highest interest by advancing his honor and establishing his character? And how shall this be done alike for the local part and for the national whole?

If we solve this problem we shall again pilot the world. There is a tendency—is there not?—a tendency as yet dim, but already steadily impulsive and clearly destined to prevail, towards, first the confederation of

parts of empires like the British, and finally of great states themselves. Instead of centralization of power, there is to be wide union with tolerated divisions of prerogative. This is a tendency towards the American type—of governments joined with governments for the pursuit of common purposes, in honorary equality and honorable subordination. Like principles of civil liberty are everywhere fostering like methods of government; and if comparative studies of the ways and means of government should enable us to offer suggestions which will practicably combine openness and vigor in the administration of such governments with ready docility to all serious, well-sustained public criticism, they will have approved themselves worthy to be ranked among the highest and most fruitful of the great departments of political study. That they will issue in such suggestions I confidently hope.

BRYCE'S "AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH"

A REVIEW OF JAMES BRYCE'S "THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH" IN THE "POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY," MARCH, 1889, VOL. IV, PP. 153-169. WRITTEN WHILE MR. WILSON WAS TEACHING AT WESLEYAN COLLEGE.

THIS is a great work, worthy of heartiest praise. Its strength does not lie in its style, although that, while lacking distinction, is eminently straightforward and clear; nor yet altogether in its broad scope of weighty topics,—a scope wide almost beyond precedent in such subjects, and rich in suggestion,—but chiefly in its method and in its point of view. Mr. Bryce does not treat the institutions of the United States as experiments in the application of theory, but as quite normal historical phenomena to be looked at, whether for purposes of criticism or merely for purposes of description, in the practical, every-day light of comparative politics. He seeks to put American institutions in their only instructive setting—that, namely, of comparative institutional history and life.

It is of course inevitable to compare and contrast what Mr. Bryce has given us in these admirable volumes with de Tocqueville's great *Democracy in America*. The relations which the two works bear the one to the other are almost altogether relations of contrast, and the contrast serves to make conspicuous the peculiar significance of what Mr. Bryce has written. De Tocqueville came to America to observe the operation of a principle of government, to seek a well-founded answer to the question: How does democracy work? Mr. Bryce, on the other hand, came, and came not once but

several times, to observe the concrete phenomena of an institutional development, into which, as he early perceived, abstract political theory can scarcely be said to have entered as a formative force. The question for which he sought an answer was this: What sort of institutions have the English developed in America? In satisfaction of his curiosity, his keen and elevated philosophical desire, de Tocqueville saw the crude and impatient democracy of Andrew Jackson's time. Mr. Bryce has seen the almost full grown, the measurably sobered America of to-day, and has seen, therefore, with a fairer chance of just proportion.

It will hardly be accounted a disparagement of Mr. Bryce's style to say that it is inferior to de Tocqueville's; the thoughts it has to convey, the meanings it has to suggest belong to quite another class than that to which de Tocqueville's judgments must be assigned: it is not meant to carry the illumination of philosophical conceptions into the regions of fact which it explores; its task is rather exposition than judgment. Mr. Bryce does not feel called upon to compete with de Tocqueville in the field in which de Tocqueville is possibly beyond rivalry. Something very different was needed, and that he has done to admiration: he has written a book invaluable to students of comparative politics,—invaluable because of its fullness, its accuracy, its candor, its sane, perhaps I ought rather to say its sage, balance of practical judgment.

Mr. Bryce's qualifications for the great task he has thus worthily performed were probably equal to those of any other man of our generation. First of all, he is a Roman lawyer steeped in the legal and political conceptions of that race whose originative strength in the field of law and practical sagacity in the field of politics were as conspicuous and as potent in the ancient world as the legal capacity and political virility of the English race are in the modern world. His knowledge of Roman institutions constantly serves to remind him of

the oldness and persistency of certain features of institutional development, to warn him against perceiving novelty where it does not exist. In the second place, he is a member of Parliament and an English constitutional statesman, knowing the parent stock from which our institutions sprang, not only through study, but also through having himself tasted of its present fruits. Perhaps no one can so readily understand our institutions as an English public man sufficiently read in our history and our constitutional law not to expect to find bishops in our Senate or prime ministers in the presidency. He has breathed the air of practical politics in the country from which we get our habits of political action; and he is so familiar with the machinery of government at home as to be able to perceive at once the most characteristic differences, as well as the real resemblances, between political arrangements in England and in the United States. He is prepared to see clearly, almost instinctively, the derivation of our institutions, at the same time that he is sure to be struck by even our minor divergences from English practice. But Mr. Bryce brought to the task of judging us a wider and more adequate preparation than even a schooling in Roman law and English practice could by itself have supplied. He is sufficiently acquainted with the history and practical operation of the present constitutions of the leading states of Europe to be able readily to discern what, in American practice, is peculiar to America, or to America and England, what common to modern political experience the world over. In brief, he has a comprehensive mastery of the materials of comparative politics, and great practical sagacity in interpreting them.

Mr. Bryce divides his work into six parts. In Part I he discusses "The National Government," going carefully over the ground made almost tediously familiar to American constitutional students by commentaries without number. But he gives to his treatment a fresh-

ness of touch and a comprehensiveness which impart to it a new and first-rate interest. This he does by combining in a single view both the legal theory and interpretation and the practical aspects and operation of the federal machinery. More than that, he brings that machinery and the whole federal arrangement into constant comparison with federal experiments and constitutional machinery elsewhere. There is a scope and an outlook here such as render his critical expositions throughout both impressive and stimulating. Congress, the presidency, and the federal courts are discussed in every point of view that can yield instruction. The forms and principles of the federal system are explained both historically and practically and are estimated with dispassionate candor. Perhaps the most emphasized point made in this part is one which is derived from comparative politics. It is the separation of the executive from Congress, a separation which deprives the executive of all voice in the formation of administrative and financial policy, and which deprives Congress of such leadership as would give its plans coherency and make available for its use that special and intimate knowledge of administrative possibilities without which much well-meant legislation must utterly miscarry. This is of course the particular in which our government differs most conspicuously from all the other governments of the world. Everywhere else there is one form or another of ministerial leadership in the legislature. A body of ministers constitutes, as it were, a nerve centre, or rather a sensitive presiding brain, in the body politic, taking from the nation such broad suggestions as public opinion can unmistakably convey touching the main ends to be sought by legislation and policy, but themselves suggesting in turn, in the light of their own special knowledge and intimate experience of affairs, the best means by which those ends may be attained. Because we are without such legislative leadership we remain for long periods of embarrassment

without any solution of some of the simplest problems that await legislation.¹ To this absence of cabinet government in America, and the consequent absence of party government in the European sense of the term, Mr. Bryce again and again returns as to a salient feature, full of significance both for much evil and for some good.² The evil consists in slipshod, haphazard, unskilled and hasty legislation; the good, so far as it may be stated in a single sentence, consists in delaying the triumphs of public opinion and thereby, perhaps, rendering them safer triumphs.

One chapter of this first part possesses conspicuous merit, namely, chapter xxiii, on "The Courts and the Constitution."³ It brings out with admirable clearness the wholly normal character of the function of constitutional interpretation, as a function familiar from of old to English judicial practice in the maintenance of charter provisions, and of course necessary, according to English precedents and ideas, to the maintenance and application of charter-like written constitutions. In exposition of this view, now universally held but not always lucidly explained, he gives a prominence such as it has never before had to the very instructive fact that the constitution does not grant the power of constitutional interpretation to the federal courts in explicit terms, but that that power, so marvelled at by Europeans, is simply a necessary inference (at least a necessary *English* inference) from its general provisions touching the functions of a federal judiciary. One point touching the action of the courts is, however, left perhaps a little too much to this same English inference. It is stated that cases involving questions of constitutionality must wait to be made up in the ordinary manner at the initiative of private parties suing in their own interest and are often, most often, decided

¹ See especially vol. ii, pp. 316, 317.

² See particularly vol. i, chap. xxv: Comparison of the American and European Systems.

³ Vol. i, pp. 237-255.

at the instance and in behalf of such private litigants; but it is left too much to inference—an inference easy of course to an American, but doubtless far from obvious to a foreigner—that a decision, when against the constitutionality of a law, is, not that the law is null and void, but is that the law *will not be enforced in that case*. Therefore other cases involving the same points will not be made up, litigants knowing what to expect, and it is *thus*, indirectly, that the desired annulment is effected. This is not a matter of form merely or only of curious interest. For Mr. Bryce's purpose it is a point of importance. It illustrates the thesis he is trying to establish, namely, the normality of the whole principle and procedure: the entire absence from our system of any idea of a veto exercised by the courts upon legislation or of any element of direct antagonism between Congress and the judiciary, and the matter-of-course interpretation of the supreme law by those who interpret all law.

The appendix to Volume I adds to this first part, besides much other illustrative matter, a statement of the main features of the federal structure of the two great English universities and the federal constitution of Canada.

Part II is devoted to "The State Governments." Here for the first time in any comprehensive treatise the states are given the prominence and the careful examination which they have always deserved at the hands of students of our institutions but have never before gotten. Under some seventeen heads, occupying as many close-packed chapters full of matter, the state governments (including of course local government and the virtually distinct subject of the government of cities), state politics, the territories, and the general topics in comparative politics suggested by state constitutions and state practice are discussed, so far as reliable materials serve, with the same interest and thoroughness that were in the first part bestowed upon

the federal government. Mr. Bryce more than once urges upon European students of comparative politics the almost incomparable richness of this well-nigh unexplored region of state law. If he can wonder that Mr. Mill "in his *Representative Government* scarcely refers to" our states, and that "Mr. Freeman in his learned essays, Sir H. Maine in his ingenious book on *Popular Government*, pass by phenomena which would have admirably illustrated some of their reasonings," finding, as he does, in M. Boutmy and Dr. von Holst the only European discoverers in this field, it may profit American students to reflect in what light their own hitherto almost complete neglect of the constitutional history of the states ought to be viewed. This second part of Mr. Bryce's book ought to mark a turning point in our constitutional and political studies. In several of our greater universities some attention is already paid to state law and history; but it is safe to say that in no one of them are these subjects given the prominence they deserve; and it is safe to predict that our state history will some day be acknowledged a chief source of instruction touching the development of modern institutions. The states have been laboratories in which English habits, English law, English political principles have been put to the most varied, and sometimes to the most curious, tests; and it is by the variations of institutions under differing circumstances that the nature and laws of institutional growth are to be learned. While European nations have been timidly looking askance at the various puzzling problems now pressing alike in the field of economics and in the field of politics, our states have been trying experiments with a boldness and a persistency which, if generated by ignorance in many cases and in many fraught with disaster, have at any rate been surpassingly rich in instruction.

Part III, on "The Party System," is the crowning achievement of the author's method. Here in a learned systematic treatise which will certainly for a long time

be a standard authority on our institutions, a much used handbook for the most serious students of politics, we have a careful, dispassionate, scientific description of the "machine," an accurately drawn picture of "bosses," a clear exposition of the way in which the machine works, an analysis of all the most practical methods of "practical politics," as well as what we should have expected, namely, a sketch of party history, an explanation of the main characteristics of the parties of to-day, a discussion of the conditions of public life in the United States, those conditions which help to keep the best men out of politics and produce certain distinctively American types of politicians, and a complete study of the nominating convention. One can well believe that that not supersensitive person, the practical politician, much as he pretends to scorn the indignant attacks made upon him by "pious" reformers, would be betrayed into open emotion should he read this exact and passionless, this discriminating and scientific digest of the methods by which he lives, of the motives by which he is moved. And certainly those who are farthest removed from the practical politician's point of view will gain from these chapters a new and vital conception of what it is to study constitutions in the life. The wholesome light of Mr. Bryce's method shines with equal ray alike upon the just and upon the unjust.

Mr. Bryce very happily describes our system of nomination by convention as

an effort of nature to fill the void left in America by the absence of the European parliamentary or cabinet system, under which an executive is called into being out of the legislature by the majority of the legislature. In the European system no single act of nomination is necessary, because the leader of the majority comes gradually to the top in virtue of his own strength.¹

But what, in view of this, are we to say of his judgment ² that "a system for selecting candidates is not

¹ Vol. ii, p. 187.

² *Ibid.*, p. 47.

a mere contrivance for preventing party dissensions, but an essential feature of matured democracy"? Clearly no system for nominating candidates can touch the leading places in a democracy, however matured that democracy may be, if those places be filled under the parliamentary or cabinet system, as they are in England and France. Mr. Bryce is able to show that the selection of candidates by local representative party associations has been coming more and more into vogue in England *pari passu* with the widening of the franchise, having in 1885 been behind almost every new Liberal candidate for the Commons;¹ but is it quite safe to argue *cum hoc ergo propter hoc*? Of course it needs no nominating convention in Midlothian to select Mr. Gladstone, and no caucus in any other constituency to choose for the voters a man who has made himself necessary because of mastery in Parliament, because of proof given there of a dominant mind in statesmanship. But, leaving parliamentary leaders apart, is not all nominating machinery a "separable accident" rather than an essential feature of democracy? Has it failed of construction in Switzerland merely because of the smallness of the Swiss constituencies? Have not the exceeding multiplicity of elective officers and that pernicious principle that no one may be chosen state or national representative except from the district in which he lives—a principle whose history runs back to insignificant Governor Phips of colonial Massachusetts—been more to blame than anything that can be regarded as essential to democracy?² Above all, is not that complete obscuration of individual responsibility which results from the operation of the "checks and balances"

¹ Vol. ii, p. 48, note.

² Mr. Wilson discussed this subject toward the close of his Presidency and then maintained that the greatest weakness of the American system is the habit of requiring representatives to be residents of particular districts. He said that it is not a constitutional requirement but a habit, and a habit which weakens and lowers the character of the representative. (Conversation of December 27, 1920.—William E. Dodd.)

of our system chiefly chargeable? It prevents any man from selecting himself for leadership by conspicuous service and makes the active part of politics turn upon selecting men rather than upon selecting measures. Men are not identified with measures; there must, consequently, be some artificial way of picking them out.

In enumerating the causes why the best men do not enter politics,¹ Mr. Bryce seems to me to omit one of the most important, although he elsewhere repeatedly gives evidence that he is in full view of it, namely, the absence of all great prizes of legislative leadership to be won by sheer strength of persuasive mind and constructive skill. He sums up the reasons he does give with admirable point, however, by saying that "in America, while politics are relatively less interesting than in Europe, and lead to less, other careers are relatively more interesting and lead to more";² but he omits to state, in this connection, one of the most patent reasons why politics are relatively less interesting, why they lead to less, here than elsewhere.³

Part IV, on "Public Opinion," its American organs, its American characteristics, its American successes and failures, contains some of the author's best analytical work, but is less characteristic of his method than the preceding parts.

Part V contains "Illustrations and Reflections." It opens with an excellent chapter on the Tweed ring by one of the most lucid of our own writers, Professor Goodnow; treats of other special phases of local ring government; of "Kearneyism in California," of *laissez*

¹ Vol. ii, chap. lviii, pp. 37-43.

² *Ibid.*, p. 41.

³ For Mr. Bryce's recognition of the readiness of the people to receive and follow leaders whenever circumstances produce them, spite of institutions—an acknowledgment apparently not perfectly consistent with some other judgments of the book (*e.g.*, that any arrogation of a right to consideration, greater than that accorded to the ordinary, the average man, is resented)—see vol. ii, pp. 333, 334.

faire, of woman's suffrage, and of the supposed and true faults of democracy as it appears in America.

Part VI concerns "Social Institutions"—railroads, Wall Street, the bench, the bar, the universities, the influence of religion, the position of women, the influence of democracy on thought and on creative intellectual power, American oratory, *etc.*,—and contains the author's cautious forecast of the political, social, and economic future of the United States.

All through, the work is pervaded with the air of practical sense, the air of having been written by an experienced man of affairs, accustomed to handle institutions as well as to observe them. Besides, this observer is an Englishman without English insularity, with views given elasticity by wide studies of institutions and extensive travel. He understands us with the facility of one who belongs to the same race; but he understands us also in our relations with the politics of the wider world of Europe.

The work, however, has the faults of its good qualities. If it is full of acute and sage observation and satisfying in its wonderfully complete practical analysis, it gains its advantage at a certain sacrifice. The movement of the treatment is irregular, and even hesitating at times, like the varied conversation of a full, reiterative talker; and the internal plan of each part is lacking in executive directness and consistency, is even sometimes a little confused, reminding one now and again of the political system the author is describing. So judicious and balanced is the tone, too, that it is also a little colorless. It is a matter-of-fact book in which, because of the prominence and multiplicity of the details, it is often difficult to discern the large proportions of the thought. It is full of thoughts, thoughts singularly purged of prejudice, notably rich in suggestion; but these thoughts do not converge towards any common conceptions. It is rather, one may imagine, like that lost book of Aristotle's which contained his mate-

rials of observation than like the *Politics*. It carries one over immense distances characteristic of its great subject; but this it does by carrying one in many directions, in order to do which, from substantially the same point of departure in each case, it repeatedly traverses the same ground. In brief, it is an invaluable storehouse of observations in comparative politics rather than of guiding principles of government inductively obtained. The facts, not the principles derivable from them, are prominent.

These underlying principles could not, indeed, have been made prominent without a much freer use, a much fuller use, of the historical method than Mr. Bryce has allowed himself; and it is in his sparing use of history that Mr. Bryce seems to me principally at fault. The other drawbacks to his treatment which I have mentioned are, no doubt, for the most part directly due to his purpose, clearly and consistently kept in view, to explore this rich field of politics in search of the facts only, not in search of generalizations. His method is that of thorough, exact, exhaustive analysis. But history belongs to the very essence of such a method; facts in comparative politics possess little value in the absence of clues to their development; and one cannot but wonder at the apologies which preface Mr. Bryce's occasional introduction of historical matter. Without more history than he gives there must be at least a partial failure to meet the demands of his own method. His work satisfies all who are in search of information, whether as to the existing facts or as to the formal historical derivation of our institutions. But its historical portions do not go beyond the formal history of measures and of methods to make evident the forces of national development and material circumstances which have lain behind measures and methods, and which, when once the nation gets past the youth of its continent, must work deep modification in its institutions and in its practical politics.

I can best illustrate what I mean by taking as points of departure Mr. Bryce's own clear statements of the views with which he approached our institutions. "America," he says, "is made all of a piece; its institutions are the product of its economic and social conditions and the expression of its character."¹ More pointedly and forcibly still does he express the same thing at page 404 of the same volume, in his chapter on *laissez faire*. He there reports himself as having said, to an English friend who bade him devote a chapter to the American theory of the state, "that the Americans had no theory of the state, and felt no need for one, being content, like the English, to base their constitutional ideas upon law and history." "No one doubts," he says, in another place, "that fifty years hence it (America) will differ at least as much from what it is now, as it differs now from the America which de Tocqueville described;"² and this difference, he is evidently ready to believe, may very possibly be a difference of institutions as well as a difference in material and social condition. Once again, in the chapters in which he discusses the influence of democracy on thought and on creative intellectual power, Mr. Bryce insists, assuredly with perfect justice, that political institutions have comparatively little to do with intellectual product and quality, certainly in the case of the United States. There is really, when American institutions are compared with English, nothing essentially novel in our political arrangements: they are simply the normal institutions of the Englishman in America. They are, in other words, English institutions as modified by the conditions surrounding settlements effected under corporate charters, in separate but neighbor colonies; above all as dominated by the material, economic, and social conditions attending the advance of the race in America. These conditions it is, not political principles, that

¹ Vol. ii, p. 473.

² *Ibid.*, p. 691.

have controlled our intellectual as well as our political development. Mr. Bryce has frequently to say of propositions of de Tocqueville's that, although possibly or even probably true when advanced, they are now no longer true; for example, certain "supposed faults of democracy." Many things supposed to be due to democracy, to political ideas, have turned out, under the test of time, to be due to circumstances. So disconnected with institutions, indeed, are actual national methods and characteristics that even what Mr. Bryce says of American public opinion in his very suggestive and valuable fourth part will doubtless be true only so long as our country is new. Americans, he says, are sympathetic, but they are unsettled and changeful. This cannot remain true of the people of an old and fully settled country, where sympathy will lead to cohesiveness and to the development of local types of opinion, where variety, consequently, will take the place of that uniformity of life and opinion which now leads to a too rapid transmission of impressions and impulses throughout the whole body of the nation,—the quick contagion of even transient impressions and emotions. America is now sauntering through her resources and through the mazes of her politics with easy nonchalance; but presently there will come a time when she will be surprised to find herself grown old,—a country crowded, strained, perplexed,—when she will be obliged to fall back upon her conservatism, obliged to pull herself together, adopt a new regimen of life, husband her resources, concentrate her strength, steady her methods, sober her views, restrict her vagaries, trust her best, not her average, members. That will be the time of change.

All this Mr. Bryce sees; his conspicuous merit consists, indeed, in perceiving that democracy is not a cause but an effect, in seeing that our politics are no explanation of our character, but that our character, rather, is the explanation of our politics. Throughout

his work you feel that he is generally conscious of the operation of historical causes and always guided by a quick appreciation of the degree to which circumstances enter into our institutions to mould and modify them. A reader who is himself conscious of our historical make-up and tendencies can see that Mr. Bryce is also. But it is one thing for a writer to be conscious of such things himself and quite another thing for him to convey to readers not possessed of his knowledge adequate conceptions of historical development. If our politics are the expression of our character and if that character is the result of the operation of forces permanent in the history of the English race, modified in our case by peculiar influences, subtle or obvious, operative in our separate experience, the influences, namely, of a peculiar legal status and of unexampled physical surroundings, then it is to the explanation of these forces and influences that every means of exposition ought to be bent in order to discover the bases of our law and our constitutions, of our constructive statesmanship and our practical politics. A description of our institutions, even though it be so full and accurate as to call for little of either criticism or addition, like this of Mr. Bryce's, will not suffice unless backed by something that goes deeper than mere legal or phenomenal history. In legal history Mr. Bryce leaves little to be desired: nothing could be more satisfying than his natural history of our courts with their powers of constitutional interpretation. The course of constitutional amendment, too, he traces, and all such concrete phenomena as the growth and operation of nominating conventions, the genesis and expansion of the spoils system, or of municipal rings and "bossdom," *etc.* But outside of legal and phenomenal history he seldom essays to go. If his method were that which de Tocqueville too often followed, there would be little reason why he should look further than visible institutions; if a nation can be understood by the single light of its institutions, its institutions may

be made to stand forth as itself. But if institutions be the expression of the national life, as Mr. Bryce rightly conceives, that national life must be brought constantly forward, even in its most hidden aspects, to explain them.

Some passages of Mr. Bryce's work, indeed, afford ground for suspecting that he does not himself always make sufficient private analysis even of the forces operative outside of our laws and acting in support and vivification of them. Thus he permits himself the old expression that we are "trying an experiment" in government. This is not true except in the same sense that it is true that the English are trying an experiment in their extensions of the franchise and in their extreme development of ministerial responsibility to the Commons. We are in fact but living an old life under new conditions. Where there is conservative continuity there can hardly be said to be experiment. Again, Mr. Bryce's statement,—the old statement,—that 1789 witnessed the birth of a national government could be made only by one who had not analyzed the growth of the national idea, which is coincident with the conscious development of the national experience and life. Its truth in juristic theory may be cogently maintained; but from the lay historian's point of view, and particularly from the point of view proper to English institutional and legal history, it is scarcely true at all. In the first place, no people can be a nation before its time, and its time has not come until the national thought and feeling have been developed and have become prevalent. Until a people thinks its government national it is not national. In the second place, the whole history—indeed the very theory—of judge-made law such as ours, whether it be equity or common law, bears witness to the fact that for a body of English people *the fundamental principles of the law are at any given time substantially what they are then thought to be*. The saving fact is that English (and American) thought

is, particularly in the sphere of law, cautiously conservative, coherently continuous, not carelessly or irresponsibly spreading abroad, but slowly "broadening down from precedent to precedent" within a well-defined course. It is not a flood, but a river. The complete nationality of our law, therefore, had to await the slowly developed nationality of our thought and habit. To leave out in any account of our development the growth of the national idea and habit, consequently, is to omit the best possible example of one of the most instructive facts of our politics, the development, namely, of constitutional principles outside the Constitution, the thoroughly English accumulation of unwritten law. That there has been such an accumulation Mr. Bryce of course points out and illustrates; but because of his shyness touching the use of history, which he fears will be tedious or uninteresting, he leaves the matter, after all, without adequate analysis. For such an analysis is not supplied by his chapter (xxxiv) on "The Development of the Constitution by Usage." That chapter contains a history of measures, of certain concrete practices, but no account of the national sentiment which has so steadily grown into a controlling, disposing, governing force, and which has really become a most tremendous sort of "usage." It is a sketch of the development of the government rather than of the influences which have made the government and altered the conceptions upon which it rests.

This must be taken to explain also the author's somewhat inadequate view of the constitutional effects of the war of secession. He seems to judge the effects of the war by the contents of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments.¹ A European reader, I believe, would get the impression that our civil war, which was a final contest between nationalism and sectionalism, simply confirmed the Union in its old strength,

¹ Thus he expresses surprise at the slightness of the changes wrought by the war in the Constitution—meaning, of course, the *formal* changes.

whereas it in reality, of course, confirmed it in a new character and strength which it had not at first possessed, but which the steady advance of the national development, and of the national idea thereby begotten, had in effect at length bestowed upon it.

If Mr. Bryce was obliged to exclude such historical analysis from his volumes, whose whole spirit and method nevertheless suggest such an analysis, and seem to await it, if not to take it for granted, why then much remains to be done in elucidation of the lessons of government to be learned in America. Those lessons can be fully learned only from history. There still remains to be accomplished the work of explaining democracy *by* America, in supplement of Mr. Bryce's admirable explanation of democracy *in* America. Comparative politics must yet be made to yield an answer to the broad and all-important question: What is democracy that it should be possible, nay natural, to some nations, impossible as yet to others? Why has it been a cordial and a tonic to little Switzerland and to big America, while it has been as yet only a quick intoxicant or a slow poison to France and Spain, a mere maddening draught to the South American states? Why has England approached democratic institutions by slow and steady stages of deliberate and peaceful development, while so many other states have panted towards democracy through constant revolution? Why has democracy existed in America and in Australia virtually from the first, while other states have utterly failed in every effort to establish it? Answers to such questions as these would serve to show the most truly significant thing now to be discovered concerning democracy: its place and office, namely, in the process of political development. What is its relative function, its characteristic position and power, in politics viewed as a whole?

Democracy is of course wrongly conceived when treated as merely a body of doctrine, or as simply a form of government. It is a stage of development. It

is not created by aspirations or by new faith: it is built up by slow habit. Its process is experience, its basis old wont, its meaning national organic unity and effectual life. It comes, like manhood, as the fruit of youth: immature peoples cannot have it, and the maturity to which it is vouchsafed is the maturity of freedom and self-control, and no other. It is conduct, and its only stable foundation is character. America has democracy because she is free; she is not free because she has democracy. A particular form of government may no more be adopted than a particular type of character may be adopted: both institutions and character must be developed by conscious effort and through transmitted aptitudes. The variety of effects produced by democratic principles, therefore, upon different nations and systems, and even upon the same nation at different periods, is susceptible of instructive explanation. It is not the result of accident merely, nor of good fortune, manifestly, that the English race has been the only race, outside of quiet, closeted Switzerland, the only race, that is, standing forward amidst the fierce contests of national rivalries, that has succeeded in establishing and maintaining the most liberal forms of government. It is, on the contrary, a perfectly natural outcome of organic development. The English alone have approached popular institutions *through habit*. All other races have rushed prematurely into them through mere impatience with habit: have adopted democracy, instead of cultivating it. An expansion of this contrast would leave standing very little of the reasoning from experience which constitutes so large a part of Sir Henry Maine's plausible *Popular Government*, and would add to Mr. Bryce's luminous exposition of the existing conditions of life and the operative machinery of politics in the greatest of republics something which might serve as a natural history of republicanism.

Mr. Bryce has given us a noble work possessing in

high perfection almost every element that should make students of comparative politics esteem it invaluable. If I have regretted that it does not contain more, it has been because of the feeling that the author of *The American Commonwealth*, who has given us a vast deal, might have given us everything.

MAKE HASTE SLOWLY ¹

THE ONE HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE INAUGURATION OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, ADDRESS DELIVERED APRIL 30, 1889, AT (PLACE NOT GIVEN). FROM ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT IN MR. WILSON'S HAND-WRITING, IN MRS. WILSON'S POSSESSION.

PRECEDENCE belongs to-day as of right to thoughts of thanksgiving and joy. To have kept our national government from destruction or decay for one hundred years were itself justification for gratification and pride. But we have done more than that. We are more—much more—than a preserved nation: we are a strengthened, elevated, matured nation. We have triumphed over difficulties, not by steadfastness merely but by progress also. We have had that best evidence of health, namely growth. Vastly better, greater, more worthy, whether for strength, for unity, or for achievement are the Re-United States than were the merely *United* States. We have done more than kept faith with the deeds of our Fathers: we have kept faith with their spirit also. We cannot doubt that in building together a compact and confident nation out of the somewhat disagreeing elements which they handled, with courage and in hope but not without doubt and misgiving, we have returned them their own with usury. Their thirteen talents, coined in various mints, bearing no single or standard value, have become in our hands thirty-eight talents, made up of coins bearing all the same image and superscription, emblems of liberty and nationality.

We may boast, too,—if boasting may have a place—that we have led the modern movement of Politics:

¹Title supplied by editors.

that it is at our hands that popular liberty has received its most absolute test and its highest confirmation. Never before we gave them scope of empire had the principles of democratic government received more than a narrow local application. Snug Swiss cantons, buttressed by Nature against the disturbances of European politics; mediæval cities forcibly holding the feudal world a while at arm's length; Rome straining her city constitution to the point of breaking by imposing upon it the weight of an Empire's affairs; the republics of Greece ruling territories ridiculously small when compared with the power and the abiding influence of the peoples whom they sustained—none of these afford any precedent for this continental rule of the people, so familiar to us now, but which we have astonished the world by successfully establishing. Our success has been on the scale of our geography: democracies there had been before and confederacies not a few; but never a democracy of sixty millions of people, never a federal state as large and as whole as a continent.

But these great things, which have unquestionably put us at the front of the world's politics, have not been accomplished by those elements of thought and character which make for pride and self-gratulation. It is significant of the forces that have made us what we are that we celebrate to-day not only the establishment of a government but also the inauguration of a man.¹ But Washington, it seems to me, though high-statured even beyond the other giants of his day, bore in his mien and stature the marks of the race to which he belonged. In him we may discern the "brief chronicle

¹ You know by heart, of course, Mr. Lowell's fine lines, of 1876:

"Virginia gave us this imperial man
Cast in the massive mould
Of those high-statured ages old
Which into grander forms our mortal metal ran.

Mother of States and undiminished men,
Thou gavest us a Country giving him."

and abstract" of a time and a nation. His courageous calmness in seasons of political crisis; his solemn sense of public duty; his steady aptitude for affairs; his hold upon men of various and diverse natures; his capacity for persuasive counsel; his boldness without dash, and power without display—do we not see in these things the perfect epitome of what the slow processes of English national history had proved themselves capable of producing in the way of manhood and character? Washington was neither an accident nor a miracle. Neither chance nor a special Providence need be assumed to account for him. It was God, indeed, who gave him to us; but God had been preparing him ever since English constitutional history began. He was of the same breed with Hampden and Pym and Cromwell. Burke and Chatham both recognized him as a brother so soon as they saw opened before them the credentials of his deeds. He was of such heroic stuff as God had for centuries been so graciously and so lavishly weaving into the character of our race.

Do you recall that striking story of one of the opening incidents of the Constitutional Convention related by Gouverneur Morris, an eye-witness of scenes? "Of the delegates," he says, "some were for halfway measures, for fear of displeasing the people; others were anxious and doubting. Just before there were enough to form a quorum, Washington, standing self-collected in the midst of them, his countenance more than usually solemn, his eye seeming to look into futurity, said:—'It is too probable that no plan we propose will be adopted. Perhaps another dreadful conflict is to be sustained. If, to please the people, we offer what we ourselves disapprove, how can we afterwards defend our course? Let us raise a standard to which the wise and honest can repair; the event is in the hands of God.' " That is an utterance, not of statesmanship merely, but of character as well: and do we not understand that character; do we not thrill at its expression? It strikes to the

quick of our sensibilities because we are of the same race and derivation that this man was of.

I press this point because it seems to me the point of chief instruction and inspiration, the best point, of to-day's suggestion. There is no strength in mere self-gratulation: there is no hope in being sure. Enlightened endeavour is the law of progress: a stout-hearted dissatisfaction with what has been done, a clear-sighted understanding of what there remains to do, an undaunted spirit to undertake and achieve it. I fear that we are becoming a little prone as a nation to mistake the real nature of our success. It does not lie in the forms but in the essence of our institutions. We are not great in popular government because we invented written constitutions: for we did not invent them. We are not successful because we put into our constitutions new devices whereby to moderate the disorders or facilitate the better influences of politics: for we originated no devices. We are great because of what we perfected and fulfilled, not because of anything that we discovered: and it is only by extending such lines of development as can be clearly traced backwards through the normal evolutions of politics in the past that we can make further permanent advances. We did not break with the past: we understood and obeyed it, rather. The most thorough way of understanding ourselves lies through an intimate acquaintance with the long processes of our breeding. There are no individual discoveries to be made in politics as there are in astronomy or biology or physics; society grows as a whole, and as a whole grows into knowledge of itself. Society is an organism, which does not develop by the cunning leadership of a single member so much as by a slow maturing and an all-round adjustment, though led at last into self-consciousness and self-command by those who best divine the laws of its growth.

So long were we compelled to centre our thoughts in national politics upon the interpretation of our written

standards—so short is the period during which we have been excused from looking exclusively into our constitutions for the sanction and substance of our national life, that it is open to question whether we have even yet accepted the fact that the real foundations of political life in the United States are to be found elsewhere than in our legal documents.

Our politics and our character were derived from a

“land that freemen till
That sober-suited Freedom chose,
The land where, girt with friends or foes,
A man may speak the thing he will;

“A land of settled government,
A land of just and old renown,
Where freedom broadens slowly down
From precedent to precedent:

“Where faction seldom gathers head,
But by degrees to fulness wrought,
The strength of some diffusive thought
Hath time and space to work and spread.”

We have been strong and successful—and shall be—just in proportion to our fidelity to this so great heritage of political manliness. It is no light thing to have such traditions behind us: liberty is not something that can be laid away in a document, a completed work. It is an organic principle, a principle of life, renewing and being renewed. Democratic institutions are never done—they are, like the living tissue, always a-making. It is a strenuous thing this of living the life of a free people: and we cannot escape the burden of our inheritance.

But this burden is light: the only grievous burden is to be held back from liberty by a heritage of subjection. Those of you who have followed the course of events in France and who share with all lovers of liberty the anxiety caused by the present posture of her affairs will know whence my best illustration will be

drawn. You know how straight M. Monod has pointed his finger at his country's trouble in what he says in the current (the April) number of the *Contemporary Review*. "France," he says, "is suffering mainly from moral instability and diseases of the imagination, the result of a too sudden rupture with her own traditions." "After every revolution," he adds,—and he is right,— "and in spite of 17 changes of constitution in a single century, she always rights herself, and knows no pause in her intellectual and industrial activity, nor any decline in her material force." This is indeed true. In her habit of being prosperous France is established; in her habit of making her wit tell in literature and in art she is well grounded; but the habit of being free she as yet most imperfectly possesses. That habit, instead of having something like a thousand years of steady practice in it with her as with us, has but the uneven exertions of a brief hundred years of feverish change. She is acquiring it: but it would be a miracle could she adopt it, as one would put on a garment. We only make ourselves contemptible when we despise France because she has failed at the miracle: we only make ourselves ridiculous when we pity her; she deserves sympathy and she will achieve success: we cannot do better than learn a lesson from her.

The profitable thing for us to remember is, that, though the saving habit in politics may be acquired by wisdom and sober, steadfast endeavour, which are very rare, it may be lost by folly, which is very common. Evidently wisdom and endeavour have had rare good opportunities in America during the century that is past: wisdom is not difficult where resources are unbounded; endeavour is not arduous where there is exceeding rich reward. But the century which *begins* to-day will doubtless make a very different distribution of its favours among us. It is easier to be new than to be old—far lighter work to be pioneers needing mere muscle and physical courage, than patiently and resolutely to face

the problems of a crowded and perplexed civilization. It was easier to drive out an army of English troops than it will be to assimilate a heterogeneous horde of immigrants. It required less self-possession to establish our governments than it will require to maintain them: the principles on which they should be constructed to meet our needs in the beginning were much plainer to see than are the principles upon which they must be modified to meet the needs of the present and future.

For us this is the centennial year of Washington's inauguration; but for Europe it is the centennial year of the French Revolution. One hundred years ago we gained, and Europe lost, self-command, self-possession. But since then we have been steadily receiving into our midst and to full participation in our national life the very people whom their home politics have familiarized with revolution: our own equable blood we have suffered to receive into it the most feverish blood of the restless old world. We are facing an ever-increasing difficulty of self-possession with ever deteriorating materials: for your only reliable stuff in this strain of politics is Character.

Think! Our task is to be

"A nation yet, the rulers and the ruled—
Some sense of duty, something of a faith,
Some reverence for the laws ourselves have made,
Some patient force to change them when we will,
Some civic manhood firm against the crowd."

And our material? "Minds cast in every mould of race, minds inheriting every bias of environment, warped by the histories of a score of different nations, warmed or chilled, closed or expanded by almost every climate of the globe!"

This is not the place or the occasion for the discussion of policies: we are here only to renew our vows at the altar of Liberty, only to look ourselves in the face, to examine and know ourselves,—to confess ourselves

to God and ask of him succour and guidance. It behooves us once and again to stand face to face with our ideals, to renew our enthusiasms, to reckon again our duties, to take fresh views of our aims and fresh courage for their pursuit. To-day we should stand close to the thought and close to the hearts of those who gave our nation life. The tasks of the future are not to be less but greater than the tasks of the past: it is our part to improve even the giant breed of which we came—to return to the high-statured ages: to weld our people together in a patriotism as pure, a wisdom as elevated, a virtue as sound as those of the greater generation whom to-day we hold in special and grateful remembrance—a nation knowing

“Its duties,—prompt to move, but firm to wait,—
Knowing, things rashly sought are rarely found:
That, for the functions of an ancient State—
Strong by her charters, free because imbound,
Servant of Providence, not slave of Fate—
Perilous is sweeping change, all chance unsound.”

A SYSTEM OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A REVIEW OF "POLITICAL SCIENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW"¹ BY JOHN W. BURGESS. FROM THE "ATLANTIC MONTHLY," MAY, 1891, VOL. 67, PP. 694-699. WRITTEN DURING MR. WILSON'S FIRST YEAR AT PRINCETON AS A PROFESSOR.

MR. BURGESS has produced a work possessing conspicuous merits and conspicuous faults. It will both command admiration and provoke criticism; and it will be fortunate if the criticism does not overcrowd the praise which it must receive. For the very fact that its good and its bad points are equally accentuated tends to make its bad points seem more prominent than any just estimate should pronounce them. It will serve the purposes alike of specific appreciation and specific criticism if, at the outset, a general chart be made of Mr. Burgess's method and thought, and an outline of the excellences and defects which must be examined and estimated before his work can be appreciated as a whole.

Its excellences are excellences both of method and of thought. There is the utmost clearness and adequacy of analysis throughout the book: nowhere in the two volumes does one lose his way in the subject, or doubt for a moment concerning the bearings of what he reads upon the subject-matter as a whole. There is also, of course, what successful analysis always secures, namely, perfect consistency everywhere; there is almost complete logical wholeness in the exposition. The reader enjoys the satisfaction, so rare in this day of easy writ-

¹ *Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law*. In two volumes. By John W. Burgess. Boston: Ginn & Co. 1891.

ing, of being nowhere in doubt as to the author's meaning.

These are excellences of a high order, and are excellences, obviously, not of method only, but of thought as well. The thought is for the most part clear, consistent, and certain. There is accurate knowledge throughout, also, and thoroughness in setting it forth.

The faults of the work, though equally evident, are not so easy of statement: the mind of the reader finds them distinct and irritating, but his vocabulary may find them subtle and difficult of explicit exposure. Stated in the plainest words that come to hand, they consist in a mechanical and incorrect style, a dogmatic spirit, and a lack of insight into institutions as detailed expressions of life, not readily consenting to be broadly and positively analyzed and classified.

We have now our scheme for a more minute and just examination of the contents of the work, whose importance no one can deny without fortifying his judgment by not reading it. The title of the work indicates at once the principal distinction upon which its treatment is based: one portion of it is devoted to those topics touching the nature and operations of the state which the author conceives to fall mainly within the domain of political science; another and quite distinct portion embodies such topics as fall exclusively within the domain of constitutional law. A sharp line of division is run between these two domains. Political science deals with those processes, whether legal or revolutionary, and with those conceptions, whether juristic or lying entirely outside the thought of the lawyer, by virtue of which states come into existence, take historic shape, create governments and institutions, and at pleasure change or discard what forms or laws they must in order to achieve development. Constitutional law, on the other hand, has a much narrower scope. It deals only with such part of political life as is operative within the forms of law, and obedient to its commands and

sanctions. Juristic method scrutinizes laws, examines their contents, ponders their meaning, seeks to elicit from them their logical purpose; does not concern itself with what they ought to contain, but only with what they do contain. The method of political science is much broader and freer. It does not hesitate to question laws as to their right to exist, to indulge bold speculations as to their foundations in the historical development and purposes of the people which has produced them, to account revolution just and necessary upon occasion, to say that laws are valid only so long as they contain some part of the national life and impede no essential measure of reform. Political science, in short, studies the forces of which laws are only the partial and temporary manifestations, while constitutional law is a study of conditions wholly statical.

Almost all that is most individual and important in Mr. Burgess's thought lies within the first portion of his work, which deals with the greater topics of political science. The two topics which stand forward most prominently in his treatment, as including all the rest, are Sovereignty and Liberty. The cardinal questions of systematic politics are, first, With whom does supreme political power rest, where is sovereignty lodged? and second, What liberty does the sovereign vouchsafe to the individual, and what are the guarantees of that liberty? But neither of these questions, nor any other questions whatever, either of political science or of constitutional law, can be discussed with any assurance of success without a most careful and consistent observance of the distinction between the state and the government. This is a distinction fundamental to every portion, great or small, of Mr. Burgess's thought. Always, under whatever constitution, distinguishable in thought, the state and the government are in most modern constitutions distinguishable also in fact. Back of the government, or else contained in it, is that other entity in which there persists a life higher than that of

the government, and more enduring: that entity is the state, which gives to the government its form and its vitality. State and government are never identical except in mere point of organization; they may have the same organs, but they are not on that account the same thing. It is the state which is sovereign; whatever person or body of persons constitutes the sole vital source of political power in a nation, that person or body of persons is the state, and is sovereign. In those periods of the history of politics in which the will of a king or of a prince has been decisive of law and conclusive as to individual liberty, the monarch has himself been the state. Wherever minorities have established themselves as a ruling class, obeyed by all organs of government, there minorities have wielded sovereignty, have been the state. Whenever majorities command, the nation has itself become sovereign, has been made the state.

So much for the fact of the state as a thing separable from the forms of government, and merely operative through those forms. The organization of the state is another matter. Its organization may be identical with the organization of the government, as it practically is in England, where the House of Commons is sovereign; or it may be distinct from the organization of the government, as it is among ourselves, where our constitutions are not changed by ordinary legislative process, but by other machinery specially arranged for the purpose. Only the state is superior to the laws; the government is subject to the laws. The state makes constitutions; governments give effect to them. Whatever power can change the constitution, that power is the state organized. Thus in England the government is organized in the Queen, the Lords, and the Commons; but the state is organized in the House of Commons alone, whose will, whenever it is clearly determinate, is supreme. In France the state is organized in the National Assembly sitting at Versailles; the gov-

ernment, in the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, and the President and Ministers. In Germany the government consists of the Emperor, the Reichstag, and the Bundesrath; but sovereignty resides in the Reichstag and a majority of the Bundesrath great enough to include at least forty-five out of the fifty-eight votes of that body. In the United States, while the government is organized in the houses of Congress and the President, the state has an alternative organization, represented by the two alternative methods of amending the Constitution permitted by Article V. of that instrument.

Nor does the significance of this distinction between state and government stop here. It is carried much further, to the upsetting of not a little familiar phraseology; for it invades that portion of Mr. Burgess's book which is devoted to comparative constitutional law, and commands his discussion of the forms of government. We can no longer speak of a federal state, but only of a federal government; neither does there exist any dual state, though dual governments there may be and have been. Every state is single and indivisible, let governments have what duality or complexity they may. The sovereign body which can make or unmake constitutions is in every case a single body; but the governments which give effect to constitutions may be made up of as many distinct and balanced parts as constitution makers may succeed in giving them. Sweden-Norway, for example, is not a dual state, for there is no such thing, but two states bound together in some important matters under a common government, which you may, if you choose, call a dual government.

If it be asked, Why must the sovereign will be always conceived of as single and indivisible, — why may it not be dual or treble, or multiple? the answer is ready and emphatic: Because sovereignty is by very definition supreme will, and there can be but one supreme will. This is an old answer, sometimes supposed to have

become long ago axiomatic; only the reasoning here built upon it contains anything that is new.

Such is the theoretical side of the book, such its structure of thought. The importance and serviceableness of such an analysis will not for a moment be doubted. It is only in the application of it to the actual facts of political life, the actual phenomena of state growth, that difficulty enters. Mr. Burgess himself does not seem to feel that there are any difficulties. He is as confident in his application of this analysis as in his construction of it. It is characteristic of him to have no doubts; to him the application of his analysis seems the perfect and final justification of it. His thoughtful readers, however, will experience much more difficulty and have many more doubts. For he makes specific application of his analysis to the governments of the United States, England, France, and Germany — governments with which every student of politics is familiar, and whose history is known in detail. It is in his treatment of the history of these governments — a treatment in every instance as brief as it is confident — that our author is at his boldest in making trial of his theories. He subjects them to great risks in the process, and they by no means escape damage. Or perhaps it would be more just to say that, in seeking a very absolute exemplification of the truth of his theories at every stage of complex national histories, like those of Germany, France, and England, he displays an extraordinary dogmatic readiness to force many intricate and diverse things to accommodate themselves to a few simple formulas. He believes that he can specifically identify on the one hand the state, and on the other the government, in each period of the manifold development of these great nations, — that he can point out exactly, that is, the real possessors of sovereign influence or authority during each principal age of their political growth; and the attempt must give every reader accustomed to deal with the multiform and deli-

cate phenomena of such growth a distressing impression of crudeness and dogmatic presumption.

Perhaps the most striking example of this quality is afforded by Mr. Burgess's confident analysis of our own national history in the terms of his theory. Without touch of hesitation, he formulates our history as follows: A national "state" came into existence among us in 1774 with the assembling of the first Continental Congress; so long as the Continental Congress continued to sit, it represented that state in organization; when that state, thus in Congress assembled, consented to the formation of the Confederation, under the Articles framed in 1777 and put into operation in 1781, it consented to its own dissolution, for those Articles attributed statehood to the several commonwealths, denying in every provision the existence of any single national sovereign will; but in the Constitution of 1789 the national state reasserted itself and regained organization, while the commonwealths lost their statehood, and became once again merely governments. These conclusions Mr. Burgess reaches, not as a lawyer, of course, for they are without sanction in our legal history, but as a political scientist: they are the "facts" of the case as contradistinguished from the law of the case,—a distinction upon which he is careful to insist. The distinction is indeed valid,—nay, obvious enough; but many there be that are betrayed into singular error in the use of it. For the facts have to be determined; and while it is generally easy enough to determine what the law is, political fact is subtle and elusive, not to be caught up whole in any formula. It is a thing which none but a man who is at once a master of sentences and a seer can bring entire before the mind's eye in its habit as it lived, so many-sided is it and so quick to change.

It is always necessary to ascertain, therefore, just what a writer means by the antithesis between law and fact. Mr. Burgess believes, as we have seen, that a "state," with a single sovereign will, sprang into exist-

ence, however imperfect its organization, with the assembling of the Continental Congress of 1774. He evidently, therefore, excludes opinion altogether from the category of "fact"; for he quite certainly would not undertake to prove that in contemporary thought there was any real recognition of the occurrence of so momentous an event. He admits, indeed, with perhaps a touch of regret, that "the dull mind of the average legislator cannot at once be made conscious of such changes"; and he would probably admit also that even legislators who were not dull, like Madison and Hamilton, for example, were quite unconscious that a state had been born in 1774, and destroyed in 1781. The truth is, of course, that political fact is made up largely of opinion. Opinion is no less a fact than is heat, or cold, or gravitation. It is a determining force, and for that reason a controlling fact; in political development it is the fact of facts. If Mr. Burgess could but appreciate this, it would give life and significance to his theories such as in his own hands they do not possess. The national "state," with its sense of unity and of a common purpose, if democratic in structure, comes always slowly into existence, with the habit of coöperation and the growth of the national idea. The commonwealths of 1774 esteemed themselves states, and were states; adding nothing to their independence and dignity, assuredly, by the arrangement of 1781, but on the contrary consciously curtailing their privileges thereby. States they remained both in consciousness and purpose when they entered the union consummated in 1789. The national "state" has come into existence since then by virtue of a revolution of ideas, by reason of national union and growth and achievement, through a process also of struggle and of civil war. A state cannot be born unawares, cannot spring unconsciously into being. To think otherwise is to conceive mechanically, and not in terms of life. To teach otherwise is to deaden effort, to leave no function for patriotism. If the processes of

politics are unconscious and unintelligent, why then this blind mechanism may take care of itself; there is nothing for us to do.

The truth seems to be that Mr. Burgess does not keep the method of the jurist and the method of the political scientist quite so distinct as he supposes. The juristic method is the method of logic: it squares with formulated principles; it interprets laws only, and concrete modes of action. The method of political science, on the contrary, is the interpretation of life; its instrument is insight, a nice understanding of subtle, unformulated conditions. For this latter method Mr. Burgess's mind seems unfit; the plain logic of concrete modes of action is much more natural to him than the logic of circumstance and opinion. Where he employs the forms and expressions of induction, therefore, he will often be found using in reality the processes of a very absolute deduction. He has strong powers of reasoning, but he has no gift of insight. This is why he is so good at logical analysis, and so poor at the interpretation of history. This is why what he says appears to have a certain stiff, mechanical character, lacking flexibility and vitality. It seems to have been constructed, not conceived. It suggests nothing; it utterly lacks depth and color. As a matter of fact, these defects do not invalidate in the least the serviceable analysis upon which the whole work is founded, neither do they rob its very excellent and lucid discussions of comparative constitutional law of their significance; but they do put the author at a great disadvantage with his reader by creating the impression that the whole matter of the volumes has been arbitrarily conceived.

Mr. Burgess, constructing thus, does not write in the language of literature, but in the language of science. The sentences of the scientist are not sentences in the literary sense,—they are simply the ordered pieces of statements; they are not built upon any artistic plan, but upon the homeliest principles of grammatical joinery,

which cares nothing for color, or tone, or contrast, but contents itself with more serviceable construction out of any materials that will hold together mechanically. There is no "style" about such writing; words are used simply as counters, without regard to the material out of which they are made, or to the significance which they bear in their hearts. A book thus constituted may be read much and consulted often, but can itself never live: it is not made up of living tissue. It may suggest life, but it cannot impart it. Doubtless the artificers of such writings do not pretend to be making literature, but they have no choice; if they do not write literature, they do not write truth. For political science cannot be truthfully constructed except by the literary method; by the method, that is, which seeks to reproduce life in speech. Constitutional law may perhaps dispense with the literary method in its expositions, but political science cannot. Politics can be successfully studied only as life; as the vital embodiment of opinions, prejudices, sentiments, the product of human endeavor, and therefore full of human characteristics of whim and ignorance and half knowledge; as a process of circumstance and of interacting impulses, a thing growing with thought and habit and social development—a thing various, complex, subtle, defying all analysis save that of insight. And the language of direct sight is the language of literature.

It would not be possible to criticise these volumes in detail without criticising them in very great detail. The strong ideas that stand out in them will prove eminently serviceable to subsequent writers in the great field which they seek to occupy, and will doubtless pass into the literature of the subject; but Mr. Burgess's specific judgments upon the political history of the four great nations with whose institutions he chiefly concerns himself, his judgments also upon races and upon race development in the opening chapters of the work, every attempt that he makes to unfold the interior meanings of na-

tional political development, must provoke sharp dissent and criticism. Perhaps this, in the absence of a suggestive method of treatment, will be the book's means of stimulation. Its very dogmatism, indeed, will prove not unpleasant to those who have experienced a touch of *ennui* in this age of cautious, timid writing. It is an agreeable shock to hear once more the old confident phrase, "I have demonstrated." You may not agree, but you may possibly admire the boldness of temperament which makes such phrases possible.

Mr. Burgess will not have done a bad thing if he heartens us once more to get clear ideas and put muscle into their defense. That is one way to rouse truth, though it may not be the gentlest or the best way.

MR. CLEVELAND'S CABINET

THE "REVIEW OF REVIEWS" (AMERICAN), APRIL, 1893,
VOL. VII, PP. 286-297.

THERE is much to arrest attention and challenge comment in Mr. Cleveland's cabinet appointments. He has so evidently chosen his advisers with independence of judgment not upon conventional lines, but upon lines of individual choice, that the make-up of the cabinet furnishes us with a fresh test of his interesting character as a leader and ruler. The career of Mr. Cleveland has been an individual career from the first. He has been a leader among citizens rather than a leader of parties. He has dominated his party because he represented a great force of unpartisan opinion. His career, too, has been exclusively executive within the field, not of the choice of measures, but of the choice of men and of just means for the conduct of the government on its business side. Equipped with an admirable practical judgment from the outset, and with an extraordinary capacity for understanding the larger aspects of great questions, he has yet, apparently, come slowly into the possession of general views regarding the legislative policy of the government.

These views, moreover, would seem to have come to him as to a very thoughtful man of affairs rather than as to a natural student of policy, as the result of the direct contact of a strong and sagacious judgment with the practical conduct of the business of the government. No one can doubt for a moment his extraordinary powers of mind. Those powers do not seem brilliant because they operate without display of force. They are equable, unhurried, moving, it would seem,

through a certain inevitable course of judgment to conclusions which do not take them by surprise; and the reason he has so riveted the attention and engaged the admiration of his countrymen is that he possesses in perfection that largeness and candor of view, that strong sagacity in affairs, and that solidity of judgment which characterize the best Americans. He is a typical American, albeit of the best type, and his countrymen believe in him without always knowing why.

He approached his present exalted station, nevertheless, through a series of almost exclusively executive offices, which he had occupied, not as a man who had chosen a public career, but as an independent citizen who had consented to lend his individual character to the task of bettering the methods of public administration. He has always disconcerted the politicians by selecting, for such offices as he had to give, men like himself in their disconnection from politics—men whom the politicians had never heard of, and consequently found it difficult to reckon with. His conception of the way in which government ought to be conducted is identical with the conception which thrust him forward to occupy offices of the greatest influence within the gift of the people—the conception which gave Andrew Jackson the presidency. He believes that what the government needs at moments of apparent lethargy or demoralization is the infusion of new blood, the disinterested service of men untainted by party management. He has chosen his present cabinet on that plan. He would not have been true to his career or to his character had he not done so. He does not regard it as important that the country at large should know the men he has selected. The country has trusted him with the organization of the government, and, with his customary courage, he has assumed all the responsibility of the choice, taking, not men sifted out of the general mass by the processes of public life, but men whom his own

judgment approved; and no one need be surprised or chagrined.

That he has chosen well in all cases no one can safely say until the four years of his administration shall have made full test of the men. With one exception, Mr. Richard Olney, who may, perhaps, be reckoned the scholar of the little group, the members of the new cabinet are all practical men, like Mr. Cleveland himself, with minds formed by experience, rather than by books or by the observation of affairs lying beyond the immediate sphere of their own lives. With two notable exceptions—Mr. Carlisle and Mr. Herbert—they have none of them had any such direct acquaintance with public questions as would be necessary to give them ease and steadiness of judgment in the exercise of the functions which they have now undertaken, unless Mr. Lamont busily hived wisdom in such matters while he served Mr. Cleveland as private secretary. With but a single exception—Mr. Lamont—they have all had the training of lawyers, though Mr. Carlisle and Mr. Herbert have doubtless added a great deal to that training during their long connection with the public business in Congress, where they have played no narrow rôle. Mr. Morton is said to have found the law too “unpractical” to satisfy his full-blooded ardor to be doing something that would tell at once; he, therefore, has made it only one instrument among many to enable him to live his hard pioneer life in Nebraska. Mr. Hoke Smith is not suspected of knowing more than enough law to serve the practical purposes of his professional engagements from day to day. It is a cabinet of lawyers nevertheless, and two of its members, Mr. Gresham and Mr. Olney, may fairly be called great lawyers—men fit to be jurists if they would but take the pains. As a body of practical men they are accustomed to overcoming difficulties, and the ignorance of the majority of them as to what exactly they will have to do in their several departments will be but a new difficulty

to surmount. They may be counted on to learn rapidly. They are, at any rate, men of uncommonly fine physique and can easily outlive their sentence of four years at hard labor. The reporters have amused themselves and us with specific details as to their weight, which is most of it, they assure us, in bone and sinew, very little of it in mere adipose tissue, which might not stand the strain of too close application to executive routine. A stalwart set of men, with the good humor of giants for the most part,—until too outrageously assaulted by office seekers. And no part of the country, it would seem, has a monopoly in the production of giants. These big men come from widely separated States. Mr. Smith, of Georgia, is as large as Mr. Bissell, of New York, and each of these is bigger than Mr. Carlisle, the Kentuckian, who comes from a region where the men notoriously grow tall and full chested. Mr. Olney, too, is said to be of a height, an athletic build, and a distinction of bearing striking enough to have entitled him to be noted and known long ago outside his profession. You would know such men not to be insignificant, wherever you might chance to see them. It is a humorous way of estimating importance, not set down in any ethical manual; but it has its obvious usefulness as a standard for the general eye.

Compared, man for man, with their predecessors in Mr. Cleveland's official counsels, they afford material for some marked contrasts. The first time he filled the office of Secretary of State Mr. Cleveland followed time-honored precedents. Mr. Bayard represented the oldest and best traditions of American public life. He came of a race of statesmen, and had fair claim to rank with his forebears in the notable line of family succession. He was, by common consent, one of the foremost men on the Democratic side of the Senate; he had served on several of the most important committees of that body, the President's Great Council in foreign affairs; and when he assumed the duties of Secretary of

State he only passed from one branch of the public service into another not far removed. The grave question was, Did not the Senate lose too much by his transference? He had as great familiarity with the policy of the government as Mr. Blaine, his immediate predecessor, and greater familiarity than Mr. Evarts, the predecessor of Mr. Blaine. His knowledge of the course of policy, moreover, was more a knowledge of questions considered upon their merits than Mr. Blaine's, whose close acquaintance with public affairs consisted in a knowledge of men in their groupings rather than in any mastery of questions considered apart from men. Judge Gresham has usually lived at a considerable remove from such business as his forerunners were immersed in. His fine qualities of mind, his engaging liberality of temper and elevation of moral view, have been manifested chiefly upon the bench in the West. For all his reading, his knowledge of men and of the history of the country, his wide sympathies and quick insight, he will be a novice in adjusting the foreign relations of the country. Mastery in such matters cometh not by observation merely. Besides the wishes of the President, he will have only his own legal capacity and his own natural apprehension of right and wrong to guide him. Fortunately our foreign relations are generally simple enough to require little more. But the experienced officials of the State Department will find their new chief very *naïf* and ignorant about many things which seem to them obvious arrangements of Providence.

It seems a pity, too, to waste so fine a Secretary of the Interior, as it seems certain Mr. Gresham would have made, on the novel field of foreign affairs. Other Presidents have taken their Secretaries of State from the interior of the country; but Henry Clay was already the leading spirit in public affairs before he took that post; Lewis Cass was a Nestor among the statesmen of his day when Buchanan called him to the cabinet; Elihu

Washburne had served in Congress until he led, by sheer force of good service, in almost everything that it undertook. He was Secretary of State but a week (but six days, to be very accurate), but he had had experience enough in the conduct of the government's business to have remained Secretary of State for all the eight years of General Grant's terms. Mr. Gresham brings with him from the interior a minute knowledge of the questions of the interior, the questions of interstate commerce, of railway monopoly on the grand scale, of land grants and agricultural depression,—to enter, not the Department which deals with such matters, but the Department which looks away from home to questions affecting the exterior interests of the country. He was Postmaster-General for a year and a half in the cabinet of President Arthur, and the Post Office, the world supposes, demands little more of its chief than a talent for business; but the Secretaryship of State? This is certainly an appointment to provoke comment! It would seem a pity, I say, to lose so fine a Secretary of the Interior in order that a man of brilliant gifts may have the honor of the chief post in the Administration.

But not only, or chiefly, because it is in such wise out of the line of previous appointments, is this elevation of Judge Gresham to the office of Secretary of State remarkable. Mr. Gresham may do well or ill as Secretary of State—his talents fit him to do brilliantly even with a novice's hand. The startling feature of the appointment, as everybody knows, is that until last summer he was a Republican, and a Republican of such influence and importance in the West that he was seriously thought of as a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination! When the issue was squarely joined between the parties on the tariff question he declared that he could not act with his former party, but must vote for Mr. Cleveland; and his announcement of his purpose to do so was one of the notable incidents of the campaign. It was reckoned widely influential in

changing votes in the great States of Indiana and Illinois, where his name stands for courage, sagacity, integrity and public spirit. Finding this notable man thus on his way to the Democratic party, Mr. Cleveland called upon him to make the whole journey at a single stage and accept at the hands of a Democratic Administration the post that stands first on the list of cabinet appointments. It was a bold step to take, both for Mr. Cleveland and for Judge Gresham. It is the most original thing Mr. Cleveland has done in all his striking career of independent choice. The politicians had grown accustomed to being surprised by his appointments; this time they were dumfounded.

What the result will be a prudent man should be slow to predict. Signs are not wanting that the Republican party is going, or at any rate may presently go, to pieces; and signs are fairly abundant that the Democratic party is rapidly being made over by the stirring and disturbing energy of the extraordinary man who is now President. It may be that Mr. Gresham's accession to the Democratic cabinet means that great interests and great forces of thought in the Northwest are now turning about to the assistance of the Democratic party, Judge Gresham being their gift to the counsels of that party. Mr. Cleveland has been steadily effecting a revolution in the purposes and methods of the Democratic party by drawing so many new men about him, by assisting to shelve so many older men of the Democratic party of former days. The party has grown bold and aggressive and certain of its own mind in consequence of the change. Mr. Cleveland's present term of office may afford him time and opportunity to complete the transformation. Young men are eager to serve him; and a Democratic party of young men is the most formidable danger the Republicans have to fear—the best hope that the Democrats have to cherish.

There is a singular and quite admirable mixture of conservatism, however, in the new President's methods.

Mr. Carlisle and Mr. Herbert are living examples that he has not broken with tradition in filling the great offices of State, and very important examples indeed they are. In both of these appointments Mr. Cleveland has followed some of the oldest and very best traditions of the government. Except for the Hawaiian matter, no questions of delicacy now press for immediate attention in the Department of State, but there is every reason to believe that its financial policy will be the most important feature of this Administration, and Mr. Cleveland has shown real statesmanship in placing at the head of the Treasury Department a man who is not only a real leader of his party, but its leader first of all and most notably in the field of financial legislation. Together with Mr. Morrison and Mr. Mills, he prepared it, by long and doubtful parliamentary battle, for the policy which it has now accepted from Mr. Cleveland himself. In poise and in the quiet masterfulness that makes a leader he is superior to both his comrades in that struggle. His elevation to the post of Secretary of the Treasury, moreover, redresses the balance of authority within the party which was for a time disturbed by the election of Mr. Crisp to the Speakership of the House two years ago. Mr. Manning and Mr. Fairchild, of Mr. Cleveland's former cabinet, were admirable business men; but something more than mere business capacity is needed in the Treasury at this juncture. Questions of financial policy have become exigent, and it was proper that a past master in financial legislation should be called to preside over the Department.

It is doubtful, indeed, whether the Treasury should ever be considered a mere business department. General Grant, it is understood, once invited Mr. A. T. Stewart, of New York, to occupy the post of Secretary of the Treasury, upon the theory that the Treasury Department was not essentially different in kind from a great commercial establishment. But the financial

legislation of Congress is so dependent upon the Treasury for its wise effectuation, the policy of the department so intimately touches at every point the most sensitive business interests of the country, the Secretary of the Treasury has so often to determine questions which really fix a financial programme on the government, that it is always hazardous to put any man at the head of the Treasury who does not possess tested political judgment as well as approved business capacity. The appointment of Mr. Carlisle is a better appointment than that of Mr. Manning was, wise and efficient an officer as Mr. Manning proved himself to be. Mr. Manning was no statesman, as Mr. Carlisle is. The two appointments illustrate in their contrast the development of Mr. Cleveland himself. When he first became President he had no determinate or constructive views with regard to the general policy of the government, but came in to perform a purpose of the executive rather than for the legislative branch of the government; to reform the civil service, not to preside over a party programme. Now, on the contrary, he is conscious of a wider mission. His views broadened to the whole extent of his function as President during his first term of office; the interval of four years during which he has been out of official place has strengthened and particularized those views. He began by regarding the Treasury Department as a business branch of the service, like the post office; he now regards it as possessing a presidential function in respect of the general financial policy of the country.

Mr. Herbert has long had a very important part in administering the Navy Department. No one has had a more influential share than he in the legislation by which Congress has of late years sought to build up the navy into real effectiveness; and as chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs in the House of Representatives of the Congress which has just expired he has been, as it were, the legislative representative and

head of the Navy Department—a sort of American parliamentary secretary. He will now manage the Department from the inside instead of from the outside, that is all. His success in Congress has been marked, but it has been so quietly achieved that the country at large has hardly heard of it. Except that the public eye has not much noted him, he has won a cabinet place quite after the English fashion, by a steady course of eminently useful parliamentary service. He has come forward by that process of self-selection which is the most stimulating and significant feature of free institutions under parliamentary forms of government. Previous Secretaries of the Navy, being obvious heads of the Department, have gotten the credit for many things planned, proposed and accomplished by Mr. Herbert. He is now Secretary of the Navy himself, and may realize both his plans and the reputation which those plans ought to bring him.

But there is something else about Mr. Herbert which is even more interesting. He is not only a Southerner, but served with distinction in the Confederate army, and now he is put at the head of one of the war departments of the federal government, having been confirmed by the Senate, apparently without a dissenting voice: for it took the Senate only fifteen minutes to confirm the whole list of cabinet appointments of March 6. Mr. Lamar, of Mr. Cleveland's former cabinet, had also espoused and served the cause of the Southern Confederacy, and he became Secretary of the Interior and a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. But here is a man who fought against the Union; who has already spent many years in assisting to build up the warlike strength of the very government he resisted; and who is now made one of the war ministers of that government! Who can regard such facts without wonder and pride? Such is the healing and amalgamating force of fair fight, and of the sovereign determinations of policy under free institutions! The war is indeed a

long way behind us—and yet these men are of the very generation that fought it!

The other appointments may be dismissed with much briefer comment—must be so dismissed, in fact, for we know too little of the men to make the commentary long. The selection of Mr. Richard Olney, of Massachusetts, for the office of Attorney-General may safely be pronounced excellent. No lawyer who knows him doubts that Mr. Olney stands at the front of his profession, not by arrogation, but by merit. Certainly the Department of Justice is the least political of the Departments. It is of little consequence whether the Attorney-General have the training and experience of a statesman or not. His functions, outside the cabinet meetings, demand, not a knowledge of public affairs, but a knowledge of the laws and a judicial fairness of mind in applying them to the law business of the government, and it cannot be reckoned unjust to Mr. Garland to say that Mr. Cleveland has made a better selection this time for this important office than he made eight years ago. Mr. Garland was a shade or two too much of a politician for that particular post. Mr. Olney, it may be taken for granted, has no entangling alliances by which to be embarrassed.

So far as we know anything about Mr. Morton, the new Secretary of Agriculture, his selection, too, seems a very happy one. There were no precedents to follow in filling this office—for even Mr. Rusk is hardly venerable enough to be a precedent—and Mr. Morton seems unquestionably a representative man for the post in the best sense of the term. A pioneer and yet a student, it is said; a man of hard sinew and acquainted with all weathers, with all moods of mother earth, he has yet taken time to think and act upon public questions; a good farmer whose mind has developed much beyond the limits of his farm, he ought not to find it difficult to be an excellent officer in the position of advice which he now occupies.

The other three men of the cabinet the public has been inclined to regard as curiosities in the line of cabinet appointment. Two of them Mr. Cleveland had long known and had doubtless sufficiently tested. Mr. Lamont was his private secretary during his first administration, and Mr. Bissell was his law partner twelve or thirteen years ago. Very sagacious politicians have known and trusted Mr. Lamont. He stood close in Mr. Tilden's confidence; he earned great favor as editor of a political newspaper; Mr. Whitney, whose political talents every one now doffs his hat to, recognized the same ability, the same worthiness of confidence in him. There can be no reasonable doubt about his ability to administer the War Department with success, as there would have been little doubt about his ability to occupy almost any other high administrative post with credit and efficiency. The only criticism which his appointment prompts is, that he was, so far as we are able to ascertain, no more fitted for the War Department than for any other. He is, in short, simply a very capable man of unusual executive talents. He has had no special training to be war minister.

The management of the Post Office Department is not very like "chamber practice," and Mr. Bissell has never been anything but a lawyer; but the law is not now a learned profession, though there are still men of eminent learning in it. Lawyers, nowadays, in the great cities at any rate, are simply experts in a technical business. Mr. Bissell is doubtless such an expert. The conduct of the Post Office Department is also a technical business; no doubt Mr. Bissell can learn all that it is necessary for the Postmaster General to know readily enough. The trusted counsel of the Lehigh Valley Railroad must of course have a head for business.

But what is one to say of the appointment of Mr. Hoke Smith? In selecting him Mr. Cleveland depended, not upon his own judgment, but upon the judgment of others; and upon the advice of others he has

entrusted him with some of the most delicate and important interests of the Administration. This is the fact that places Mr. Smith's appointment in sharp contrast with all the others—neither the country nor Mr. Cleveland knew him when he was selected. There is no Department, unless it be the Treasury, whose mistakes can so easily or so quickly discredit the Administration as the mistakes of the Interior Department can. Mr. Cleveland last time appointed to this difficult office, with its nice test of character and judgment, a man of the highest attainments both as a public servant and as a student of institutions, the scholarly, earnest, enviably honored L. Q. C. Lamar. Mr. Lamar had no quick executive capacity; his habit fitted him for contemplation rather than for action; he was doubtless better suited for the place he subsequently took on the Supreme bench than for service in one of the most complex and exacting of the administrative Departments. He made frequent mistakes in his minor appointments, and, seeing his own errors of judgment in such matters, often found it hard to make up his mind to sign any commissions at all. But the making of appointments, important matter as it is for the proper administration of the government, is not the whole duty of the Interior; and Mr. Lamar had that chastened and judicial cast of mind which the intensely and wholly practical man knows nothing of, and was the better fitted on that account for the dispassionate determination of delicate questions of policy which rest upon considerations of justice, but which the practical man might have regarded as based wholly upon considerations of expediency.

Expediency is a short-sighted counsellor; and yet Mr. Smith's training has been such as disposes a man habitually to resort to her for counsel. His intellectual discipline has been intensely practical and upon a very narrow field of practice. Leaving college while still a boy, he went immediately to the bar, with only such an

acquaintance with the principles of law as would enable him to pass the easy examination for license. Once admitted to practice, he made an eager, astute, unremitting, successful effort to get business. He prepared his cases diligently, became known by the number of cases he got and the number he won; devoted himself particularly to what one may call anti-corporation law, representing anybody, and presently everybody, that had a grievance against any railway especially, and finally grew to be so considerable a corporation lawyer that, just before he discovered himself to Mr. Cleveland's friends, he had begun to be employed by corporations. He had added meanwhile, of course, immensely to his knowledge of the law on its case side, to his ability to make his large figure and his flexible voice, his familiarity with the facts of the case, and particularly with the weak points of his opponent's position, tell upon the minds of the jury and the opinions of the court. It is a familiar story at the American bar; Mr. Smith's version of it is simply on a somewhat bigger scale than usual. Such men very often make very efficient and sometimes very useful practitioners. But they seldom make more. Their training is narrow, their apprehension specialized; their conceptions of justice are technical, their standards of policy too self-regardful. If they broaden, when opportunity is offered, to the scale of judgment required by more liberal functions, it is because of qualities which have lain latent in them, not because of qualities already developed in them by experience. The Department of the Interior will make a heavy drain upon Mr. Smith's latent qualities. If he turns out to have none, Mr. Cleveland will have to carry the heavy responsibilities of the Department for himself.

Taken altogether, this is certainly a very unconventional cabinet. Mr. Harrison's was made up much more after the conventional manner. His appointments were many of them open to very grave criticism, but they represented an attempt, made after the fashion set by

previous Presidents, to bring the different elements of the party together into the council of the Administration. Until Mr. Cleveland, it may be said to have been habitual with our Presidents to regard the cabinet as a council of party leaders. Mr. Arthur, for example, unquestionably averted premature party calamity by putting aside his personal preferences in the choice of his cabinet and broadening its membership much beyond the ranks of the stalwart wing, to which he himself belonged. Other Presidents have followed a like course of conciliation and coöperation. Only men like Jackson have hitherto put their personal preferences foremost in supplying the Departments with heads and themselves with assistants.

In this case Mr. Cleveland has combined the two methods in a way which may turn out to have been significant of the future course of the Government under him. If he had put a man of real party consequence and of some political capacity of which we could be sure at the head of the Interior Department, instead of Mr. Hoke Smith, this would be plain enough to be taken for granted. The public questions which now press for solution lie within the fields of the Treasury and of the Interior. The policy already finely begun, which needs to be carefully and intelligently completed, lies with the Navy Department; it is the construction of an efficient modern navy. The immediate questions of the time affect the tariff, the coinage, the policy of the government with regard to its public lands, the administration of the Pension Bureau, and the realization of the purposes of our later legislation in respect to the settlement and civilization of the Indians. Mr. Carlisle can be counted on for sound and reasoned purposes concerning the tariff and the coinage; Mr. Herbert, we may be sure, will carry forward the plans for the navy; it may be that Mr. Smith will do what he is directed to do in the Department of the Interior. Let us hope that such will be the arrangement, for fear of miscarriages.

If he were a man like Mr. Carlisle, it would seem clear enough that this Administration was prepared to play the difficult, but now imperative, part of guiding legislation: that a tariff bill and an explicit coinage policy might be expected to emanate from the Treasury Department, with distinct suggestions of the course to be pursued from each of the departments likely to be affected by legislation. As it is, we are left to surmises, for all the Administration is so strong and so truly representative in one or two departments. What will Mr. Cleveland do with this cabinet? for nothing can be clearer than that he purposes to do something. Will the Treasury submit a programme of reform? Will the Administration assume the leadership in revising the tariff laws, reforming the coinage, extending the provisions of the civil service law, as Mr. Whitney did in developing the navy? Is this a legislative as well as an administrative cabinet? Is it a cabinet with purposes as well as with capabilities? If so, how does Mr. Cleveland stand for strength in such courses, with a cabinet constituted as this one is, not as a party counsel, but rather as a body of personal counsellors? Is it strong enough for leadership, or is Mr. Cleveland relying entirely on his own strength to carry his purposes to successful completion?

Probably he is depending upon himself, taking his cue from the country, which undoubtedly depends upon him to exercise an active guidance in affairs for the next four years. If so, it is a fine display of courage and resolution. It commits the country, it must be said, in a hazardous degree, to the understanding and capacity of a single man; but it will, at any rate, make capital test of our idea that the President, constitutionally viewed, constitutes the Executive Department of the government: that he is, not simply the directing head, but the efficient embodiment of the administrative function.

For, after all, one cannot avoid, if he would, putting

general questions with regard to the character of the government at a time when appointments are being made to its chief administrative offices. Much as they are irritated by the appointment of irregular party men like Judge Gresham, and unknown party men like Mr. Bissell and Mr. Smith, the politicians fall back with resignation upon the consideration that "it is Mr. Cleveland's cabinet, and its make-up, after all, nobody's business but Mr. Cleveland's." This is the view which Mr. Cleveland himself apparently takes—not arrogantly, but with a grave sense of responsibility for the manner in which the executive business of the country is to be carried on. It may be called the literally constitutional view of the cabinet. The Constitution vests the executive power of the government in the President in perfectly plain terms. It takes it for granted in an occasional phrase that there will be "heads of departments," and it authorizes Congress to place the appointment of the minor officers of the government in the hands of such principal officials. But it offers no hint that they are to be more than heads of departments; they receive no cue from it to speak as if they had legal share in the exercise of executive power. Statute, indeed, may give them a certain degree of independence of the President. The statute which erected the Treasury Department, for example, gave Andrew Jackson no little trouble because it rendered it necessary for him to obtain the assent of the Secretary to the withdrawal of the deposits of the government from the Bank of the United States. He had to make two removals before he found a pliant Secretary. But such statutes must be acknowledged to strain the tenor of the Constitution. The President may make what selections he will in providing the administrative departments with their chief officers, and keep indisputably within his literal constitutional powers. The Senate must, indeed, confirm his appointments; but it has long regarded its function in this respect, not as a right to assist or dictate to the President in his choice

of cabinet officials, but merely as a check upon the nomination of men touched in some degree by scandal or known in some way to have shown gross incompetency for assuming public trusts. No man who has followed Mr. Cleveland's career ought to have the slightest disposition to curtail his freedom of choice, or can have sufficient reason for distrusting his judgment of men, and his strength to bear the whole executive responsibility of the government.

But no President dominates more than eight years of our national life. Whatever his individual talents, he is only one in a long line of chief magistrates. He does not make his own Administration merely: he gives a precedent to his successors, who may not have like ability and discretion. He contributes an example to the general development; he determines a section of the general institutional growth of the country. He is responsible, not only to the Constitution, which, besides being a legal document, is also a vehicle of life, but also to the general sense of the country regarding its institutions. We possess the right not merely, but must feel the duty also, of friendly criticism. We must take care to know very clearly what sort of a development we are having.

What kind of a government are we to have? Are we to have a purely administrative cabinet, and individual choice of policy by the President; or are we to have responsible party government, parties being made responsible not only for the choice they make of Presidents, but also for the character and motives of the men they bring forward to give him counsel? The choice between these two methods is a fundamental one in the constitution of government. Either system would be constitutional under the existing provisions of our fundamental law; the former literally constitutional, the latter within the permissions of the Constitution. The practice of our Presidents, too, whenever at least they have not been mere military chiefs like Jackson and

Grant, with imperative preferences of their own, has been in the direction of the latter system, until Mr. Cleveland, a man as truly taken from outside the regular lines of civil promotion as either Grant or Jackson. He has broken more than most Presidents with what I may call the historical method of appointment. That method has unquestionably regarded the cabinet as a party council. Mr. Carlisle is the only Democratic leader Mr. Cleveland has put into his cabinet. Eminent and admirable as the services of Mr. Herbert have been, they have been restricted in their field, and they have been inconspicuous outside Congress. He has shaped legislation, and he goes into the cabinet equipped as few men could be for the duties of the particular Department to which he has been assigned. But we do not know in what degree he may be qualified for general political counsel when sitting with his colleagues. He is in no broad sense a leader of his party.

Very few thoughtful men, I suppose, would maintain that Mr. Cleveland should have put some representative of the stalwart wing of his party among his advisers. All who cherish liberal views of reform must hope that the future of the party is in the hands of its other, its newer elements and must rejoice that the President has made up his body of counsellors from those sections of the party which seem, so far as we know the new men, to be represented. But with the conspicuous exception already mentioned, he has chosen from the rank and file of that division of his following, and not from among leaders at all. Mr. Josiah Quincy, the First Assistant Secretary of State, is a Democratic leader in the best sense of the term, and a very influential and important one, who has constantly, of recent months, been at Mr. Cleveland's elbow; but Mr. Gresham, his chief, of course is not. He was a leader the other day of the liberal wing of the other party; now, if he is to be classified at all, he is an independent. He carries great weight with those who, like himself, are

becoming Democrats in the Northwest. He leads in opinion among those whose party ties are loose or loosening—leads very honorably, very ably, and with an enviable distinction—but he does not yet, at any rate, lead either a party or the section of a party. If he leads a section of a party it is a section of the party which has hitherto been opposed to Mr. Cleveland. Mr. Lamont has taken confidential part in the counsels of leaders, but he is not himself a leader. Mr. Morton has been prominent among Democratic campaign speakers in Nebraska, and has had such functions of leadership as force of character and of conviction give when publicly displayed; but there has of course been no place of national leadership hitherto for Nebraska Democrats. Messrs. Olney, Bissell and Smith have been quiet lawyers, leading only as men of local prominence must always lead when they hold and express pronounced views upon party questions. Mr. Cleveland's first cabinet was much more of the historical pattern than this one. It was in some sense a group of leaders.

It is not often enough noted that we have really never answered for ourselves clearly and with definite purpose the question, *What is the Cabinet?* Is it the President's cabinet, or are the heads of the executive departments meant by the spirit of our national institutions to be real party colleagues of the President, in council, chosen by him, indeed, but from among men of accredited political capacity, not from among the general body of the citizenship of the country? It is a question fundamental to our whole political development, and it is by no means to be answered from out the text of the Constitution simply. That Constitution is a vehicle of life. Its chief virtue is, that it is not too rigidly conceived. It leaves our life free to take its own courses of well-considered custom, its own chosen turns of development. Presidents who are themselves of the stuff out of which real party leaders are made—men like Jackson and Lincoln and Cleveland—will of course dominate their cab-

inets, no matter what the principle of appointment; but headstrong men like Andrew Johnson will rule only to ruin; will goad parties into extreme and ill-considered courses by the sheer exasperations of their obstinacy; and men who are not by natural constitution equipped for leadership will only make the more conspicuous, it may be the more disastrous, failures by seeking, in the choice of their advisers, to play a rôle beyond their talents. Our party leaders we can choose slowly, by the conservative processes of the survival of the fittest in Congress, by the exacting tests of command over public opinion. Our Presidents, experience has taught us, we must often choose hastily, by the unpremeditated compromises or the sudden impulses of huge popular conventions.

It is impossible, moreover, that the President should really decide all the issues of choice which come to the several executive departments. There are only twenty-fours hours in the day for him, as for other men, and some of these he must, I suppose, devote to sleep. The departments are not executive bureaus merely: their chief officers are much more than a superior sort of secretaries to the President. Their functions are political, outside the cabinet as well as within it. They must decide many questions which bear directly upon the general policy of the Administration, as well as innumerable questions of routine detail, and must decide them independently of their colleagues and the President. It is only concerning the largest, broadest, most general matters of policy that they can consult the judgment of the cabinet as a whole, or the wishes of the President. The presidency is thus inevitably put, as it were, into the hands of a sort of commission, of which the President is only the directing head.

Not only so, but, inasmuch as, whether we wish it or not, the President is necessarily a party leader, *ex officio*, there ought to be some regular, open, responsible connection established between him and his party. He

is not always, as we know, a real leader before he is chosen to his great office of leadership. It has several times happened that he was not even personally acquainted with the men by whom the policy of his party had been habitually determined before he was discovered by a popular convention. Once and again a President has come to Washington ignorant both of men and of measures. How is he to make the acquaintance of his party; how are they to learn his character and intentions? He must somehow get the confidence of the men in whom the party habitually places confidence and whom it will follow, or else he must consent to be quite impotent during his four years in everything but the mere routine of executive action.

I go a step further. It is necessary that the members of the cabinet should be recognized party leaders, not only because the President's day is as short as other men's, and many important and far-reaching decisions of policy must be left to them, but also because the literally constitutional position of the President, as an absolutely separate, self-sufficient part of the government, is a practically impossible position. No government can be administered with the highest efficiency unless there be close coöperation and an intimate mutual understanding between its Administration and its legislature. The real and conclusive test of excellency for all laws is their workability, and no legislature can intelligently apply that test unless it be in constant correspondence with the administrative branch of the government. Legislative proposals, too, are usually more apt to be well considered, feasible, business-like, when they come from the Administration, which is immediately in the presence of the practical conditions under which they must be carried out, in the presence, too, of the practical difficulties which create the need for such legislation than when it comes from committees of the Houses themselves, committees which cannot coöperate for the construction of a consistent policy, and which

are not sobered by the knowledge that they will be obliged to find practicable ways of putting their schemes into actual execution.

This is the argument, to which the country is becoming more and more inclined to listen, for the introduction of the members of the cabinet into the Houses: the argument for making it their duty to be present in Congress to give information and offer advice, their privilege to propose measures and take part in debate. Ours is the only country in the world of any consequence which does not in some direct way facilitate coöperation between its executive and its legislature; and it is only because unbounded material prosperity and unprecedented freedom from social disorder and discontent have made it easy to conduct our government, despite its disintegrated structure, that we have not yet become conscious of the pinch of disadvantage which must sooner or later result from the singular division of our government into groups of public servants looking askance at one another.

Sooner or later we must recognize in the cabinet the President's responsible party council, and must require our Presidents, not by hard and fast constitutional provision, but by the more flexible while equally imperative mandates of public opinion, operating through the medium of the Senate, to call to the chief places in the departments representative party men who have accredited themselves for such functions by long and honorable public service. We cannot be forever running the risks involved in the elevation of unknown men to the presidency. The present posture of affairs is altogether exceptional, and Mr. Cleveland is an altogether exceptional man, a real leader, but a leader created by circumstances which can hardly soon recur. We do not know many of the men who are in his cabinet because we do not yet know the new Democratic party which is now in process of formation. The men in that cabinet whom we do know we know as leaders in things which

are the vital and operative causes of that re-formation. The financial policy of the country is to be reformed; its new naval strength is to give us proper dignity and proper assurance of safety among the nations; the reform of the civil service is to be carried forward on the lines now, it is to be hoped, definitely established; the executive departments are to be conducted on business principles, with a view to making them as economical and as efficient as possible. New men have come to the front for the accomplishment of the new tasks; new regions of the country are turning toward the new party. Parties, whether they retain old names or not, are making ready for the new start which the rise of new interests has now for some time been commanding. The politics of the war time are to be forgotten, even by select men of the very generation which engaged in the stupendous struggle, and convictions made up, not of reminiscence, but of firm purpose for the future development of the country along normal lines of growth, are to be the controlling forces of politics, which shall come in with a new generation which lives for the future, not in the past. We like this cabinet well enough until the new movement shall have shown us who the real leaders are. Then parties must choose the men who really lead them for Presidents, and Presidents thus chosen must give us responsible party government by surrounding themselves with a cabinet council made up from among party men whom the people have known and have shown themselves disposed to trust.

The degree of separation now maintained between the executive and legislative branches of our government cannot long be preserved without very serious inconvenience resulting. Congress and the President now treat with one another almost like separate governments, so jealous is each of its prerogatives. The Houses find out only piecemeal and with difficulty what is going on at the other end of the avenue, in bureaus which have been created by statute. Members have been known to grow

uneasy, and even indignant, if cabinet officers followed the debates from the galleries. Congress, consequently, often gropes very helplessly for lack of guidance which might be had almost for the asking, while the tasks of the departments languish or miscarry for lack of appreciative coöperation and support on the part of Congress. We risk every degree of friction and disharmony rather than hazard the independence of branches of the government which are helpless without each other. What we need is harmonious, consistent, responsible party government, instead of a wide dispersion of function and responsibility; and we can get it only by connecting the President as closely as may be with his party in Congress. The natural connecting link is the cabinet.

SHOULD AN ANTECEDENT LIBERAL EDUCATION BE REQUIRED OF STUDENTS IN LAW, MEDICINE AND THEOLOGY?

WORLD'S FAIR, CHICAGO, 1893. INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF EDUCATION. WILSON'S ANSWER TO THE QUERY, DELIVERED JULY 26, 1893. FROM THE "PROCEEDINGS" OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF EDUCATION OF THE WORLD'S COLUMBIAN EXPOSITION, NEW YORK, 1894, PP. 112-117.

WE shall, I think, escape entanglements if we note at the very outset the twofold aspect of the subject. It may be discussed (1) from the point of view of the individual who is seeking professional instruction as a means of gaining a livelihood, or (2) from the point of view of society itself, which must wish to be well served by its professional classes. The community will doubtless be inclined to demand more education than the individual will be willing to tarry for before entering on the practice of his profession. To which shall we give greater weight, the self-interest of the individual or the self-interest of the community? The community, if it be wise, will be anxious to see practical knowledge advanced all along the line: will wish the physician to be something more than an empiric, capable himself of sure-footed search for the origins and determining conditions of disease; will desire to find in the preacher something larger and more generous in temper and endowment than dogmatism—even the liberal spirit of a serious and withal practical philosophy; will look for dignified parts of learning in the lawyer, something better than practical shrewd-

ness and successful chicane, a capacity to rise at need to the point of view of the jurist, as if aware of the great and permanent principles of large-eyed justice. The average individual, on the other hand, will be eager to make his way as rapidly as possible to business; and when once business engagements begin to press upon him, his thought will adjust itself to them. If the habit of carrying special cases up into the region of general principles—where alone the real light of discovery burns—be not formed during the period of preparation, it will hardly come afterward, when the special cases crowd fast and the general principles remain remote. Only the pastor has any leisure then for the higher sort of study, and even he is not likely to begin it then if he has never known before what it is and what it may do for him. The old women, and the young, will prevent his becoming studious if he be not already a confirmed student, safe in "his pensive citadel."

An antecedent liberal education, it must of course be admitted, does not necessarily disclose general principles; is too often so *il*liberal in its survey of subjects as to leave upon the mind no trace of the generalizing habit. But usually it is liberal, at any rate, in being general; and, without a survey of the field of knowledge, a various view of the interests of the mind, it is hard to see how a man is to discern *the relations of things*, upon the perception of which all just thought must rest. It is something simply to have traversed many fields of thought, to have seen where they lie, and how surrounded, with what coasts, what natural, what "scientific" boundaries. It is something to have made "the grand tour," even under indifferent tutors; something to have had a *Wanderjahr*, if only to see the world of men and things. A man who has not had an antecedent liberal education can certainly never get a subsequent equivalent; and, without it, he must remain shut in by a narrow horizon, imagining the confines of knowledge to lie very close about him on every

side. Such is the "practical" physician, lawyer, or preacher who now rides us like the Old Man of the Sea, monarch of his little isle of expert knowledge until we can drug and dislodge him.

The world woke once, in that notable fifteenth century, to find itself standing in the clear dawn of the New Learning, and the light which then came has never since been taken away. But we have played tricks with it; we have defracted it, distinguishing the lines of its spectrum with an extreme nicety exceeding that of the Rowland grating, and so have brought upon ourselves a New Ignorance. In our desire to differentiate its rays we have forgotten to know the sun in its entirety—its power to illuminate, to quicken and expand. Knowledge has lost its synthesis, and lies with its colors torn apart, dissolved. That New Learning, which saw knowledge whole, shattered the feudal system of society; this New Ignorance, which likes knowledge piecemeal and in weak solution, has created a feudal system of learning. There is no common mastery, but everywhere separate baronies of knowledge, where a few strong men rule and many ignorant men are held vassals—men ignorant of the freedom of more perfect, more liberal knowledge. We need a freer constitution of learning. Its present constitution only makes it certain that we shall have disorder and wasteful war. To come to the matter immediately in hand, see to how many subjects the student of medicine must turn if he would master his single practical art. It is impossible he should understand the physical life of man without understanding the physical life of the universe. He may not wisely stop short of the widest ranges of biology. And yet the physical life of man is made distinctive, after all, by his singular mental life. He may imagine himself into distemper and disease, and the physician will lose trace of causes of great moment to his own art if he know nothing of the laws of the mind—of physiological psychology not only, but of pure

psychology too. He cannot get this range of knowledge in the medical school; he must get it from an antecedent liberal education; and it will be sheer misfortune for him, even as a practical man, if that antecedent training bring him not out upon a plane of knowledge, a vantage-ground of outlook and command, higher even and more invigorating than these special fields of science. The student of theology, it will be admitted, is but a poor pretender if no serious survey of other subjects precede and accompany his direct preparation for the ministry. He, of all men, must understand mankind if he is to lead them into better ways of living and to a death of hope. And how can he understand modern society without a knowledge of the scientific standards and conceptions that condition all modern thought? How can he understand any society without knowing aught of philosophy or politics or economy? He will never reach any motive unless he learn to read men and their life.

The student of law, too: what can he know but the forms and the tricks of the law if he know nothing of the law's rootage in society, the principles of its origin and development; how it springs out of material and social conditions which it is the special task of economy and political science to elucidate, out of elements which run centuries deep into the history of nations? No mere technical training can ever make a first-rate lawyer. Observe, I do not say jurist—that, of course. I say that no first-rate lawyer can be made by merely technical training, no lawyer of mastery and real resource. General principles learned *memoriter* are as useless for mastery as precedents learned *memoriter*. No man shall command them who does not know whence they came, and what like occasions must be made to yield new principles alike to bar and bench. Such is the practitioner who is armed *cap-a-pie*, to be feared by every opponent in the mere matter of winning cases. How shall a man who knows nothing of history, of eco-

nomics, or of political science ever know more than the technical rules of the law, which must for him be rules dead, inflexible, final?

All this is plain enough, at least to every liberally educated man, and to every one who considers first of all the good of the community and the advancement of the professions. But immediate self-interest, haste to get at the pecuniary rewards of his profession, to make a supporting business of it, will make the individual indifferent to these larger considerations. He is willing to leave the higher reaches of his calling to those who have time to seek them. The physician is content to be a successful empiric, and learn useful practical lessons from his daily experience. The minister is satisfied if he please his congregation by agreeable sermons and still more agreeable pastoral visits. The lawyer does not aspire to be more than an expert in a technical business. As many will go without a "liberal education" as the community will permit to do so. Public opinion does not act imperatively in the matter, because not all of the public, at any rate here in the United States, has made up its mind that a general training need precede professional training. Some communities even seem inclined to boast of their "born" preachers, and their lawyers who have gained admission to the bar after only six weeks' study. There is among us a somewhat general skepticism as to the efficacy of college instruction, and a very widely diffused belief in the sufficiency of natural endowments. And, of course, no one will claim that the colleges give a man all, or even any considerable part, of what he should have by way of equipment for one of the learned professions. All that we can say is that the colleges can give him the point of view, the outlook and the habit of mind, of the scholar; that, without an "antecedent liberal education," not one man in a thousand will have the studies he ought to undertake so much as suggested to him. His little world will be flat, not

round, shut in by an encompassing sea, bounded by the near horizon. A professional man ought to have a liberal education, if only to make him aware of his limitations, careful not to blunder into fields of which he knows that he is ignorant.

The practical side of this question is certainly a very serious one in this country. That there should be an almost absolute freedom of occupation is a belief very intimately and tenaciously connected with the democratic theory of government, and our legislators are very slow to lay many restrictions upon it. Our colleges and universities, and our law and medical and theological schools have seldom endowment enough to render them independent of popular demands and standards. They are wholly independent, however, of each other, and cannot be constrained to accept any common scheme or standard. Even if the public had made up its mind very definitely on this subject, no means are at hand to facilitate concerted action. Reform must come piecemeal, and by example: not all at once and by authority. The remedy for the present state of affairs in this country seems to me to lie in resolute independent experiment by individual institutions. Let leading universities and colleges that have or can get money enough to make them free to act without too much regard to outside criticism, first erect professional schools upon a new model of scholarship, and then close the doors of those schools to all who have not a first-rate college training. It would not take the country long to find out that the best practical lawyers and doctors and preachers came out from those schools—and the rest would be discredited. I believe that no medical or law or theological school ought to be a separate institution. It ought to be both organically and in situation part of a university, a university big and real enough to dominate it. It ought to be permeated with the university atmosphere; it ought to employ university methods; it ought itself to exemplify

the liberal spirit of learning. It would do little good to the professions to send only college graduates to many of our separate professional schools. They would find nothing but empiricism there. To nothing there would their college training seem applicable. It is useless, too, to try to reform these separate schools as they stand. Build a university over them and extend the university faculty into them, and they may be made to your mind; but do not dream of making them like universities in spirit, method, thoroughness in any other way. When universities put students trained in chemistry, biology, and psychology into their own medical schools; students drilled in history, in economics, in philosophy, and in the natural history of society into their law schools; students informed in the various thought of the age and read in the literature of all ages into their schools of theology, the country will begin to be filled with real lawyers, capable physicians, powerful preachers once more, and these great professions will once again deserve the name of learned professions.

The separation of general and special training is an acute symptom of the disease of specialization by which we are now so sorely afflicted. Our professional men are lamed and hampered by that partial knowledge which is the most dangerous form of ignorance. I would no more employ a physician unacquainted with the general field of science than I would employ an oculist who was ignorant of the general field of medicine. Knowledge is trustworthy only when it is balanced and complete. This is the reason why the whole of the question we are now considering is a university question. Knowledge must be kept together; our professional schools must be university schools. Our faculties must make knowledge whole. The liberal education that our professional men get must not only be antecedent to their technical training; it must also be concurrent with it.

No more serious mistake was ever made than the divorce of technical or practical education from theoretic-

cal, as if principles could be made use of and applied without being understood. It is, indeed, true that a locomotive driver may handle his engine with dexterity and safety without being either a machinist or an engineer, but the body of knowledge of which the physician or the lawyer or the preacher makes practical application is no machine. It is a body of *thought*; it does not stand alone; it is not even true except in its proper relations to other thought. To handle it requires not only skill, but insight also—a trained perception of relative values, a quick capacity for sifting and assessing evidence. As liberal an education as possible is needed for such functions, if only to open the eyes and accustom the faculties to a nice manipulation of thought. The empiric is the natural enemy of society, and it is imperative that everything should be done—everything risked—to get rid of him. Nothing sobers and reforms him like a (genuine) liberal education.

DISCUSSION.

PRESIDENT GILMAN said: I want to speak of one phase in this matter, that of medical education, because my attention has been particularly called to it. Everybody knows that a medical man ought to be well grounded in everything that pertains to biology, let us say. Now there is a school of medicine to be started in Baltimore. We have started on the principle that nobody shall be admitted to it except those who are liberally educated. That seems very simple; but how are we going to find out who are liberally educated? You say the holders of the Bachelor of Arts degree. But on coming to scrutinize a little more closely, we find a great many young men graduate from colleges, and, although they have diplomas, they come from institutions which have not the elements of good education in them. Then, again, we find this difficulty, that many of these institutions which give bachelorate degrees already provide some instruction in physics, in chemistry, in botany, in zoology, and physiology, each of which ought to have its own place in a finished medical course. How shall this difficulty be adjusted? Let us say, then, it shall be those who have taken a bachelorate degree, provided their bachelorate degree includes those items. I expect the result will be that a smaller number of scholars will come, and the

question is whether we shall be strong enough to stand it. That is the difficulty in this whole problem. Generally speaking, the more that is done to require an education equivalent to that given by an ordinarily good college giving the bachelor's degree, as antecedent to the study of law, medicine, and theology, the better it will be for the country.

MR. DEWEY thought it would be unwise to forbid men by legislation to practice law or medicine without an antecedent college education, but that a public feeling against professional men devoid of a liberal education could be created by proper stimulation. A help against the admission of really uneducated students to professional schools would be found when the too common system by which the pay of the professor is fixed and his salary regulated by the fee, is done away with. The taking of fees is a constant temptation to admit incompetent students. Take the fees away and it becomes the interest of the professor to shut out incompetent students. Furthermore, the degree-giving power should not be lodged in detached professional schools.

LEGAL EDUCATION OF UNDERGRADUATES

ADDRESS BEFORE THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
SARATOGA SPRINGS, AUGUST 23, 1894. TAKEN
FROM THE "REPORT" OF THE SEVENTEENTH
ANNUAL MEETING, PP. 439-451, PHILADELPHIA,
1894.

AT no time, it must seem to every thoughtful man, has the study of the law in a broad and enlightened spirit been of more vital importance to society than it is at present. For society and its established principles of conduct and authority are being subjected nowadays to a peculiarly sharp and disturbing scrutiny. Men of every calibre and all dispositions have assumed the rôle of critics. Society does not suit one because it has loitered too long on the way to perfection. It displeases another because it has been all too energetic in its mistaken zeal for change. Some censure it because it is not altruistic; others, because it has not noted and acted upon radical practical changes in modern life. On one hand it is condemned for its lack of heart and humane feeling; on another, for its lack of practical sagacity. It is bidden, in some quarters, to make the individual freer, in others to take him more thoroughly in hand for his discipline and guidance. Some want the State to regulate monopolies, others wish it to assume the entire management of them out of hand. Every one knows that the relations—even the legal relations—now existing between capitalists and laborers are seriously amiss, and every one has his own remedy for the evil. None of the critics of society stop short with censure; each has his reform to propose; each comes with the draft of a new law in his hand. There is an

accumulating clamor for legislation, for changes in the law—an almost pathetic faith that new machinery for the voter and new rules for the courts will surely bring regeneration and progress. The lawyer, meanwhile, is everywhere sadly discredited. The world is in search of prophets, not barristers. It wants change, not a judgment. The lawyer will stickle for form and regularity, will demand exactness of phrase and certitude of provision, workable laws and rules susceptible of being consistently and equitably administered. He has puzzling points in his head, too, about the practicability of getting at certain vague rights upon which philanthropists insist. And so reformers shun him and deem his counsel disheartening. It must be granted, moreover, that they are not without striking instances, drawn out of authentic history, of lawyers having acted as very stubborn and very stupid obstructionists, and having refused to take any part in necessary, nay inevitable, changes in the law which they might have moderated and shaped to temperate uses had they not resisted them and so rendered them the more inapt and extreme. The prophets, therefore, go without their counsel and lend countenance to the improving of statutes by any hopeful man, with or without experience in such critical matters, who is of their creed and vision.

No doubt much of this new ardor for reform is sound and just, an earnest of quick health in the social body, and a signal of hope. No man among us is so blind as not to see that the law limps sadly at many points; that it has not at all kept pace with the swift and radical changes that have transformed industrial society beyond recognition almost within a single generation. I do not doubt that the law of contract and association and taxation and tenure needs amendment and remodeling. But I deprecate the haste, the ignorance, the intemperance, the fatuity of many of those who are seeking our suffrages as reformers. I believe that we shall run upon irreparable disaster unless we ponder very seriously the

proper means and practicable measures of reform. I feel sure, therefore, that nothing will steady us like a body of citizens instructed in the essential nature and processes of law and a school of lawyers deeply versed in the methods by which the law has grown, the vital principles by which, under every system, it has been pervaded, its means of serving society and its means of guiding it. We need laymen who understand the necessity for law, and the right uses of it, too well to be unduly impatient of its restraints; and lawyers who understand the necessity for reform and the safe means of affecting it, too well to be unreasonably shy of assisting it. The worst enemy to the law is the man who knows only its technical details and neglects its generative principles, and the worst enemy of the lawyer is the man who does not comprehend why it is that there need be any technical details at all. There is critical danger that the law may cease or fail to be a liberal profession and lose its guiding place in society accordingly; and I know of no measure so well calculated to deliver us from that danger as the proper establishment of law studies as a university discipline, no more to be confined to technical and professional schools than the study of science. Law is a branch of political science, and in this day especially we need to insist in very plain terms upon its study as such. In the presence of many new and strange questions, our courts are puzzled and disconcerted. Called upon to find principles of law or procedure for the amazing developments of an industrial society which seems constantly to shift and change under their very eyes, they either strain old analogies and wrest old precedents to strange uses or else cut the knot with some sharp remedy which seems to damage as many rights as it preserves. We need lawyers now, if ever, who have drunk deeper at the fountains of the law, much deeper, than the merely technical lawyer, who is only an expert in an intricate and formal business; lawyers who have explored the

sources as well as tapped the streams of the law, and who can stand in court as advisers as well as pleaders, able to suggest the missing principles and assist at the adaptation of remedies. Such men we shall get when we recognize law as a university study. You must begin to make your lawyer, in short, on the other side of the law school. There are other reasons, to be sure, for teaching undergraduates to understand law. Every business man must wish such a training, for his business runs everywhere amidst the intricacies of the law. Every minister should know as intimately as possible the function that law performs in society, for our ministers are nowadays our reformers, and they make but a silly exhibition of themselves when they talk as if law could be recast to-morrow upon the lines of the nearest text. Every citizen should know what law is, how it came into existence, what relation its form bears to its substance, and how it gives to society its fibre and strength and poise of frame. But our concern is with the lawyer, and it is certainly he more than any other who needs to be versed in the philosophy and the history of law. In the Law School he cannot get this view of his great subject. Time does not serve. Details, niceties, special statutes, entangled decisions crowd into the foreground. He is too near the mass of the law and too much engaged with a critical scrutiny and nice discrimination of its multifarious parts to take his distance, observe whence it came and whither it is tending, what its greater proportions are and its commanding principles. He must see all this first, and then the details will not confuse or mislead him. What the instruction given him in college should be, how arranged, how imparted, how emphasized, is the important and difficult question. One thing is plain: it must be put in its right place among his other studies. It must be made evident from its position, its method, its outlook, that it is an integral portion of political science. In law the principles of social relationship—elsewhere in solution, in philan-

thropy, in social intercourse, in political economy—are brought to a sharp crystallization. It is that portion of the established social habit which has gained distinct and formal recognition in the shape of uniform rules, backed by the authority and the power of government, and all the influences that move and mould society serve to explain and animate and prophesy for law. The lawyer should know what these influences are, how they are to be recognized and their force reckoned, how they are to be dealt with and directed. The man who teaches law to undergraduates should be a political scientist and—what nowadays we recognize as a different thing—a sociologist; and I do not hesitate to add that the teacher of sociology and political science should have a thorough acquaintance with the principles which govern the life of law. The statical forces of law which hold society steadfast, and the dynamical forces of politics and morals and industrial motive, which subject it to almost constant change, are not to be separated as if they had no casual connections. Austin has done us the great disservice of putting his analysis of law into such terms as to create the very general impression among lawyers who do not think, but swallow formulas, that law is somehow made independently of the bulk of the community, and that it is their business to accept and apply it as it is without troubling themselves to look beyond the statute or decision in which it is embodied. I do not see how any one can possibly understand the law or know anything of it, except *memoriter*, without getting a clear idea of how it is in fact generated in society and adapted from age to age to its immediate needs and uses.

For my own part, I have a very clear notion of the field which ought to be covered in the undergraduate instruction of young men who expect to become lawyers. They ought, in the first place, to be taught very carefully the differences between the two great bodies of law which we call public and private. Public law is a thing

of polity; private law, a product of the essential relationship existing between man and man in any society, no matter what its political constitution. The student, as well as every other citizen, ought to know the nature and organization of the government he lives under and the principles, whether of liberty or authority, which regulate the relations of individuals to the State. But the student of the law should go further than the citizen, and scrutinize those conceptions of jural relationship which are in a sense independent of polity. He should be very carefully grounded in the principles of general jurisprudence before he undertakes to master any particular system of law. For the time, the explicit provisions of particular systems should serve his thought simply as illustrations, concrete examples and verifications. It is possible—and I need not say how desirable—that he should be made familiar with a sketch, general, of course, and yet not too general, of the history of law; its genesis and form in the childhood of States, its development in classical instances in antique States, its passage through the strange crucible of the middle ages, and the circumstances of its development in the societies of modern Europe. But that is not enough. He should not be left with nothing but this sketch, which can hardly do more than provoke his curiosity upon a hundred and one points left undeveloped. He must be given, besides, two bodies of law for his more particular examination, in respect of their individual character and the way they came about; one a system aged and completed, the other a system of our own time and as yet unfinished. The former can be none other than the splendid system of Rome, which no lawyer can contemplate without emotion or examine without instruction; the other, if one had the knowledge and the foreign taste, might be the law of France or the law of Prussia, but I should think it ought to be the common law of England. We know much less about how the common law was begotten and bred and

brought to maturity than French and German scholars know of the derivation and growth of their own systems, to our shame be it said; but there is the more reason that we should bestir ourselves to put together what we do know, extend it and complete it; and nothing is quite so stimulating or so instructive to the young student as to be present at such a process of investigation and take part in it where he can. That is the lesson of modern educational methods.

I need not say, after this survey of the field, that the method of instruction should at every step be both historical and comparative. No other method has the slightest claim to be called philosophical. For by the philosophy of law I do not mean its metaphysics; I mean its rational explanation; and no explanation of law can be rational which does not make it clear why and how law came into existence, what are the essential and what the accidental contrasts and divergences between particular systems, and what the principles are which everywhere prevail and under whatever circumstances, as if by a sort of radical necessity. And here let me pay my compliments in passing to the question whether the law, when taught as a profession, should be taught by the inductive use of cases or by the deductive use of principles already extracted from the cases and formulated in texts. The teaching of law as a profession should no more be irrational than the teaching of it as part of a liberal education or as a preparation for law studies. The case method, therefore, falls short and is slavish if it stops in each instance with the first case in a series. Where did the courts get their principle from in the first case, if there was, indeed, neither statute nor precedent; and, if there was a statute, what guided them to its interior meaning? Such are the questions which reveal to the student, when successfully answered, the real genesis and significance of law. In like manner, the text-book method is neither philosophical nor really instructive unless the principles

made use of are challenged, cross-questioned, and made to give a rational account of themselves. It is only when principle is thus realized as a living and necessary thing with as clear a pedigree and explanation as a horse or a king, that it can become really a part of the lawyer's thought and judgment and professional equipment. The first case, of course, came to the judges out of a special set of circumstances in the community around them, and they were able to decide it because they understood the conditions out of which it had arisen and knew what those conditions demanded. They pluck out the heart of a statute in the same way, by understanding what gave rise to its enactment and what it is that it is intended to accomplish. The judge, after all, if he be of the sort we quote and make a veritable authority of, is a seer and a man who might have been a statesman or a professor of political science! The "common" law we believe to have arisen out of *custom*, out of the life of the people; and have not all our writers upon the common law, from astute Sir Matthew Hale down to formal Mr. Broom, assumed that statutes are made but in supplement to it or amendment to it, as if it were complete and they exceptional? This is plainly the assumption of the celebrated maxims with regard to the interpretation of statutes: "What was the common law before the making of the act?" "What was the mischief and defect against which the common law did not provide?" "What remedy has the legislature devised and applied?" "The true reason of the remedy?" And have you not noted the result of this process of interpretation, the new law held up to the standard of the old and treated as if it were meant, of course, to be fitted into it? Old statutes disappear, as it were by digestion, into the general body of principles; or, rather, for the process is deliberate, they are kneaded into the mass by much pressing and handling in the courts, until writers are sorely puzzled to distinguish common from statute law. New statutes,

too, immediately begin to feel and yield to the same process. In time they, too, will be so knitted into the body of the law by the careful stitches of successive generations of judges as to have become fairly indistinguishable from the material with which they have been combined. Through the courts they are being played upon and weather-beaten by the practical conditions of the economic and moral life of the community, and so are being steadily moulded by forces which the student must afterwards re-examine if he would comprehend and veritably master the law which is their product.

To take a definite example, in order to make my meaning clearer, it is a favorite idea of mine that commercial law should be taught along with *the history of commerce*, which will make it plain what gave rise to the relations of business with which the law deals, how the forms of commercial negotiation and of commercial paper came into existence, and how statutes and all the imperative regulations of the law have come after the fact, fixing obligations already habitually recognized, or at any rate ready to be put into form, and so simply serving merchants, not inventing transactions for them. One portion of our law we already study in this way—the law of real property. It has retained forms and phrases which we cannot understand without turning back to examine the feudal system and the social conditions of the middle ages; and so we are happily obliged to give heed to its genesis. We ought to do the same for every portion of the law.

I shall not need to argue, after what I have said, that the studies I have outlined properly find a place in the curriculum of a college. They are liberal studies, not technical. I am careful, in my own lecturing, to treat such subjects as strictly as possible as a part of political science—to exhibit law as an instrument of society, and not as the subject-matter of a technical profession. I am punctilious to give out as little as may be of such law

as could be used in court to win a case with. If you say that such studies, though no doubt very interesting, and even stimulating and enlightening, are only for the man who has the time for them; that they are a luxury, and are but so much the more added to what the lawyer will in any case be obliged to learn, I reply that you are mistaken; that such studies, besides being in themselves a liberal education, really save time. It saves time to become more than a lawyer and be a jurist. You have just so much the readier and more various means of ascertaining and enforcing the methods and the arguments by which to win cases, if that is all you want; and you will the sooner get the best sort of practice. Mr. James Bryce was for twenty-three years professor of the civil law at the University of Oxford, taking up the office in 1870, and laying it down last year; and during all of that time, I believe, he continued in the active practice of his profession as a barrister. He says very frankly, in his interesting valedictory lecture, that his knowledge of Roman law has seldom, if ever, been of direct and immediate service to him in his practical law business; and he doubts whether any of his pupils has ever found occasion to use it in court. But he confidently expresses the opinion that a student who, out of three years devoted to law study, has given one year to Roman law and two to English, will, at the end of the period, know as much English law as the man who has given all three of the years to studying nothing else; and he intimates that the student of Roman law will know English law more discriminatingly and with an easier mastery. That is what I meant by saving time; *saving subsequent time*. The more various the apparatus of study, the easier the study. And so I believe that, by teaching law to undergraduates thus historically and comparatively, and as a part of general political science, as if it were stuff of society, with a wealth of instructive experience wrapped up in it, a material and

vehicle of life, I am making, so far as I succeed, not only enlightened men, but also successful lawyers.

I do not hesitate to say, moreover, that in general view and method professional instruction in law should be of the same kind. Just in proportion as you give, along with every principle, its history and its rational explanation, just in that proportion do you increase the ease and rapidity with which the pupil will master it, and the certainty that he will retain and be able to make accurate use of it. Of course, professional instruction in law must be very different in detail. It must deal with the law as a practical science and must expound with not a little minuteness the ways in which it is to be applied to business and to the changing and infinitely various circumstances of all the formal dealings of society. It is inevitable, as I have already said, that it should be technical, and that its technicalities should even crowd the foreground of every exposition. But what of the background? what of the light in which all these details are to be exhibited, the setting and the reasonable order in which they are to be placed? What of the accompanying comments and the accompanying outlines of development? It is absolutely necessary that these countless technical niceties should be given *their significance*, their connection with the principles whose servants and attendants they are, and to which they should always be obedient. To do this saves time, I urge again, as well as makes better, more masterful and sure-footed lawyers. A technicality is difficult only so long as it is unexplained and has to be kept sticking to the memory by external and artificial pressure. So soon as you explain it you bring out its adhesive quality and it will not leave you so long as you continue to understand it. There's no glue like comprehension! I have observed that the young American very keenly relishes a technicality and makes no difficulty of it at all, if you will but show him how it points a principle or sums up an experience. He likes the intel-

lectual art of navigating a subtlety amidst practical difficulties.

We do not in this country recognize, at any rate in any formal manner, the distinction drawn in the old country between attorneys and barristers. Our barristers are their own attorneys, and are in fact very much more engaged in most instances in attorney work than in the conduct of actual litigation. It is for this reason, no doubt, that our law schools have come to confine themselves so exclusively to a very technical course of training. It is not clearly enough realized, I venture to think, however, that this is the case; that we devote our instruction to the preparation of attorneys, who direct the *business* of the law and must be technical experts, and neglect to provide ourselves, in any systematic way, with barristers, who handle the *principles* of the law in argument, and who must possess a knowledge of legal reasoning at once comprehensive and flexible. We must not forget, either, that we need judges—under our system of government a great many—and that we get so many illiberal judgments from our courts because we have so many mere attorneys on the bench. A barrister, let it be said very frankly, has a much higher function than the attorney—as the judge has, by common consent, a higher function than either. Any exact and painstaking man may make a fairly good attorney; but a man who would plead cases must, if he would master his part, be a man capable of making law for the court—making it, I mean, as courts make it, by systematic interpretation. Systematic interpretation is the reading together, as the premises for a conclusion, of different parts of a body of law. It is driving precedents into court, not tandem, but abreast, to beat a new road and pick the court up to take them into a fresh country. It is bringing the thought of a system of law to a new focus, and so effecting a new illumination. A few men we always have who can do this. They are always men who have somehow gotten a wide outlook

upon men and books; who have given themselves a large equipment and diligently multiplied their resources. They have not in all cases gotten these things from a classroom or the guidance of any teacher. Sometimes they have conquered their territory for themselves, unassisted, because they had the instinct of mastery, and the courage, and the initiative. But systematic study under the right sort of stimulation and suggestion must be credited with most such master practitioners, I believe. It is worth while considering whether we could not deliberately produce them in somewhat greater numbers by a partial change in the method and point of view of our instruction in the law schools. Many a young fellow, not yet awakened or stimulated by a liberal course of preparation for professional studies, would discover the life and power of the law for himself if you would but once make the necessary suggestions to his mind, if you would but enable him to see the law as a thing full of life and growth, quick with questions waiting to be answered out of accessible books and by means of study sure to yield tremendous increase of forensic power.

But the best hope is from the colleges. We must invite undergraduates to become jurists, and systematically show them how it can be done. It is the proper function of universities, certainly, to train citizens; and while training citizens you can provoke jurists. It is in this sense that our young men must be made to become lawyers before entering law schools. Our Committee on Legal Education, in their admirable report, insist, with irresistible show of reason, that we must give over devoting our attention so exclusively to the detail of highly specialized portions of the law and return to the earlier and better method of giving the student, first of all, at any rate, and as a foundation for everything that is to follow, a unified and comprehensive view of the law as a whole, displayed and connected as a system, its parts shown in their due proportions and

relations, and its entire body erected for a single view. In my opinion, only the coöperation of the colleges can make this possible. We all remember that Blackstone's *Commentaries* were first of all what we should call a course of college lectures. To view the law as a whole, in its philosophy and historical relationships and for the purpose of discovering its whole significance is the function, not of the professional expert, but of the political scientist. The means and the spirit for such study must be supplied by the universities; the law schools must welcome and carry forward their employment. When we have universities investigating and teaching law as a science, we may ask the law schools to adopt the spirit of the universities, and to transmit the results of such study while carrying forward their own proper function of imparting law as an art. The undergraduate must determine what the law student is to be.

UNIVERSITY TRAINING AND CITIZENSHIP.

FROM "THE FORUM," SEPTEMBER, 1894, VOL. XVIII,
PP. 107-116. WALTER H. PAGE WAS THEN EDITOR
OF "THE FORUM."

IT is hard, amidst a multitude of counsellors, to make up our own ideal of what a university should be. We have been so often bidden, by young and old alike, to make our university instruction like that of Germany, that we have more than half consented to try the experiment. And yet we are by no means sure of our purpose in that direction. Once and again we have been made to think a good deal about the advantage that a young fellow gets from reading widely and systematically with a tutor, as the men do at the English universities. We like the close contact between teacher and pupil, and the rather liberal and unscholastic way of handling many books, which such a method of instruction seems to secure. The French system, too, we can appreciate and wish for when we are in the humour. We like the French spirit and sense of form, and we hold our judgments open to suggestions as to the best way of imparting vitality of that sort to our own instruction. All the while, however, it is our temper to put varied and vexatious restrictions on these, as on other, international exchanges. There is a very heavy duty on imported ideals. It costs us more than they are worth to subject them to our customs and get them fairly on the market. There is no great demand for them. The young men who really want them go abroad, if they can, to get them.

And yet we have no university ideal of our own. We are not even sure that we wish to create one. We ask

ourselves, Do we want universities of a distinctively American type? It is the first impulse of most scholarly minds to reply with a plain and decided negative. Learning is cosmopolitan, and it would seem at first thought like stripping learning of its freedom and wide prerogative to demand that the universities where it makes its home should be national. Let the common schools smack of the soil, if they must, but not the universities! Must not the higher forms of scholarship follow everywhere the same method, in the same spirit? May not its doctrines constitute always a sort of international law of thought? Is it not a kind of freemasonry which has everywhere like degrees and a common ceremonial? Certainly truth is without geographical boundary, and no one could justly wish to observe a national bias in the determination of it.

It must be remembered, however, that scholarship is something more than an instrument of abstract investigation merely. It is also an instrument and means of life. Nations, as well as individuals, must seek wisdom: the truth that will make them free. There is a learning of purpose as well as a learning of science; for there is a truth of spirit as well as a truth of fact. And scholarship, though it must everywhere seek the truth, may select the truths it shall search for and emphasize. It is this selection that should be national. It is a question of emphasis and point of view; not a question of completing the circle and sum of knowledge. A wise man will choose what to learn; and so also will a wise nation. Not all learning, besides, is without a country. All physical science is international, so are also all formal parts of learning; and all philosophy, too, no doubt, and the laws of reasoning. But there is, besides these, a learning of purpose, to be found in literature and in the study of institutions; and this it is which should be made the means of nationalizing universities, being given the central and coördinating place in their courses of instruction.

In order to be national, a university should have, at the centre of all its training, courses of instruction in that literature which contains the ideals of its race and all the nice proofs and subtle inspirations of the character, spirit, and thought of the nation which it serves; and, besides that, instruction in the history and leading conceptions of those institutions which have served the nation's energies in the preservation of order and the maintenance of just standards of civil virtue and public purpose. These should constitute the common training of all its students, as the only means of schooling their spirits for their common life as citizens. For the rest, they might be free to choose what they would learn. Being thus prepared for their common life together by schooling in the same ideals of life and public action, they might the more safely be left to prepare for their individual and private functions separately and with undisturbed freedom.

It is the object of learning, not only to satisfy the curiosity and perfect the spirits of individual men, but also to advance civilization; and, if it be true that each nation plays its special part in furthering the common advancement, every people should use its universities to perfect it in its proper rôle. A university should be an organ of memory for the State for the transmission of its best traditions. Every man sent out from a university should be a man of his nation, as well as a man of his time.

This idea of a balance between general and special training has been temporarily lost sight of by the necessity to make room for the modern scientific studies. We have adopted the principle that a student may freely choose his studies, and so make the most of his natural tastes and aptitudes; and the length we go in applying the principle is determined, it would seem, rather by historical accident than by reasoned policy. If we are conservative, we insist that at least every Bachelor of Arts shall submit to a drill in both Greek and Latin.

If we are liberal, we permit the substitution of a modern language for one of these. If we are radical, we give the pupil *carte blanche*, and let him choose for himself what training he will have. But, whether we be conservative, liberal, or radical, we are willing to confer other degrees besides Bachelor of Arts, and, under another label, to send men forth from the university who have taken nothing from it but a drill in laboratories and instruction in the use of tools. We have lost all idea of a common standard of training for all the men alike who seek to be accredited to the world by an academic degree.

Not only so, but in our controversies about the matter we have allowed ourselves to be driven into an awkward and even untenable position. We debate the relative values of a classical training and a scientific, as if it turned wholly upon the question of the development of the individual mind as a good working instrument. Can the man who has received a purely scientific training, from which all the nice discriminations of taste and of delicate judgment that come from the critical study of languages have been left out, use his mind as well as the man who has had these; as well as the man who has been schooled to submit his faculties to the subtle and refining influences of style and syntax, the elevating influences of delicate feeling, and the vivid passion of poet and orator? The question cannot be answered. The one may use his mind quite as well as the other: it depends upon what he uses it for. He uses it differently: that is all. The values represented by the difference cannot be satisfactorily assessed.

The difference is even very difficult to express. But no doubt it can be illustrated. The man who has been trained only in science or in technical and narrow lines—however well equipped or variously within those lines—is confined to them, not because he lacks knowledge, but because he lacks sympathy and adaptability. The scientific spirit and method, in academic instruction, hold

their votaries very rigourously to a single point of view, and the more this spirit and method are submitted to and served, the more restrictive does their mastery become. It is presently impossible for those who are their willing and habituated subjects to understand whereof other men speak when they urge considerations which cannot be subjected to exact tests or modern standards. The men who have been inducted into literature and language, on the other hand, while they have obtained little marketable knowledge, have obtained both drill and an opened view of life. They have, so to say, breathed and analyzed the common air of thought that the better minds have lived in from the first. They have, in greater or less degree, become citizens of the intellectual world, and have examined with some critical care and a little discrimination the documents by which that citizenship is evidenced and secured. They cannot, however, make themselves so immediately useful in the practical tasks of the world of business as the men of the laboratories, the shops, or the purely professional schools; and they are thought, by those who have special training or capacity, to know nothing. They can use their minds, but there is nothing in them to use. They possess, at most, only a point of view. They are like good soils that have been prepared for planting, but as yet contain no edible harvest. The best light of the world has shone upon them; they have been watered by the tears of old songs, quickened by the passion of deeds done long ago; but no merchantable thing has yet been sown in them, and the man of science brings his quick crop first to market.

Certainly we have come to the parting of the ways, and there is nothing for us but to choose a direction. The graduates of our universities no longer go forth with a common training which will enable them to hold together in a community of thought. Some of them are trained in science, some in letters; some well and broadly trained, many ill and narrowly, with a hard technicality

and mean contraction of view. Scarcely one of them has been fully inducted into the learning which deals with the common experiences, the common thoughts and struggles, the old triumphs and defeats of the men of his race in the past: their dreams and awakenings; their ambitions, humours, confidences, liberties, and follies: the intimate stuff of their minds and lives in past generations, when others were in like manner graduated from college and brought face to face with life and the unthinking mass of men.

The study of institutions and of English literature furnishes the only practicable common ground for the various disciplines of the modern university curriculum; but fortunately it has much more to commend it than its practicability. It would furnish also an ideal principle of unity. Such studies are practicable because they are not open to any serious utilitarian objection. They do not involve the long and tedious acquisition of any dead language: their tools are of easy use by any one. They bear directly upon such practical matter as a man's usefulness as a citizen and his influence and acceptability as a member of society. He can understand other men so much the better, command their sympathy the more readily, aid them and obtain their aid the more efficiently, for comprehending affairs and appreciating the common movements of sentiment and purpose. Such a community of plan is ideal because the great spiritual impulses and values which young men get when properly trained in the classics can be gotten in part from the splendid and various literature of our own tongue, rich as it is with treasures both new and old; because men trained to the exact standards and accustomed to the precise measurements of science, its cold dispassionateness and cautious reserve of judgment, can get from that literature an imagination for affairs and the standards by which things invisible and of the spirit are to be assessed; and because the men trained in the classics can get by it their pilotage into the modern world of

men and ideas. It makes the classicist more practical and the scientist less narrow and pedantic; it is capable of giving to things technical an horizon and an elevation of spirit, and to things merely scholarly or æsthetic a thrill and ardour and discipline of life.

Every university, therefore, which would educate men as well as drill them, should make the reading of English literature in many sorts and much variety, under energetic and quick-witted tutors, compulsory from entrance to graduation; and the study of institutions under suggestive lecturers compulsory throughout at least the latter half of every course for a degree. It can be done, and sooner or later it must be done, if only to prevent disintegration and the utter separation and segregation of educated men in respect of their ideals of thought and conduct.

But this is the view only from inside the university. The greater arguments, from without, are supplied by the life of the modern world and the exigencies of national existence. The world in which we live is troubled by many voices, seeking to proclaim righteousness and judgment to come; but they disturb without instructing us. They cry out upon this point or upon that, but they have no whole doctrine which we can accept and live. They exaggerate, distort, distract. But they are dangerous voices, for all they are so obviously partial and unwise, because we have no clearly conceived standards of common thought to which to hold them. Those who hear are as ignorant and as fanatical as those who speak. A college man who has studied only the classics can no more criticise them than the man who has studied only science or the man who has studied nothing at all. Even the man who has read political economy and history has nowadays, very likely, read no literature. He can only cry out from his corner that these would-be teachers now everywhere on the platform are guilty of errors in logic and misconceptions of historical fact in all their revolutionary talk; and

no one cares to listen to his pedantic and scholastic corrections: for these, they say, are matters of life and death, in which we need, not dialectic, but deliverance.

There is no corrective for it all like a wide acquaintance with the best books that men have written, joined with a knowledge of the institutions men have made trial of in the past; and for each nation there is its own record of mental experience and political experiment. Such a record always sobers those who read it. It also steadies the nerves. If all educated men knew it, it would be as if they had had a revelation. They could stand together and govern, with open eyes and the gift of tongues which other men could understand. Here is like wild talk and headlong passion for reform in the past,—here in the books,—with all the motives that underlay the perilous utterance now laid bare: these are not new terrors and excitements. Neither need the wisdom be new, nor the humanity, by which they shall be moderated and turned to righteous ends. There is old experience in these matters, or rather in these states of mind. It is no new thing to have economic problems and dream dreams of romantic and adventurous social reconstruction.

And so it is out of books that we can get our means and our self-possession for a sane and systematic criticism of life; out of our own English books that we can get and appropriate and forever recreate the temper of our own race in dealing with these so hazardous affairs. We shall lose our sense of identity and all advantage of being hard-headed Saxons if we become ignorant of our literature, which is so full of action and of thoughts fit for action. We must look to the universities to see to it that we be not denationalized, but rather made more steadfast in our best judgments of progress. To hear the agitators talk, you would suppose that righteousness was young and wisdom but of yesterday. How are the universities correcting the view, and aiding to make this nonsense ridiculous? How

many of their graduates know anything clearly to the contrary? How many of them know when to laugh?

Of all things that a university should do for a man, the most important is to put him in possession of the materials for a systematic criticism of life. Our present methods of training may easily enough make *tabula rasa* of a man's mind in respect of such matters. The reasoning of the scientific method, for all but a few constructive minds, is analytical reasoning. It picks things to pieces and examines them in their ultimate elements. It is jealous, if not quite intolerant, of all traditional views; will receive nothing, but test everything; and its influence is very marked and pervasive. It produces, for one thing, an overweening confidence in the pure reasoning faculty. Now, it happens that the pure reasoning faculty, whose only standard is logic and whose only data are put in terms of determinable force, is the worst possible instrument for reforming society. The only thing that makes modern socialism more dangerous than like doctrine has ever been is, that its methods are scientific and that the age also is scientific. Two-thirds of our college graduates are not taught anything that would predispose them against accepting its logic or its purpose to put all things into a laboratory of experiment and arbitrarily recombine the elements of society.

The "humane" spirit of our time is a very different thing from the *human* spirit. The humanity which we nowadays affect is scientific and pathological. It treats men as specimens, and seeks to subject them to experiment. It cuts cross-sections through the human spirit and calls its description of what is thereby disclosed moral essays and sociological novels. It is self-conscious and without modesty or humour. The human spirit is a very different thing. It has a memory and a sense of humour. It cannot read Ibsen after having read Shakespeare, any more than it can prefer sugar and butter and flour and sweets separately, in their individual

intensity, to their toothsome and satisfying combination in pudding. Its literature is that which has the one flavour for every generation, and the same broad and valid sagacity. It regards the scientific method of investigation as one, but only one, method of finding out the truth; and as a method for finding only one kind of truth. It sees the telling points of the socialistic argument, but it knows some old standards of justice that have outlived many programmes of reform and seem still sound enough to outlast these also. "It's a mad world, my masters!" but it takes a nice balance of judgment and a long view of human nature to determine where the madness lies.

The worst possible enemy to society is the man who, with a strong faculty for reasoning and for action, is cut loose in his standards of judgment from the past; and universities which train men to use their minds without carefully establishing the connection of their thought with that of the past, are instruments of social destruction. Of course no man's thought is entirely severed from the past, or ever can be. But it is worth while to remember that science is no older than the present century, and is apt to despise old thought. At least its young votaries are: not because they are "scientists," but because they are only scientists. They are as much pedants, in their narrowness, as the men trained exclusively in the classics, whose thought is all in the past.

The training that will bring these two extremes together can be obtained by a thorough familiarity with the masterpieces of English thought and with the efforts of human genius in the field of institutions. A body of men thus made acquainted with their species is needed, to give us, at the centre of our political and social life, a class with definite and elevated ideals and a real capacity for understanding the conditions of progress: a power making for stability and righteousness against the petty and ineffectual turbulence of revolution.

We mistake the service of literature when we regard it as merely æsthetic. A literature of such variety as our own is nothing less than the annals of the best thought of our race upon every topic of life and destiny. Even our poets have had an eye for affairs; their visions have been of men and deeds. And, as for reading in the literature of institutions, no self-governing people can long hold together in order and peace without it. It is noteworthy that what remains the greatest text-book of English law, invaluable in spite of all the modern changes which have been hurried forward in the century since it was written, was written for laymen. Blackstone intended his lectures for the gentlemen of England: to enable the men of Oxford to take a place of intelligent authority in society when they should come into their own. With the spirit of our sane literature in us, and the strong flavour of our institutional principles present in all that we do or attempt, we shall be broad men enough, be our special training, in tools or books, what it may. Without this, we can but go astray alike in our private judgments and our public functions.

It would not be necessary to erect a new university to try the experiment of such a synthesis of university courses; though that would be worth doing, were the means made sufficient for a really great object-lesson in the right motives of education. Anybody can establish the modern sort of university, anywhere. It has no necessary nationality or character. But only in a free country, with great traditions of enlightened sentiment and continuous purpose, can a university have the national mark and distinction of a deliberate espousal of the spirit of a noble literature and historic institutions. Such a university would be a National Academy,—the only sort worth having. The thing can be done, however, without troubling a millionaire to appropriate to himself the glory of a unique function of greatness

in the development of education. It can be done by only a comparatively slight readjustment of subjects and instructors in the greater of the universities we already have. It can even be done upon no mean scale by every college whose resources are at all adequate to the ordinary demands of education.

It may be made the basis for the synthesis now so sadly lacking in university plans. Better than any other discipline, it can be made the meeting point for all degrees: where candidates in every sort may get their liberalizing outlook upon the world of thought and affairs. More worthily than any other can it be made the means of nationalizing the men whom the universities send forth to represent the power and worth of education. In no better way can an American university obtain a distinguishing function in the world.

As a practical means of university reorganization, such a plan would sacrifice nothing of our present academic freedom. The study of the literature and institutions of our stock could be made the common feature of all the schools of a modern university without cutting off any essential part of the separate groups of studies we have been at such pains to develop. It would not prevent, or even embarrass, specialization. It is susceptible of being joined alike to classical studies and to technical training; and it would not be incongruously joined to either. It would serve ideally, besides, as the centre of those compromise and middle courses of study, halfway between the classical and the scientific, which the peculiar conditions of the day have constrained the colleges to offer. It would make all courses in a good sense "liberal" without requiring any wholesale reconsideration of the provisions we have already made to train men for the special tasks of practical life.

The serious practical question is, How are all the men of a university to be made to read English literature widely and intelligently, as this plan presupposes? For it is reading, not set lectures, that will prepare a soil for

culture: the inside of books, and not talk about them; though there must be the latter also, to serve as a chart and guide to the reading. The difficulty is not in reality very great. A considerable number of young tutors, serving their novitiate for full university appointments, might easily enough effect an organization of the men that would secure the reading. Taking them in groups of manageable numbers, suggesting the reading of each group, and by frequent interviews and quizzes seeing that it was actually done, explaining and stimulating as best they might by the way, they could not only get the required tasks performed, but relieve them of the hateful appearance of being tasks, and cheer and enrich the whole life of the university.

PRINCETON IN THE NATION'S SERVICE

FROM "THE FORUM," DECEMBER, 1896, VOL. XXII, PP.
447-466. AN ORATION DELIVERED AT THE PRINCETON
SESQUI-CENTENNIAL CELEBRATION, OCTOBER
21, 1896.

PRINCETON pauses to look back upon her past, not as an old man grown reminiscent, but as a prudent man still in his youth and lusty prime and at the threshold of new tasks, who would remind himself of his origin and lineage, recall the pledges of his youth, and assess as at a turning in his life the duties of his station.

We look back only a little way to our birth; but the brief space is quick with movement and incident enough to crowd a great tract of time. Turn back only one hundred and fifty years, and you are deep within quiet colony times, before the French and Indian War, or thought of separation from England. But a great war is at hand. Influences restrained and local presently spread themselves at large upon the continent, and the whole scene is altered. The brief plot runs with a strange force and haste:—First, a quiet group of peaceful colonies, very placid and commonplace and dull, to all seeming, in their patient working out of a slow development; then, of a sudden, a hot fire of revolution, a quick release of power, as if of forces long pent up, but set free at last in the generous heat of the new day; the mighty processes of a great migration, the vast spaces of a waiting continent filled almost suddenly with hosts bred in the spirit of conquest; a constant making and renewing of governments, a tremendous growth, a perilous expansion. Such days of youth

and nation-making must surely count double the slower days of maturity and calculated change, as the spring counts double the sober fruitage of the summer.

Princeton College was founded upon the very eve of the stirring changes which put this drama on the stage, —not to breed politicians, but to give young men such training as, it might be hoped, would fit them handsomely for the pulpit and for the grave duties of citizens and neighbors. A small group of Presbyterian ministers took the initiative in its foundation. They acted without ecclesiastical authority, as if under obligation to society rather than to the church. They had no more vision of what was to come upon the country than their fellow-colonists had; they knew only that the pulpits of the middle and southern colonies lacked properly equipped men and all the youth in those parts ready means of access to the higher sort of schooling. They thought the discipline at Yale a little less than liberal, and the training offered as a substitute in some quarters elsewhere a good deal less than thorough. They wanted “a seminary of true religion and good literature” which should be after their own model and among their own people. It was not a sectarian school they wished. They were acting as citizens, not as clergymen, and the charter they obtained said never a word about creed or doctrine; but they gave religion the first place in their programme, which belonged to it of right, and the formation of their college they confided to the Rev. Jonathan Dickinson, one of their own number, and a man of such mastery as they could trust.

Their school was first of all merely a little group of students gathered about Mr. Dickinson in Elizabethtown. Its master died the very year his labors began; and it was necessary to induce the Rev. Aaron Burr, one of the trustees, to take the college under his own charge at Newark. It was the charm and power of that memorable young pastor and teacher which carried it forward to a final establishment. Within ten years

many friends had been made, substantial sums of money secured, a new and more liberal charter obtained, and a permanent home found at Princeton. And then its second president died, while still in his prime, and the succession was handed on to other leaders of like quality.

It was the men, rather than their measures, as usual, that had made the college vital from the first and put it in a sure way to succeed. The charter was liberal and very broad ideas determined the policy of the young school. There were laymen upon its board of trustees, as well as clergymen—not all Presbyterians, but all lovers of progress and men known in the colony: no one was more thoroughly the friend of the new venture than Governor Belcher, the representative of the crown. But the life of the college was in the men who administered it and spoke in its class-rooms,—a notable line of thinkers and orators. There were not many men more regarded in debate or in counsel in that day than Jonathan Dickinson; and Aaron Burr was such a man as others turn to and follow with an admiration and trust they might be at a loss to explain, so instinctive is it and inevitable—a man with a touch of sweet majesty in his presence, and a grace and spirit in his manner which more than made amends for his small and slender figure; the unmistakable fire of eloquence in him when he spoke and the fine quality of sincerity. Piety seemed with him only a crowning grace.

For a few brief weeks after Burr was dead Jonathan Edwards, whom all the world knows, was president in his stead; but death came quickly and left the college only his name. Another orator succeeded him, Samuel Davies, brought out of Virginia, famous out of all proportion to his years, you might think, until you heard him speak, and knew the charm, the utterance, and the character that made him great. He, too, was presently taken by the quick way of death, though the college had had him but a little while; and Samuel Finley had presided in his stead, with a wise sagacity and quiet gift of

leadership, for all too short a time, and was gone, when John Witherspoon came to reign in the little academic kingdom for twenty-six years. It was by that time the year 1768; Mr. Dickinson had drawn that little group of students about him under the first charter only twenty-one years ago; the college had been firmly seated in Princeton only those twelve years in which it had seen Burr and Edwards and Davies and Finley die, and had found it not a little hard to live so long in the face of its losses and the uneasy movements of the time. It had been brought to Princeton in the very midst of the French and Indian War, when the country was in doubt who should possess the continent. The deep excitement of the Stamp act agitation had come, with all its sinister threats of embroilment and disaffection, while yet it was in its infancy and first effort to live. It was impossible it should obtain proper endowment or any right and equable development in such a season. It ought by every ordinary rule of life to have been quite snuffed out in the thick and troubled air of the time. New Jersey did not, like Virginia and Massachusetts, easily form her purpose in that day of anxious doubt. She was mixed of many warring elements, as New York also was, and suffered a turbulence of spirit that did not very kindly breed "true religion and good literature."

But your thorough Presbyterian is not subject to the ordinary laws of life,—is of too stubborn a fibre, too unrelaxing a purpose, to suffer mere inconvenience to bring defeat. Difficulty bred effort, rather; and Dr. Witherspoon found an institution ready to his hand that had come already in that quickening time to a sort of crude maturity. It was no small proof of its self-possession and self-knowledge that those who watched over it had chosen that very time of crisis to put a man like John Witherspoon at the head of its administration, a man so compounded of statesman and scholar, Calvinist, Scotsman, and orator, that it must ever be a sore puzzle

where to place or rank him,—whether among great divines, great teachers, or great statesmen. He seems to be all these, and to defy classification, so big is he, so various, so prodigal of gifts. His vitality entered like a tonic into the college, kept it alive in that time of peril,—made it as individual and inextinguishable a force as he himself was, alike in scholarship and in public affairs.

It has never been natural, it has seldom been possible, in this country for learning to seek a place apart and hold aloof from affairs. It is only when society is old, long settled to its ways, confident in habit, and without self-questionings upon any vital point of conduct, that study can effect seclusion and despise the passing interests of the day. America has never yet had a season of leisured quiet in which students could seek a life apart without sharp rigors of conscience, or college instructors easily forget that they were training citizens as well as drilling pupils; and Princeton is not likely to forget that sharp schooling of her youth, when she first learned the lesson of public service. She shall not easily get John Witherspoon out of her constitution.

It was a piece of providential good fortune that brought such a man to Princeton at such a time. He was a man of the sort other men follow and take counsel of gladly, as if they found in him the full expression of what is best in themselves. Not because he was always wise; but because he showed always so fine an ardor for whatever was worth while and of the better part of man's spirit; because he uttered his thought with an inevitable glow of eloquence; because of his irresistible charm and individual power. The lively wit of the man, besides, struck always upon the matter of his thought like a ray of light, compelling men to receive what he said or else seem themselves opaque and laughable. A certain straightforward vigor in his way of saying things gave his style an almost irresistible power of entering into men's convictions. A hearty honesty

showed itself in all that he did and won men's allegiance upon the instant. They loved him even when they had the hardihood to disagree with him.

He came to the college in 1768, and ruled it till he died, in 1794. In the very middle of his term as head of the college the Revolution came, to draw men's minds imperatively off from everything but war and politics, and he returned with all the force and frankness of his nature to the public tasks of the great struggle; assisted in the making of a new Constitution for the State; became her spokesman in the Continental Congress; would have pressed her on, if he could, to utter a declaration of independence of her own before the Congress had acted; voted for and signed the great Declaration with hearty good will when it came; acted for the country in matters alike of war and of finance; stood forth in the sight of all the people a great advocate and orator, deeming himself forward in the service of God when most engaged in the service of men and of liberty. There were but broken sessions of the college meanwhile. Each army in its turn drove out the little group of students who clung to the place. The college building became now a military hospital and again a barracks for the troops,—for a little while, upon a memorable day in 1777, a sort of stronghold. New Jersey's open counties became for a time the Revolutionary battleground and field of manœuvre. Swept through from end to end by the rush of armies, the State seemed the chief seat of the war, and Princeton a central point of strategy. The dramatic winter of 1776-77 no Princeton man could ever forget, lived he never so long,—that winter which saw a year of despair turned suddenly into a year of hope. In July there had been bonfires and boisterous rejoicings in the college yard and in the village street at the news of the Declaration of Independence,—for, though the rest of the country might doubt and stand timid for a little to see the bold thing done, Dr. Witherspoon's pupils were in spirits to know the fight was to be fought

to a finish. Then suddenly the end had seemed to come. Before the year was out Washington was in the place beaten and in full retreat, only three thousand men at his back, abandoned by his generals, deserted by his troops, hardly daring to stop till he had put the unbridged Delaware between himself and his enemy. The British came close at his heels and the town was theirs until Washington came back again, the third day of the new year, early in the morning, and gave his view halloo yonder on the hill, as if he were in the hunting field again. Then there was fighting in the very streets, and cannon planted against the walls of Old North herself. 'Twas not likely any Princeton man would forget those days, when the whole face of the war was changed and New Jersey was shaken of the burden of the fighting.

There was almost always something doing at the place when the soldiers were out, for the strenuous Scotsman who had the college at his heart never left it for long at a time, for all he was so intent upon the public business. It was haphazard and piecemeal work, no doubt, but there were the spirit and the resolution of the Revolution itself in what was done—the spirit of Witherspoon. It was not as if some one else had been master. Dr. Witherspoon could have pupils at will. He was so much else besides schoolmaster and preceptor, was so great a figure in the people's eye, went about so like an accepted leader, generously lending a great character to a great cause, that he could bid men act and know that they would heed him.

The time, as well as his own genius, enabled him to put a distinctive stamp upon his pupils. There was close contact between master and pupils in that day of beginnings. There were not often more than a hundred students in attendance at the college, and the president, for at any rate half their course, was himself their chief instructor. There were two or three tutors to whom the instruction of the lower classes was entrusted; Mr. Houston was professor of mathematics and natural

philosophy and Dr. Smith professor of moral philosophy and divinity, but the president set the pace. It was he who gave range and spirit to the course of study. He lectured upon taste and style, as well as upon abstract questions of philosophy, and upon politics as a science of government and of public duty, as little to be forgotten as religion itself in any well-considered plan of life. He had found the college ready to serve such purpose when he came, because of the stamp Burr and Davies and Finley had put upon it. They had, one and all, consciously set themselves to make the college a place where young men's minds should be rendered fit for affairs, for the public ministry of the bench and senate, as well as of the pulpit. It was in Finley's day, but just now gone by, that the college had sent out such men as William Paterson, Luther Martin, and Oliver Ellsworth. Witherspoon but gave quickened life to the old spirit and method of the place where there had been drill from the first in public speech and public spirit.

And the Revolution, when it came, seemed but an object lesson in his scheme of life. It was not simply fighting that was done at Princeton. The little town became for a season the centre of politics, too; once and again the Legislature of the State sat in the college hall, and its revolutionary Council of Safety. Soldiers and public men whose names the war was making known to every man frequented the quiet little place, and racy talk ran high in the jolly tavern where hung the sign of Hudibras. Finally the Federal Congress itself sought the place and filled the college hall with a new scene, sitting a whole season there to do its business,—its president a trustee of the college. A commencement day came which saw both Washington and Witherspoon on the platform together,—the two men, it was said, who could not be matched for striking presence in all the country,—and the young salutatorian turned to the country's leader to say what it was in the hearts of all to utter. The sum of the town's excitement was made

up when, upon that notable last day of October, in the year 1783, news of peace came to that secluded hall, to add a crowning touch of gladness to the gay and brilliant company met to receive with formal welcome the Minister Plenipotentiary but just come from the Netherlands, Washington moving amongst them the hero whom the news enthroned.

It was no single stamp that the college gave its pupils. James Madison, Philip Freneau, Aaron Burr, and Harry Lee had come from it almost at a single birth, between 1771 and 1773—James Madison, the philosophical statesman, subtly compounded of learning and practical sagacity; Philip Freneau, the careless poet and reckless pamphleteer of a party; Aaron Burr, with genius enough to have made him immortal and unschooled passion enough to have made him infamous; "Lighthorse Harry" Lee, a Rupert in battle, a boy in counsel, high-strung, audacious, wilful, lovable, a figure for romance. These men were types of the spirit of which the college was full; the spirit of free individual development which found its perfect expression in the president himself.

It has been said that Mr. Madison's style in writing is like Dr. Witherspoon's, albeit not so apt a weapon for the quick thrust and instant parry; and it is recalled that Madison returned to Princeton after his graduation and lingered yet another year in study with his master. But in fact his style is no more like Witherspoon's than Harry Lee's way of fighting was. No doubt there was the same firmness of touch, the same philosophical breadth, the same range of topic and finished force of argument in Dr. Witherspoon's essays upon public questions that are to be found in Madison's papers in the "Federalist"; but Dr. Witherspoon fought, too, with the same overcoming dash that made men know Harry Lee in the field, albeit with different weapons and upon another arena.

Whatever we may say of these matters, however, one thing is certain: Princeton sent upon the public stage

an extraordinary number of men of notable quality in those days; became herself for a time in some visible sort the academic centre of the Revolution, fitted, among the rest, the man in whom the country was one day to recognize the chief author of the Federal Constitution. Princetonians are never tired of telling how many public men graduated from Princeton in Witherspoon's time,—twenty Senators, twenty-three Representatives, thirteen Governors, three Judges of the Supreme Court of the Union; one Vice-President, and a President; all within a space of twenty years, and from a college which seldom had more than a hundred students. Nine Princeton men sat in the Constitutional Convention of 1787; and, though but six of them were Witherspoon's pupils, there was no other college that had there so many as six, and the redoubtable Doctor might have claimed all nine as his in spirit and capacity. Madison guided the convention through the critical stages of its anxious work, with a tact, a gentle quietness, an art of leading without insisting, ruling without commanding,—an authority, not of tone or emphasis, but of apt suggestion,—such as Dr. Witherspoon could never have exercised. Princeton men fathered both the Virginia plan, which was adopted, and the New Jersey plan, which was rejected; and Princeton men advocated the compromises without which no plan could have won acceptance. The strenuous Scotsman's earnest desire and prayer to God to see a government set over the nation that should last was realized as even he might not have been bold enough to hope. No man had ever better right to rejoice in his pupils.

It would be absurd to pretend that we can distinguish Princeton's touch and method in the Revolution or her distinctive handiwork in the Constitution of the Union. We can show nothing more of historical fact than that her own president took a great place of leadership in that time of change, and became one of the first figures of the age; that the college which he led and to which

he gave his spirit contributed more than her share of public men to the making of the nation, outranked her elder rivals in the roll-call of the Constitutional Convention, and seemed for a little a seminary of statesmen rather than a quiet seat of academic learning. What takes our admiration and engages our fancy in looking back to that time is the generous union then established in the college between the life of philosophy and the life of the state.

It moves her sons very deeply to find Princeton to have been from the first what they know her to have been in their own day,—a school of duty. The revolutionary days are gone, and you shall not find upon her rolls another group of names given to public life that can equal her muster in the days of the Revolution and the formation of the government. But her rolls read since the old days, if you know but a little of the quiet life of scattered neighborhoods, like a roster of trustees, a list of the silent men who carry the honorable burdens of business and of social obligations,—of such names as keep credit and confidence in heart. They suggest a soil full of the old seed, and ready, should the air of the time move shrewdly upon it as in the old days, to spring once more into the old harvest. The various, boisterous strength of the young men of affairs who went out with Witherspoon's touch upon them, is obviously not of the average breed of any place, but the special fruitage of an exceptional time. Later generations inevitably reverted to the elder type of Paterson and Ellsworth, the type of sound learning and stout character, without bold impulse added or any uneasy hope to change the world. It has been Princeton's work, in all ordinary seasons, not to change but to strengthen society, to give, not yeast, but bread for the raising.

It is in this wise Princeton has come into our own hands; and to-day we stand as those who would count their force for the future. The men who made Princeton are dead; those who shall keep it and better it still

live: they are even ourselves. Shall we not ask ere we go forward, what gave the place its spirit and its air of duty? "We are now men, and must accept in the highest spirit the same transcendent destiny, and not pinched in a corner, not cowards fleeing before a revolution, but redeemers and benefactors, pious aspirants to be noble clay plastic under the Almighty effort, let us advance and advance on chaos and the dark!"

No one who looks into the life of the Institution shall find it easy to say what gave it its spirit and kept it in its character the generations through; but some things lie obvious to the view in Princeton's case. She had always been a school of religion, and no one of her sons, who has really lived her life, has escaped that steadying touch which has made her a school of duty. Religion, conceive it but liberally enough, is the true salt wherewith to keep both duty and learning sweet against the taint of time and change; and it is a noble thing to have conceived it thus liberally, as Princeton's founders did.

Churches among us, as all the world knows, are free and voluntary societies separated to be nurseries of belief, not suffered to become instruments of rule; and those who serve them can be free citizens, as well as faithful churchmen. The men who founded Princeton were pastors, not ecclesiastics. Their ideal was the service of congregations and communities, not the service of a church. Duty with them was a practical thing, concerned with righteousness in this world, as well as with salvation in the next. There is nothing that gives such pith to public service as religion. A God of truth is no mean prompter to the enlightened service of mankind; and character formed as if in His eye has always a fibre and sanction such as you shall not obtain for the ordinary man from the mild promptings of philosophy.

This, I cannot doubt, is the reason why Princeton has formed practical men, whom the world could trust to do its daily work like men of honor. There were men in Dr. Witherspoon's day who doubted him the right

preceptor for those who sought the ministry of the church, seeing him "as high a son of liberty as any man in America," and turned agitator rather than preacher; and he drew about him, as troubles thickened, young politicians rather than candidates for the pulpit. But it is noteworthy that observing men in far Virginia sent their sons to be with Dr. Witherspoon because they saw intrigue and the taint of infidelity coming upon their own college of William and Mary, Mr. Madison among the rest; and that young Madison went home to read theology with earnest system ere he went out to the tasks of his life. He had no thought of becoming a minister, but his master at Princeton had taken possession of his mind and had enabled him to see what knowledge was profitable.

The world has long thought that it detected in the academic life some lack of sympathy with itself, some disdain of the homely tasks which make the gross globe inhabitable,—not a little proud aloofness and lofty superiority, as if education always softened the hands and alienated the heart. It must be admitted that books are a great relief from the haggling of the market, libraries a very welcome refuge from the strife of commerce. We feel no anxiety about ages that are past; old books draw us pleasantly off from responsibility, remind us nowhere of what there is to do. We can easily hold the services of mankind at arm's length while we read and make scholars of ourselves. But we shall be very uneasy, the while, if the high mandates of religion are let in upon us and made part of our thought. The quiet scholar has his proper breeding, and truth must be searched out and held aloft for men to see for its own sake, by such as will not leave off their sacred task until death takes them away. But not many pupils of a college are to be investigators; they are to be citizens and the world's servants in every field of practical endeavor, and in their instruction the college must use learning as a vehicle of spirit, interpreting literature as the voice

of humanity,—must enlighten, guide, and hearten its sons, that it may make men of them. If it give them no vision of the true God, it has given them no certain motive to practise the wise lessons they have learned.

It is noteworthy how often God-fearing men have been forward in those revolutions which have vindicated rights, and how seldom in those which have wrought a work of destruction. There was a spirit of practical piety in the revolutionary doctrines which Dr. Witherspoon taught. No man, particularly no young man, who heard him could doubt his cause a righteous cause, or deem religion aught but a prompter in it. Revolution was not to be distinguished from duty in Princeton. Duty becomes the more noble when thus conceived the “stern daughter of the voice of God”; and that voice must ever seem near and in the midst of life if it be made to sound dominant from the first in all thought of men and the world. It has not been by accident, therefore, that Princeton men have been inclined to public life. A strong sense of duty is a fretful thing in confinement, and will not easily consent to be kept at home cooped up within a narrow round. The university in our day is no longer inclined to stand aloof from the practical world, and, surely, it ought never to have had the disposition to do so. It is the business of a university to impart to the rank and file of the men whom it trains the right thought of the world, the thought which it has tested and established, the principles which have stood through the seasons and become at length a part of the immemorial wisdom of the race. The object of education is not merely to draw out the powers of the individual mind; it is rather its object to draw all minds to a proper adjustment to the physical and social world in which they are to have their life and their development: to enlighten, strengthen, and make fit. The business of the world is not individual success, but its own betterment, strengthening, and growth in spiritual insight. “So teach us to number our days that we

may apply our hearts unto wisdom" is its right prayer and aspiration.

It was not a work of destruction which Princeton helped forward even in that day of storm which came at the Revolution, but a work of preservation. The American Revolution wrought, indeed, a radical work of change in the world; it created a new nation and a new polity; but it was a work of conservation after all, as fundamentally conservative as the revolution of 1688 or the extortion of Magna Charta. A change of allegiance and the erection of a new nation in the West were its inevitable results, but not its objects. Its object was the preservation of a body of liberties, to keep the natural course of English development in America clear of impediment. It was meant, not in rebellion, but in self-defence. If it brought change, it was the change of maturity, the fulfilment of destiny, the appropriate fruitage of wholesome and steady growth. It was part of English liberty that America should be free. The thought of our Revolution was as quick and vital in the minds of Chatham and of Burke as in the minds of Otis and Henry and Washington. There is nothing so conservative of life as growth; when that stops, decay sets in and the end comes on apace. Progress is life, for the body politic as for the body natural. To stand still is to court death.

Here, then, if you will but look, you have the law of conservatism disclosed: it is a law of progress. But not all change is progress, not all growth is the manifestation of life. Let one part of the body be in haste to outgrow the rest and you have malignant disease, the threat of death. The growth that is a manifestation of life is equable, draws its springs gently out of the old fountains of strength, builds upon old tissue, covets the old airs that have blown upon it time out of mind in the past. Colleges ought surely to be the best nurseries of such life, the best schools of the prog-

ress which conserves. Unschooled men have only their habits to remind them of the past, only their desires and their instinctive judgments of what is right to guide them into the future: the college should serve the State as its organ of recollection, its seat of vital memory. It should give the country men who know the probabilities of failure and success, who can separate the tendencies which are permanent from the tendencies which are of the moment merely, who can distinguish promises from threats, knowing the life men have lived, the hopes they have tested, and the principles they have proved.

This college gave the country at least a handful of such men, in its infancy, and its president for leader. The blood of John Knox ran in Witherspoon's veins. The great drift and movement of English liberty, from Magna Charta down, was in all his teachings; his pupils knew as well as Burke did that to argue the Americans out of their liberties would be to falsify their pedigree. "In order to prove that the Americans have no right to their liberties," Burke cried, "we are every day endeavoring to subvert the maxims which preserve the whole spirit of our own"; the very antiquarians of the law stood ready with their proof that the colonies could not be taxed by Parliament. This Revolution, at any rate, was a keeping of faith with the past. To stand for it was to be like Hampden, a champion of law though he withstood the king. It was to emulate the example of the very men who had founded the government then for a little while grown so tyrannous and forgetful of its great traditions. This was the compulsion of life, not of passion, and college halls were a better school of revolution than colonial assemblies.

Provided, of course, they were guided by such a spirit as Witherspoon's. Nothing is easier than to falsify the past; lifeless instruction will do it. If you rob it of vitality, stiffen it with pedantry, sophisticate it with argument, chill it with unsympathetic comment, you ren-

der it as dead as any academic exercise. The safest way in all ordinary seasons is to let it speak for itself; resort to its records, listen to its poets and to its masters in the humbler art of prose. Your real and proper object, after all, is not to expound, but to realize it, consort with it, and make your spirit kin with it, so that you may never shake the sense of obligation off. In short, I believe that the catholic study of the world's literature as a record of spirit is the right preparation for leadership in the world's affairs, if you undertake it like a man and not like a pedant.

Age is marked in the case of every people, just as it is marked in the case of every work of art, into which enters the example of the masters, the taste of long generations of men, the thought that has matured, the achievement that has come with assurance. The child's crude drawing shares the primitive youth of the first hieroglyphics; but a little reading, a few lessons from some modern master, a little time in the Old World's galleries set the lad forward a thousand years and more, make his drawings as old as art itself. The art of thinking is as old, and it is the university's function to impart it in all its length: the stiff and difficult stuffs of fact and experience, of prejudice and affection, in which the hard art is to work its will, and the long and tedious combinations of cause and effect out of which it is to build up its results. How else would you avoid a ceaseless round of error? The world's memory must be kept alive, or we shall never see an end of its old mistakes. We are in danger of losing our identity and becoming infantile in every generation. That is the real menace under which we cower everywhere in this age of change. The Old World trembles to see its proletariat in the saddle; we stand dismayed to find ourselves growing no older, always as young as the information of our most numerous voters. The danger does not lie in the fact that the masses whom we have en-

franchised seek to work any iniquity upon us, for their aim, take it in the large, is to make a righteous polity. The peril lies in this, that the past is discredited among them, because they played no choosing part in it. It was their enemy, they say, and they will not learn of it. They wish to break with it forever; its lessons are tainted to their taste.

In America, especially, we run perpetually this risk of newness. Righteously enough, it is in part a consequence of boasting. To enhance our credit for originality, we boasted for long that our institutions were one and all our own inventions, and the pleasing error was so got into the common air by persistent discharges of oratory that every man's atmosphere became surcharged with it, and it seems now quite too late to dislodge it. Three thousand miles of sea, moreover, roll between us and the elder past of the world. We are isolated here. We cannot see other nations in detail, and looked at in the large they do not seem like ourselves. Our problems, we say, are our own, and we will take our own way of solving them. Nothing seems audacious among us, for our case seems to us to stand singular and without parallel. We run in a free field, without recollection of failure, without heed of example.

This danger is nearer to us now than it was in the days of armed revolution. The men whom Madison led in the making of the Constitution were men who regarded the past. They had flung off from the mother country, not to get a new liberty but to preserve an old, not to break a Constitution but to keep it. It was the glory of the Convention of 1787 that it made choice in the framing of the government of principles which Englishmen everywhere had tested, and of an organization of which in every part Americans themselves had somewhere made trial. In every essential part they built out of old stuffs whose grain and fibre they knew.

" 'Tis not in battles that from youth we train
The Governor who must be wise and good,
And temper with the sternness of the brain
Thoughts motherly, and meek as womanhood.
Wisdom doth live with children round her knees:
Books, leisure, perfect freedom, and the talk
Man holds with week-day man in the hourly walk
Of the mind's business: these are the degrees
By which true sway doth mount; this is the stalk
True power doth grow on; and her rights are these."

The men who framed the government were not radicals. They trimmed old growths, and were not forgetful of the old principles of husbandry.

It is plain that it is the duty of an institution of learning set in the midst of a free population and amidst signs of social change, not merely to implant a sense of duty, but to illuminate duty by every lesson that can be drawn out of the past. It is not a dogmatic process. I know of no book in which the lessons of the past are set down. I do not know of any man whom the world could trust to write such a book. But it somehow comes about that the man who has travelled in the realms of thought brings lessons home with him which make him grave and wise beyond his fellows, and thoughtful with the thoughtfulness of a true man of the world.

He is not a true man of the world who knows only the present fashions of it. In good breeding there is always the fine savor of generations of gentlemen, a tradition of courtesy, the perfect knowledge of long practice. The world of affairs is so old no man can know it who knows only that little last segment of it which we call the present. We have a special name for the man who observes only the present fashions of the world, and it is a less honorable name than that which we use to designate the grave and thoughtful gentlemen who keep so steadily to the practices that have made the world wise and at ease these hundreds of years. We cannot pretend to have formed the world,

and we are not destined to reform it. We cannot even mend it and set it forward by the reasonable measures of a single generation's work if we forget the old processes or lose our mastery over them. We should have scant capital to trade on were we to throw away the wisdom we have inherited and seek our fortunes with the slender stock we have ourselves accumulated. This, it seems to me, is the real, the prevalent argument for holding every man we can to the intimate study of the ancient classics. Latin and Greek, no doubt, have a grammatical and syntactical habit which challenges the mind that would master it to a severer exercise of analytical power than the easy-going synthesis of any modern tongue demands; but substitutes in kind may be found for that drill. What you cannot find a substitute for is the classics as literature; and there can be no first-hand contact with that literature if you will not master the grammar and the syntax which convey its subtle power. Your enlightenment depends on the company you keep. You do not know the world until you know the men who have possessed it and tried its ways before ever you were given your brief run upon it. And there is no sanity comparable with that which is schooled in the thoughts that will keep. It is such a schooling that we get from the world's literature. The books have disappeared which were not genuine,—which spoke things which, if they were worth saying at all, were not worth hearing more than once, as well as the books which spoke permanent things clumsily and without the gift of interpretation. The kind air which blows from age to age has disposed of them like vagrant leaves. There was sap in them for a little, but now they are gone, we do not know where. All literature that has lasted has this claim upon us: that it is not dead; but we cannot be quite so sure of any as we are of the ancient literature that still lives, because none has lived so long. It holds a sort of primacy in the aristocracy of natural selection.

Read it, moreover, and you shall find another proof of vitality in it, more significant still. You shall recognize its thoughts, and even its fancies, as your long-time familiars—shall recognize them as the thoughts that have begotten a vast deal of your own literature. We read the classics and exclaim, in our vanity: "How modern! it might have been written yesterday." Would it not be more true, as well as more instructive, to exclaim concerning our own ideas: "How ancient! they have been true these thousand years"? It is the general air of the world a man gets when he reads the classics, the thinking which depends upon no time but only upon human nature, which seems full of the voices of the human spirit, quick with the power which moves ever upon the face of affairs. "What Plato has thought he may think; what a saint has felt he may feel; what at any time has befallen any man he can understand." There is the spirit of a race in the Greek literature, the spirit of quite another people in the books of Virgil and Horace and Tacitus; but in all a mirror of the world, the old passion of the soul, the old hope that keeps so new, the informing memory, the persistent forecast.

It has always seemed to me an odd thing, and a thing against nature that the literary man, the man whose citizenship and freedom are of the world of thought, should ever have been deemed an unsafe man in affairs; and yet I suppose there is not always injustice in the judgment. It is a perilously pleasant and beguiling comradeship, the company of authors. Not many men when once they are deep in it will leave its engaging thought of things gone by to find their practical duties in the present. But you are not making an undergraduate a man of letters when you keep him four short years at odd, or even at stated, hours in the company of authors. You shall have done much if you make him feel free among them.

This argument for enlightenment holds scarcely less

good, of course, in behalf of the study of modern literature, and especially the literature of your own race and country. You should not belittle culture by esteeming it a thing of ornament, an accomplishment rather than a power. A cultured mind is a mind quit of its awkwardness, eased of all impediment and illusion, made quick and athletic in the acceptable exercise of power. It is a mind at once informed and just,—a mind habituated to choose its course with knowledge, and filled with full assurance, like one who knows the world and can live in it without either unreasonable hope or unwarranted fear. It cannot complain, it cannot trifle, it cannot despair. Leave pessimism to the uncultured, who do not know reasonable hope; leave fantastic hopes to the uncultured, who do not know the reasonableness of failure. Show that your mind has lived in the world ere now; has taken counsel with the elder dead who still live, as well as with the ephemeral living who cannot pass their graves. Help men, but do not delude them.

I believe, of course, that there is another way of preparing young men to be wise. I need hardly say that I believe in full, explicit instruction in history and in politics, in the experiences of peoples and the fortunes of governments, in the whole story of what men have attempted and what they have accomplished through all the changes both of form and of purpose in their organization of their common life. Many minds will receive and heed this systematic instruction which have no ears for the voice that is in the printed page of literature. But, just as it is one thing to sit here in republican America and hear a credible professor tell of the soil of allegiance in which the British monarchy grows, and quite another to live where Victoria is queen and hear common men bless her with full confession of loyalty, so it is one thing to hear of systems of government in histories and treatises and quite another to feel

them in the pulses of the poets and prose writers who have lived under them.

It used to be taken for granted—did it not?—that colleges would be found always on the conservative side in politics (except on the question of free trade); but in this latter day a great deal has taken place which goes far toward discrediting the presumption. The college in our day lies very near indeed to the affairs of the world. It is a place of the latest experiments; its laboratories are brisk with the spirit of discovery; its lecture rooms resound with the discussion of new theories of life and novel programmes of reform. There is no radical like your learned radical, bred in the schools; and thoughts of revolution have in our time been harbored in universities as naturally as they were once nourished among the Encyclopedists. It is the scientific spirit of the age which has wrought the change. I stand with my hat off at very mention of the great men who have made our age an age of knowledge. No man more heartily admires, more gladly welcomes, more approvingly reckons the gain and the enlightenment that have come to the world through the extraordinary advances in physical science which this great age has witnessed. He would be a barbarian and a lover of darkness who should grudge that great study any part of its triumph. But I am a student of society and should deem myself unworthy of the comradeship of great men of science should I not speak the plain truth with regard to what I see happening under my own eyes. I have no laboratory but the world of books and men in which I live; but I am much mistaken if the scientific spirit of the age is not doing us a great disservice, working in us a certain great degeneracy. Science has bred in us a spirit of experiment and a contempt for the past. It made us credulous of quick improvement, hopeful of discovering panaceas, confident of success in every new thing.

I wish to be as explicit as carefully chosen words will

enable me to be upon a matter so critical, so radical as this. I have no indictment against what science has done: I have only a warning to utter against the atmosphere which has stolen from laboratories into lecture rooms and into the general air of the world at large. Science—our science—is new. It is a child of the nineteenth century. It has transformed the world and owes little debt of obligation to any past age. It has driven mystery out of the Universe; it has made malleable stuff of the hard world, and laid it out in its elements upon the table of every class-room. Its own masters have known its limitations: they have stopped short at the confines of the physical universe; they have declined to reckon with spirit or with the stuffs of the mind, have eschewed sense and confined themselves to sensation. But their work has been so stupendous that all other men of all other studies have been set staring at their methods, imitating their ways of thought, ogling their results. We look in our study of the classics nowadays more at the phenomena of language than at the movement of spirit; we suppose the world which is invisible to be unreal; we doubt the efficacy of feeling and exaggerate the efficacy of knowledge; we speak of society as an organism and believe that we can contrive for it a new environment which will change the very nature of its constituent parts; worst of all, we believe in the present and in the future more than in the past, and deem the newest theory of society the likeliest. This is the disservice scientific study has done us: it has given us agnosticism in the realm of philosophy, scientific anarchism in the field of politics. It has made the legislator confident that he can create, and the philosopher sure that God cannot. Past experience is discredited and the laws of matter are supposed to apply to spirit and the make-up of society.

Let me say once more, this is not the fault of the scientist; he has done his work with an intelligence and success which cannot be too much admired. It is the

work of the noxious, intoxicating gas which has somehow got into the lungs of the rest of us from out the crevices of his workshop—a gas, it would seem, which forms only in the outer air, and where men do not know the right use of their lungs. I should tremble to see social reform led by men who had breathed it; I should fear nothing better than utter destruction from a revolution conceived and led in the scientific spirit. Science has not changed the laws of social growth or betterment. Science has not changed the nature of society, has not made history a whit easier to understand, human nature a whit easier to reform. It has won for us a great liberty in the physical world, a liberty from superstitious fear and from disease, a freedom to use nature as a familiar servant; but it has not freed us from ourselves. It has not purged us of passion or disposed us to virtue. It has not made us less covetous or less ambitious or less self-indulgent. On the contrary, it may be suspected of having enhanced our passions, by making wealth so quick to come, so fickle to stay. It has wrought such instant, incredible improvement in all the physical setting of our life, that we have grown the more impatient of the unreformed condition of the part it has not touched or bettered, and we want to get at our spirits and reconstruct them in like radical fashion by like processes of experiment.

We have broken with the past and have come into a new world.

Can any one wonder, then, that I ask for the old drill, the old memory of times gone by, the old schooling in precedent and tradition, the old keeping of faith with the past, as a preparation for leadership in days of social change? We have not given science too big a place in our education; but we have made a perilous mistake in giving it too great a preponderance in method in every other branch of study. We must make the humanities human again; must recall what manner of men

we are; must turn back once more to the region of practicable ideals.

Of course, when all is said, it is not learning but the spirit of service that will give a college place in the public annals of the nation. It is indispensable, it seems to me, if it is to do its right service, that the air of affairs should be admitted to all its class-rooms. I do not mean the air of party politics, but the air of the world's transactions, the consciousness of the solidarity of the race, the sense of the duty of man toward man, of the presence of men in every problem, of the significance of truth for guidance as well as for knowledge, of the potency of ideas, of the promise and the hope that shine in the face of all knowledge. There is laid upon us the compulsion of the national life. We dare not keep aloof and closet ourselves while a nation comes to its maturity. The days of glad expansion are gone, our life grows tense and difficult; our resource for the future lies in careful thought, providence, and a wise economy; and the school must be of the nation.

I have had sight of the perfect place of learning in my thought: a free place, and a various, where no man could be and not know with how great a destiny knowledge had come into the world—itself a little world; but not perplexed, living with a singleness of aim not known without; the home of sagacious men, hard-headed and with a will to know, debaters of the world's questions every day and used to the rough ways of democracy; and yet a place removed—calm Science seated there, recluse, ascetic, like a nun; not knowing that the world passes, not caring, if the truth but come in answer to her prayer; and Literature, walking within her open doors, in quiet chambers, with men of olden time, storied walls about her, and calm voices infinitely sweet; here “magic casements, opening on the foam of perilous seas, in fairy lands forlorn,” to which you may withdraw and use your youth for pleas-

ure; there windows open straight upon the street, where many stand and talk, intent upon the world of men and business. A place where ideals are kept in heart in an air they can breathe; but no fool's paradise. A place where to hear the truth about the past and hold debate about the affairs of the present, with knowledge and without passion; like the world in having all men's life at heart, a place for men and all that concerns them; but unlike the world in its self-possession, its thorough way of talk; its care to know more than the moment brings to light; slow to take excitement, its air pure and wholesome with a breath of faith; every eye within it bright in the clear day and quick to look toward heaven for the confirmation of its hope. Who shall show us the way to this place?

MR. CLEVELAND AS PRESIDENT

FROM THE "ATLANTIC MONTHLY," MARCH, 1897, VOL. LXXIX, PP. 289-300. WALTER H. PAGE WAS THEN EDITOR OF THE "ATLANTIC MONTHLY."

IT is much too early to attempt to assign to Mr. Cleveland his place in the history of our government and policy. That he has played a very great and individual part in our affairs no one can doubt. But we are still too near him to see his work in its just perspective; we cannot yet see or estimate him as an historical figure.

It is plain, however, that Mr. Cleveland has rendered the country great services, and that his singular independence and force of purpose have made the real character of the government of the United States more evident than it ever was before. He has been the sort of President the makers of the Constitution had vaguely in mind: more man than partisan; with an independent executive will of his own; hardly a colleague of the Houses so much as an individual servant of the country; exercising his powers like a chief magistrate rather than like a party leader. Washington showed a like individual force and separateness; but he had been the country's leader through all its Revolution, and was always a kind of hero, whom parties could not absorb. Jackson worked his own will as President, and seemed to change the very nature of the government while he reigned; but it was a new social force that spoke in him, and he re-created a great party. Lincoln made the presidency the government while the war lasted, and gave the nation a great ruler; but his purposes were those of a disciplined and determined party, and his

time was a time of fearful crisis, when men studied power, not law. No one of these men seems the normal President, or affords example of the usual courses of administration. Mr. Cleveland has been President in ordinary times, but after an extraordinary fashion; not because he wished to form or revolutionize or save the government, but because he came fresh to his tasks without the common party training, a direct, fearless, somewhat unsophisticated man of action. In him we got a President, as it were, by immediate choice from out the body of the people, as the Constitution has all along appeared to expect, and he has refreshed our notion of an American chief magistrate.

It is plain that Mr. Cleveland, like every other man, has drawn his character and force in large part from his origin and breeding. It would be easy to describe him as a man of the people, and he would, I suppose, be as proud as any other man of that peculiar American title to nobility. But, after all, no man comes from the people in general. We are each of us derived from some small group of persons in particular; and unless we were too poor to have any family life at all, it is the life and associations of the family that have chiefly shaped us in our youth. Mr. Cleveland had a very definite home training: wholesome, kindly, Christian. He was bred in a home where character was disciplined and the thoughts were formed, where books were read and the right rules of life obeyed. He was early thrown, indeed, into the ordinary and common school of life, had its rough work thrust upon him, and learned, by his own part in it, the life of the people. But he never got those first lessons, conned in plain village manses, out of his blood. "If mother were alive I should feel so much safer," he wrote to his brother upon the night he was elected governor of New York. Grover Cleveland certainly got good usury in his steadfast youth out of the capital stock of energy

and principle he brought away, as his only portion, from his mother and father.

The qualities which have given him his place in his profession and in the history of the country seem commonplace enough in their customary manifestation: industry, thoroughness, uprightness, candor, courage. But it is worth while to remember that the same force and adjustment that will run a toy machine, made for a child's use, will also bring to bear the full might of a Corliss engine, with strength enough to drive a city's industries. It is the size and majesty of moral and intellectual qualities that make them great; and the point the people have noted about Mr. Cleveland is that his powers, though of a kind they know and have often had experience of, are made upon a great scale, and have lifted him to the view of the world as a national force, a maker and unmaker of policies. Men have said that Mr. Cleveland was without genius or brilliancy, because the processes of his mind were calculable and certain, like a law of nature; that his utterances were not above the common, because they told only in the mass, and not sentence by sentence, were cast rather than tempered; that he was stubborn because he did not change, and self-opinionated because he did not falter. He has made no overtures to fortune; has obtained and holds a great place in our affairs by a sort of inevitable mastery, by a law which no politician has ever quite understood or at all relished, by virtue of a preference which the people themselves have expressed without analyzing. We have seen how there is genius in mere excellence of gift, and prevailing power merely in traits of chastened will.

When a city or a nation looks for a man to better its administration, it seeks character rather than gifts of origination, a clear purpose that can be depended upon to work its will without fear or favor. Mr. Cleveland never struck so straight towards the confidence of practical men as when he spoke of the tariff question as

"a condition, not a theory." His mind works in the concrete; lies close always to the practical life of the world, which he understands by virtue of lifelong contact with it. He was no prophet of novelties, but a man of affairs; had no theories, but strove always to have knowledge of fact. There is as great a field for mind in thinking a situation through and through as in threading the intricacies of an abstract problem and it has heartened men from the first to find that Mr. Cleveland could do thinking of that sort with a sure, unhurried, steadfast power, such as no less practical man could even have simulated. He was an experiment when he was chosen mayor of Buffalo, did not know his own powers, had given no one else their true measure; but he was thereafter a known and calculable force, and grew from station to station with an increase of vigor, and withal a consistency of growth, which showed his qualities such as waited only the invitation of fortune and opportunity. It may be that there are other men, of like parts and breeding, who could rise in like fashion to a great rôle, but it is certain that Mr. Cleveland has made a place of his own among the Presidents of the United States.

The ordinary rules of politics have been broken throughout his career. He came almost like a novice into the field of national politics, despite his previous experience as mayor and governor. He had always identified himself, indeed, with the Democratic party; but his neighbors in Buffalo had chosen him to better rather than to serve his party, when they elected him to local office. He had elevated the office of sheriff, when they called him to it, by executing it with conscientious energy and with an enlightened sense of public duty; and he had made it his business, when they chose him mayor of their city, to see municipal affairs put upon a footing of efficiency, such as might become a great corporation whose object was the welfare of its citizens, and no partisan interest whatever.

It was inevitable that he should shock and alienate all mere partisans, alike by his temper and by his methods. He called himself a party man, and had no weak stomach for the processes of party management; but he had not sought office as a career, and he deemed his party better served by manliness and integrity than by chicanery. He was blunt, straightforward, plain-spoken, stalwart by nature, used to choosing and pushing his own way; and he had a sober audacity which made him no caucus man. His courses of action were incalculable to the mere politician, simply because they were not based upon calculation.

It commonly turns out that the fearlessness of such a man is safer than the caution of the professional party manager. A free and thoughtful people loves a bold man, who faces the fight without too much thought of himself or of his party's fortunes. Mr. Cleveland's success as mayor of Buffalo attracted the attention of the whole State,—was too pronounced and conspicuous to be overlooked. Party managers saw in him a man to win with, little as they understood the elements of his power. Even they stared, nevertheless, to see him elected governor of the State by the astounding majority of 192,854. He evidently had not studied the art of pleasing; he had been known as the "veto mayor" of Buffalo, and his vetoes as the "plain speech" vetoes. He had an odd way of treating questions of city government as if they were questions of individual official judgment, and not at all questions of party advantage. He brought his exact habits as a lawyer to bear upon his tasks as a public officer, and made a careful business of the affairs of city and State. There was nothing puritanical about him. He had a robust and practical spirit in all things. But he did not seem to regard politics as in any way a distinct science, set apart from the ordinary business of life. He treated the legislature of the State, when he became governor, as he had treated the city council of Buffalo, as if he were the

president of a great industrial concern with incidental social functions, and they were its board of directors, often unwise, sometimes unscrupulous, in their action; as if it were his chief duty to stand between them and the stockholders, protecting the latter's interests at all hazards. He used his veto as freely when governor as he had used it when mayor. "Magnificent," cried the trained politicians about him, under their breath,—“magnificent, but it is not politics!”

And yet they found him thrust inevitably upon them as their candidate for President before his term as governor had drawn to its close. Evidence was accumulating that the country was ready to put an end to the long succession of Republican administrations which had held the federal executive departments for more than twenty years as a sort of party property; but it was also plain enough that the old, the real party leaders among the Democrats would by no means be acceptable substitutes. The Democratic party, moreover, had been too long in opposition to be ready to assume, as it stood, the responsibilities of government. It had no real union; it was little more than an assemblage of factions, a more or less coherent association of the various groups and interests opposed to the Republicans and bent upon breaking their supremacy. It did not itself know whether it was of one mind or not. For, though popular majorities had been running its way for ten years and more, and both Houses of Congress had once come into its hands, it had never had leave to undertake constructive legislation. The President's veto had stood always in its way, and its legislation had often been proposed for effect rather than with a view to actual execution. It was necessary it should go outside its own confused and disordered ranks if it would choose a successful presidential candidate, in order both to unite its own factions and to win the country's confidence; and so it chose Mr. Cleveland, and the country accepted him.

It was a novel experiment. The very considerations that made it wise to nominate Mr. Cleveland as President were likely to render it difficult to live under his presidency with an unbroken party discipline; and the circumstances of his election made it all the more probable that he would choose to be President of the country rather than leader of the Democrats. The Democrats, in fact, did not recognize him as their leader, but only as their candidate for the office of President. If he was leader at all in the ordinary sense,—if he spoke and acted for the views of any body of men,—he was the leader of those independent Republicans who had broken with their own party, and were looking for some one who should open a new era in party politics and give them efficient and public-spirited principles to believe in and vote for again. Men everywhere wished to see parties reform themselves, and old-line Democrats had more reason to expect to see their party fall apart into its constituent elements once more than to hope that Mr. Cleveland would unite and vivify it as an aggressive and triumphant organization. He had been made President, there was good reason to believe, rather because thoughtful men throughout the country wanted a pure and businesslike administration than because they wanted Democratic legislation or an upsetting of old policies; he had been chosen as a man, not as a partisan,—taken up by his own party as a likely winner rather than as an acceptable master.

Apparently there was no reason, however, to fear that Mr. Cleveland would arrogate to himself the prerogatives of political leadership, or assume the rôle of guide and mentor in matters of policy. At first he regarded the great office to which he had been chosen as essentially executive, except of course in the giving or withholding of his assent to bills passed by Congress. His veto he used with extraordinary freedom, particularly in the disapproval of private pension bills, vetoing no less than one hundred and forty-six measures

during the sessions of the first Congress of his administration; and he filled his messages with very definite recommendations; but he thought it no part of his proper function to press his preferences in any other way upon the acceptance of Congress. In the public interest, he had addressed a letter to Mr. A. J. Warner, a member of Congress, and others, only eight days before his inauguration as President, in which he had declared in urgent terms his strong conviction that the purchase and coinage of silver should be stopped at once, to prevent radical and perhaps disastrous disturbances in the currency; and he joined with Mr. Manning, his Secretary of the Treasury, in speaking very plainly to the same effect when Congress met. But he deemed his duty done when he had thus used the only initiative given him by the Constitution, and expressly declined to use any other means of pressing his views upon his party. He meant to keep aloof, and be President with a certain separateness, as the Constitution seemed to suggest.

It cost him at least one sharp fight with the Senate to carry his purpose of executive independence into effect. Mr. Cleveland saw fit to remove certain federal officers from office before the expiration of their terms, and to appoint Democrats in their places, and the Senate demanded the papers which would explain the causes of the removals. The President declined to send them, holding that the Senate had no right to judge of anything but the fitness of the men named as successors to the officers removed. It was not certain that the moral advantage lay with the President. He had been put into the presidency chiefly because independent voters all over the country, and particularly in his own State, regarded him a tried champion of civil service reform; but his choice and method in appointments had by no means satisfied the reformers. They had stared to see him make Mr. Daniel Manning Secretary of the Treasury, not because Mr. Manning lacked ability, but

because he was notoriously a politician of the very "practical" sort, and seemed to those who did not know him the very kind of manager Mr. Cleveland ought to have turned his back upon; and they did not like any more than the Senate did to see men deprived of their offices to make room for Democrats without good reason given, reason that had no taint of partisanship upon it. The truth was that the public service had been too long in the hands of the Republicans to be susceptible of being considered an unpartisan service as it stood. Mr. Cleveland said simply, to those who spoke to him in private about the matter, that he had not made any removal which he did not, after careful inquiry, believe to be for the good of the public service. This could not satisfy his critics. It meant that he must be permitted to use his judgment not only as a man, but also as a Democrat, in reconstructing a civil service which had been for a generation in the hands of the opposite political party. The laws could not be made mandatory upon him in this matter, under the Constitution, and he took leave to exercise his discretion here and there, as his judgment as a practical and strong-willed man suggested. That the operation of the laws passed for the reform of the civil service was strengthened in the main, and their administration thoroughly organized and very much bettered under him, no candid man could deny; and with that he asked the country to be content.

The whole question afforded an excellent opportunity for studying Mr. Cleveland's character. The key quality of that character is, perhaps, a sort of robust sagacity. He had never for a moment called himself anything but a party man. He had not sought personal detachment, and had all along known the weakness that would come with isolation and the absolute rejection of the regular means of party management; and he had dared to make his own choices in cases which seemed too subtle or exceptional for the law. It was unsafe

ground often; blunders were made which appeared to defeat the purposes he had in view in making removals and appointments; it looked in the end as if it would have been wiser to make no exceptions at all to the ordinary rules of appointment: but the mistakes were those of a strong nature,—too strong to strip itself absolutely of such choice as might serve what was to him legitimate party strength. Who shall judge the acts in question who does not know the grounds upon which the President proceeded? Not all of government can be crowded into the rules of the law.

At any rate, criticism did not disturb Mr. Cleveland's serenity; and it pleased the fancy of men of all sorts to see the President bear himself so steadfastly and do his work so calmly in the midst of all the talk. Outsiders could not know whether the criticism cut or not; they only knew that the President did not falter or suffer his mind to be shaken. He had an enormous capacity for work, shirked no detail of his busy function, carried the government steadily upon his shoulders. There is no antidote for worry to be compared with hard labor at important tasks which keep the mind stretched to large views; and the President looked upon himself as the responsible executive of the nation, not as the arbiter of policies. There is something in such a character that men of quick and ardent thought cannot like or understand. They want all capable men to be thinking, like themselves, along lines of active advance; they are impatient of performance which is simply thorough without also being regenerative, and Mr. Cleveland has not commended himself to them. They themselves would probably not make good Presidents. A certain tough and stubborn fibre is necessary, which does not easily change, which is unelastically strong.

The attention of the country, however, was presently drawn off from Mr. Cleveland's pension vetoes and individual methods of appointment, from his attitude and temper as a power standing aloof from Congress,

to note him a leader and master after all, as if in spite of himself. He was too good a Democrat and too strenuous a man of business to stand by and see the policy of the country hopelessly adrift without putting his own influence to the test to direct it. He could not keep to his rôle of simple executive. He saw his party cut into opposing factions upon the question of the tariff, upon the reform to which it had been pledged time out of mind. Mr. Carlisle, who wished to see the tariff brought to a revenue basis, was Speaker of the Democratic House, and Mr. Morrison was chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means; but Mr. Randall checkmated them at every turn, and nothing was done to redeem the party's promises. No man of strong convictions could stand there, where all the country watched him, waiting for him to speak, the only representative of the nation as a whole in all the government, and let a great opportunity and a great duty go by default. He had intended to make his a strictly business administration, to cleanse the public service and play his assigned part in legislation with a clear judgment to do right. But the President stands at the centre of legislation as well as of administration in executing his great office, and Mr. Cleveland grew to the measure of his place as its magnitude and responsibilities cleared to his view. The breath of affairs was at last in his lungs, and he gave his party a leader, of a sudden, in the plain-spoken, earnest, mandatory tariff message of December, 1887. It was such a stroke as no mere politician would have hazarded, and it sadly disconcerted the men who had supposed themselves the leaders of the Democrats. Mr. Cleveland had not consulted them about his manifesto. He had made the issue of the next presidential campaign for them before they were aware of it, and that campaign was immediately at hand. The Congress to which he sent his messages showed already a sad cutting off in the ranks of the Democrats. In the first Congress of

his administration his party had had a majority of close upon forty in the House, though the Senate was still against them. In the Congress of which he demanded tariff reform the Democratic majority in the House had dwindled to eleven, though the Senate was almost equally divided. It seemed as if he would commit his party to a dangerous and aggressive policy at the very moment when its power was on the decline, and risk everything with regard to the next choice of President. Some resented his action as a sudden usurpation; others doubted what they should think; a few took the changed aspect of politics with zest and relish. It was bravely done. The situation produced was even dramatic; and yet the calmest man anywhere touched by the business was Mr. Cleveland himself. It was no trick or impulse. It was the steadily delivered blow of a stalwart and thoughtful man, thoroughly sick of seeing a great party drift and dally while the nation's finances suffered waste and demoralization.

He had certainly settled the way the next campaign should go: that the country's reception of his message showed; and the politicians adjusted themselves as best they might to his policy of plain speech and no circumspection. The House passed a tariff measure, drafted by Mr. Mills, which was thrown aside in the Senate, but not rejected by the party. Mr. Cleveland was re-nominated for the presidency by acclamation, not because the politicians wanted him, but because their constituents did. The two parties went to the country, and Mr. Cleveland lost by the vote of his own State.

The odd thing about it was that defeat did not seem to lessen Mr. Cleveland's importance. Some persons did not like to see their ex-President return to the ordinary duties of legal practice, as he did in New York, apparently expecting a healthy, practical man to accept a merely ornamental part in society after once having been their chief magistrate. There was no denying the fact that he had wrought his own defeat and his

party's by forcing a hot fight when matters were going peacefully enough. He himself kept as much as might be from unnecessary publicity. But the country could not cease to be interested in him, and he was the only man it would take seriously, even now, as the leader of the Democrats. Practical men could not for the life of them think of any more suitable candidate for the next campaign. Whether he had united or pleased his party or not, he had, in any case, given it a programme and made himself its chief representative. Through all the four years of Mr. Harrison's administration Mr. Cleveland was the most conspicuous man in the country out of office, and a sort of popular expectation followed him in all his movements.

The Republicans, moreover, delivered themselves into his hands. They took his defeat as a mandate from the people to make a tariff as little like that which Mr. Cleveland had desired as it might be possible to construct. The Committee of Ways and Means, of which Major McKinley was chairman, framed a measure unmistakably fit to meet the demand; and the congressional elections of 1890 went overwhelmingly against the Republicans. Apparently, the country had come at last to Mr. Cleveland's mind in respect of the tariff, and he became once more the logical as well as the popular candidate of the Democrats for the presidency. Once more he became President, and essayed the difficult rôle of leader of a composite party. He had created an additional difficulty, meanwhile, obeying an imperative conviction without regard to policy or opportune occasion. He had ventured a frank public letter in opposition to the free coinage of silver, notwithstanding the fact that he knew free coinage to be much more distinctively a Democratic than a Republican measure. The habit of independent initiative in respect of questions of legislative policy was growing upon him, as he felt his personal power grow and his familiarity with public questions; and he knew that

he was striking straight home, this time, to the confidence, at any rate, of every enlightened man of business in the country. Such men he had known from his youth up, and could assess: his courage and self-confidence in such a case was stuff of his whole training and character, and he felt that he could afford to lose the presidency upon that issue.

Mr. Cleveland's second term has shown the full strength and the full risk of the qualities which, during his first administration, the country had seen displayed only in the disturbing tariff message of 1887, in his energetic treatment of the fisheries question, which the Senate did not like, and in certain appointments which the whole country had criticised. He gave warning at the outset of the individual rôle he meant to play in the selection of his Cabinet. He bestowed the secretaryship of state upon a man come but the other day out of the Republican ranks to support him; the secretaryship of war upon a man who had formerly been his private secretary; the post-office upon his one-time law partner; the department of the interior upon a Georgian whose name the country smiled to hear for the first time; the attorney-generalship upon a lawyer who was no politician; and the secretaryship of agriculture upon a quiet gentleman of his own picking out. Only the navy and the headship of the treasury went to men whom his party knew and followed in the House. His first Cabinet had contained men whom everybody knew as accredited leaders among the Democrats,—Mr. Bayard, Mr. Whitney, Mr. Lamar, Mr. Vilas; only the minority of his counsellors had then been selected as if to please himself, rather than to draw a party following about him by recognizing the men who exercised authority among the Democrats. But his second Cabinet seemed chosen as if of deliberate and set purpose to make a personal and private choice, without regard to party support.

And yet there was less difference between the two

Cabinets than appeared upon the surface. Though there had been some representative Democrats in the first Cabinet, they had not been men who controlled their party. Mr. Carlisle, of the second Cabinet, was undoubtedly more influential than any of them, and Mr. Herbert more truly a working, capital member of the party's force in the House. The truth was that Mr. Cleveland had, throughout his first administration, been all the while held at arm's length by his party,—an ally, perhaps, but not a partner in its undertakings,—had been compelled to keep the place of separateness and independence which had at first seemed to be his choice. In his second administration he apparently made no effort to force his way into its counsels, but accepted his place as the independent voters' President,—content if only he could have a personal following, carry out the real pledges of his party, and make his purpose felt as the nation's spokesman. Not that he broke with his party either in thought or in purpose; but he saw that it would not take counsel with him, and that, if he would fulfill his trust, he must force partisan leaders, for their own good, to feel his power from without. It might be they would draw about him more readily through mastery than through persuasion.

It was singular how politics began at once to centre in the President, waiting for his initiative, and how the air at Washington filled with murmurs against the domineering and usurping temper and practice of the Executive. Power had somehow gone the length of the avenue, and seemed lodged in one man. No one who knew Mr. Cleveland, or who judged him fairly, for a moment deemed him too covetous of authority, or in any degree disregardful of the restraints the Constitution has put upon the President. But the Democrats in the House were made conscious that the eye of the country had been withdrawn from them in matters of policy, and Washington seemed full of Mr. Cleveland, his Secretary of the Treasury and his Sec-

retary of State. A position of personal isolation had been thrust upon him, but he used the power which had come to him to effect the purposes to which, as a Democrat, he felt himself pledged. If the party would not act with him, he must act for it. There was no touch of cant in him when he declared his allegiance to the Democratic party; there was only a danger that if the leaders of the party in Congress continued to follow him merely when they were obliged, he would himself presently be all the Democratic party that was left in the country.

On June 30, 1893, four months after his second inauguration, he took steps to force action upon the silver question. He called Congress to meet in extra session upon the 7th of August following, to deal with the finances of the country and prevent a panic; telling them plainly that the law which compelled the purchase and coinage of silver by the government ought to be repealed, and that this question must be settled even if the tariff had to wait. There was already serious disturbance in business circles, arising in large part from the condition of the currency, when, on the 26th of June, the British authorities in India closed the mints of that country to the free coinage of silver, and sent the price of the unstable metal down with a disastrous tumble in all the world's markets. It looked then as if there would certainly be a fatal panic, and Mr. Cleveland saw that Congress must meet and face the situation at once.

It was evident, even before Congress came together, that the battle was to be, not between Democrats and Republicans, but between the advocates and the opponents of the free coinage of silver, without regard to party. Conventions called by the silver men met in Denver and in Chicago before Congress assembled, and denounced the proposal to repeal the silver purchase law as a scheme devised by American and English bankers, with the assistance of Mr. Cleveland, to drive

silver out of use as money; and when Congress took the matter up, old party lines seemed, for the moment at any rate, to have disappeared. It was the "friends" of silver against its "enemies." The advocates of Mr. Cleveland's policy of repeal won a decisive victory in the House of Representatives, and won it at once, before August was out; but in the Senate the fight dragged with doubtful and wavering fortunes, until the very end of October,—would have ended in some weak compromise had not the President stood resolute,—and kept the country waiting so long for the issue that business suffered almost as much as if repeal had been defeated.

It was the President's victory that the law was at last repealed, and every one knew it. He had forced the consideration of the question; he had told Senators plainly, almost passionately, when they approached him, that he would accept no compromise,—that he would veto anything less than absolute repeal, and let them face the country as best they might afterwards. Until he came on the stage both parties had dallied and coquetted with the advocates of silver. Now he had brought both to a parting of the ways. The silver men were forced to separate themselves and look their situation in the face, choose which party they should plan to bring under their will and policy, if they could, and no longer camp in the tents of both. Such a stroke settled what the course of congressional politics should be throughout the four years of Mr. Cleveland's term, and made it certain that at the end of that term he should either have won his party to himself or lost it altogether. It was evident that any party that rejected the gold standard for the currency must look upon him as its opponent.

He showed his fixed purpose in the matter once again by his veto of the so-called Seigniorage Bill in March, 1894. The silver men had already so far rallied as to induce substantial majorities in both Houses to agree

to the practically immediate coinage of all the silver bullion owned by the treasury as a result of the purchases of silver made under the law which had but just now been repealed in the special session. It would not be wise to put forth so great a body of silver, at such a time, to the fresh disturbance of the currency, said the President, and the bill was negatived. The issue of more silver was defeated, and the silver men quietly set about forming their party lines anew.

Meanwhile, issue was joined once more upon the question of the tariff, not only as between Democrats and Republicans, but also as between Democrat and Democrat, and new lines of divergence were run through Mr. Cleveland's party. The Committee of Ways and Means, of which Mr. W. L. Wilson was chairman, had formulated a tariff bill during the special session, and when Congress came together for its regular sittings they added to their tariff scheme a bill providing for an income tax, to meet the probable deficiency in the revenue likely to result from the reduction of import duties which they had proposed. The two measures were made one. There was keen opposition in the East to the adoption of the income tax, and though the composite bill went through the House by a majority of sixty-four, many Democrats voted against it, and party lines were again broken. In the Senate, the tariff bill was changed beyond recognition by more than six hundred amendments. Many of the *ad valorem* duties proposed by Mr. Wilson's committee were made specific; the Senate would not consent to put iron and lead ores or coal upon the free list with wool; above all, it insisted upon an increase rather than a reduction of the duty on sugar. In the Committee of Conference, irreconcilable differences of opinion emerged between the two Houses; a letter from Mr. Cleveland to Mr. Wilson, supporting the plans of the House and severely criticising those of the Senate, only stiffened a little more the temper of the Senate conferees; and the House

at last yielded, rather than have no change at all in the tariff.

Mr. Cleveland did not sign the bill, but suffered it to become law without his signature. It was not such a law as he wanted, he said, nor such a law as fulfilled the pledges of the party; but the party had accepted it, and he would not cast himself loose from it in this critical matter by the use of his veto. No one believed that the Senators who had insisted upon the chief matter of contention, the change in the sugar duties, had acted as Democrats. It was the universal opinion that they had acted as the representatives of a particular vested interest. But in the nice balance of parties which existed in the Senate they were in a position to dictate. The party leaders in the House thought it better to pass some measure of tariff reform than to suffer a total miscarriage; and Mr. Cleveland tacitly consented to their judgment.

The Supreme Court completed the discomfiture of the party by declaring the income tax law unconstitutional. Without that tax there was not revenue enough to meet the expenditures of the government, as presently became evident. Deficiency of revenue, coupled with the obligation of the government to redeem its notes in gold on demand, cut into the gold reserve, and the money question grew acute again. To maintain the gold reserve the administration was obliged again and again to resort to the issue of bonds. The President was in league, the silver men said, with the bankers and the men who controlled the gold of the world everywhere. Mr. Carlisle earnestly urged a radical reform of the currency system: the repeal of the law compelling a constant reissue of the government's legal tender notes, and such legislation as would make provision for a sufficiently elastic currency by means of liberal changes in the banking laws. But his plans were not acted upon; the revenue did not increase; the government was obliged to pay out gold, upon demand,

from its reserve; and there was nothing for it but to obtain gold of the bankers, and of those who had hoarded it, by issuing new bonds and increasing the interest charges of the government. The silver men grew every day more hostile to the administration.

The administration bulked very large the while, not only in the business world, but also in the field of foreign affairs. A treaty providing for the annexation of Hawaii was pending in the Senate when Mr. Cleveland came into office in March, 1893; but Mr. Cleveland promptly withdrew it, and, in characteristic fashion, set about finding out for himself the real situation of affairs in the islands. The outcome showed his transparent honesty and rare courage very plainly, if not his skill in a delicate affair. He found that it was the countenance and apparent assistance of the agent of the United States in Hawaii that had facilitated the dethronement of the Queen and the setting up of a revolutionary government, and he took steps to undo so far as possible the mischievous work of interference. The apologies of the United States were made to the Queen, and the provisional government was informed that the government of the United States would expect it to withdraw and make way for the reestablishment of the legitimate government of the islands. But the provisional government refused to withdraw, and the President was obliged to submit the whole matter to Congress, without whose sanction he did not feel justified in employing force or in taking any further step in the unhappy affair. It seemed a lame ending, and the papers found it easy to scoff, though hard to say what other honorable course could have been taken; and every man who was not a Jingo perceived that the President had not in fact lost credit. He had simply followed his conscience without regard to applause or failure, and given one more proof of his unsophisticated character.

At any rate, everybody forgot Hawaii upon the

emergence of Venezuela. Diplomatic relations had been suspended between Great Britain and Venezuela because of a dispute regarding the boundary line between Venezuela and British Guiana, and Mr. Cleveland's administration had intervened, and had insisted that the whole question be submitted to arbitration. The position it took was based explicitly upon the Monroe Doctrine, and the course it proposed was virtually a demand that the United States be accorded the right of intervention in all questions arising between South American states and European powers. Lord Salisbury declined to make any such concession to the United States, or to submit any more of the question between Great Britain and Venezuela to arbitration than he had already expressed his willingness to submit to adjudication in his correspondence with the Venezuelan government; and Mr. Cleveland sent to Congress his startling message of December 17, 1895.

Here again he showed himself a strong man, but no diplomatist. It was like a blunt, candid, fearless man to say that it was the duty of the United States to ascertain for herself the just rights of Venezuela, and resist any encroachment upon her southern neighbor by every means in her power, and to add that he fully realized the consequences that might follow such a declaration of purpose. But only our kinsmen oversea would have yielded anything or sought peace by concession, after such words had been spoken. England presently showed that she would not have taken such a defiance from William of Germany; but good feeling, good temper, good sense, soon brought the two governments to a better understanding. Our commission of inquiry acted with the utmost sobriety and tact; Mr. Olney pursued his correspondence with Lord Salisbury with a strength of good manners, good reasoning, and disinterested purpose that carried its own assurance of victory; we had in Mr. Bayard a representative in London of an old and excellent school of behavior; and the end was a diplo-

matic triumph for the United States which attracted the attention of the world. The successful settlement of the particular question in controversy was even followed by a treaty of general arbitration between England and the United States, such as multitudes of peace-loving men had prayed for, but few had dared to hope to see. What had at first seemed to threaten to mar Mr. Cleveland's fame once and for all turned out in the end its greatest title to honorable dignity. We are at last enabled to read the famous message aright. There spoke a man as desirous and capable of peace and moderation as any in the nation, but accustomed, when he spoke at all, to speak his whole mind without reserve, and willing to speak to Europe, if she must hear, as freely as he would speak to his own people. It was the perilous indiscretion of a frank nature incapable of disguises.

The Cuban question has shown us the same man. He has satisfied neither the Democrats nor the Republicans, because neither cared to observe the restraints of international law or set themselves any bounds of prudence; but he has made Spain feel the pressure of our opinion and of our material interest in the Cuban struggle none the less, and by his very self-restraint has brought the sad business sensibly nearer to its end.

In this, as in other things, he has been a man without a party. His friends have been the silent men who watch public affairs without caring too much about the fortunes of parties. He has carried civil service reform to its completion at last; but that did not give him a party. To extend the rules of the classified merit service to all branches of the public business was a work of non-partisanship, and no man need expect a party following because of that. Mr. Cleveland did not do this work hurriedly. At the close of his first administration the friends of reform stood disappointed and not a little disheartened. But he has done the work in his own way and thoroughly, and no man need doubt

his record now. He can look back with deep satisfaction upon the fact that while he directed the affairs of the government vast tracts of the public lands were reclaimed for the use of the people; that he was enabled to put system and a little economy into the management of the Pension Bureau; that more than one of the executive departments has received a complete reorganization at his hands; that he gave the country the business-like administration he promised. None of these things, however, secures any man the support of a party. Mr. Cleveland never seemed so utterly without a party as in the extraordinary campaign which has made Mr. McKinley his successor. But it is the country's debt to him now that he thus stood alone. He forced the fight which drove the silver men to their final struggle for a party. They chose the Democratic party, because it was strong in the West where the silver ore was mined, and in the South and in all the agricultural areas of the continent where those business interests are weak which most sensitively feel the movements of the money market. They drove thousands of men out of the Democratic party when they took it,—Mr. Cleveland, their chief enemy, with the rest. And the Republicans routed them upon the issue which Mr. Cleveland had made definite and final.

We need not pretend to know what history shall say of Mr. Cleveland; we need not pretend that we can draw any common judgment of the man from the confused cries that now ring everywhere from friend and foe. We know only that he has played a great part; that his greatness is authenticated by the passion of love and of hatred he has stirred up; that no such great personality has appeared in our politics since Lincoln; and that, whether greater or less, his personality is his own, unique in all the varied history of our government. He has made policies and altered parties after the fashion of an earlier age in our history, and

the men who assess his fame in the future will be no partisans, but men who love candor, courage, honesty, strength, unshaken capacity, and high purpose such as his.

THE MAKING OF THE NATION

FROM THE "ATLANTIC MONTHLY," JULY, 1897, VOL.
LXXX, PP. I-14.

THE making of our own nation seems to have taken place under our very eyes, so recent and so familiar is the story. The great process was worked out in the plain and open day of the modern world, statesmen and historians standing by to superintend, criticise, make record of what was done. The stirring narrative runs quickly into the day in which we live; we can say that our grandfathers builded the government which now holds so large a place in the world; the story seems of yesterday, and yet seems entire, as if the making of the republic had hastened to complete itself within a single hundred years. We are elated to see so great a thing done upon so great a scale, and to feel ourselves in so intimate a way actors in the moving scene.

Yet we should deceive ourselves were we to suppose the work done, the nation made. We have been told by a certain group of our historians that a nation was made when the federal Constitution was adopted; that the strong sentences of the law sufficed to transform us from a league of States into a people single and inseparable. Some tell us, however, that it was not till the War of 1812 that we grew fully conscious of a single purpose and destiny, and began to form policies as if for a nation. Others see the process complete only when the civil war struck slavery away, and gave North and South a common way of life that should make common ideals and common endeavors at last possible. Then, when all have had their say, there comes a great movement like the one which we call Populism, to remind us

how the country still lies apart in sections: some at one stage of development, some at another; some with one hope and purpose for America, some with another. And we ask ourselves, Is the history of our making as a nation indeed over, or do we still wait upon the forces that shall at last unite us? Are we even now, in fact, a nation?

Clearly, it is not a question of sentiment, but a question of fact. If it be true that the country, taken as a whole, is at one and the same time in several stages of development,—not a great commercial and manufacturing nation, with here and there its broad pastures and the quiet farms from which it draws its food; not a vast agricultural community, with here and there its ports of shipment and its necessary marts of exchange; nor yet a country of mines, merely, pouring their products forth into the markets of the world, to take thence whatever it may need for its comfort and convenience in living,—we still wait for its economic and spiritual union. It is many things at once. Sections big enough for kingdoms live by agriculture, and farm the wide stretches of a new land by the aid of money borrowed from other sections which seem almost like another nation, with their teeming cities, dark with the smoke of factories, quick with the movements of trade, as sensitive to the variations of exchange on London as to the variations in the crops raised by their distant fellow countrymen on the plains within the continent. Upon other great spaces of the vast continent, communities, millions strong, live the distinctive life of the miner, have all their fortune bound up and centred in a single group of industries, feel in their utmost concentration the power of economic forces elsewhere dispersed, and chafe under the unequal yoke that unites them with communities so unlike themselves as those which lend and trade and manufacture, and those which follow the plough and reap the grain that is to feed the world.

Such contrasts are nothing new in our history, and our system of government is admirably adapted to relieve the strain and soften the antagonism they might entail. All our national history through our country has lain apart in sections, each marking a stage of settlement, a stage of wealth, a stage of development, as population has advanced, as if by successive journeyings and encampments, from east to west; and always new regions have been suffered to become new States, form their own life under their own law, plan their own economy, adjust their own domestic relations, and legalize their own methods of business. States have, indeed, often been whimsically enough formed. We have left the matter of boundaries to surveyors rather than to statesmen, and have by no means managed to construct economic units in the making of States. We have joined mining communities with agricultural, the mountain with the plain, the ranch with the farm, and have left the making of uniform rules to the sagacity and practical habit of neighbors ill at ease with one another. But on the whole, the scheme, though a bit haphazard, has worked itself out with singularly little friction and no disaster, and the strains of the great structure we have erected have been greatly eased and dissipated.

Elastic as the system is, however, it stiffens at every point of national policy. The federal government can make but one rule, and that a rule for the whole country, in each act of its legislation. Its very Constitution withholds it from discrimination as between State and State, section and section; and yet its chief powers touch just those subjects of economic interest in which the several sections of the country feel themselves most unlike. Currency questions do not affect them equally or in the same way. Some need an elastic currency to serve their uses; others can fill their coffers more readily with a currency that is inelastic. Some can build up manufactures under a tariff law; others cannot, and must submit to pay more without earning more. Some

have one interest in a principle of interstate commerce; others, another. It would be difficult to find even a question of foreign policy which would touch all parts of the country alike. A foreign fleet would mean much more to the merchants of Boston and New York than to the merchants of Illinois and the farmers of the Dakotas.

The conviction is becoming painfully distinct among us, moreover, that these contrasts of condition and differences of interest between the several sections of the country are now more marked and emphasized than they ever were before. The country has been transformed within a generation, not by any creations in a new kind, but by stupendous changes in degree. Every interest has increased its scale and its individual significance. The "East" is transformed by the vast accumulations of wealth made since the civil war,—transformed from a simple to a complex civilization, more like the Old World than like the New. The "West" has so magnified its characteristics by sheer growth, every economic interest which its life represents has become so gigantic in its proportions, that it seems to Eastern men, and to its own people also, more than ever a region apart. It is true that the "West" is not, as a matter of fact, a region at all, but, in Professor Turner's admirable phrase, a stage of development, nowhere set apart and isolated, but spread abroad through all the far interior of the continent. But it is now a stage of development with a difference, as Professor Turner has shown,¹ which makes it practically a new thing in our history. The "West" was once a series of States and settlements beyond which lay free lands not yet occupied, into which the restless and all who could not thrive by mere steady industry, all who had come too late and all who had stayed too long, could pass on, and, it might be, better their fortunes. Now it lies without outlet. The free lands are gone. New communities

¹ *American Historical Review*, vol. i. p. 71.

must make their life sufficient without this easy escape,—must study economy, find their fortunes in what lies at hand, intensify effort, increase capital, build up a future out of details. It is as if they were caught in a fixed order of life and forced into a new competition, and both their self-consciousness and their keenness to observe every point of self-interest are enlarged beyond former example.

That there are currents of national life, both strong and definite, running in full tide through all the continent from sea to sea, no observant person can fail to perceive,—currents which have long been gathering force, and which cannot now be withstood. There need be no fear in any sane man's mind that we shall ever again see our national government threatened with overthrow by any power which our own growth has bred. The temporary danger is that, not being of a common mind, because not living under common conditions, the several sections of the country, which a various economic development has for the time being set apart and contrasted, may struggle for supremacy in the control of the government, and that we may learn by some sad experience that there is not even yet any common standard, either of opinion or of policy, underlying our national life. The country is of one mind in its allegiance to the government and in its attachment to the national idea; but it is not yet of one mind in respect of that fundamental question, What policies will best serve us in giving strength and development to our life? Not the least noteworthy of the incidents that preceded and foretold the civil war was, if I may so call it, the sectionalization of the national idea. Southern merchants bestirred themselves to get conventions together for the discussion, not of the issues of politics, but of the economic interests of the country. Their thought and hope were of the nation. They spoke no word of antagonism against any section or interest. Yet it was plain in every resolution they uttered that for

them the nation was one thing and centred in the South, while for the rest of the country the nation was another thing and lay in the North and Northwest. They were arguing the needs of the nation from the needs of their own section. The same thing had happened in the days of the embargo and the War of 1812. The Hartford Convention thought of New England when it spoke of the country. So must it ever be when section differs from section in the very basis and method of its life. The nation is to-day one thing in Kansas, and quite another in Massachusetts.

There is no longer any danger of a civil war. There was war between the South and the rest of the nation because their differences were removable in no other way. There was no prospect that slavery, the root of those differences, would ever disappear in the mere process of growth. It was to be apprehended, on the contrary, that the very processes of growth would inevitably lead to the extension of slavery and the perpetuation of radical social and economic contrasts and antagonisms between State and State, between region and region. An heroic remedy was the only remedy. Slavery being removed, the South is now joined with the "West," joined with it in a stage of development, as a region chiefly agricultural, without diversified industries, without a multifarious trade, without those subtle extended nerves which come with all-round economic development, and which make men keenly sensible of the interests that link the world together, as it were into a single community. But these are lines of difference which will be effaced by mere growth, which time will calmly ignore. They make no boundaries for armies to cross. Tide-water Virginia was thus separated once from her own population within the Alleghany valleys, —held two jealous sections within her own limits. Massachusetts once knew the sharp divergences of interest and design which separated the coast settlements upon the Bay from the restless pioneers who had taken up the

free lands of her own western counties. North Carolina was once a comfortable and indifferent "East" to the uneasy "West" that was to become Tennessee. Virginia once seemed old and effete to Kentucky. The "great West" once lay upon the Ohio, but has since disappeared there, overlaid by the changes which have carried the conditions of the "East" to the Great Lakes and beyond. There has never yet been a time in our history when we were without an "East" and a "West," but the novel day when we shall be without them is now in sight. As the country grows it will inevitably grow homogeneous. Population will not henceforth spread, but compact; for there is no new land between the seas where the "West" can find another lodgment. The conditions which prevail in the ever widening "East" will sooner or later cover the continent, and we shall at last be one people. The process will not be a short one. It will doubtless run through many generations and involve many a critical question of statesmanship. But it cannot be stayed, and its working out will bring the nation to its final character and rôle in the world.

In the meantime, shall we not constantly recall our reassuring past, reminding one another again and again, as our memories fail us, of the significant incidents of the long journey we have already come, in order that we may be cheered and guided upon the road we have yet to choose and follow? It is only by thus attempting, and attempting again and again, some sufficient analysis of our past experiences that we can form any adequate image of our life as a nation, or acquire any intelligent purpose to guide us amidst the rushing movement of affairs. It is no doubt in part by reviewing our lives that we shape and determine them. The future will not, indeed, be like the past; of that we may rest assured. It cannot be like it in detail; it cannot even resemble it in the large. It is one thing to fill a fertile continent with a vigorous people and take first posses-

sion of its treasures; it is quite another to complete the work of occupation and civilization in detail. Big plans, thought out only in the rough, will suffice for the one, but not for the other. A provident leadership, a patient tolerance of temporary but unavoidable evils, a just temper of compromise and accommodation, a hopeful industry in the face of small returns, mutual understandings, and a cordial spirit of coöperation are needed for the slow intensive task, which were not demanded amidst the free advances of an unhampered people from settlement to settlement. And yet the past has made the present, and will make the future. It has made us a nation, despite a variety of life that threatened to keep us at odds amongst ourselves. It has shown us the processes by which differences have been obliterated and antagonisms softened. It has taught us how to become strong, and will teach us, if we heed its moral, how to become wise, also, and single-minded.

The colonies which formed the Union were brought together, let us first remind ourselves, not merely because they were neighbors and kinsmen, but because they were forced to see that they had common interests which they could serve in no other way. "There is nothing which binds one country or one State to another but interest," said Washington. "Without this cement the Western inhabitants can have no predilection for us." Without that cement the colonies could have had no predilection for one another. But it is one thing to have common interests, and quite another to perceive them and act upon them. The colonies were first thrust together by the pressure of external danger. They needed one another, as well as aid from oversea, as any fool could perceive, if they were going to keep their frontiers against the Indians, and their outlets upon the Western waters from the French. The French and Indian War over, that pressure was relieved, and they might have fallen apart again, indifferent to any common aim, unconscious of any common interest, had not

the government that was their common master set itself to make them wince under common wrongs. Then it was that they saw how like they were in polity and life and interest in the great field of politics, studied their common liberty, and became aware of their common ambitions. It was then that they became aware, too, that their common ambitions could be realized only by union; not single-handed, but united against a common enemy. Had they been let alone, it would have taken many a long generation of slowly increased acquaintance with one another to apprise them of their kinship in life and interests and institutions; but England drove them into immediate sympathy and combination, unwittingly founding a nation by suggestion.

The war for freedom over, the new-fledged States entered at once upon a very practical course of education which thrust its lessons upon them without regard to taste or predilection. The Articles of Confederation had been formulated and proposed to the States for their acceptance in 1777, as a legalization of the arrangements that had grown up under the informal guidance of the Continental Congress, in order that law might confirm and strengthen practice, and because an actual continental war commanded a continental organization. But the war was virtually over by the time all the reluctant States had accepted the Articles; and the new government had hardly been put into formal operation before it became evident that only the war had made such an arrangement workable. Not compacts, but the compulsions of a common danger, had drawn the States into an irregular coöperation, and it was even harder to obtain obedience to the definite Articles than it had been to get the requisitions of the unchartered Congress heeded while the war lasted. Peace had rendered the makeshift common government uninteresting, and had given each State leave to withdraw from common undertakings, and to think once more, as of old, only of itself. Their own affairs again

isolated and restored to their former separate importance, the States could no longer spare their chief men for what was considered the minor work of the general Congress. The best men had been gradually withdrawn from Congress before the war ended, and now there seemed less reason than ever why they should be sent to talk at Philadelphia, when they were needed for the actual work of administration at home. Politics fell back into its old localization, and every public man found his chief tasks at home. There were still, as a matter of fact, common needs and dangers scarcely less imperative and menacing than those which had drawn the colonies together against the mother country; but they were needs and perils of peace, and ordinary men did not see them; only the most thoughtful and observant were conscious of them: extraordinary events were required to lift them to the general view.

Happily, there were thoughtful and observant men who were already the chief figures of the country,—men whose leadership the people had long since come to look for and accept,—and it was through them that the States were brought to a new common consciousness, and at last to a real union. It was not possible for the several States to live self-sufficient and apart, as they had done when they were colonies. They had then had a common government, little as they liked to submit to it, and their foreign affairs had been taken care of. They were now to learn how ill they could dispense with a common providence. Instead of France, they now had England for neighbor in Canada and on the Western waters, where they had themselves but the other day fought so hard to set her power up. She was their rival and enemy, too, on the seas; refused to come to any treaty terms with them in regard to commerce; and laughed to see them unable to concert any policy against her because they had no common political authority among themselves. She had promised, in the treaty of peace, to withdraw her garrisons from the

Western posts which lay within the territory belonging to the Confederation; but Congress had promised that British creditors should be paid what was due them, only to find that the States would make no laws to fulfill the promise, and were determined to leave their federal representatives without power to make them; and England kept her troops where they were. Spain had taken France's place upon the further bank of the Mississippi and at the great river's mouth. Grave questions of foreign policy pressed on every side, as of old, and no State could settle them unaided and for herself alone.

Here was a group of commonwealths which would have lived separately and for themselves, and could not; which had thought to make shift with merely a "league of friendship" between them and a Congress for consultation, and found that it was impossible. There were common debts to pay, but there was no common system of taxation by which to meet them, nor any authority to devise and enforce such a system. There were common enemies and rivals to deal with, but no one was authorized to carry out a common policy against them. There was a common domain to settle and administer, but no one knew how a Congress without the power to command was to manage so great a property. The Ordinance of 1787 was indeed bravely framed, after a method of real statesmanship; but there was no warrant for it to be found in the Articles, and no one could say how Congress would execute a law it had had no authority to enact. It was not merely the hopeless confusion and sinister signs of anarchy which abounded in their own affairs—a rebellion of debtors in Massachusetts, tariff wars among the States that lay upon New York Bay and on the Sound, North Carolina's doubtful supremacy among her settlers in the Tennessee country, Virginia's questionable authority in Kentucky—that brought the States at last to attempt a better union and set up a real government for the whole country. It was the inevitable continental outlook of

affairs as well; if nothing more, the sheer necessity to grow and touch their neighbors at close quarters.

Washington had been among the first to see the necessity of living, not by a local, but by a continental policy. Of course he had a direct pecuniary interest in the development of the Western lands,—had himself pre-empted many a broad acre lying upon the far Ohio, as well as upon the nearer western slopes of the mountains,—and it is open to any one who likes the sinister suggestion to say that his ardor for the occupancy of the Western country was that of the land speculator, not that of the statesman. Everybody knows that it was a conference between delegates from Maryland and Virginia about Washington's favorite scheme of joining the upper waters of the Potomac with the upper waters of the streams which made their way to the Mississippi—a conference held at his suggestion and at his house—that led to the convening of that larger conference at Annapolis, which called for the appointment of the body that met at Philadelphia and framed the Constitution under which he was to become the first President of the United States. It is open to any one who chooses to recall how keen old Governor Dinwiddie had been, when he came to Virginia, to watch those same Western waters in the interest of the first Ohio Company, in which he had bought stock; how promptly he called the attention of the ministers in England to the aggressions of the French in that quarter, sent Washington out as his agent to warn the intruders off, and pushed the business from stage to stage, till the French and Indian War was ablaze, and nations were in deadly conflict on both sides of the sea. It ought to be nothing new and nothing strange to those who have read the history of the English race the world over to learn that conquests have a thousand times sprung out of the initiative of men who have first followed private interest into new lands like speculators, and then planned their occupation and government like statesmen. Dinwiddie was no states-

man, but Washington was; and the circumstance which it is worth while to note about him is, not that he went prospecting upon the Ohio when the French war was over, but that he saw more than fertile lands there,—saw the “seat of a rising empire,” and, first among the men of his day, perceived by what means its settlers could be bound to the older communities in the East alike in interest and in polity. Here were the first “West” and the first “East,” and Washington’s thought mediating between them.

The formation of the Union brought a real government into existence, and that government set about its work with an energy, a dignity, a thoroughness of plan, which made the whole country aware of it from the outset, and aware, consequently, of the national scheme of political life it had been devised to promote. Hamilton saw to it that the new government should have a definite party and body of interests at its back. It had been fostered in the making by the commercial classes at the ports and along the routes of commerce, and opposed in the rural districts which lay away from the centres of population. Those who knew the forces that played from State to State, and made America a partner in the life of the world, had earnestly wanted a government that should preside and choose in the making of the nation; but those who saw only the daily round of the countryside had been indifferent or hostile, consulting their pride and their prejudices. Hamilton sought a policy which should serve the men who had set the government up, and found it in the funding of the debt, both national and domestic, the assumption of the Revolutionary obligations of the States, and the establishment of a national bank. This was what the friends of the new plan had wanted, the rehabilitation of credit, and the government set out with a programme meant to commend it to men with money and vested interests.

It was just such a government that the men of an opposite interest and temperament had dreaded, and

Washington was not out of office before the issue began to be clearly drawn between those who wanted a strong government, with a great establishment, a system of finance which should dominate the markets, an authority in the field of law which should restrain the States and make the Union, through its courts, the sole and final judge of its own powers, and those who dreaded nothing else so much, wished a government which should hold the country together with as little thought as possible of its own aggrandizement, went all the way with Jefferson in his jealousy of the commercial interest, accepted his ideal of a dispersed power put into commission among the States,—even among the local units within the State,—and looked to see liberty discredited amidst a display of federal power. When the first party had had their day in the setting up of the government and the inauguration of a policy which should make it authoritative, the party of Jefferson came in to purify it. They began by attacking the federal courts, which had angered every man of their faith by a steady maintenance and elaboration of the federal power; they ended by using that power just as their opponents had used it. In the first place, it was necessary to buy Louisiana, and with it the control of the Mississippi, notwithstanding Mr. Jefferson's solemn conviction that such an act was utterly without constitutional warrant; in the second place, they had to enforce an arbitrary embargo in order to try their hand at reprisal upon foreign rivals in trade; in the end, they had to recharter the national bank, create a national debt and a sinking fund, impose an excise upon whiskey, lay direct taxes, devise a protective tariff, use coercion upon those who would not aid them in a great war,—play the rôle of masters and tax-gatherers as the Federalists had played it,—on a greater scale, even, and with equal gusto. Everybody knows the familiar story: it has new significance from day to day only as it illustrates the invariable process of nation-

making which has gone on from generation to generation, from the first until now.

Opposition to the exercise and expansion of the federal power only made it the more inevitable by making it the more deliberate. The passionate protests, the plain speech, the sinister forecasts, of such men as John Randolph aided the process by making it self-conscious. What Randolph meant as an accusation, those who chose the policy of the government presently accepted as a prophecy. It was true, as he said, that a nation was in the making, and a government under which the privileges of the States would count for less than the compulsions of the common interest. Few had seen it so at first; the men who were old when the government was born refused to see it so to the last; but the young men and those who came fresh upon the stage from decade to decade presently found the scarecrow look like a thing they might love. Their ideal took form with the reiterated suggestion; they began to hope for what they had been bidden to dread. No party could long use the federal authority without coming to feel it national,—without forming some ideal of the common interest, and of the use of power by which it should be fostered.

When they adopted the tariff of 1816, the Jeffersonians themselves formulated a policy which should endow the federal government with a greater economic power than even Hamilton had planned when he sought to win the support of the merchants and the lenders of money; and when they bought something like a third of the continent beyond the Mississippi, they made it certain the nation should grow upon a continental scale which no provincial notions about state powers and a common government kept within strait bounds could possibly survive. Here were the two forces which were to dominate us till the present day, and make the present issues of our politics: an open "West" into which a frontier population was to be thrust from generation to generation, and a protective tariff which should build up spe-

cial interests the while in the "East," and make the contrast ever sharper and sharper between section and section. What the "West" is doing now is simply to note more deliberately than ever before, and with a keener distaste, this striking contrast between her own development and that of the "East." That was a true instinct of statesmanship which led Henry Clay to couple a policy of internal improvements with a policy of protection. Internal improvements meant in that day great roads leading into the West, and every means taken to open the country to use and settlement. While a protective tariff was building up special industries in the East, public works should make an outlet into new lands for all who were not getting the benefit of the system. The plan worked admirably for many a day, and was justly called "American," so well did it match the circumstances of a set of communities, half old, half new: the old waiting to be developed, the new setting the easy scale of living. The other side of the policy was left for us. There is no longer any outlet for those who are not the beneficiaries of the protective system, and nothing but the contrasts it has created remains to mark its triumphs. Internal improvements no longer relieve the strain; they have become merely a means of largess.

The history of the United States has been one continuous story of rapid, stupendous growth, and all its great questions have been questions of growth. It was proposed in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 that a limit should be set to the number of new members to be admitted to the House of Representatives from States formed beyond the Alleghanies; and the suggestion was conceived with a true instinct of prophecy. The old States were not only to be shaken out of their self-centred life, but were even to see their very government changed over their heads by the rise of States in the Western country. John Randolph voted against the admission of Ohio into the Union, because he held

that no new partner should be admitted to the federal arrangement except by unanimous consent. It was the very next year that Louisiana was purchased, and a million square miles were added to the territory out of which new States were to be made. Had the original States been able to live to themselves, keeping their own people, elaborating their own life, without a common property to manage, unvexed by a vacant continent, national questions might have been kept within modest limits. They might even have made shift to digest Tennessee, Kentucky, Mississippi, Alabama, and the great commonwealths carved out of the Northwest Territory, for which the Congress of the Confederation had already made provision. But the Louisiana purchase opened the continent to the planting of States, and took the processes of nationalization out of the hands of the original "partners." Questions of politics were henceforth to be questions of growth.

For a while the question of slavery dominated all the rest. The Northwest Territory was closed to slavery by the Ordinance of 1787. Tennessee, Kentucky, Mississippi, Alabama, took slavery almost without question from the States from which they were sprung. But Missouri gave the whole country view of the matter which must be settled in the making of every State founded beyond the Mississippi. The slavery struggle, which seems to us who are near it to occupy so great a space in the field of our affairs, was, of course, a struggle for and against the extension of slavery, not for or against its existence in the States where it had taken root from of old,—a question of growth, not of law. It will some day be seen to have been, for all it was so stupendous, a mere episode of development. Its result was to remove a ground of economic and social difference as between section and section which threatened to become permanent, standing forever in the way of a homogeneous national life. The passionate strug-

gle to prevent its extension inevitably led to its total abolition; and the way was cleared for the South, as well as the "West," to become like its neighbor sections in every element of its life.

It had also a further, almost incalculable effect in its stimulation of a national sentiment. It created throughout the North and Northwest a passion of devotion to the Union which really gave the Union a new character. The nation was fused into a single body in the fervent heat of the time. At the beginning of the war the South had seemed like a section pitted against a section; at its close it seemed a territory conquered by a neighbor nation. That nation is now, take it roughly, that "East" which we contrast with the "West" of our day. The economic conditions once centred at New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Pittsburg, and the other commercial and industrial cities of the coast States are now to be found, hardly less clearly marked, in Chicago, in Minneapolis, in Detroit, through all the great States that lie upon the Lakes, in all the old "Northwest." The South has fallen into a new economic classification. In respect of its stage of development it belongs with the "West," though in sentiment, in traditional ways of life, in many a point of practice and detail, it keeps its old individuality, and though it has in its peculiar labor problem a hindrance to progress at once unique and ominous.

It is to this point we have come in the making of the nation. The old sort of growth is at an end,—the growth by mere expansion. We have now to look more closely to internal conditions, and study the means by which a various people is to be bound together in a single interest. Many differences will pass away of themselves. "East" and "West" will come together by a slow approach, as capital accumulates where now it is only borrowed, as industrial development makes its way westward in a new variety, as life gets its final elaboration and detail throughout all the great spaces of

the continent, until all the scattered parts of the nation are drawn into real community of interest. Even the race problem of the South will no doubt work itself out in the slowness of time, as blacks and whites pass from generation to generation, gaining with each remove from the memories of the war a surer self-possession, an easier view of the division of labor and of social function to be arranged between them. Time is the only legislator in such a matter. But not everything can be left to drift and slow accommodation. The nation which has grown to the proportions almost of the continent within the century lies under our eyes, unfinished, unharmonized, waiting still to have its parts adjusted, lacking its last lesson in the ways of peace and concert. It required statesmanship of no mean sort to bring us to our present growth and lusty strength. It will require leadership of a much higher order to teach us the triumphs of coöperation, the self-possession and calm choices of maturity.

Much may be brought about by a mere knowledge of the situation. It is not simply the existence of facts that governs us, but consciousness and comprehension of the facts. The whole process of statesmanship consists in bringing facts to light, and shaping law to suit, or, if need be, mould them. It is part of our present danger that men of the "East" listen only to their own public men, men of the "West" only to theirs. We speak of the "West" as out of sympathy with the "East": it would be instructive once and again to reverse the terms, and admit that the "East" neither understands nor sympathizes with the "West,"—and thorough nationalization depends upon mutual understandings and sympathies. There is an unpleasant significance in the fact that the "East" has made no serious attempt to understand the desire for the free coinage of silver in the "West" and the South. If it were once really probed and comprehended, we should know that it is necessary to reform our currency at once, and we should know in what

way it is necessary to reform it; we should know that a new protective tariff only marks with a new emphasis the contrast in economic interest between the "East" and the "West," and that nothing but currency reform can touch the cause of the present discontents.

Ignorance and indifference as between section and section no man need wonder at who knows the habitual courses of history; and no one who comprehends the essential soundness of our people's life can mistrust the future of the nation. He may confidently expect a safe nationalization of interest and policy in the end, whatever folly of experiment and fitful change he may fear in the meanwhile. He can only wonder that we should continue to leave ourselves so utterly without adequate means of formulating a national policy. Certainly Providence has presided over our affairs with a strange indulgence, if it is true that Providence helps only those who first seek to help themselves. The making of a nation has never been a thing deliberately planned and consummated by the counsel and authority of leaders, but the daily conduct and policy of a nation which has won its place must be so planned. So far we have had the hopefulness, the readiness, and the hardihood of youth in these matters, and have never become fully conscious of the position into which our peculiar frame of government has brought us. We have waited a whole century to observe that we have made no provision for authoritative national leadership in matters of policy. The President does not always speak with authority, because he is not always a man picked out and tested by any processes in which the people have been participants, and has often nothing but his office to render him influential. Even when the country does know and trust him, he can carry his views no further than to recommend them to the attention of Congress in a written message which the Houses would deem themselves subservient to give too much heed to. Within the Houses there is no man, except the Vice-

President, to whose choice the whole country gives heed; and he is chosen, not to be a Senator, but only to wait upon the disability of the President, and preside meanwhile over a body of which he is not a member. The House of Representatives has in these latter days made its Speaker its political leader as well as its parliamentary moderator; but the country is, of course, never consulted about that beforehand, and his leadership is not the open leadership of discussion, but the undebatable leadership of the parliamentary autocrat.

This singular leaderless structure of our government never stood fully revealed until the present generation, and even now awaits general recognition. Peculiar circumstances and the practical political habit and sagacity of our people for long concealed it. The framers of the Constitution no doubt expected the President and his advisers to exercise a real leadership in affairs, and for more than a generation after the setting up of the government their expectation was fulfilled. Washington was accepted as leader no less by Congress than by the people. Hamilton, from the Treasury, really gave the government both its policy and its administrative structure. If John Adams had less authority than Washington, it was because the party he represented was losing its hold upon the country. Jefferson was the most consummate party chief, the most unchecked master of legislative policy, we have had in America, and his dynasty was continued in Madison and Monroe. But Madison's terms saw Clay and Calhoun come to the front in the House, and many another man of the new generation, ready to guide and coach the President rather than to be absolutely controlled by him. Monroe was not of the calibre of his predecessors, and no party could rally about so stiff a man, so cool a partisan, as John Quincy Adams. And so the old political function of the presidency came to an end, and it was left for Jackson to give it a new one,—instead of a leadership of counsel, a leadership and discipline by rewards and

punishments. Then the slavery issue began to dominate politics, and a long season of concentrated passion brought individual men of force into power in Congress, —natural leaders of men like Clay, trained and eloquent advocates like Webster, keen debaters with a logic whose thrusts were as sharp as those of cold steel like Calhoun. The war made the Executive of necessity the nation's leader again, with the great Lincoln at its head, who seemed to embody, with a touch of genius, the very character of the race itself. Then reconstruction came,—under whose leadership who could say?—and we were left to wonder what, henceforth, in the days of ordinary peace and industry, we were to make of a government which could in humdrum times yield us no leadership at all. The tasks which confront us now are not like those which centred in the war, in which passion made men run together to a common work. Heaven forbid that we should admit any element of passion into the delicate matters in which national policy must mediate between the differing economic interests of sections which a wise moderation will assuredly unite in the ways of harmony and peace! We shall need, not the mere compromises of Clay, but a constructive leadership of which Clay hardly showed himself capable.

There are few things more disconcerting to the thought, in any effort to forecast the future of our affairs, than the fact that we must continue to take our executive policy from presidents given us by nominating conventions, and our legislation from conference committees of the House and Senate. Evidently it is a purely providential form of government. We should never have had Lincoln for President had not the Republican convention of 1860 sat in Chicago, and felt the weight of the galleries in its work,—and one does not like to think what might have happened had Mr. Seward been nominated. We might have had Mr. Bryan for President, because of the impression which may be made upon an excited assembly by a good voice

and a few ringing sentences flung forth just after a cold man who gave unpalatable counsel has sat down. The country knew absolutely nothing about Mr. Bryan before his nomination, and it would not have known anything about him afterward had he not chosen to make speeches. It was not Mr. McKinley, but Mr. Reed, who was the real leader of the Republican party. It has become a commonplace amongst us that conventions prefer dark horses,—prefer those who are not tested leaders with well-known records to those who are. It has become a commonplace amongst all nations which have tried popular institutions that the actions of such bodies as our nominating conventions are subject to the play of passion and of chance. They meet to do a single thing,—for the platform is really left to a committee,—and upon that one thing all intrigue centres. Who that has witnessed them will ever forget the intense night scenes, the feverish recesses, of our nominating conventions, when there is a running to and fro of agents from delegation to delegation, and every candidate has his busy headquarters,—can ever forget the shouting and almost frenzied masses on the floor of the hall when the convention is in session, swept this way and that by every wind of sudden feeling, impatient of debate, incapable of deliberation? When a convention's brief work is over, its own members can scarcely remember the plan and order of it. They go home unmarked, and sink into the general body of those who have nothing to do with the conduct of government. They cannot be held responsible if their candidate fails in his attempt to carry on the Executive.

It has not often happened that candidates for the presidency have been chosen from outside the ranks of those who have seen service in national politics. Congress is apt to be peculiarly sensitive to the exercise of executive authority by men who have not at some time been members of the one House or the other, and so learned to sympathize with members' views as to the

relations that ought to exist between the President and the federal legislature. No doubt a good deal of the dislike which the Houses early conceived for Mr. Cleveland was due to the feeling that he was an "outsider," a man without congressional sympathies and points of view,—a sort of irregular and amateur at the delicate game of national politics as played at Washington; most of the men whom he chose as advisers were of the same kind, without Washington credentials. Mr. McKinley, though of the congressional circle himself, has repeated the experiment in respect of his cabinet in the appointment of such men as Mr. Gage and Mr. Bliss and Mr. Gary. Members resent such appointments; they seem to drive the two branches of the government further apart than ever, and yet they grow more common from administration to administration.

These appointments make coöperation between Congress and the Executive more difficult, not because the men thus appointed lack respect for the Houses or seek to gain any advantage over them, but because they do not know how to deal with them,—through what persons and by what courtesies of approach. To the uninitiated Congress is simply a mass of individuals. It has no responsible leaders known to the system of government, and the leaders recognized by its rules are one set of individuals for one sort of legislation, another for another. The Secretaries cannot address or approach either House as a whole; in dealing with committees they are dealing only with groups of individuals; neither party has its leader,—there are only influential men here and there who know how to manage its caucuses and take advantage of parliamentary openings on the floor. There is a master in the House, as every member very well knows, and even the easy-going public are beginning to observe. The speaker appoints the committees; the committees practically frame all legislation; the Speaker, accordingly, gives or withholds legislative power and opportunity, and members are

granted influence or deprived of it much as he pleases. He of course administers the rules, and the rules are framed to prevent debate and individual initiative. He can refuse recognition for the introduction of measures he disapproves of as party chief; he may make way for those he desires to see passed. He is chairman of the Committee on Rules, by which the House submits to be governed (for fear of helplessness and chaos) in the arrangement of its business and the apportionment of its time. In brief, he is not only its moderator, but its master. New members protest and write to the newspapers; but old members submit,—and indeed the Speaker's power is inevitable. You must have leaders in a numerous body,—leaders with authority; and you cannot give authority in the House except through the rules. The man who administers the rules must be master, and you must put this mastery into the hands of your best party leader. The legislature being separated from the executive branch of the government, the only rewards and punishments by which you can secure party discipline are those within the gift of the rules,—the committee appointments and preferences: you cannot administer these by election; party government would break down in the midst of personal exchanges of electoral favors. Here again you must trust the Speaker to organize and choose, and your only party leader is your moderator. He does not lead by debate; he explains, he proposes nothing to the country; you learn his will in his rulings.

It is with such machinery that we are to face the future, find a wise and moderate policy, bring the nation to a common, a cordial understanding, a real unity of life. The President can lead only as he can command the ear of both Congress and the country,—only as any other individual might who could secure a like general hearing and acquiescence. Policy must come always from the deliberations of the House committees, the debates, both secret and open, of the Senate, the com-

promises of committee conference between the Houses; no one man, no group of men, leading; no man, no group of men, responsible for the outcome. Unquestionably we believe in a guardian destiny! No other race could have accomplished so much with such a system; no other race would have dared risk such an experiment. We shall work out a remedy, for work it out we must. We must find or make, somewhere in our system, a group of men to lead us, who represent the nation in the origin and responsibility of their power; who shall draw the Executive, which makes choice of foreign policy and upon whose ability and good faith the honorable execution of the laws depends, into cordial coöperation with the legislature, which, under whatever form of government, must sanction law and policy. Only under a national leadership, by a national selection of leaders, and by a method of constructive choice rather than of compromise and barter, can a various nation be peacefully led. Once more is our problem of nation-making the problem of a form of government. Shall we show the sagacity, the open-mindedness, the moderation, in our task of modification, that were shown under Washington and Madison and Sherman and Franklin and Wilson, in the task of construction?

LEADERLESS GOVERNMENT

ADDRESS BEFORE THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, AUGUST 4, 1897. JAMES E. GOODE PRINTING COMPANY, RICHMOND, 1897.

GENTLEMEN OF THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION :

Before I enter upon the discussion of my theme, permit me to express my keen gratification at finding myself in this congenial company. I am a lawyer and a Virginian. I feel here the sort of exhilaration that must always come to a man who returns from a distance to breathe his native air again and mix once more with those to whom he feels bound by a sort of intellectual consanguinity. I am proud of Virginia's traditions, as you are. I feel, as you do, that she gave the country its first life, long kept a sort of presidency in its affairs, and has always been one of the strategic centres of its society and its politics. I feel as if her great University, where, like so many of you, I was trained in the law, were still in no small part my academic home; and I know that here, among men of my own race and breeding, I can speak my mind frankly upon any theme, as the best men have always spoken in Virginia ever since Sir George Yeardly summoned that first assembly in the little church at Jamestown in the far year 1619.

It heartens a man not a little to know that he may speak his real thought and be understood, if he but speak it in the right temper. It is my purpose to-day to speak of public affairs; and we have a longer tradition than that of Virginia, even, to give us warrant for free speech in that field. We have the immemorial practice

of the English race itself, to which we belong. Nowhere else has the pure strain of the nation which planted the colonies and made the independent government under which we live been kept so without taint or mixture as it has been in Virginia, and hitherto in all the South. One feels here that the origin and breeding, the impulse and the memory of the men he deals with are unmistakable; that he reckons with an ascertained force and a certain habit—a force and a habit that have not changed since the great days of the Revolution, when Virginia led the country in the making of the Constitution; and that he ought to be able to count now, among the offspring of that achieving generation, upon the same fearless examination of policies and institutions that enabled Washington and Mason and Henry and Madison to win triumphs in their heroic day.

This is not a day of revolution; but it is a day of change, and of such change as may breed revolution, should we fail to guide and moderate it. Institutions, if they live, must grow, and suffer the alterations of growth—must rise to new uses; must lose some parts and take others on. They cannot stand still; they cannot even stiffen to a single shape and use. The nation must at every turn make its choice, not only as to legislative policy, but also as to the uses to which it shall put its fundamental law and its very principles of government.

If ever a nation was transformed, this nation has been, under the eyes of a single generation—and processes that run so fast are perilous. The choices made in the midst of them are not deliberate, but hasty and almost at hazard; the necessary adjustments of life and institutions are made, not by plan, but upon the suggestion of the instant. It is matter, surely, of common prudence that we should pause and look the time through when we can, with a purpose to gain distinct knowledge of what is going forward, discover its force and direction, and make ourselves ready to assume con-

trol of it for the future, seeing that the pace is now set, the running determined. It is time we should speak frankly with each other about the present and about the future.

I mean to go, if I can, to-day, to the centre of some of the chief topics of government. We chose the forms of political life under which we live, and it is our duty to scrutinize them from season to season, if we would keep them incorrupt and suitable to our use. We talk of statesmanship and of policy sometimes as if they arose out of institutions; but we know that they do not. They are the children of individual initiative and of individual strength of character. The framers of our Constitution in this country made a great deal of institutions; but, after all, institutions only create the condition under which action must be planned: they do not breed action. No government will run itself. The excellence of any form of government depends upon the provision it has made for the action of those who conduct it and choose its policies. It gets its character from what they find it possible to do. The men who chose our present forms of government made much of law and of method because they were engaged in a work of actual creation. They were constructing a polity which was novel and without model, and they knew that definiteness of plan was, for the time being, everything. They were forging, and fitting and bolting the structural iron of the whole fabric of which they were the originating architects. But we are now choosing policies, not forms of government. The nation is made—its mode of action is determined; what we now want to know is: What is it going to do with its life, its material resources and its spiritual strength? How is it to gain and keep a common purpose in the midst of complex affairs; how is its government to afford it wisdom in action?

This is the question I have chosen to discuss. Put in its most direct form it is this: How is the nation to get

definite leadership and form steady and effective parties? Take what government you will, this question includes all others, if you inquire concerning efficiency. Among a free people there can be no other method of government than such as permits an undictated choice of leaders and a strong, unhampered making up of bodies of active men to give them effective support. When party government fails, all definiteness goes out of politics. Who is to be held responsible for policy? By what legerdemain are you to get anything done? Shall you convince one man at a time the nation through, assume that your neighbor counts for as much in affairs as any one else, hazard the fortunes of the nation upon a chance concurrence of opinion? Policy, —where there is no absolute and arbitrary ruler to do the choosing for a whole people—means massed opinion, and the forming of the mass is the whole art and mastery of politics. How is the massing done among us? Who chooses our leaders, and by what process? What guides our parties and what do we know them to stand for? These are questions of fact, to be answered first without attention to the criticisms our answers may suggest with regard to some of the radical features of our constitutional arrangements. Let those criticisms follow after, if they must. We cannot afford to blink either the facts or their necessary revelation.

I have told you my own conclusion with regard to our present constitutional usage in the title I have chosen for this address. By the words "Leaderless Government" I mean to describe the government of the United States. I do not utter the words with the least touch of censoriousness or cynicism or even discouragement. In using them I am simply speaking a careful and, if I may say so, a dispassionate judgment. I do not believe it a necessary feature of our government that we should be without leaders; neither do I believe that we shall continue to be without them; but as a matter of fact we are without them, and we ought to ask ourselves, Why?

I mean, of course, that we are without official leaders—without leaders who can be held immediately responsible for the action and policy of the government, alike upon its legislative and upon its administrative side. Leaders of some sort we, of course, always have; but they come and go like phantoms, put forward as if by accident, withdrawn, not by our choice, but as if upon some secret turn of fortune which we neither anticipate nor as a nation control—some local quarrel, some obscure movement of politics within a single district, some manipulation of a primary or some miscarriage in a convention. They are not of the nation, but come and go as if unbidden by any general voice. The government does not put them forward, but groups of men formed we hardly know where, planning we hardly know what; the government suffers no change when they disappear—that is the private affair of some single constituency and of the men who have supplanted them.

Look at the familiar system for a little with this matter in view, and you shall see that, as we now use it, it seems devised as if to prevent official and responsible leadership. The President cannot lead. We call his office great, say that the Queen of England has no power to be compared with his and make choice of nominees for the presidency as if our votes decided a constructive policy for the four years to come; but we know that in fact he has as little power to originate as the Queen has. He may, no doubt, stand in the way of measures with a veto very hard to overleap; and we think oftentimes with deep comfort of the laws he can kill when we are afraid of the majority in Congress. Congressional majorities are doubtless swayed, too, by what they know the President will do with the bills they send him. But they are swayed sometimes one way and sometimes the other, according to the temper of the times and state of parties. They as often make his assured veto a pretext for recklessness as a reason for self-restraint. They take a sort of irresponsible and

defiant pleasure in "giving him the dare": in proposing things they know many people want and putting upon him the lonely responsibility of saying that they shall not have them. And if he stand for long in the way of any serious party purpose, they heat opinion against him and make his position more and more unpleasant, until he either yields or is finally discredited. It is a game in which he has no means of attack and few effective weapons of defence.

Of course he can send a message to Congress whenever he likes—the Constitution bids him do so "from time to time," in order to "give the Congress information of the state of the Union and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall deem necessary and expedient"; and we know that, if he be a man of real power and statesmanlike initiative, he may often hit the wish and purpose of the nation so in the quick in what he urges upon Congress that the House will heed him promptly and seriously enough. But there is a stubborn and very natural pride in the Houses with respect to this matter. They, not he, are the nation's representatives in the making of law; and they would deem themselves subservient were they too often to permit him leadership in legislative policy. It is easy to stir their resentment by too much suggestion; and it is best that a message should be general, not special—best that it should cover a good many topics and not confine itself too narrowly to one, if a President would keep in credit with those who shape matters within the House and Senate. In all ordinary times the President recognizes this and preserves a sort of modesty, a tone as if of a chronicler merely, and setter forth of things administrative, when he addresses Congress. He makes it his study to use only a private influence and never to seem a maker of resolutions. And even when the occasion is extraordinary and his own mind definitely made up, he argues and urges—he cannot command. In short, in making suggestions to Congress the Presi-

dent of the United States has only this advantage over any other influential person in the nation who might choose to send to Congress a letter of information and advice. It is the duty of Congress to read what he says; all the larger newspapers will print it; most of them will have editorial comments upon it; and some will have letters from their Washington correspondents devoted to guessing what effect, if any, it will have upon legislation. The President can make his message a means of concentrating public opinion upon particular topics of his own choosing, and so force those topics upon the attention of the House. But that is all; and under ordinary circumstances it is not much.

It was not so in the early years of the government. Roughly speaking, Presidents were leaders until Andrew Jackson went home to the "Hermitage." Sometimes they have been leaders since; but in the old days it was a matter of course that they should be. Since Jackson's masterful figure passed off the stage, the ordinary courses of politics have been drawing us away from the state of things which once made the country, and politicians themselves, instinctively turn to the President for guidance, as if he were a sort of prime minister as well as the official head of the permanent administration. Washington led, of course, and fashioned the government itself—for reasons no man any longer needs to have stated to him; and his first cabinet, as everybody knows, was made up of the party masters of the day—men whom all knew to be chief political figures, for the moment not only, but also for the years to come. John Adams, the second President, was almost as great a figure in all civil affairs as Washington himself. Jefferson was a born leader of men, who not only led his party, but first created it and then taught it the methods of power. Madison felt, in no small measure, that compulsion by which later Presidents by the half dozen have been led and mastered, the compulsion of Congressional initiative—resident in that day of

change in the persons of Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun, under whom, themselves youngsters in the arena, a young party was coming to self-consciousness and authority. But Madison was of a stature and eminence in affairs which even the high and taking qualities of these men could not dwarf. Monroe saw times of quiet peace, when parties seemed for a little to have fallen asleep. John Quincy Adams but kept the seat warm for Jackson—and not very warm at that; and with Jackson came in a new democracy. which was to change the whole face of affairs.

Merely to name these men is to call the roll of the leaders of two generations. It was taken for granted at the first that the real leaders of the nation would be put into the presidential chair. For a little while Vice-Presidents succeeded Presidents, as if of course; and then for a season Presidents were allowed to name their own successors in their appointment to the office of Secretary of State—or, rather, were expected to fill that great office with men whom their party accepted as second only to the Presidents themselves in weight and influence, their natural successors. The management of these things was left in that day to well-known groups of men which all the country knew to constitute, each for its own party, a sort of unofficial ministry. Nominations were arranged in Congressional caucus, by men in whose hands rested not only the conduct of these matters, but the whole shaping of party policies as well; and they naturally chose according to some recognized plan, compatible with the immediate objects of their organization, putting those in authority who were their actual leaders, and to whom they looked for guidance whether in office or out.

It was no doubt inevitable that this system of Congressional nomination should come to an end. The nation began before very long to look upon it as a system which bred intrigue and threatened to put affairs of the first importance into the hands of cliques and

"rings." But in rejecting that system to pass to the use of nominating conventions we certainly rendered it impossible—or, at any rate, in the highest degree unlikely—that our Presidents should ever be leaders again. Do what you will in such a matter, you do not very much lessen the overwhelming weight of Congress. You still leave the real energy of the government with the men who make the laws, pay the bills, and create the conditions under which Presidents must act. Roger Sherman declared very bluntly, in the Constitutional Convention of 1787, that "he considered the executive magistracy as nothing more than an institution for carrying the will of the Legislature into effect"; and, although we may not be willing to go to the length of saying quite so much as that, we see even more clearly now than Roger Sherman did at the beginning that, in the last resort, it lies with Congress, and not with the executive, to choose what the government shall be and do. And we know that it is a serious matter that the intimate relations which once existed between Congress and the President should have been so completely broken.

The men who are sent to our nominating conventions are men, for the most part, little known—and in other matters little regarded; men who have nothing to do with legislation, and who are without any responsible part whatever in the choice of policies for the nation. An incalculable number of local influences, utterly obscure to the country at large, and unconnected, as we know, with any general party purpose or policy of which the country can know anything, determine the instructions with which delegates are sent. They run together to press the claims of a score of candidates, selected, not by the general voice of any party, but upon grounds of preference which only their special friends and partisans can explain. Generally it turns out that the candidates whom all the country knows have been too much talked about beforehand, too definitely preferred or rejected in the preliminary contests in which the dele-

gates were chosen. Some "dark horse"; some man hitherto little thought of; some one whom his friends have astutely known how to push in the secret conferences of separate delegations; some man whose personal tact of force has caught of a sudden the enthusiasm of the convention itself and of the crowds in its galleries; some man unheralded and untried, it may be, catches the drift of the vote and is nominated. A good man he may be, and a fair President—Providence has been kind to us much beyond the encouragement we have given it; but he is not always a man whom we know, and he is seldom a man accepted in Washington as of course a leader and maker of affairs.

Singular things happen in the process. A new figure emerges, sometimes, behind the accepted candidate, the figures of his backer and manager. Nobody has known him, until now, outside his State. Men hear his name with curiosity. But, if his candidate be elected, they hear it for a little while with awe—and behold, a new Colossus in the midst of our shifting politics! Seasoned Congressmen smile in their beards, no doubt, to see the new man come radiant to Washington, beaming authority on every side; but they court him for a brief space, as one who has the ear of the President in the making of appointments; and then, when the appointments are made and the President has found his place, they draw aside to see whether this crack coach will slip into oblivion or not. And so each man has his entry and his exit.

And even if things go differently, even when the man whom the convention nominates is some one of whose career and influence we know or can assess, how often does it happen that he is such a man as will be accepted as a real leader at Washington—where alone he can lead? Nobody supposes, I take it, that Mr. McKinley was ever the real leader of the Republican party. He did not even play a really constructive part in the framing of the celebrated tariff law which we call by his

name; but the country thought that he did and rejected what they deemed his handiwork in the most emphatic manner, by name and title. Whatever personal admiration Mr. McKinley may have excited by reason of the sincerity, simplicity, and directness of his character, he was clearly dwarfed in all matters of party choice by Mr. Reed and Mr. Lodge, and the real leaders of the Republican ranks. It was much the same as if Mr. Depew had been taken in his stead, a prominent person, but no master of policy—except that Congressmen particularly resent the selection of an outsider. Mr. McKinley had at least been bred to politics in the atmosphere of Washington, and might be expected to know something of the temper and tact of dealings between the President and the Houses. Plainly the nominating convention has separated legislature and executive much more sharply than the makers of the Constitution intended; has brought utterly incalculable forces into play for the choice of our Presidents; and has cut us off once and for all from the old traditions of party leadership. We must take our Presidents somewhat at haphazard and by a special, clumsy, machinery out of the general body of the nation; and the Houses must provide themselves with purposes and leaders of their own.

And yet the Houses show a notable lack of efficient organization; for I take it for granted that when one is speaking of a representative legislature he must mean by "an efficient organization," an organization which provides for deliberate, and deliberative, action, and which enables the nation to affix responsibility for what is done and what is not done. The Senate is deliberate enough; but it is hardly deliberative after its ancient and better manner; and who shall say who is responsible for what it does and for what it does not do? The House of Representatives is neither deliberate nor deliberative. We have not forgotten that one of the most energetic of its recent Speakers thanked God, in his frankness, that the House was not a deliberative body. It has not

time for the leadership of argument; it has not time, therefore, to disclose the individual weight of its members. Debate takes time. It also lets the nation hear the prevailing voices and the reasons for action. For debate and leadership in that sort the House must have a party organization and discipline such as it has never had.

The Speaker of the House is its master—how absolutely members of the House have known these two generations and more; but the general public have only recently begun to find out. It has time out of mind been the custom among us to elevate the leader of the dominant party in the popular House to its Speakership—ever since Colonial times, when the Speaker of the Assembly was our spokesman against the domineering Governor and Council whom the Crown had appointed. We have long been familiar with the idea that, for some reason which we have not very carefully looked into, the presiding officer of our representative chamber is not a mere moderator, but also a guiding spirit in legislation: and so we have not very carefully noted the several steps by which he has come to be a sort of dictator. In the first place, the House sifts and handles all its business by means of standing committees. Thousands of bills are presented for consideration every session; it would be impossible to consider them all, or even to vote upon them all, were the House to give itself up exclusively to voting. They naturally fall into classes, according to their subjects, and for each class there is a standing committee to which they are referred. But it is a critical matter for a bill that it should pass into the hands of a committee along with hundreds of other bills, relating to the same or like matter. It may be it will not come back alive. The committee is very likely to pocket most of the proposals sent it, and to modify the rest, and the net result is that all legislation in effect originates with the commit-

tees, or, at any rate, comes before the House unmistakably marked by their handling.

And the Speaker appoints the committees. Of course he has not a perfectly free hand in the matter. Length and priority of service entitle certain members to certain chief posts of honor on the committee lists; and the Speaker, besides regarding their claims, must take counsel in some decent degree with the other leaders of his party before he finally makes up his mind whom he shall put upon the committees; but he none the less determines their make-up, and their make-up determines legislation. That is the Speaker's power of creation; and that is the reason the session disappoints the country and discredits the party if the Speaker be not a consummate party leader.

But this is only a part of the Speaker's power. He also retains control of the business of the House from day to day in a very autocratic manner. The rules of the House themselves in part determine what the course of business shall be. They give precedence to the reports of the committees which have charge of bills touching the raising and the spending of revenue; and they determine in what order and at what times the other committees shall be allowed to report. When important matters pile up and it becomes necessary to fix a special order by which questions of the first consequence shall gain precedence and the docket be relieved of its congestion, the Committee on Rules is authorized to bring in a temporary programme for the purpose. But the Speaker appoints the Committee on Rules and is himself its chairman. He steers as well as presides.

The rules are adopted afresh at the opening of every new Congress, with such modifications as the committee may have to suggest—and that committee is always the first to be appointed. Its regulations, alike in ordinary and in extraordinary cases, aim always at this single and consistent object—to keep business in the hands of the committee and rigidly exclude personal initiative on the

part of individual members. It requires unanimous consent for a member to get any matter before the House independently of the committees: and you cannot even ask for unanimous consent unless you can obtain recognition and get the floor. The Speaker's eye is his own. He can see whom he pleases: and he must know your object before he will recognize you. If you do not know it, he will not see you. He will never see you even when he does know it, if he knows it to be something that will upset or interfere with party plans or the settled programme of the session—if only by taking up time. You may remonstrate with him and pray to him in private as you will, he will not let you cross the purposes he has in view as the leader of his party. Or, if, by reason of your importunity, he should at last seem to yield, and agree to accord you recognition and a chance to make your motion, you may be sure he will take very good care to get some member's promise that he will promptly object, and you will fail of unanimous consent and be silenced after all.

Here, then, is your silent master of men and of policies in the House, the Speaker, who appoints the committees which originate legislation, determines the order of business at every critical point through the Committee on Rules, and sees whom he will amongst those who would put themselves forward in the business of the House. I have not described him to condemn him. I do not see how else business could go forward in an assembly which would otherwise be a mere mass meeting. But I do wish to make it evident that this is an extraordinary picture, and that it sets our national legislature apart as unique among the representative assemblies of the world—unique in having its leader silent and in the form of his office a mere moderator, and in having its course of action determined by management and not by debate.

And what of leadership in the Senate? When you have described the House of Representatives you have

described but half of Congress, and that, Senators would say, the lower half. The Senate unquestionably, whatever we may say of the House of Representatives, stands unique among legislative bodies in the modern time. Whether we relish its uniqueness in the present generation quite as much as it was relished among our fathers is an open question, but its individuality is indubitable. This singular body has assumed of late what I may, perhaps, be allowed to call a sort of Romo-Polish character. Like the Roman Senate, it has magnified its administrative powers and its right of negative in the great fields of finance and foreign affairs, as well as in all ordinary legislation; and, following Polish precedents, it has seemed to arrogate to its members the right of individual veto. Each Senator, like each prince of ancient Poland, insists, it would seem, upon consulting his own interests and preferences before he will allow measures to reach their final consideration and passage. In the field of administration, it seems plain, the Senate expects the executive very generally to submit to its oversight and suggestion, as Roman magistrates submitted to the Senate of their singular republic.

I am anxious not to distort the true proportions of the picture, even in pleasantry; and, if to put the matter as I have just put it savours too much of exaggerating temporary tendencies into established practices, let us rest content with saying merely that this noted assembly has at almost every critical juncture of our recent political history had an influence in affairs greater, much greater, than that of the House of Representatives; and that the methods by which this great council is led are likely to be of the utmost consequence to the nation at every turn in its fortunes. Who leads the Senate? Can any one say? It, too, has its standing committees, to which all of its business is in the first place sent, as to the committees of the House; but it accords them no such mastery as is accorded the committees of the House. Debate and amendment make free with com-

mittee reports, as with any other matter, and upon the open floor of the Senate no man is master. The Vice-President is an outsider, not the leader of his party—even if his party have the majority in the Senate—and generally not a very influential outsider—timid about asserting even the natural powers of a parliamentary moderator. Among the Senators themselves there is an equality as absolute as the equality of the sovereign states which they represent. It is give and take amongst them. Personal conferences are the only means for the adjustment of views and the compounding of differences. One Senator is as formidable as a dozen in the obstruction of business. The Senate as a whole is jealous of its dignity and of its prerogatives; and its members severally stand out distinct units in every matter of controversy. Who shall say who leads and who obeys amongst them?

And so we have the composite thing which we call the Government of the United States. Its several parts are severally chosen; it is no unified and corporate whole. Its President is chosen, not by proof of leadership among the men whose confidence he must have if he is to play an effective part in the making of affairs, but by management—the management of obscure men—and through the uncertain chances of an ephemeral convention which has no other part in politics. Its popular chamber shapes its affairs, not by conference with those who must execute the laws and show them feasible, nor yet by any clarifying process of debate, but chiefly by means of the silent management of its moderator, whose office is fixed for a two years' term, and who represents, not the country, but a single constituency. Its Senate is a band of individuals, amongst whom it is impossible to maintain leadership, and to whom it is difficult to extend the discipline of party organization. This is not a government of systematic checks and balances,—a *system* of checks and balances would enable you to distinguish causes and calculate ef-

fects. It is a government without definite order, showing a confident interplay of forces, in which no man stands at the helm to steer, whose course is beaten out by the shifting winds of personal influence and popular opinion.

On the whole, however, it has not worked ill, you will say; and what was good enough for our fathers is good enough for us. I heartily assent to the one proposition, but not to the other. A colonial government was once good enough for our fathers, if you will but go back so far; but it was not good enough for their sons, and our government as we use it is not as good as when they used it. Our fathers were choosing men, and so must we be. They chose governments to suit their circumstances, not to suit their ancestors; and we must follow the like good rule—praying that we may choose wisely as they did. The colonial governments were not failures so long as they were good enough to last; and certainly the Government of the United States has been no failure, but a success so conspicuous, for the most part, that the nations of the world have stood at gaze to see so great a thing done in the West, upon the new continent whither they supposed none but radicals had gone. You shall not find me uttering aught in dispraise of the great work of that memorable body of statesmen who met in Philadelphia in that year 1787, which they have made illustrious. They have won an imperishable name in the history of politics, and no man can take it away from them, were we churl enough to wish to do so. Neither shall you find me an advocate of radical changes. The men who made our government showed themselves statesmen in nothing so much as in this, that they adapted what they had to a new age; and we shall not be wise if we outrun their great example. But let us know the facts; and, if need be, fit our institutions to suit them. There is cowardice, sometimes, in mere self-satisfaction.

The Government of the United States as we use it,

besides, is not the Government of the United States as they used it. Why is it that this leaderless character of our government did not disclose itself to an earlier generation as it has disclosed itself to us? The government has the same formal structure now that it always has had: why has its weakness been so long concealed? Why can it not serve the new time as well as it served the old? Because the new time is not like the old—for us or any other nation; the changes which we have witnessed have transformed us. The tasks set the government now differ both in magnitude and in kind from those set it in days gone by. It is no old man's fancy that the old days were different from those we now see. For one thing—and this can be no news to any man—an industrial revolution separates us from the times that went by no longer ago than when the war between the States came on; and that industrial revolution—like the war itself—has not affected all parts of the country alike—has left us more various and more unequal, part by part, than ever before. We speak nowadays of a new sectionalism, and I, for one, deprecate the phrase. I rejoice to believe that there are no longer any permanent sectional lines in this country. But there is an unprecedented diversification of interests—and for the time, no doubt, differences of interest mark also differences of region and of development. And these differences of condition and of economic growth as between region and region, though temporary, are more sharply marked than they ever were before. Moreover, there is a confused variety: region differs from region in an almost incalculable number of significant details. And there is added to this everywhere a swift process of change, a shifting of elements, a perplexing vicissitude in affairs. Here and there communities have a fixed life, and are still and quiet as of old, but these lie apart from the great forces that are making the nation, and the law is change.

These things do not need demonstration; they hardly

need illustration. No man is so ill-informed as not to know that the conditions which existed before the war were simple and uniform the country through, as compared with those which have sprung up since the war. And where conditions are comparatively simple and uniform, constructive leadership is little needed. Men readily see things alike and easily come to a common opinion upon the larger sort of questions: or, at any rate, to *two* general opinions, widespread and definite enough to form parties on. For well-nigh a generation after the war, moreover, the problems which the government of the Union had to settle were very definite problems indeed, which no man could mistake, and upon which opinion could readily be concentrated. I think the country sadly needed responsible and conscientious leadership during the period of Reconstruction, and it has suffered many things because it did not get it—things of which we still keenly feel the consequences. But the tasks, at least, were definite and unmistakable, and parties formed themselves upon sharp-cut issues.

Since then, how has the scene changed! It is not now fundamental matters of structure and franchise upon which we have to centre our choice; but those general questions of policy upon which every nation has to exercise its discretion: foreign policy, our duty to our neighbors, customs tariffs, coinage, currency, immigration, the law of corporations and of trusts, the regulation of railway traffic and of the great industries which supply the necessities of life and the stuffs of manufacture. These are questions of economic policy chiefly; and how shall we settle questions of economic policy except upon grounds of interest? Who is to reconcile our interests and extract what is national and liberal out of what is sectional and selfish? These are not questions upon which it is easy to concentrate general opinion. It is infinitely difficult to effect a general enlightenment of the public mind in regard to their real merits and significance for the nation as a whole. Their settle-

ment in any one way affects the several parts of the country unequally. They cannot be settled justly by a mere compounding of differences, a mere unguided interplay of rival individual forces, without leadership and the courage of definite party action. Such questions are as complex and as difficult of adequate comprehension as the now infinitely varied life of the nation itself; and we run incalculable risks in leaving their settlement to the action of a House of Representatives whose leaders are silent and do not tell up upon what principle they act, or upon what motive; to a Senate whose undisciplined members insist upon making each an individual contribution to the result; and to a President chosen by processes which have little or nothing to do with party organization or with the solution of questions of State. We can seldom in this way see a single year ahead of us.

I, for my part, when I vote at a critical election, should like to be able to vote for a definite line of policy with regard to the great questions of the day—not for platforms, which Heaven knows, mean little enough—but for *men* known and tried in the public service; with records open to be scrutinized with reference to these very matters; and pledged to do this or that particular thing, to take definite course of action. As it is, I vote for nobody I can depend upon to do anything—no, not if I were to vote for myself. It may be that, if I vote with the successful party, my representative in the House is a perfectly honest, well-meaning, and moreover, able man; but how do I know upon which committee Mr. Speaker will put him? How do I know where his influence will come in, in the silent play of influences (it may be perfectly legitimate influences) that runs through the committee rooms in so heady a stream? How do I know what the Speaker and those with whom he takes counsel will let the House do? I do not vote for the Senators of my State: I do not always know just why those who do choose them make the particular selection they hit upon. When I vote for Presidential

electors, I know only what the candidate's friends say that he will do. He accepts a platform made for him by a convention which he did not lead and which does not have to carry out its own programme; and I know that he may have no constructive power at all when he gets to Washington. No man can vote with real hope or confidence, or with intelligent interest even, under such a system.

What would I have? I feel the embarrassment of the question. If I answer it, I make the unpleasant impression of posing as a statesman, and tempt those who wish to keep every man in his place to remind me that I am only a college professor, whom it would better become to stick to his legitimate business of describing things as they are, leaving it to men of affairs to determine what they ought to be. I have been trying to describe things as they are, and that has brought me, whether I would or no, straight upon this question of the future. I am not addressing a college class, but men of affairs, who want their doctrine in the concrete and with no shirking of hard questions. Moreover, the things I have been describing are the proper objects of my study. In lecturing upon Politics I try, indeed, not to lecture as a politician; but I try also not to lecture as a fossil. I must study affairs of the day as well as things dead and buried and all but forgot. I remember, too, that this is not a convention, but a body of students. You will want from me, not a programme of reform, but a suggestion for thought.

My studies have taught me this one thing with a definiteness which cannot be mistaken: Successful governments have never been conducted safely in the midst of complex and critical affairs except when guided by those who were responsible for carrying out and bringing to an issue the measures they proposed; and the separation of the right to plan from the duty to execute has always led to blundering and inefficiency; and modern representative bodies cannot of themselves combine

the two. The Roman Senate, the only efficient administrative assembly that I know of in the history of the world, was a permanent body, made up for the most part of men who had served their terms as executive officials through a long succession of offices. It undertook actually to direct the affairs of the state, as our Houses do; but its members had had varied executive experience, and—what was of still more significance—its mistakes came back upon itself. The shame of failure fell upon it, and not upon those who were merely its agents. Moreover, it was a thoroughly *national* power: it stood for no constituencies; in its days of success it represented, not a divided, but a thoroughly homogeneous state. If you would have the present error of our system in a word, it is this, that Congress is the motive power in the government and yet has in it nowhere any representative of the nation as a whole. Our Executive, on the other hand, is national; at any rate may be made so, and yet has no longer any place of guidance in our system. It represents no constituency, but the whole people; and yet, though it alone is national, it has no originaive voice in domestic national policy.

The sum of the matter is, that we have carried the application of the notion that the powers of government must be separated to a dangerous and unheard-of length by thus holding our only national representative, the Executive, at arm's length from Congress, whose very commission it seems to be to represent, not the people, but the communities into which the people are divided. We should have Presidents and Cabinets of a different calibre were we to make it their bounden duty to act as a committee for the whole nation to choose and formulate matters for the consideration of Congress in the name of a party and an Administration; and then, if Congress consented to the measures, what they are already—a committee to execute them—make them work and approve themselves practicable and wise.

And that is exactly what we ought to do. We should have not a little light thrown daily, and often when it was least expected, upon the conduct of the Departments, if the heads of the Departments had daily to face the representatives of the people, to propose, defend, explain administrative policy, upon the floor of the Houses, where such a plan would put them: and heads of departments would be happy under such a system only when they were very straightforward and honest and able men. I am not suggesting that initiative in legislation be by any means confined to the Administration—that would be radical, indeed—but only that they be given a free, though responsible, share in it—and that, I conceive, would bring the government back very nearly to the conception and practice of Washington. It would be a return to our first models of statesmanship and political custom.

I ask you to put this question to yourselves: Should we not draw the Executive and Legislature closer together? Should we not, on the one hand, give the individual leaders of opinion in Congress a better chance to have an intimate part in determining who should be President, and the President, on the other hand, a better chance to approve himself a statesman, and his advisers capable men of affairs, in the guidance of Congress? This will be done when the Executive is given an authoritative initiative in the Houses. I see no other way to create national figures in the field in which domestic policy is chosen, or to bring forward tested persons to vote for. I do not suggest methods—this is not the place or the occasion; I suggest an idea—a way out of chaos: the nationalization of the motive power of the government, to offset the economic sectionalization of the country; I suggest the addition to Congress, which represents us severally, of a power, constituted how you will, which shall represent us collectively in the proposing of laws; which shall have the right as of course to press national motives and courses

of action to a vote in the Congress. This will not subordinate Congress; it may accept the proposals of the Administration or not, as it pleases (it once took a scolding from Washington himself for not accepting them); but the country will at least have a mouthpiece and not all of policy will lurk with committees and in executive sessions of the Senate.

THE PURITAN

SPEECH BEFORE THE NEW ENGLAND SOCIETY OF NEW
YORK CITY, DECEMBER 22, 1900. PROCEEDINGS
PRINTED BY WILLIAM GREEN, NEW YORK, 1900,
PP. 39-49.

MR. DODGE, Ladies and Gentlemen: I cannot but regard it as a whimsical fortune that a Scotch-Irishman should be brought here to pay tribute to the New England Society. The Scotch-Irishman is not fond of paying anything except his just debts, and there is always a certain risk in letting him speak his real mind. Mr. Dodge himself has given you some intimation of the risk he knows he is incurring by intimating to you—he was thinking of the Irish in me, I hope, rather than of the Scotch—that if I spoke long enough it would be a desecration of the Sabbath.

And yet I believe, gentlemen, that nothing gives one strong race so much satisfaction as to pay its respects to another strong race. We came later to this continent than you did, but we had the better opportunity for observing your characters and the cut of your jibs. We saw how important was the task which you had half completed. We saw how necessary it was that certain other elements should be added which you had not contributed, and so we are here, gentlemen, and we don't mind talking about it. We, like you, are beginning to form societies to annex the universe; we, like you, are beginning to elect memorialists who shall record how every line of strength in the history of the world is a line colored by Scotch-Irish blood. There is a great deal in that. [Laughter and applause.] I believe that it is necessary that races of different characters should

exchange their ideas as well as their compliments, and that we should understand just what our relative parts are to be in the great game that we are to play upon this continent. The Puritan was—as Dr. Hadley has said—intensely human; but you will remember that he apologized to God as many as three times a day for the fact [laughter], and that it was an imperative part of his creed that he should root out diligently, in season and out of season, the pestiferous elements of the flesh that were in him. [Laughter.] Now, I have no objection to the hatred that Dr. Hadley referred to. I believe in a certain degree of intolerance. It is an eminently comfortable indulgence. I believe that intolerance can express itself, if not exactly as a dear old President of Princeton expressed it, at any rate, in more parliamentary form. I refer to that occasion when he brought all the strong flavor of his Scotch-Presbyterianism to a meeting of the Evangelical Alliance—one of the early gatherings of that interesting association—when Dr. Huntington arose and proposed that they adopt the Apostles' Creed as a platform upon which all could stand. "Tut! tut!" said Dr. McCosh in an undertone, to a neighbor, "I'll not descend into hell with the Episcopalians." [Laughter.] There is in this, gentlemen, the flavor and the definiteness which go with the Scotch character.

I believe that if you will look into it you will find that you are worshipping your ancestors at a safe distance. Dr. Hadley said that we had met this evening to celebrate your *descent* from those Fathers [laughter], and the old phrase came into my mind: *Facilis descensus*. It is not very much to your credit that you have descended; it will be to your credit if you ascend to the standards which they established. I sometimes recall when I think of the shock and the change which the Puritan principles underwent when they came to the City of New York [laughter], the story, half-pathetic and half-amusing, which is told of an old lady who,

unaccustomed to travel, boarded a train somewhere in the neighborhood of New Haven, coming in this direction, and nervously asked the brakeman if that train stopped at Forty-second Street. "Well, ma'am, if it don't, you'll get the dumbdest bumping you ever got!" Now, I have sometimes thought that the New England principles, when they stopped at Forty-second Street, got the "dumbdest bumping" they ever got. [Laughter and applause.]

And yet, seriously, gentlemen, there is a great deal which you have preserved besides your handsome persons. You have preserved what I may be allowed to call, in rhetorical phrase, a great deal of the old structural iron, though you have changed a good deal about the exterior of the building and have employed new and French architects. I ask you to consider with me just what contribution it was that the Puritans seem to have made to the civilization of this country. Of course I can tell you. [Laughter.] That contribution is worth considering, because, having been obliged to read many of the historians of this country, and having found that most of them were also celebrating their descent from the Pilgrim Fathers, I have read in their pages, and for a long time believed, that the history of this country was the expansion of New England. If it was the expansion of New England, it was spread thin. [Laughter.] And having been born, as I was born, in the valley of Virginia, where they do not accept that view, except as heretical, I was led in my maturer years to question its validity. I did not see reason to believe that all the elements of this country came out of what was, after all, the not very productive soil of New England, because when I looked at the character of those Puritan men they seemed to me to stand for one single principle—a very splendid principle, I allow you, but, nevertheless, the single principle of discipline, of order, of polity. It was for the discipline that pulls in harness; it was for subjection to

authority; it was for crucifixion of the things which did not comport with a fixed and rigid creed that they strove [for]. These men stood for the discipline of life. They did not stand for the quick pulses which have operated in some of the most momentous things that have taken place on this continent, but they stood for those lessons of duty which they read out of a Bible, interpreted in the light of a Calvinistic creed, cut in a definite pattern, not allowing elasticity of interpretation; which forced men to settle in different parts of New England, because, if they differed with each other, they had to go and live somewhere else [laughter]; they could not continue to live with each other. The churches of Massachusetts did indeed pay their tribute of respect, and very generously, to Mr. Thomas Hooker, but Mr. Hooker found it more convenient to live at Hartford, and he lived at Hartford, because he did not like the doctrine of Mr. Cotton; because he did not like the doctrine of Mr. Wilson—a very respectable name; because he did not feel that there was just the sort of room for his doctrine in Newtown that there might be in the new places on the Connecticut. There is a sense in which the development of America is represented by the movement of people out of Massachusetts into that wild Cave of Adullam in Rhode Island whither all who were heretical, all who were discontented, all who were ungovernable, betook themselves, and where they combined to form that fine, effervescent mixture which is more like the rest of the country than the plain, unmixed material of the places of older settlements. Those men who struggled south through the Narragansett country, through the cold, forbidding woods, and made their new homes on the delightful prospects along the Bay of Narragansett—who made those places destined to have the distinction of containing the most fashionable summer resort in the United States—they represented that expulsive power of New England which certainly has been one of the causes of the growth of this country.

[Applause.] There is an application here for an old theme of Dr. Chalmers, who preached one of the greatest of his sermons on the subject: "The Expulsive Power of a New Affection." These men got an affection for new things, and they found that only old things would not be permitted in the places where they were living, and so they had to seek homes elsewhere.

So when the race to which I belong landed on this continent and made its way in its principal migrations through the State of Pennsylvania and down through the Cumberland Valley and the valley of the Shenandoah and into the country of the Southwest; and then crossed the mountains and was amongst the first to face the French on the Ohio, and, going with the vanguard of the whole movement, deployed at last upon the plains that led to the Great Valley of the Mississippi, it saw the thing which it remained for another principle than that of discipline to do—the principle of aspiration, the principle of daring, the principle of unrest, the principle of mere adventure, which made the level lines of the prairie seem finer and more inviting than the uplifted lines of the mountain; that made it seem as if the world were bigger on the plains, and as if the feet of young men were the feet of leaders. And this was a place where all those new things should be tried and all those ungoverned adventures should be made which filled this continent with an abounding life. For there is something, gentlemen, of this balance in our lives between the discipline of restraint, the discipline of the old reminders of moral principle, and that uplifting power of an unregulated ambition. I believe that there is a sense, if you will permit me to say so in all soberness, in which there is a contrast between the New England spirit and the national spirit. You contributed something without which the national spirit would have simply set the world on fire, without being able to confine its power in piston rods to drive the heart of machines to make furnaces hold the abounding heat. You contributed the restraint

—that mechanical combination, that poise, that power of union, which is the spirit of discipline. But there was besides a national spirit which, if it had not received this restraint, would have broken all bonds. The spirit of progression is this spirit of aspiration which has led us into new conditions and to face a new destiny. [Applause.]

I pray that sober principle may ever be whispered at our ear, that we may be ever critical of our motives, that we may ever be self-examining men with regard to our lives and conduct; but I also pray that that fine discipline of the heart may but precede the expansion of power; that that fine elevation and expansion of nature which ventures everything may go with us to the ends of the earth, so be it we go to the ends of the earth carrying conscience and the principles that make for good conduct. I believe that it is necessary that when we get reformers upon our platforms we should see that their function is properly spelled. [Applause.] Most of our reformers are retro-reformers. They want to hale us back to an old chrysalis which we have broken; they want us to resume a shape which we have outgrown; they want us to take back the outward form of principles which they think cannot live in a new habilitment, or prosper under new forms and conditions. It is not the forms of our lives; it is the principles of our lives that count. I can quote Scripture for this [laughter], though not Scripture which, I am afraid, would be regarded as exactly orthodox in Princeton. There was an old darky preacher who said, "The Lord said unto Moses, Come fo'th; and he came fifth, and lost the race." [Great laughter.] Now, I think we ought to come forth, and not to come fifth and lose the race; and if we sufficiently obey this fine, expansive impulse in us we shall not make it necessary that we should forget the fine old discipline of ancient doctrine; we should not forget to have some sense of duty, some-

thing of a faith, some reverence for the laws ourselves have made.

I believe that the principal menace of a democracy is that the disciplinary power of the common thought should overwhelm the individual instinct of man's originative power, and that that individuality should be a little rubbed off and lost. I should wish to hear every man dare speak his thoughts. I should wish to have every man use a boldness, which I should also wish to see in the nation. I pray that the time may never come when we are not ready to do new things, when we are not ready to acknowledge that the age has changed. I suppose you have all heard Mr. Joseph Jefferson tell the story about the little boy who was to be taken by his mother to hear the play of "Rip Van Winkle." His mother fell ill and could not take him, but rather than disappoint him she turned the ticket over to his aunt and asked her to take the lad. "But," she said, "you must remember that he never has been to the theatre before, and you must explain things to him, as he cannot understand it." But the aunt, being less solicitous than the mother, forgot all about the boy until the curtain went down on the young "Rip Van Winkle" and was about to rise on the old "Rip Van Winkle," when it occurred to the aunt to say to the boy, "You know, Johnny, twenty years have gone by since the curtain went down." He said, "Where's my mamma?" [Laughter.] Now, that is the attitude of a great many people whom I very sincerely respect. You say to them, "Twenty years have gone by since we fought Spain," and they say, "Where are our papas?" [Laughter.] They go to consult a generation that did not know anything about it. They even take liberties with the Father of his Country. Now Washington was a Virginian, and, perhaps, since I am a Virginian, I may be allowed to interpret Washington. [Laughter.] We all know each other down there. [Applause.] When you reflect that Washington wrote

his Farewell Address to something over three million people, to whom he was, if his letters are to be believed, very willing to say good-bye [laughter], and if you will understand that Address to have meant, as it would seem to have meant: "I want you to discipline yourselves and stay still and be good boys until you grow up, until you are big enough to stand the competition of foreign countries, until you are big enough to go abroad in the world," I think you will have put the proper interpretation on it. "Wait," he said, "until you need not be afraid of foreign influence, and then you shall be ready to take your part in the field of the world." I do not accept the interpretation of Washington's Farewell Address that those people who have but seen the curtain go down accept. [Laughter and applause.]

Now, gentlemen, will you follow the Scotch-Irish across the continent and into the farther seas of the Pacific? Will you follow the Star of Empire with those men who will follow anything which they think will drop profit or amusement? [Laughter.] Are you ready, are we ready, to go shoulder to shoulder, forgetting our differences of origin, forgetting our fatal descent, forgetting all the things which might restrain us, not going with faces averted over shoulder, but going with faces to the front, faces that will scorn to face a shame but will dare to face a glory? [Applause.]

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE SOUTHERN STATES

FROM THE "ATLANTIC MONTHLY," JANUARY, 1901,
VOL. LXXXVII, PP. 1-15.

IT is now full thirty years, and more, since the processes of Reconstruction were finished, and the southern states restored to their place in the Union. Those thirty years have counted for more than any other thirty in our history, so great have been the speed and range of our development, so comprehensive and irresistible has been the sweep of change amongst us. We have come out of the atmosphere of the 'sixties. The time seems remote, historic, not of our day. We have dropped its thinking, lost its passion, forgot its anxieties, and should be ready to speak of it, not as partisans, but as historians.

Most troublesome questions are thus handed over, sooner or later, to the historian. It is his vexation that they do not cease to be troublesome because they have been finished with by statesmen, and laid aside as practically settled. To him are left all the intellectual and moral difficulties, and the subtle, hazardous, responsible business of determining what was well done, what ill done; where motive ran clear and just, where clouded by passion, poisoned by personal ambition, or darkened by malevolence. More of the elements of every policy are visible to him than can have been visible to the actors on the scene itself; but he cannot always be certain which they saw, which they did not see. He is deciding old questions in a new light. He is dangerously cool in dealing with questions of passion; too much informed about questions which had, in fact, to

be settled upon a momentary and first impression; scrupulous in view of things which happened afterward, as well as of things which happened before the acts upon which he is sitting in judgment. It is a wonder that historians who take their business seriously can sleep at night.

Reconstruction is still revolutionary matter. Those who delve in it find it like a banked fire, still hot and fiery within, for all it has lain under the ashes a whole generation; and a thing to take fire from. It is hard to construct an argument here which shall not be heated, a source of passion no less than of light. And then the test of the stuff must be so various. The American historian must be both constitutional lawyer and statesman in the judgments he utters; and the American constitutional lawyer must always apply, not a single, but a double standard. He must insist on the plain, explicit command and letter of the law, and yet he must not be impracticable. Institutions must live and take their growth, and the laws which clothe them must be no straitjacket, but rather living tissue, themselves containing the power of normal growth and healthful expansion. The powers of government must make shift to live and adapt themselves to circumstances: it would be the very negation of wise conservatism to throttle them with definitions too precise and rigid.

Such difficulties, however, are happily more formidable in the mass than in detail; and even the period of Reconstruction can now be judged fairly enough, with but a little tolerance, breadth, and moderation added to the just modicum of knowledge. Some things about it are very plain,—among the rest, that it is a period too little studied as yet, and of capital importance in our constitutional history. Indeed, it is not too much to say that there crosses it, in full sight of every one who will look, a great rift, which breaks, and must always break, the continuity and harmony of our constitutional development. The national government

which came out of Reconstruction was not the national government which went into it. The civil war had given leave to one set of revolutionary forces; Reconstruction gave leave to another still more formidable. The effects of the first were temporary, the inevitable accompaniments of civil war and armed violence; the effects of the second were permanent, and struck to the very centre of our forms of government. Any narrative of facts, however brief, carries that conclusion upon its surface.

The war had been fought to preserve the Union, to dislodge and drive out by force the doctrine of the right of secession. The southern states *could* not legally leave the Union,—such had been the doctrine of the victorious states whose armies won under Grant and Sherman,—and the federal government had been able to prevent their leaving, in fact. In strict theory, though their people had been in revolt, under organizations which called themselves states, and which had thrown off all allegiance to the older Union and formed a new confederation of their own, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas and Tennessee, the historic states once solemnly embodied in the Union, had never gone out of it, could never go out of it and remain states. In fact, nevertheless, their representatives had withdrawn from the federal House and Senate; their several governments, without change of form or personnel, had declared themselves no longer joined with the rest of the states in purpose or allegiance, had arranged a new and separate partnership, and had for four years maintained an organized resistance to the armies of the Union which they had renounced. Now that their resistance had been overcome and their confederacy destroyed, how were they to be treated? As if they had been all the while in the Union, whether they would or no, and were now at last simply brought to their senses again, to take up their old-time rights and duties intact, resume their familiar

functions within the Union as if nothing had happened? The theory of the case was tolerably clear; and the Supreme Court of the United States presently supplied lawyers, if not statesmen, with a clear enough formulation of it. The Constitution, it said (for example, in the celebrated case of *Texas vs. White*, decided in 1868), had created an indestructible Union of indestructible states. The eleven states which had attempted to secede had not been destroyed by their secession. Everything that they had done to bring about secession or maintain resistance to the Union was absolutely null and void, and without legal effect; but their laws passed for other purposes, even those passed while they were in fact maintaining their resolution of secession and defying the authority of the national government, were valid, and must be given effect to in respect of all the ordinary concerns of business, property, and personal obligation, just as if they had been passed in ordinary times and under ordinary circumstances. The states had lost no legitimate authority; their acts were invalid only in respect of what they had never had the right to do.

But it was infinitely hard to translate such principles into a practicable rule of statesmanship. It was as difficult and hazardous a matter to reinstate the states as it would have been had their legal right to secede been first admitted, and then destroyed by the revolutionary force of arms. It became, whatever the theory, in fact a process of reconstruction. Had Mr. Lincoln lived, perhaps the whole of the delicate business might have been carried through with dignity, good temper, and simplicity of method; with all necessary concessions to passion, with no pedantic insistence upon consistent and uniform rules, with sensible irregularities and compromises, and yet with a straightforward, frank, and open way of management which would have assisted to find for every influence its natural and legitimate and quieting effect. It was of the nature of Mr. Lincoln's

mind to reduce complex situations to their simples, to guide men without irritating them, to go forward and be practical without being radical,—to serve as a genial force which supplied heat enough to keep action warm, and yet minimized the friction and eased the whole progress of affairs.

It was characteristic of him that he had kept his own theory clear and unconfused throughout the whole struggle to bring the southern people back to their allegiance to the Union. He had never recognized any man who spoke or acted for the southern people in the matter of secession as the representative of any government whatever. It was, in his view, not the southern states which had taken up arms against the Union, but merely the people dwelling within them. State lines defined the territory within which rebellion had spread and men had organized under arms to destroy the Union; but their organization had been effected without color of law; that could not be a state, in any legal meaning of the term, which denied what was the indispensable prerequisite of its every exercise of political functions, its membership in the Union. He was not fighting states, therefore, or a confederacy of states, but only a body of people who refused to act as states, and could not, if they would, form another Union. What he wished and strove for, without passion save for the accomplishment of his purpose, without enmity against persons, and yet with burning hostility against what the southerners meant to do, was to bring the people of the southern states once more to submission and allegiance; to assist them, when subdued, to rehabilitate the states whose territory and resources, whose very organization, they had used to effect a revolution; to do whatever the circumstances and his own powers, whether as President or merely as an influential man and earnest friend of peace, might render possible to put them back, defeated, but not conquered or degraded, into the old-time hierarchy of the Union.

There were difficulties and passions in the way which possibly even Mr. Lincoln could not have forced within any plan of good will and simple restoration; but he had made a hopeful beginning before he died. He had issued a proclamation of amnesty so early as 1863, offering pardon and restoration to civil rights to all who would abandon resistance to the authority of the Union, and take the oath of unreserved loyalty and submission which he prescribed; and as the war drew to an end, and he saw the power of the Union steadily prevail, now here, now there, throughout an ever increasing area, he earnestly begged that those who had taken the oath and returned to their allegiance would unite in positive and concerted action, organize their states upon the old footing, and make ready for a full restoration of the old conditions. Let those who had taken the oath, and were ready to bind themselves in all good faith to accept the acts and proclamations of the federal government in the matter of slavery,—let all, in short, who were willing to accept the actual results of the war, organize themselves and set up governments made conformable to the new order of things, and he would recognize them as the people of the states within which they acted, ask Congress to admit their representatives, and aid them to gain in all respects full acknowledgment and enjoyment of statehood, even though the persons who thus acted were but a tenth part of the original voters of their states. He would not insist upon even so many as a tenth, if only he could get *some* body of loyal citizens to deal and coöperate with in this all-important matter upon which he had set his heart; that the roster of the states might be complete again, and some healing process follow the bitter anguish of the war.

Andrew Johnson promptly made up his mind, when summoned to the presidency, to carry out Mr. Lincoln's plan, practically without modification; and he knew clearly what Mr. Lincoln's plan had been, for he himself

had restored Tennessee upon that plan, as the President's agent and representative. As military governor of the state, he had successfully organized a new government out of abundant material, for Tennessee was full of men who had had no sympathy with secession; and the government which he had organized had gone into full and vigorous operation during that very spring which saw him become first Vice President and then President. In Louisiana and Arkansas similar governments had been set up even before Mr. Lincoln's death. Congress had not recognized them, indeed; and it did not, until a year had gone by, recognize even Tennessee, though her case was the simplest of all. Within her borders the southern revolt had been, not solid and of a piece, but a thing of frayed edges and a very doubtful texture of opinion. But, though Congress doubted, the plan had at least proved practicable, and Mr. Johnson thought it also safe and direct.

Mr. Johnson himself, unhappily, was not safe. He had been put on the same ticket with Mr. Lincoln upon grounds of expediency such as have too often created Vice Presidents of the United States. Like a great many other Tennesseans, he had been stanch and unwavering in his adherence to the Union, even after his state had cast the Union off; but he was in all other respects a Democrat of the old order rather than a Republican of the new, and when he became President the rank and file of the Republicans in Congress looked upon him askance, as was natural. He himself saw to it, besides, that nobody should relish or trust him whom bad temper could alienate. He was self-willed, imperious, implacable; as headstrong and tempestuous as Jackson, without Jackson's power of attracting men, and making and holding parties. At first, knowing him a radical by nature, some of the radical leaders in Congress had been inclined to trust him; had even hailed his accession to the presidency with open satisfaction, having chafed under Lincoln's power to restrain them. "Johnson, we

have faith in you!" Senator Wade had exclaimed. "By the gods, there will be no trouble now in running the government!" But Johnson was careful that there should be trouble. He was determined to lead as Lincoln had led, but without Lincoln's insight, skill, or sweetness of temper,—by power and self-assertion rather than by persuasion and the slow arts of management and patient accommodation; and the houses came to an open breach with him almost at once.

Moreover, there was one very serious and radical objection to Mr. Lincoln's plan for restoring the states, which would in all likelihood have forced even him to modify it in many essential particulars, if not to abandon it altogether. He had foreseen difficulties, himself, and had told Congress that his plan was meant to serve only as a suggestion, around which opinion might have an opportunity to form, and out of which some practicable method might be drawn. He had not meant to insist upon it, but only to try it. The main difficulty was that it did not meet the wishes of the congressional leaders with regard to the protection of the negroes in their new rights as freemen. The men whom Mr. Lincoln had called upon to reorganize the state governments of the South were, indeed, those who were readiest to accept the results of the war, in respect of the abolition of slavery as well as in all other matters. No doubt they were in the beginning men who had never felt any strong belief in the right of secession,—men who had even withstood the purpose of secession as long as they could, and had wished all along to see the old Union restored. They were a minority now, and it might be pretty safely assumed that they had been a minority from the outset in all this fatal business. But they were white men, bred to all the opinions which necessarily went along with the existence and practice of slavery. They would certainly not wish to give the negroes political rights. They might be counted on, on the contrary, to keep them still as much as possible un-

der restraint and tutelage. They would probably accept nothing but the form of freedom for the one-time slaves, and their rule would be doubly unpalatable to the men in the North who had gone all these weary years through, either in person or in heart, with the northern armies upon their mission of emancipation.

The actual course of events speedily afforded means for justifying these apprehensions. Throughout 1865 Mr. Johnson pushed the presidential process of reconstruction successfully and rapidly forward. Provisional governors of his own appointment in the South saw to it that conventions were elected by the voters who had taken the oath prescribed in the amnesty proclamation, which Mr. Johnson had reissued, with little change either of form or of substance; those conventions proceeded at once to revise the state constitutions under the supervision of the provisional governors, who in their turn acted now and again under direct telegraphic instructions from the President in Washington; the several ordinances of secession were repealed, the war debts of the states were repudiated, and the legislatures set up under the new constitutions hastened to accept and ratify the Thirteenth Amendment, abolishing slavery, as the President demanded. By December of the very year of his inauguration, every southern state except Florida and Texas had gone through the required process, and was once more, so far as the President was concerned, in its normal relations with the federal government. The federal courts resumed their sessions in the restored states, and the Supreme Court called up the southern cases from its docket. On December 18, 1865, the Secretary of State formally proclaimed the Thirteenth Amendment ratified by the vote of twenty-seven states, and thereby legally embodied in the Constitution, though eight of the twenty-seven were states which the President had thus of his own motion reconstructed. Without their votes the

amendment would have lacked the constitutional three-fourths majority.

The President had required nothing of the new states with regard to the suffrage; that was a matter, as he truly said, in respect of which the several states had "rightfully exercised" their free and independent choice "from the origin of the government to the present day"; and of course they had no thought of admitting the negroes to the suffrage. Moreover, the new governments, once organized, fell more and more entirely into the hands of the very persons who had actively participated in secession. The President's proclamation of amnesty had, indeed, excepted certain classes of persons from the privilege of taking the oath which would make them voters again, under his arrangements for reconstruction: those who had taken a prominent official part in secession, or who had left the service of the United States for the service of the Confederate government. But a majority of the southerners were still at liberty to avail themselves of the privilege of accepting the new order of things; and it was to their interest to do so, in order that the new arrangements might be shaped as nearly as possible to their own liking. What was to their liking, however, proved as distasteful to Congress as had been expected. The use they made of their restored power brought absolute shipwreck upon the President's plans, and radically altered the whole process of reconstruction.

An extraordinary and very perilous state of affairs had been created in the South by the sudden and absolute emancipation of the negroes, and it was not strange that the southern legislatures should deem it necessary to take extraordinary steps to guard against the manifest and pressing dangers which it entailed. Here was a vast "laboring, landless, homeless class," once slaves, now free; unpracticed in liberty, unschooled in self-control; never sobered by the discipline of self-support, never established in any habit of prudence; excited by

a freedom they did not understand, exalted by false hopes; bewildered and without leaders, and yet insolent and aggressive; sick of work, covetous of pleasure,—a host of dusky children untimely put out of school. In some of the states they outnumbered the whites,—notably in Mississippi and South Carolina. They were a danger to themselves as well as to those whom they had once served, and now feared and suspected; and the very legislatures which had accepted the Thirteenth Amendment hastened to pass laws which should put them under new restraints. Stringent regulations were adopted with regard to contracts for labor, and with regard to the prevention of vagrancy. Penalties were denounced against those who refused to work at the current rates of wages. Fines were imposed upon a great number and variety of petty offenses, such as the new freemen were most likely to commit; and it was provided that, in the (extremely probable) event of the non-payment of these fines, the culprits should be hired out to labor by judicial process. In some instances an elaborate system of compulsory apprenticeship was established for negroes under age, providing that they should be bound out to labor. In certain states the negroes were required to sign written contracts of labor, and were forbidden to do job work without first obtaining licenses from the police authorities of their places of residence. Those who failed to obtain licenses were liable to the charge of vagrancy, and upon that charge could be arrested, fined, and put to compulsory labor. There was not everywhere the same rigor; but there was everywhere the same determination to hold the negroes very watchfully, and, if need were, very sternly, within bounds in the exercise of their unaccustomed freedom; and in many cases the restraints imposed went the length of a veritable “involuntary servitude.”

Congress had not waited to see these things done before attempting to help the negroes to make use of their freedom,—and self-defensive use of it, at that.

By an act of March 3, 1865, it established, as a branch of the War Department, a Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, which was authorized and empowered to assist the one-time slaves in finding means of subsistence, and in making good their new privileges and immunities as citizens. The officials of this bureau, with the War Department behind them, had gone the whole length of their extensive authority; putting away from the outset all ideas of accommodation, and preferring the interests of their wards to the interests of peaceable, wholesome, and healing progress. No doubt that was inevitable. What they did was but the final and direct application of the rigorous, unsentimental logic of events. The negroes, at any rate, had the full advantage of the federal power. A very active and officious branch of the War Department saw to it that the new disabilities which the southern legislatures sought to put upon them should as far as possible be rendered inoperative.

That, however, did not suffice to sweeten the temper of Congress. The fact remained that Mr. Johnson had rehabilitated the governments of the southern states without asking the leave of the Houses; that the legislatures which he had authorized them to call together had sought, in the very same sessions in which they gave their assent to the emancipating amendment, virtually to undo the work of emancipation, substituting a slavery of legal restraints and disabilities for a slavery of private ownership; and that these same legislatures had sent men to Washington, to seek admission to the Senate, who were known, many of them, still openly to avow their unshaken belief in the right of secession. The southern voters, too, who had qualified by taking the oath prescribed by the President's proclamation, had in most instances sent men similarly unconvinced to ask admission to the House of Representatives. Here was indeed a surrender of all the advantages of the contest of arms, as it seemed to the radicals,—very gen-

erous, no doubt, but done by a Tennessean and a Democrat, who was evidently a little more than generous; done, too, to exalt the Executive above Congress; in any light, perilous and not to be tolerated. Even those who were not radicals wished that the restoration of the states, which all admitted to be necessary, had been effected in some other way, and safeguarded against this manifest error, as all deemed it, of putting the negroes back into the hands of those who had been their masters, and would not now willingly consent to be their fellow citizens.

Congress, accordingly, determined to take matters into its own hands. With the southern representatives excluded, there was a Republican majority in both houses strong enough to do what it pleased, even to the overriding, if necessary, of the President's vetoes. Upon assembling for their regular session in December, 1865, therefore, the House and Senate at once set up, by concurrent resolution, a joint committee of nine Representatives and six Senators, which was instructed to inquire into all the conditions obtaining in the southern states, and, after sufficient inquiry, advise the Houses upon the question whether, under the governments which Mr. Johnson had given them, those states were entitled to representation. To this committee, in other words, was intrusted the whole guidance of Congress in the all-important and delicate business of the full rehabilitation of the southern states as members of the Union. By February, 1866, it had virtually been settled that the admission of their representatives to Congress should await the action of the reconstruction committee; and that purpose was very consistently adhered to. An exception was made in the case of Tennessee, but in her case only. The Houses presently agreed to be satisfied with her "reconstruction," and admitted her representatives to their seats in both House and Senate by an act of the 24th of July, 1865. But the other states were put off until the joint committee had forced

them through a process of "Thorough," which began their reconstruction at the very beginning, again, and executed at every stage the methods preferred by the Houses. The leader throughout the drastic business was Mr. Thaddeus Stevens, of Pennsylvania, the chairman of the committee, the leader of the House. He was foremost among the radicals, and drew a following about him, much as Stephen Douglas had attached thoroughgoing Democrats to himself, in the old days when the legislative battles were being fought over the extension of slavery into the territories,—by audacity, plain speaking, and the straightforward energy of unhesitating opinion. He gave directness and speed to all he proposed. He understood better than Douglas did the coarse work of hewing out practicable paths of action in the midst of opinions and interests at odds. He had no timidity, no scruples about keeping to constitutional lines of policy, no regard or thought for the sensibilities of the minority,—being roughhewn and without embarrassing sensibilities himself,—an ideal radical for the service of the moment.

Careful men, trained in the older ways of statesmanship and accustomed to reading the Constitution into all that they did, tried to form some consistent theory of constitutional right with regard to the way in which Congress ought to deal with this new and unprecedented situation. The southern states were still "states" within the meaning of the Constitution as the Supreme Court had interpreted it. They were communities of free citizens; each had kept its territorial boundaries unchanged, unmistakable; in each there was an organized government, "sanctioned and limited by a written constitution, and established by the consent of the governed." Their officers of government, like their people, had for a time, indeed, repudiated the authority of the federal government; but they were now ready to acknowledge that authority again, and could resume their normal relations with the other states at a moment's

notice, with all proper submission. Both Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Johnson had acted in part upon these assumptions. They had objected only that the governments actually in existence at the close of the war had been chosen by persons who were in fact insurgents, and that their officers had served to organize rebellion. Let those citizens of the South who had made submission, and who had been pardoned under the President's proclamation, reconstitute their governments, repudiating their old leaders, and the only taint upon their statehood would be removed: the Executive would recognize them as again normally constituted members of the Union.

Not many members of Congress, however, accepted this view. The Republican party, it was true, had entered upon the war emphatically disavowing either wish or purpose to interfere with the constitutional rights of the states; declaring its sole object to be the preservation of the Union,—the denial of a single particular right which it could not but view as revolutionary. But war had brought many things in its train. The heat and struggle of those four tremendous years had burned and scarred the body of affairs with many an ineffaceable fact, which could not now be overlooked. Legally or illegally, as states or as bodies of individuals merely, the southern people had been at war with the Union; the slaves had been freed by force of arms; their freedom had now been incorporated in the supreme law of the land, and must be made good to them; there was manifest danger that too liberal a theory of restoration would bring about an impossible tangle of principles, an intolerable contradiction between fact and fact. Mr. Sumner held that, by resisting the authority of the Union, of which they were members, the southern states had simply committed suicide, destroying their own institutions along with their allegiance to the federal government. They ceased to be states, he said, when they ceased to fulfill the duties imposed upon them by

the fundamental law of the land. Others declined any such doctrine. They adhered, with an instinct almost of affection, to the idea of a veritable federal Union; rejected Mr. Sumner's presupposition that the states were only subordinate parts of a consolidated national government; and insisted that, whatever rights they had for a time forfeited, the southern states were at least not destroyed, but only estopped from exercising their ordinary functions within the Union, pending a readjustment.

Theories made Mr. Stevens very impatient. It made little difference with him whether the southern states had forfeited their rights by suicide, or temporary disorganization, or individual rebellion. As a matter of fact, every department of the federal government, the courts included, had declared the citizens of those states public enemies; the Constitution itself had been for four years practically laid aside, so far as they were concerned, as a document of peace; they had been overwhelmed by force, and were now held in subjection under military rule, like conquered provinces. It was just as well, he thought, to act upon the facts, and let theories alone. It was enough that all Congressmen were agreed—at any rate, all who were allowed a voice in the matter—that it was properly the part of Congress, and not of the Executive, to bring order out of the chaos: to see that federal supremacy and federal law were made good in the South; the legal changes brought about by the war forced upon its acceptance; and the negroes secured in the enjoyment of the equality and even the privileges of citizens, in accordance with the federal guarantee that there should be a republican form of government in every state,—a government founded upon the consent of a majority of its adult subjects. The essential point was that Congress, the law-making power, should be in control. The President had been too easy to satisfy, too prompt, and too lenient. Mr. Stevens consented once and again that the lan-

guage of fine-drawn theories of constitutional right should be used in the reports of the joint Committee on Reconstruction, in which he managed to be master; but the motto of the committee in all practical matters was his motto of "Thorough," and its policy made Congress supreme.

The year 1866 passed, with all things at sixes and sevens. So far as the President was concerned, most of the southern states were already reconstructed, and had resumed their places in the Union. Their assent had made the Thirteenth Amendment a part of the Constitution. And yet Congress forbade the withdrawal of the troops, refused admittance to the southern representatives, and set aside southern laws through the action of the Freedmen's Bureau and the military authorities. By 1867 it had made up its mind what to do to bring the business to a conclusion. 1866 had at least cleared its mind and defined its purposes. Congress had still further tested and made proof of the temper of the South. In June it had adopted a Fourteenth Amendment, which secured to the blacks the status of citizens, both of the United States and of the several states of their residence, authorized a reduction in the representation in Congress of states which refused them the suffrage, excluded the more prominent servants of the Confederacy from federal office until Congress should pardon them, and invalidated all debts or obligations "incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States"; and this amendment had been submitted to the vote of the states which Congress had refused to recognize as well as to the vote of those represented in the Houses. Tennessee had promptly adopted it, and had been as promptly admitted to representation. But the other southern states, as promptly as they could, had begun, one by one, to reject it. Their action confirmed the Houses in their attitude toward Reconstruction.

Congressional views and purposes were cleared the

while with regard to the President, also. He had not been firm; he had been stubborn and bitter. He would yield nothing; vetoed the measures upon which Congress was most steadfastly minded to insist; alienated his very friends by attacking Congress in public with gross insult and abuse; and lost credit with everybody. It came to a direct issue, the President against Congress: they went to the country with their quarrel in the congressional elections, which fell opportunely in the autumn of 1866, and the President lost utterly. Until then some had hesitated to override his vetoes, but after that no one hesitated. 1867 saw Congress go triumphantly forward with its policy of reconstruction *ab initio*.

In July, 1866, it had overridden a veto to continue and enlarge the powers of the Freedman's Bureau, in a bill which directed that public lands should be sold to the negroes upon easy terms, that the property of the Confederate government should be appropriated for their education, and that their new-made rights should be protected by military authority. In March, 1867, two acts, passed over the President's vetoes, instituted the new process of reconstruction, followed and completed by another act in July of the same year. The southern states, with the exception, of course, of Tennessee, were grouped in five military districts, each of which was put under the command of a general of the United States. These commanders were made practically absolute rulers, until the task of reconstruction should be ended. It was declared by the Reconstruction Acts that no other legal state governments existed in the ten states concerned. It was made the business of the district commanders to erect such governments as Congress prescribed. They were to enroll in each state, upon oath, all made citizens of one year's residence, not disqualified by reason of felony or excluded under the terms of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment, "of whatever race, color, or previous condition" they might be; the persons thus registered were to choose constitu-

tional conventions, confining their choice of delegates to registered voters like themselves; these conventions were to be directed to frame state constitutions, which should extend the suffrage to all who had been permitted by the military authorities to enroll for the purpose of taking part in the election of delegates; and the constitutions were to be submitted to the same body of voters for ratification. When Congress had approved the constitutions thus framed and accepted, and when the legislatures constituted under them had adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, the states thus reorganized were to be readmitted to representation in Congress, and in all respects fully reinstated as members of the Union; but not before. Meanwhile, the civil governments already existing within them, though illegal, were to be permitted to stand; but as "provisional only, and in all respects subject to the paramount authority of the United States at any time to abolish, control, or supersede the same."

Such was the process which was rigorously and consistently carried through during the memorable years 1867-70; and upon the states which proved most difficult and recalcitrant Congress did not hesitate from time to time to impose new conditions of recognition and reinstatement before an end was made. By the close of July, 1868, the reconstruction and reinstatement of Arkansas, the two Carolinas, Florida, Alabama, and Louisiana had been completed. Virginia, Mississippi, and Texas were obliged to wait until the opening of 1870, because their voters would not adopt the constitutions offered them by their reconstructing conventions; and Georgia was held off a few months longer, because she persisted in attempting to exclude negroes from the right to hold office. These four states, as a consequence, were obliged to accept, as a condition precedent to their reinstatement, not only the Fourteenth Amendment, but a Fifteenth also, which Congress had passed in February, 1869, and which forbade

either the United States or any state to withhold from any citizen the right to vote "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." The military commanders, meanwhile, used or withheld their hand of power according to their several temperaments. They could deal with the provisional civil governments as they pleased,—could remove officials, annul laws, regulate administration, at will. Some were dictatorial and petty; some were temperate and guarded in their use of authority, with a creditable instinct of statesmanship; almost all were straightforward and executive, as might have been expected of soldiers.

Whatever their mistakes or weaknesses of temper or of judgment, what followed the reconstruction they effected was in almost every instance much worse than what had had to be endured under military rule. The first practical result of reconstruction under the acts of 1867 was the disfranchisement, for several weary years, of the better whites, and the consequent giving over of the southern governments into the hands of the negroes. And yet not into their hands, after all. They were but children still; and unscrupulous men, "carpet-baggers,"—men not come to be citizens, but come upon an expedition of profit, come to make the name of Republican forever hateful in the South,—came out of the North to use the negroes as tools for their own selfish ends; and succeeded, to the utmost fulfillment of their dreams. Negro majorities for a little while filled the southern legislatures; but they won no power or profit for themselves, beyond a pittance here and there for a bribe. Their leaders, strangers and adventurers, got the lucrative offices, the handling of the state moneys raised by loan, and of the taxes spent no one knew how. Here and there an able and upright man cleansed administration, checked corruption, served them as a real friend and an honest leader; but not for long. The negroes were exalted; the states were misgoverned and looted in their name; and a few men, not of their num-

ber, not really of their interest, went away with the gains. They were left to carry the discredit and reap the consequences of ruin, when at last the whites who were real citizens got control again.

But that dark chapter of history is no part of our present story. We are here concerned, rather, with the far-reaching constitutional and political influences and results of Reconstruction. That it was a revolutionary process is written upon its face throughout; but how deep did the revolution go? What permanent marks has it left upon the great structure of government, federal, republican; a partnership of equal states, and yet a solidly coherent national power, which the fathers erected?

First of all, it is clear to every one who looks straight upon the facts, every veil of theory withdrawn, and the naked body of affairs uncovered to meet the direct question of the eye, that civil war discovered the foundations of our government to be in fact unwritten; set deep in a sentiment which constitutions can neither originate nor limit. The law of the Constitution reigned until war came. Then the stage was cleared, and the forces of a mighty sentiment, hitherto unorganized, deployed upon it. A thing had happened for which the Constitution had made no provision. In the Constitution were written the rules by which the associated states should live in concert and union, with no word added touching days of discord or disruption; nothing about the use of force to keep or to break the authority ordained in its quiet sentences, written, it would seem, for lawyers, not for soldiers. When the war came, therefore, and questions were broached to which it gave no answer, the ultimate foundation of the structure was laid bare: physical force, sustained by the stern loves and rooted predilections of masses of men, the strong ingrained prejudices which are the fibre of every system of government. What gave the war its passion, its hot energy as of a tragedy from end to end, was

that in it sentiment met sentiment, conviction conviction. It was the sentiment, not of all, but of the efficient majority, the conviction of the major part, that won. A minority, eager and absolute in another conviction, devoted to the utmost pitch of self-sacrifice to an opposite and incompatible ideal, was crushed and overwhelmed. It was that which gave an epic breadth and majesty to the awful clash between bodies of men in all things else of one strain and breeding; it was that which brought the bitterness of death upon the side which lost, and the dangerous intoxication of an absolute triumph upon the side which won. But it unmistakably uncovered the foundations of force upon which the Union rested.

It did more. The sentiment of union and nationality, never before aroused to full consciousness or knowledge of its own thought and aspirations, was henceforth a new thing, aggressive and aware of a sort of conquest. It had seen its legions and felt its might in the field. It saw the very Constitution, for whose maintenance and defense it had acquired the discipline of arms, itself subordinated for a time to the practical emergencies of war, in order that the triumph might be the more unimpeded and complete; and it naturally deemed nationality henceforth a thing above law. As much as possible,—so far as could be without serious embarrassment,—the forms of the fundamental law had indeed been respected and observed; but wherever the law clogged or did not suffice, it had been laid aside and ignored. It was so much the easier, therefore, to heed its restrictions lightly, when the war was over, and it became necessary to force the southern states to accept the new model. The real revolution was not so much in the form as in the spirit of affairs. The spirit and temper and method of a federal Union had given place, now that all the spaces of the air had been swept and changed by the merciless winds of war, to a spirit which was consciously national and of a new age.

It was this spirit which brushed theories and technicalities aside, and impressed its touch of revolution on the law itself. And not only upon the law, but also upon the processes of lawmaking, and upon the relative positions of the President and Congress in the general constitutional scheme of the government, seeming to change its very administrative structure. While the war lasted the President had been master; the war ended, and Mr. Lincoln gone, Congress pushed its way to the front, and began to transmute fact into law, law into fact. In some matters it treated all the states alike. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth amendments bound all the states at once, North and West as well as South. But that was, after all, a mere equality of form. The amendments were aimed, of course, at the states which had had slaves and had attempted secession, and did not materially affect any others. The votes which incorporated them in the Constitution were voluntary on the part of the states whose institutions they did not affect, involuntary on the part of the states whose institutions they revolutionized. These states were then under military rule. Congress had declared their whole political organization to be illegal; had excluded their representatives from their seats in the Houses; and yet demanded that they assent, as states, to the amendment of the Constitution as a condition precedent to their reinstatement in the Union! No anomaly or contradiction of lawyers' terms was suffered to stand in the way of the supremacy of the lawmaking branch of the general government. The Constitution knew no such process as this of Reconstruction, and could furnish no rules for it. Two years and a half before the Fifteenth Amendment was adopted by Congress, three years and a half before it was put in force by its adoption by the states, Congress had by mere act forced the southern states, by the hands of military governors, to put the negroes upon the roll of their voters. It had dictated to them a radical re-

vision of their constitutions, whose items should be framed to meet the views of the Houses rather than the views of their own electors. It had pulled about and rearranged what local institutions it saw fit, and then had obliged the communities affected to accept its alterations as the price of their reinstatement as self-governing bodies politic within the Union.

It may be that much, if not all, of this would have been inevitable under any leadership, the temper of the times and the postures of affairs being what they were; and it is certain that it was inevitable under the actual circumstances of leadership then existing at Washington. But to assess that matter is to reckon with causes. For the moment we are concerned only with consequences, and are neither justifying nor condemning, but only comprehending. The courts of the United States have held that the southern states never were out of the Union; and yet they have justified the action of Congress throughout the process of Reconstruction, on the ground that it was no more than a proper performance by Congress of a legal duty, under the clause of the Constitution which guarantees to every state a republican form of government. It was making the southern governments republican by securing full standing and legislative representation as citizens for the negroes. But Congress went beyond that. It not only dictated to the states it was reconstructing what their suffrage should be; it also required that they should never afterward narrow the suffrage. It required of Virginia, Texas, and Mississippi that they should accord to the negroes not only the right to vote, but also the right to hold political office; and that they should grant to all their citizens equal school privileges, and never afterward abridge them. So far as the right to vote was concerned, the Fifteenth Amendment subsequently imposed the same disability with regard to withholding the suffrage upon all the states alike; but the southern states were also forbidden by mere federal statute to

restrict it on any other ground; and in the cases of Virginia, Mississippi, and Texas Congress assumed the right, which the Constitution nowhere accorded it, to regulate admission to political office and the privileges of public education.

South Carolina and Mississippi, Louisiana and North Carolina, have since changed the basis of their suffrage, notwithstanding; Virginia and Mississippi and Texas might now, no doubt, reorganize their educational system as they pleased, without endangering their status in the Union, or even meeting rebuke at the hands of the federal courts. The temper of the times has changed; the federal structure has settled to a normal balance of parts and functions again; and the states are in fact unfettered except by the terms of the Constitution itself. It is marvellous what healing and oblivion peace has wrought, how the traces of Reconstruction have worn away. But a certain deep effect abides. It is within, not upon the surface. It is of the spirit, not of the body. A revolution was carried through when war was done which may be better comprehended if likened to England's subtle making over, that memorable year 1688. Though she punctiliously kept to the forms of her law, England then dismissed a king almost as, in later years, she would have dismissed a minister; though she preserved the procedure of her constitution intact, she in fact gave a final touch of change to its spirit. She struck irresponsible power away, and made her government once for all a constitutional government. The change had been insensibly a-making for many a long age; but now it was accomplished consciously and at a stroke. Her constitution, finished, was not what it had been until this last stroke was given,—when silent forces had at last found sudden voice, and the culminating change was deliberately made.

Nearly the same can be said of the effect of the war and of the reconstruction of the southern states upon our own government. It was a revolution of consciousness,

—of mind and purpose. A government which had been in its spirit federal became, almost of a sudden, national in temper and point of view. The national spirit had long been a-making. Many a silent force, which grew quite unobserved, from generation to generation, in pervasiveness and might, in quiet times of wholesome peace and mere increase of nature, had been breeding these thoughts which now sprang so vividly into consciousness. The very growth of the nation, the very lapse of time and uninterrupted habit of united action, the mere mixture and movement and distribution of populations, the mere accretions of policy, the mere consolidation of interests, had been building and strengthening new tissue of nationality the years through, and drawing links stronger than links of steel round about the invisible body of common thought and purpose which is the substance of nations. When the great crisis of secession came, men knew at once how their spirits were ruled, men of the South as well as men of the North,—in what institutions and conceptions of government their blood was fixed to run; and a great and instant readjustment took place, which was for the South, the minority, practically the readjustment of conquest and fundamental reconstruction, but which was for the North, the region which had been transformed, nothing more than an awakening.

It cannot be said that the forms of the Constitution were observed in this quick change as the forms of the English constitution had been observed when the Stuarts were finally shown the door. There were no forms for such a business. For several years, therefore, Congress was permitted to do by statute what, under the long-practiced conceptions of our federal law, could properly be done only by constitutional amendment. The necessity for that gone by, it was suffered to embody what it had already enacted and put into force as law into the Constitution, not by the free will of the country at large, but by the compulsions of mere force exercised upon a

minority whose assent was necessary to the formal completion of its policy. The result restored, practically entire, the forms of the Constitution; but not before new methods and irregular, the methods of majorities, but not the methods of law, had been openly learned and practiced, and learned in a way not likely to be forgot. Changes of law in the end gave authentic body to many of the most significant changes of thought which had come, with its new consciousness, to the nation. A citizenship of the United States were created; additional private civil rights were taken within the jurisdiction of the general government; additional prohibitions were put upon the states; the suffrage was in a measure made subject to national regulation. But the real change was the change of air,—a change of conception with regard to the power of Congress, the guiding and compulsive efficacy of national legislation, the relation of the life of the land to the supremacy of the national lawmaking body. All policy thenceforth wore a different aspect.

We realize it now, in the presence of novel enterprises, at the threshold of an unlooked-for future. It is evident that empire is an affair of strong government, and not of the nice and somewhat artificial poise or of the delicate compromises of structure and authority characteristic of a mere federal partnership. Undoubtedly, the impulse of expansion is the natural and wholesome impulse which comes with a consciousness of matured strength; but it is also a direct result of that national spirit which the war between the states cried so wide awake, and to which the processes of Reconstruction gave the subtle assurance of practically unimpeded sway and a free choice of means. The revolution lies there, as natural as it was remarkable and full of prophecy. It is this which makes the whole period of Reconstruction so peculiarly worthy of our study. Every step of the policy, every feature of the time, which

wrought this subtle transformation, should receive our careful scrutiny. We are now far enough removed from the time to make that scrutiny both close and dispassionate. A new age gives it a new significance.

DEMOCRACY AND EFFICIENCY

FROM THE "ATLANTIC MONTHLY," MARCH, 1901, VOL.
LXXXVII, PP. 289-299.

IT is no longer possible to mistake the reaction against democracy. The nineteenth century was above all others a century of democracy; and yet the world is no more convinced of the benefits of democracy as a form of government at its end than it was at its beginning. The history of closeted Switzerland has not been accepted as proving the stability of democratic institutions; the history of the United States has not been accepted as establishing their tendency to make governments just and liberal and pure. Their eccentric influence in France, their disastrous and revolutionary operation in South America, their power to intoxicate and their powerlessness to reform,—except where the states which use them have had in their training and environment what Switzerland or the colonies and commonwealths sprung from England have had, to strengthen and steady them,—have generally been deemed to offset every triumph or success they can boast. When we praise democracy, we are still put to our proofs; when we excuse its errors, we are understood to have admitted its failure.

There need be in this, however, no serious discouragement for us, whose democratic institutions have in all large things succeeded. It means nothing more than that the world is at last ready to accept the moral long ago drawn for it by de Tocqueville. He predicted the stability of the government of the United States, not because of its intrinsic excellence, but because of its suitability to the particular social, economic, and polit-

ical conditions of the people and the country for whose use and administration it had been framed; because of the deliberation and sober sagacity with which it had been devised and set up; because it could reckon upon a sufficient "variety of information and excellence of discretion" on the part of the people who were to live under it to insure its intelligent operation; because he observed a certain uniformity of civilization to obtain throughout the country, and saw its affairs steadied by their fortunate separation from European politics; because he found a sober, religious habit of thought among our people, and a clear sense of right. Democracy was with us, he perceived, already a thing of principle and custom and nature, and our institutions admirably expressed our training and experience. No other people could expect to succeed by the same means, unless those means equally suited their character and stage of development. Democracy, like every other form of government, depended for its success upon qualities and conditions which it did not itself create, but only obeyed.

Many excellent suggestions, valid and applicable everywhere, we have given the world, with regard to the spirit in which government should be conducted. No doubt class privilege has been forever discredited because of our example. We have taught the world the principle of the general welfare as the object and end of government, rather than the prosperity of any class or section of the nation, or the preferment of any private or petty interest. We have made the law appear to all men an instrument wherewith to secure equality of rights and a protection which shall be without respect of persons. There can be no misgivings about the currency or the permanency of the *principles* of right which we have exalted. But we have not equally commended the forms or the organizations of the government under which we live.

A federal union of diverse commonwealths we have indeed made to seem both practicable and efficient as a

means of organizing government on a great scale, while preserving at the same time the utmost possible latitude and independence in local self-government. Germany, Canada, Australia, Switzerland herself, have built and strengthened their constitutions in large part upon our model. It would be hard to exaggerate the shock which has been given to old theories, or the impetus which has been given to hopeful experiment, in the field of political action, by our conspicuous successes as constitution-makers and reformers. But those successes have not been unlimited. We have not escaped the laws of error that government is heir to. It is said that riots and disorders are more frequent amongst us than in any other country of the same degree of civilization; justice is not always done in our courts; our institutions do not prevent, they do not seem even to moderate, contests between capital and labor; our laws of property are no more equitable, our laws of marriage no more moralizing, than those of undemocratic nations, our contemporaries; our cities are perhaps worse governed than any in Europe outside the Turkish Empire and Spain; crime defies or evades the law amongst us as amongst other peoples, less favored in matters of freedom and privilege; we have no monopoly either of happiness or of enlightened social order. As we grow older, we grow also perplexed and awkward in the doing of justice and in the perfecting and safeguarding of liberty. It is character and good principle, after all, which are to save us, if we are to escape disaster.

That moral is the justification of what we have attempted. It is for this that we love democracy: for the emphasis it puts on character; for its tendency to exalt the purposes of the average man to some high level of endeavor; for its just principle of common assent in matters in which all are concerned; for its ideals of duty and its sense of brotherhood. Its forms and institutions are meant to be subservient to these things. Democracy is merely the most radical form of "constitutional" gov-

ernment. A "constitutional" government is one in which there is a definite understanding as to the sphere and powers of government; one in which individual liberty is defined and guaranteed by specific safeguards, in which the authority and the functions of those who rule are limited and determined by unmistakable custom or explicit fundamental law. It is a government in which these understandings are kept up, alike in the making and in the execution of laws, by frequent conferences between those who govern and those who are governed. This is the purpose of representation: stated conference and a cordial agreement between those who govern and those who are governed. The process of the understanding is discussion,—public and continuous, and conducted by those who stand in the midst of affairs, at the official centre and seat of management, where affairs can be looked into and disposed with full knowledge and authority; those intrusted with government being present in person, the people by deputy.

Representative government has had its long life and excellent development, not in order that common opinion, the opinion of the street, might prevail, but in order that the best opinion, the opinion generated by the best possible methods of general counsel, might rule in affairs; in order that some sober and best opinion might be created, by thoughtful and responsible discussion conducted by men intimately informed concerning the public weal, and officially commissioned to look to its safeguarding and advancement,—by discussion in parliaments, discussion face to face between authoritative critics and responsible ministers of state.

This is the central object to which we have devoted our acknowledged genius for practical politics. During the first half century of our national life we seemed to have succeeded in an extraordinary degree in approaching our ideal, in organizing a nation for counsel and co-operation, and in moving forward with cordial unison and with confident and buoyant step toward the accom-

plishment of tasks and duties upon which all were agreed. Our later life has disclosed serious flaws, has even seemed ominous of pitiful failure, in some of the things we most prided ourselves upon having managed well: notably, in pure and efficient local government, in the successful organization of great cities, and in well-considered schemes of administration. The boss—a man elected by no votes, preferred by no open process of choice, occupying no office of responsibility—makes himself a veritable tyrant amongst us, and seems to cheat us of self-government; parties appear to hamper the movements of opinion rather than to give them form and means of expression; multitudinous voices of agitation, an infinite play of forces at cross-purpose, confuse us; and there seems to be no common counsel or definite union for action, after all.

We keep heart the while because still sure of our principles and of our ideals: the common weal, a common and cordial understanding in matters of government, secure private rights and yet concerted public action, a strong government and yet liberty also. We know what we have to do; what we have missed and mean to find; what we have lost and mean to recover; what we still strive after and mean to achieve. Democracy is a principle with us, not a mere form of government. What we have blundered at is its new applications and details, its successful combination with efficiency and purity in governmental action. We tell ourselves that our partial failure in these things has been due to our absorption in the tasks of material growth, that our practical genius has spent itself upon wealth and the organization of industry. But it is to be suspected that there are other elements in the singular fact. We have supposed that there could be one way of efficiency for democratic governments and another for monarchical. We have declined to provide ourselves with a professional civil service, because we deemed it undemocratic; we have made shift to do without a trained

diplomatic and consular service, because we thought the training given by other governments to their foreign agents unnecessary in the case of affairs so simple and unsophisticated as the foreign relations of a democracy in politics and trade,—transactions so frank, so open, so straightforward, interests so free from all touch of chicane or indirection; we have hesitated to put our presidents or governors or mayors into direct and responsible relations of leadership with our legislatures and councils in the making of laws and ordinances, because such a connection between lawmakers and executive officers seemed inconsistent with the theory of checks and balances whose realization in practice we understood Montesquieu to have proved essential to the maintenance of a free government. Our theory, in short, has paid as little heed to efficiency as our practice. It has been a theory of non-professionalism in public affairs; and in many great matters of public action non-professionalism is non-efficiency.

“If only we had our old leisure for domestic affairs, we should devise a way of our own to be efficient, consonant with our principles, characteristic of our genius for organization,” we have heard men say. “How fatal it may prove to us that our attention has been called off from a task but half done to the tasks of the world, for which we have neither inclination nor proper training nor suitable organization,—from which, until now, we were so happily free! We shall now be forever barred from perfection, our own perfection, at home!” But may it not be that the future will put another face upon the matter, and show us our advantage where least we thought it to lie? May it not be that the way to perfection lies along these new paths of struggle, of discipline, and of achievement? What will the reaction of new duty be? What self-revelations will it afford; what lessons of unified will, of simplified method, of clarified purpose; what disclosures of the fundamental principles

of right action, the efficient means of just achievement, if we but keep our ideals and our character?

At any rate, it is clear that we could not have held off. The affairs of the world stand in such a case, the principles for which we have battled the long decades through are now put in such jeopardy amidst the contests of nations, the future of mankind faces so great a peril of reactionary revolution, that our own private business must take its chances along with the greater business of the world at large. We dare not stand neutral. All mankind deem us the representatives of the moderate and sensible discipline which makes free men good citizens, of enlightened systems of law and a temperate justice, of the best experience in the reasonable methods and principles of self-government, of public force made consistent with individual liberty; and we shall not realize these ideals at home, if we suffer them to be hopelessly discredited amongst the peoples who have yet to see liberty and the peaceable days of order and comfortable progress. We should lose heart ourselves, did we suffer the world to lose faith in us as the champions of these things.

There is no masking or concealing the new order of the world. It is not the world of the eighteenth century, nor yet of the nineteenth. A new era has come upon us like a sudden vision of things unpropheied, and for which no polity has been prepared. Here is straightway a new frontage for the nations,—this frontage toward the Orient. Our almost accidental possession of the Philippines has put us in the very presence of the forces which must make the politics of the twentieth century radically unlike the politics of the nineteenth; but we must have taken cognizance of them and dealt with them in any event. They concern us as nearly as they concern any other nation in the world. They concern all nations, for they shall determine the future of the race. Fortunately, they have not disclosed themselves before we were ready. I do not mean that our

thought was prepared for them; I do not mean that our domestic affairs were in such shape as to seem fairly well ordered, so that we might in good conscience turn from them as from things finished and complete, and divert our energies to tasks beyond our borders. I mean that this change in the order of the world came, so far as we are concerned, at the natural point in our national development. The matter is worth looking into.

There has been a certain singular unity in our national task, hitherto; and these new duties now thrust upon us will not break that unity. They will perpetuate it, rather, and make it complete, if we keep but our integrity and our old-time purpose true. Until 1890 the United States had always a frontier; looked always to a region beyond, unoccupied, unappropriated, an outlet for its energy, a new place of settlement and of achievement for its people. For nearly three hundred years their growth had followed a single law,—the law of expansion into new territory. Themselves through all their history a frontier, the English colonies in America grew into a nation whose life poured still with strong tide along the old channel. Over the mountains on to the long slopes that descended to the Mississippi, across the great river into the plains, up the plains to the crowning heights of the Rockies, beyond the Rockies to the Pacific, slowly moved the frontier nation. England sought colonies at the ends of the earth to set her energy free and give vent to her enterprise; we, a like people in every impulse of mastery and achievement, had our own vast continent and were satisfied. There was always space and adventure enough and to spare, to satisfy the feet of our young men.

The great process put us to the making of states; kept the wholesome blood of sober and strenuous and systematic work warm within us; perpetuated in us the spirit of initiative and of practical expediency which had made of the colonies vigorous and heady states; created in us that national feeling which finally put sectionalism

from the field and altered the very character of the government; gave us the question of the extension of slavery, brought on the civil war, and decided it by the weight of the West. From coast to coast across the great continent our institutions have spread, until the western sea has witnessed the application upon a great scale of what was begun upon a small scale on the shores of the Atlantic, and the drama has been played almost to its last act,—the drama of institutional construction on the vast scale of a continent. The whole European world, which gave us our materials, has been moralized and liberalized by the striking and stupendous spectacle.

No other modern nation has been schooled as we have been in big undertakings and the mastery of novel difficulties. We have become confirmed in energy, in resourcefulness, in practical proficiency, in self-confidence. We have become confirmed, also, so far as our character is concerned, in the habit of acting under an odd mixture of selfish and altruistic motives. Having ourselves a population fit to be free, making good its freedom in every sort of unhampered enterprise, determining its own destiny unguided and unbidden, moving as it pleased within wide boundaries, using institutions, not dominated by them, we have sympathized with freedom everywhere; have deemed it niggardly to deny an equal degree of freedom to any race or community that desired it; have pressed handsome principles of equity in international dealings; have rejoiced to believe that our principles might some day make every government a servant, not a master, of its people. Ease and prosperity have made us wish the whole world to be as happy and well to do as ourselves; and we have supposed that institutions and principles like our own were the simple prescription for making them so. And yet, when issues of our own interest arose, we have not been unselfish. We have shown ourselves kin to all the world, when it came to pushing an advantage. Our action

against Spain in the Floridas, and against Mexico on the coasts of the Pacific; our attitude toward first the Spaniards, and then the French, with regard to the control of the Mississippi; the unpitying force with which we thrust the Indians to the wall wherever they stood in our way, have suited our professions of peacefulness and justice and liberality no better than the aggressions of other nations that were strong and not to be gainsaid. Even Mr. Jefferson, philanthropist and champion of peaceable and modest government though he was, exemplified this double temper of the people he ruled. "Peace is our passion," he had declared; but the passion abated when he saw the mouth of the Mississippi about to pass into the hands of France. Though he had loved France and hated England, he did not hesitate then what language to hold. "There is on the globe," he wrote to Mr. Livingston at Paris, "one single spot the possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy. The day that France takes possession of New Orleans seals the union of two nations, who, in conjunction, can maintain exclusive possession of the sea. From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation." Our interests must march forward, altruists though we are: other nations must see to it that they stand off, and do not seek to stay us.

It is only just now, however, that we have awakened to our real relationship to the rest of mankind. Absorbed in our own development, we had fallen into a singular ignorance of the rest of the world. The isolation in which we lived was quite without parallel in modern history. Our only near neighbor of any consequence was like ourselves in every essential particular. The life of Canada has been unlike ours only in matters which have turned out in the long run to be matters of detail; only because she has had direct political connection with the mother country, and because she has had to work out the problem of forming a real union of life and sentiment between alien strains of French and

English blood in her population. The contrast grows less and less between the two sides of the friendly border. And so we have looked upon nothing but our own ways of living, and have been formed in isolation. This has made us—not provincial, exactly: upon so big and various a continent there could not be the single pattern of thought and manners and purpose to be found cloistered in a secluded province. But if *provincial* be not the proper word, it suggests the actual fact. We have, like provincials, too habitually confined our view to the range of our own experiences. We have acquired a false self-confidence, a false self-sufficiency, because we have heeded no successes or failures but our own.

There could be no better illustration of this than the constant reargument, *de novo*, of the money question among us, and the easy currency to be obtained, at every juncture of financial crisis, for the most childish errors with regard to the well-known laws of value and exchange. No nation not isolated like ourselves in thought and experience could possibly think itself able to establish a value of its own for gold and silver, by legislation which paid no regard either to the commercial operations or to the laws of coinage and exchange which obtained outside its own borders. That a great political party should be able to win men of undoubted cultivation and practical sense to the support of a platform which embodied palpable and thrice-proven errors in such matters, and that, too, at a great election following close upon protracted, earnest, frank, and universal discussion, and should poll but little less than half the votes of the nation, is startling proof enough that we have learned to think, for the most part, only in terms of our own separate life and independent action, and have come to think ourselves a divided portion of mankind, masters and makers of our own laws of trade.

We have been equally deceived in matters in which we might more reasonably have deemed ourselves accredited experts. Misled by our own splendid initial

advantage in the matter of self-government, we have suffered ourselves to misunderstand self-government itself, when the question was whether it could be put into practice amidst conditions totally unlike those with which, and with which alone, we have been familiar. The people of the United States have never known anything but self-government since the colonies were founded. They have forgotten the discipline which preceded the founding of the colonies, the long drill in order and in obedience to law, the long subjection to kings and to parliaments which were not in fact of the people's choosing. They have forgotten how many generations were once in tutelage in order that the generations which discovered and settled the coasts of America might be mature and free. No thoughtful student of history or observer of affairs needs to be told the necessary conditions precedent to self-government: the slow growth of the sense of law; the equally slow growth of the sense of community and of fellowship in every general interest; the habit of organization, the habit of discipline and obedience to those intrusted with authority, the self-restraint of give and take; the allegiance to ideals, the consciousness of mutual obligation; the patience and intelligence which are content with a slow and universal growth. These things have all been present in abundant measure in our own national life; but we have not deemed them singular, and have assumed that they were within reach of all others as well, and at as little cost of conscious effort.

Our own form of self-government is, in fact, by no means the one necessary and inevitable form. England is the oldest home of self-government in the modern world; our own principles and practices of self-government were derived from her; she has served as the model and inspiring example of self-government for every country in Europe throughout a century of democratic reform. And yet England did not have what we should call local self-government until 1888, outside her bor-

oughs. Until 1888, influential country gentlemen, appointed justices of the peace by the crown upon the nomination of the Lord Chancellor, were the governing officers of her counties. Practically every important matter of local administration was in their hands, and yet the people of the counties had absolutely no voice in their selection. Things had stood so for more than four hundred years. Professor Rudolph Gneist, the great German student of English institutions, in expounding English ideas of self-government as he found them exemplified in the actual organization of local administration, declared that the word *government* was quite as emphatic in the compound as the word *self*. The people of the counties were not self-directed in affairs: they were governed by crown officials. The policy of the crown was indeed moderated and guided in all things by the influence of a representative parliament; the justices received no salaries; were men resident in the counties for which they were commissioned, identified with them in life and interest, landlords and neighbors among the men whose public affairs they administered. They had nothing to gain by oppression, much to gain by the real advancement of prosperity and good feeling within their jurisdictions: they were in a very excellent and substantial sense representative men. But they were not elected representatives; their rule was not democratic either in form or in principle. Such was the local self-government of England during some of the most notable and honorable periods of her history.

Our own, meanwhile, though conceived in the same atmosphere and spirit, had been set up upon a very different pattern, suitable to a different order of society. The appointment of officials was discredited amongst us; election everywhere took its place. We made no hierarchy of officials. We made laws,—laws for the selectmen, laws for the sheriff, laws for the county commissioners, laws for the district attorney, laws

for each official from bailiff to governor,—and bade the courts see to their enforcement; but we did not subordinate one officer to another. No man was commanded from the capital, as if he were a servant of officials rather than of the people. Authority was put into commission and distributed piecemeal; nowhere gathered or organized into a single commanding force. Oversight and concentration were omitted from the system. Federal administration, it is true, we constituted upon a different principle,—the principle of appointment and of responsibility to the President; but we did not, when that new departure was made, expect the patronage of the President to be large, or look to see the body of federal officials play any very important or intimate part in our life as a people. The rule was to be, as before, the dispersion of authority. We printed the *SELF* large and the *government* small in almost every administrative arrangement we made; and that is still our attitude and preference.

We have found that even among ourselves such arrangements are not universally convenient or serviceable. They give us untrained officials, and an expert civil service is almost unknown amongst us. They give us petty officials, petty men of no ambition, without hope or fitness for advancement. They give us so many elective offices that even the most conscientious voters have neither the time nor the opportunity to inform themselves with regard to every candidate on their ballots, and must vote for a great many men of whom they know nothing. They give us, consequently, the local machine and the local boss; and where population crowds, interests compete, work moves strenuously and at haste, life is many-sided and without unity, and voters of every blood and environment and social derivation mix and stare at one another at the same voting places, government miscarries, is confused, irresponsible, unintelligent, wasteful. Methods of electoral choice and administrative organization, which served us admirably

well while the nation was homogeneous and rural, serve us oftentimes ill enough now that the nation is heterogeneous and crowded into cities.

It is of the utmost importance that we should see the unmistakable truth of this matter and act upon it with all candor. It is not a question of the excellence of self-government: it is a question of the method of self-government, and of choosing which word of the compound we shall emphasize in any given case. It is a matter of separating the essentials from the non-essentials, the principle of self-government from its accidental forms. Democracy is unquestionably the most wholesome and livable kind of government the world has yet tried. It supplies as no other system could the frank and universal criticism, the free play of individual thought, the open conduct of public affairs, the spirit and pride of community and of coöperation, which make governments just and public-spirited. But the question of efficiency is the same for it as for any other kind of polity; and if only it have the principle of representation at the centre of its arrangements, where counsel is held and policy determined and law made, it can afford to put into its administrative organization any kind of businesslike power or official authority and any kind of discipline as if of a profession that it may think most likely to serve it. This we shall see, and this we shall do.

It is the more imperative that we should see and do it promptly, because it is our present and immediate task to extend self-government to Porto Rico and the Philippines, if they be fit to receive it,—so soon as they can be made fit. If there is to be preparation, we must know of what kind it should be, and how it ought to be conducted. Although we have forgotten our own preparatory discipline in that kind, these new tasks will undoubtedly teach us that some discipline—it may be prolonged and tedious—must precede self-government and prepare the way for it; that one kind of self-government is suitable for one sort of community, one stage of de-

velopment, another for another; that there is no universal form or method either of preparation or of practice in the matter; that character and the moralizing effect of law are conditions precedent, obscure, and difficult, but absolutely indispensable. An examination of our own affairs will teach us these things; an examination of the affairs of the peoples we have undertaken to govern will confirm us in the understanding of them.

We shall see now more clearly than ever before that we lack in our domestic arrangements, above all things else, concentration, both in political leadership and in administrative organization; for the lack will be painfully emphasized, and will embarrass us sadly in the career we have now set out upon. Authority has been as much dispersed and distributed in the making of law and the choice of policy, under the forms we have used hitherto, as it has been in administrative action. We have been governed in all things by mass meetings. Committees of Congress, as various in their make-up as the body itself, sometimes guided by the real leaders of party, oftener guided by men whom the country at large neither knew nor looked to for leadership, have determined our national policy, piece by piece, and the pieces have seldom been woven together into any single or consistent pattern of statesmanship. There has been no leadership except the private leadership of party managers, no integration of the public business except such as was effected by the compromises and votes of party caucuses. Such methods will serve very awkwardly, if at all, for action in international affairs or in the government of distant dependencies. In such matters leadership must be single, open, responsible, and of the whole. Leadership and expert organization have become imperative, and our practical sense, never daunted hitherto, must be applied to the task of developing them at once and with a will.

We did not of deliberate choice undertake these new tasks which shall transform us. All the world knows

the surprising circumstances which thrust them upon us. Sooner or later, nevertheless, they would have become inevitable. If they had not come upon us in this way, they would have come in another. They came upon us, at it was, though unexpected, with a strange opportuneness, as if part of a great preconceived plan for changing the world. Every man now knows that the world is to be changed,—changed according to an ordering of Providence hardly so much as foreshadowed until it came; except, it may be, to a few Europeans who were burrowing and plotting and dreaming in the mysterious East. The whole world had already become a single vicinage; each part had become neighbor to all the rest. No nation could live any longer to itself, the tasks and the duties of neighborhood being what they were. Whether we had had a material foothold there or not, it would have been the duty of the United States to play a part, and a leading part at that, in the opening and transformation of the East. We might not have seen our duty, had the Philippines not fallen to us by the willful fortune of war; but it would have been our duty, nevertheless, to play the part we now see ourselves obliged to play. The East is to be opened and transformed, whether we will or no; the standards of the West are to be imposed upon it; nations and peoples which have stood still the centuries through are to be quickened, and make part of the universal world of commerce and of ideas which has so steadily been a-making by the advance of European power from age to age. It is our peculiar duty, as it is also England's, to moderate the process in the interests of liberty: to impart to the peoples thus driven out upon the road of change, so far as we have opportunity or can make it, our own principles of self-help; teach them order and self-control in the midst of change; impart to them, if it be possible by contact and sympathy and example, the drill and habit of law and obedience which we long ago got out of the strenuous processes of English history; secure

for them, when we may, the free intercourse and the natural development which shall make them at least equal members of the family of nations. In China, of course, our part will be indirect, but in the Philippines it will be direct; and there in particular must the moral of our polity be set up and vindicated.

This we shall do, not by giving them out of hand our codes of political morality or our methods of political action, the generous gifts of complete individual liberty or the full-fangled institutions of American self-government,—a purple garment for their nakedness,—for these things are not blessings, but a curse, to undeveloped peoples, still in the childhood of their political growth; but by giving them, in the spirit of service, a government and rule which shall moralize them by being itself moral, elevate and steady them by being itself pure and steadfast, inducting them into the rudiments of justice and freedom. In other words, it is the aid of our character they need, and not the premature aid of our institutions. Our institutions must come after the ground of character and habit has been made ready for them; as effect, not cause, in the order of political growth. It is thus that we shall ourselves recognize the fact, at last patent to all the world, that the service of democracy has been the development of ideals rather than the origination of practical methods of administration of universal validity, or any absolute qualification of the ultimate conceptions of sovereignty and the indispensable disciplinary operation of law. We must aid their character and elevate their ideals, and then see what these will bring forth, generating after their kind. As the panacea for oppressive taxation lies in honesty and economy rather than in this, that, or the other method of collection, in reasonable assessment rather than in a particular machinery of administration, so the remedy for oppressive government in general is, not a constitution, but justice and enlightenment. One set of guaran-

tees will be effective under one set of circumstances, another under another.

The best guarantee of good government we can give the Filipinos is, that we shall be sensitive to the opinion of the world; that we shall be sensitive in what we do to our own standards, so often boasted of and proclaimed, and shall wish above all things else to live up to the character we have established, the standards we have professed. When they accept the compulsions of that character and accept those standards, they will be entitled to partnership with us, and shall have it. They shall, meanwhile, teach us, as we shall teach them. We shall teach them order as a condition precedent to liberty, self-control as a condition precedent to self-government; they shall teach us the true assessment of institutions,—that their only invaluable content is motive and character. We shall no doubt learn that democracy and efficiency go together by no novel rule. Democracy is not so much a form of government as a set of principles. Other forms of government may be equally efficient; many forms of government are more efficient,—know better ways of integrating and purifying administration than we have yet learned, more successful methods of imparting drill and order to restless and undeveloped peoples than we are likely to hit upon of ourselves, a more telling way of getting and a more effectual way of keeping leadership in a world of competitive policies, doubtful concerts, and international rivalries. We must learn what we can, and yet scrupulously square everything that we do with the high principles we brought into the world: that justice may be done to the lowly no less than to the great; that government may serve its people, not make itself their master,—may in its service heed both the wishes and the needs of those who obey it; that authority may be for leadership, not for aggrandizement; that the people may be the state.

The reactions which such experiments in the universal validity of principle and method are likely to bring about in respect of our own domestic institutions cannot be calculated or forecast. Old principles applied in a new field may show old applications to have been clumsy and ill considered. We may ourselves get responsible leadership instead of government by mass meeting; a trained and thoroughly organized administrative service instead of administration by men privately nominated and blindly elected; a new notion of terms of office and of standards of policy. If we but keep our ideals clear, our principles steadfast, we need not fear the change.

THE IDEALS OF AMERICA ¹

FROM THE "ATLANTIC MONTHLY," DECEMBER, 1902,
VOL. XC, PP. 721-734. THIS ARTICLE APPEARED
THE FIRST YEAR MR. WILSON WAS PRESIDENT OF
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.

WE do not think or speak of the War for Independence as if we were aged men who, amidst alien scenes of change, comfort themselves with talk of great things done in days long gone by, the like of which they may never hope to see again. The spirit of the old days is not dead. If it were, who amongst us would care for its memory and distant, ghostly voice? It is the distinguishing mark, nay the very principle of life in a nation alive and quick in every fibre, as ours is, that all its days are great days,—are to its thought single and of a piece. Its past it feels to have been but the prelude and earnest of its present. It is from its memories of days old and new that it gets its sense of identity, takes its spirit of action, assures itself of its power and its capacity, and knows its place in the world. Old colony days, and those sudden days of revolution when debate turned to action and heady winds as if of destiny blew with mighty breath the long continent through, were our own days, the days of our childhood and our headstrong youth. We have not forgotten. Our memories make no effort to recall the time. The battle of Trenton is as real to us as the battle of San Juan hill.

We remember the chill, and the ardor, too, of that gray morning when we came upon the startled outposts

¹ An address delivered on the one hundred and twenty-fifth anniversary of the battle of Trenton, December 26, 1901.

of the town, the driving sleet beating at our backs; the cries and hurrying of men in the street, the confused muster at our front, the sweeping fire of our guns and the rush of our men, Sullivan coming up by the road from the river. Washington at the north, where the road to Princeton is; the showy Hessian colonel shot from his horse amidst his bewildered men; the surrender; the unceasing storm. And then the anxious days that followed: the recrossing of the icy river before even we had rested; the troop of surly prisoners to be cared for and sent forward to Philadelphia; the enemy all the while to be thought of, and the way to use our advantage.

How much it meant a third time to cross the river, and wait here in the town for the regiments Sir William Howe should send against us! How sharp and clear the night was when we gave Cornwallis the slip and took the silent, frosty road to Allentown and Princeton! Those eighteen miles between bedtime and morning are not easily forgot, nor that sharp brush with the redcoats at Princeton: the moving fight upon the sloping hillside, the cannon planted in the streets, the gray old building where the last rally was made,—and then the road to Brunswick, Cornwallis at our heels!

How the face of things was changed in those brief days! There had been despair till then. It was but a few short weeks since the men of the Jersey towns and farms had seen us driven south across the river like fugitives; now we came back an army again, the Hessians who had but the other day harried and despoiled that countryside beaten and scattered before us, and they knew not whether to believe their eyes or not. As we pushed forward to the heights at Morristown we drew in the British lines behind us, and New Jersey was free of the redcoats again. The Revolution had had its turning point. It was easy then to believe that General Washington could hold his own against any

adversary in that terrible game of war. A new heart was in everything!

And yet what differences of opinion there were, and how hot and emphatic every turn of the war made them among men who really spoke their minds and dissembled nothing! It was but six months since the Congress had ventured its Declaration of Independence, and the brave words of that defiance halted on many lips that read them. There were men enough and to spare who would not speak them at all; who deemed the whole thing madness and deep folly, and even black treason. Men whose names all the colonies knew held off and would take no part in armed resistance to the ancient crown whose immemorial sovereignty kept a great empire together. Men of substance at the ports of trade were almost all against the Revolution; and where men of means and principle led, base men who played for their own interest were sure to follow. Every movement of the patriotic leaders was spied upon and betrayed; everywhere the army moved there were men of the very countryside it occupied to be kept close watch against.

Those were indeed "times that tried men's souls"! It was no light matter to put the feeling as of a nation into those scattered settlements: to bring the high-spirited planters of the Carolinas, who thought for themselves, or their humble neighbors on the upland farms, who ordered their lives as they pleased, to the same principles and point of view that the leaders of Virginia and Massachusetts professed and occupied,—the point of view from which everything wore so obvious an aspect of hopeful revolt, where men planned the war at the north. There were great families at Philadelphia and in Boston itself who were as hard to win, and plain men without number in New York and the Jerseys who would not come for the beckoning. Opinion was always making and to be made, and the campaign of mind was as hard as that of arms.

To think of those days of doubt and stress, of the swaying of opinion this way and that, of counsels distracted and plans to be made anew at every turn of the arduous business, takes one's thoughts forward to those other days, as full of doubt, when the war had at last been fought out and a government was to be made. No doubt that crisis was the greatest of all. Opinion will form for a war, in the face of manifest provocation and of precious rights called in question. But the making of a government is another matter. And the government to be made then was to take the place of the government cast off: there was the rub. It was difficult to want any common government at all after fighting to be quit of restraint and overlordship altogether; and it went infinitely hard to be obliged to make it strong, with a right to command and a power to rule. Then it was that we knew that even the long war, with its bitter training of the thoughts and its hard discipline of union, had not made a nation, but only freed a group of colonies. The debt is the more incalculable which we owe to the little band of sagacious men who labored the summer through, in that far year 1787, to give us a Constitution that those heady little commonwealths could be persuaded to accept, and which should yet be a framework within which the real powers of a nation might grow in the fullness of time, and gather head with the growth of a mighty people.

They gave us but the outline, the formula, the broad and general programme of our life, and left us to fill it in with such rich store of achievement and sober experience as we should be able to gather in the days to come. Not battles or any stirring scene of days of action, but the slow processes by which we grew and made our thought and formed our purpose in quiet days of peace, are what we find it hard to make real to our minds again, now that we are mature and have fared far upon the road. Our life is so broad and various now, and was so simple then; the thoughts of those first

days seem crude to us now and unreal. We smile upon the simple dreams of our youth a bit incredulously, and seem cut off from them by a great space. And yet it was by those dreams we were formed. The lineage of our thoughts is unbroken. The nation that was making then was the nation which yesterday intervened in the affairs of Cuba, and to-day troubles the trade and the diplomacy of the world.

It was clear to us even then, in those first days when we were at the outset of our life, with what spirit and mission we had come into the world. Clear-sighted men oversea saw it too, whose eyes were not holden by passion or dimmed by looking steadfastly only upon things near at hand. We shall not forget those deathless passages of great speech, compact of music and high sense, in which Edmund Burke justified us and gave us out of his riches our philosophy of right action in affairs of state. Chatham rejoiced that we had resisted. Fox clapped his hands when he heard that Cornwallis had been trapped and taken at Yorktown. Dull men without vision, small men who stood upon no place of elevation in their thoughts, once cried treason against these men,—though no man dared speak such a taunt to the passionate Chatham's face; but now all men speak as Fox spoke, and our Washington is become one of the heroes of the English race. What did it mean that the greatest Englishmen should thus cheer us to revolt at the very moment of our rebellion? What is it that has brought us at last the verdict of the world?

It means that in our stroke for independence we struck a blow for all the world. Some men saw it then; all men see it now. The very generation of Englishmen who stood against us in that day of our struggling birth lived to see the liberating light of that day shine about their own path before they made an end and were gone. They had deep reason before their own day was out to know what it was that Burke had meant when he said, "We cannot falsify the pedigree of this fierce people,

and persuade them that they are not sprung from a nation in whose veins the blood of freedom circulates. The language in which they would hear you tell them this tale would detect the imposition, your speech would betray you. An Englishman is the unfittest person on earth to argue another Englishman into slavery." . . . "For, in order to prove that the Americans have no right to their liberties, we are every day endeavoring to subvert the maxims which preserve the whole spirit of our own. To prove that the Americans ought not to be free, we are obliged to depreciate the value of freedom itself; and we never seem to gain a paltry advantage over them in debate, without attacking some of those principles, or deriding some of those feelings, for which our ancestors have shed their blood."

It turned out that the long struggle in America had been the first act in the drama whose end and culmination should be the final establishment of constitutional government for England and for English communities everywhere. It is easy now, at this quiet distance, for the closeted student to be puzzled how to set up the legal case of the colonists against the authority of Parliament. It is possible now to respect the scruples of the better loyalists, and even to give all honor to the sober ardor of self-sacrifice with which they stood foursquare against the Revolution. We no longer challenge their right. Neither do we search out the motives of the mass of common men who acted upon the one side or the other. Like men in all ages and at every crisis of affairs, they acted each according to his sentiment, his fear, his interest, or his lust. We ask, rather, why did the noble gentlemen to whom it fell to lead America seek great action and embark all their honor in such a cause? What was it they fought for?

A lawyer is puzzled to frame the answer; but no statesman need be. "If I were sure," said Burke, "that the colonists had, at their leaving this country, sealed a regular compact of servitude, that they had solemnly

abjured all the rights of citizens, that they had made a vow to renounce all ideas of liberty for them and their posterity to all generations, yet I should hold myself obliged to conform to the temper I found universally prevalent in my own day, and to govern two millions of men, impatient of servitude, on the principles of freedom. I am not determining a point of law; . . . the general character and situation of a people must determine what sort of government is fit for them." It was no abstract point of governmental theory the leaders of the colonies took the field to expound. Washington, Henry, Adams, Hancock, Franklin, Morris, Boudinot, Livingston, Rutledge, Pinckney,—these were men of affairs, who thought less of books than of principles of action. They fought for the plain right of self-government, which any man could understand. The government oversea had broken faith with them,—not the faith of law, but the faith that is in precedents and ancient understandings, though they be tacit and nowhere spoken in any charter. Hitherto the colonies had been let live their own lives according to their own genius, and vote their own supplies to the crown as if their assemblies were so many parliaments. Now, of a sudden, the Parliament in England was to thrust their assemblies aside and itself lay their taxes. Here was too new a thing. Government without precedent was government without license or limit. It was government by innovation, not government by agreement. Old ways were the only ways acceptable to English feet. The revolutionists stood for no revolution at all, but for the maintenance of accepted practices, for the inviolable understandings of precedent,—in brief, for *constitutional government*.

That sinister change which filled the air of America with storm darkened the skies of England too. Not in America only did George, the king, and his counsellors make light of and willfully set aside the ancient understandings which were the very stuff of liberty in English

eyes. That unrepresentative Parliament, full of placemen, which had taxed America, contained majorities which the king could bestow at his will upon this minister or that; and the men who set America by the ears came or went from their places at his bidding. It was he, not the Parliament, that made and unmade ministries. Behind the nominal ministers of the crown stood men whom Parliament did not deal with, and the nation did not see who were the king's favorites, and therefore the actual rulers of England. There was here the real revolution. America, with her sensitive make-up, her assemblies that were the real representatives of her people, had but felt sooner than the mass of Englishmen at home the unhappy change of air which seemed about to corrupt the constitution itself. Burke felt it in England, and Fox, and every man whose thoughts looked soberly forth upon the signs of the times. And presently, when the American war was over, the nation itself began to see what light the notable thing done in America shed upon its own affairs. The king was to be grappled with at home, the Parliament was to be freed from his power, and the ministers who ruled England were to be made the real servants of the people. Constitutional government was to be made a reality again. We had begun the work of freeing England when we completed the work of freeing ourselves.

The great contest which followed oversea, and which was nothing less than the capital and last process of making and confirming the constitution of England, kept covert beneath the surface of affairs while the wars of the French Revolution swept the world. Not until 1832 was representation in Parliament at last reformed, and the Commons made a veritable instrument of the nation's will. Days of revolution, when ancient kingdoms seemed tottering to their fall, were no days in which to be tinkering the constitution of old England. Her statesmen grew slow and circumspect and moved in all things with infinite prudence, and even with a

novel timidity. But when the times fell quiet again, opinion gathering head for a generation, moved forward at last to its object; and government was once more by consent in England. The Parliament spoke the real mind of the nation, and the leaders whom the Commons approved were of necessity also the ministers of the crown. Men could then look back and see that America had given England the shock, and the crown the opportune defeat, which had awakened her to save her constitution from corruption.

Meanwhile, what of America herself? How had she used the independence she had demanded and won? For a little while she had found it a grievous thing to be free, with no common power set over her to hold her to a settled course of life which should give her energy and bring her peace and honor and increase of wealth. Even when the convention at Philadelphia had given her the admirable framework of a definite constitution, she found it infinitely hard to hit upon a common way of progress under a mere printed law which had no sanction of custom or affection, which no ease of old habit sustained, and no familiar light of old tradition made plain to follow. This new law had yet to be filled with its meanings, had yet to be given its texture of life. Our whole history, from that day of our youth to this day of our glad maturity, has been filled with the process.

It took the War of 1812 to give us spirit and full consciousness and pride of station as a nation. That was the real war of independence for our political parties. It was then we cut our parties and our passions loose from politics oversea, and set ourselves to make a career which should be indeed our own. That accomplished, and our weak youth turned to callow manhood, we stretched our hand forth again to the west, set forth with a new zest and energy upon the western rivers and the rough trails that led across the mountains and down to the waters of the Mississippi. There lay a continent to be possessed. In the very day of first union Virginia

and her sister states had ceded to the common government all the great stretches of western land that lay between the mountains and that mighty river into which all the western waters gathered head. While we were yet weak and struggling for our place among the nations, Mr. Jefferson had added the vast bulk of Louisiana, beyond the river, whose boundaries no man certainly knew. All the great spaces of the continent from Canada round and about by the great Rockies to the warm waters of the southern Gulf lay open to the feet of our young men. The forests rang with their noisy march. What seemed a new race deployed into those broad valleys and out upon those long, unending plains which were the common domain, where no man knew any government but the government of the whole people. That was to be the real making of the nation.

There sprang up the lusty states which now, in these days of our full stature, outnumber almost threefold the thirteen commonwealths which formed the Union. Their growth set the pace of our life; forced the slavery question to a final issue; gave us the civil war with its stupendous upheaval and its resettlement of the very foundations of the government; spread our strength from sea to sea; created us a free and mighty people, whose destinies daunt the imagination of the Old World looking on. That increase, that endless accretion, that rolling, resistless tide, incalculable in its strength, infinite in its variety, has made us what we are; has put the resources of a huge continent at our disposal; has provoked us to invention and given us mighty captains of industry. This great pressure of a people moving always to new frontiers, in search of new lands, new power, the full freedom of a virgin world, has ruled our course and formed our policies like a Fate. It gave us, not Louisiana alone, but Florida also. It forced war with Mexico upon us, and gave us the coasts of the Pacific. It swept Texas into the Union. It made far

Alaska a territory of the United States. Who shall say where it will end?

The census takers of 1890 informed us, when their task was done, that they could no longer find any frontier upon this continent; that they must draw their maps as if the mighty process of settlement that had gone on, ceaseless, dramatic, the century through, were now ended and complete, the nation made from sea to sea. We had not pondered their report a single decade before we made new frontiers for ourselves beyond the seas, accounting the seven thousand miles of ocean that lie between us and the Philippine Islands no more than the three thousand which once lay between us and the coasts of the Pacific. No doubt there is here a great revolution in our lives. No war ever transformed us quite as the war with Spain transformed us. No previous years ever ran with so swift a change as the years since 1898. We have witnessed a new revolution. We have seen the transformation of America completed. That little group of states, which one hundred and twenty-five years ago cast the sovereignty of Britain off, is now grown into a mighty power. That little confederation has now massed and organized its energies. A confederacy is transformed into a nation. The battle of Trenton was not more significant than the battle of Manila. The nation that was one hundred and twenty-five years in the making has now stepped forth into the open arena of the world.

I ask you to stand with me at this new turning-point of our life, that we may look before and after, and judge ourselves alike in the light of that old battle fought here in these streets, and in the light of all the mighty processes of our history that have followed. We cannot too often give ourselves such challenge of self-examination. It will hearten, it will steady, it will moralize us to reassess our hopes, restate our ideals, and make manifest to ourselves again the principles and the purposes upon which we act. We are else without chart upon a novel voyage.

What are our thoughts now, as we look back from this altered age to the Revolution which to-day we celebrate? How do we think of its principles and of its example? Do they seem remote and of a time not our own, or do they still seem stuff of our thinking, principles near and intimate, and woven into the very texture of our institutions? What say we now of liberty and of self-government, its embodiment? What lessons have we read of it on our journey hither to this high point of outlook at the beginning of a new century? Do those old conceptions seem to us now an ideal modified, of altered face, and of a mien not shown in the simple days when the government was formed?

Of course forms have changed. The form of the Union itself is altered, to the model that was in Hamilton's thought rather than to that which Jefferson once held before us, adorned, transfigured, in words that led the mind captive. Our ways of life are profoundly changed since that dawn. The balance of the states against the federal government, however it may strike us now as of capital convenience in the distribution of powers and the quick and various exercise of the energies of the people, no longer seems central to our conceptions of governmental structure, no longer seems of the essence of the people's liberty. We are no longer strenuous about the niceties of constitutional law; no longer dream that a written law shall save us, or that by ceremonial cleanliness we may lift our lives above corruption. But has the substance of things changed with us, also? Wherein now do we deem the life and very vital principle of self-government to lie? Where is that point of principle at which we should wish to make our stand and take again the final risk of revolution? What other crisis do we dream of that might bring in its train another battle of Trenton?

These are intensely practical questions. We fought but the other day to give Cuba self-government. It is a point of conscience with us that the Philippines shall

have it, too, when our work there is done and they are ready. But when will our work there be done, and how shall we know when they are ready? How, when our hand is withdrawn from her capitals and she plays her game of destiny apart and for herself, shall we be sure that Cuba has this blessing of liberty and self-government, for which battles are justly fought and revolutions righteously set afoot? If we be apostles of liberty and of self-government, surely we know what they are, in their essence and without disguise of form, and shall not be deceived in the principles of their application by mere differences between this race and that. We have given pledges to the world and must redeem them as we can.

Some nice tests of theory are before us,—are even now at hand. There are those amongst us who have spoken of the Filipinos as standing where we stood when we were in the throes of that great war which was turned from fear to hope again in that battle here in the streets of Trenton which we are met to speak of, and who have called Aguinaldo, the winning, subtle youth now a prisoner in our hands at Manila, a second Washington. Have they, then, forgotten that tragic contrast upon which the world gazed in the days when our Washington was President: on the one side of the sea, in America, peace, an ordered government, a people busy with the tasks of mart and home, a group of commonwealths bound together by strong cords of their own weaving, institutions sealed and confirmed by debate and the suffrages of free men, but not by the pouring out of blood in civil strife,—on the other, in France, a nation frenzied, distempered, seeking it knew not what,—a nation which poured its best blood out in a vain sacrifice, which cried of liberty and self-government until the heavens rang and yet ran straight and swift to anarchy, to give itself at last, with an almost glad relief, to the masterful tyranny of a soldier? “I should suspend my congratulations on the new liberty of

France," said Burke, the master who had known our liberty for what it was, and knew this set up in France to be spurious,—“I should suspend my congratulations on the new liberty of France until I was informed how it had been combined with government; with public force; with the discipline and obedience of armies; with the collection of an effective and well-distributed revenue; with morality and religion; with the solidity of property; with peace and order; with social and civil manners.” Has it not taken France a century to effect the combination; and are all men sure that she has found it even now? And yet were not these things combined with liberty amongst us from the very first?

How interesting a light shines upon the matter of our thought out of that sentence of Burke's! How liberty had been combined with government! Is there here a difficulty, then? Are the two things not kindly disposed toward one another? Does it require any nice art and adjustment to unite and reconcile them? Is there here some cardinal test which those amiable persons have overlooked, who have dared to cheer the Filipino rebels on in their stubborn resistance to the very government they themselves live under and owe fealty to? Think of Washington's passion for order, for authority, for some righteous public force which should teach individuals their place under government, for the solidity of property, for morality and sober counsel. It was plain that he cared not a whit for liberty without these things to sustain and give it dignity. “You talk, my good sir,” he exclaimed, writing to Henry Lee in Congress, “you talk of employing influence to appease the present tumults in Massachusetts. I know not where that influence is to be found, or, if attainable, that it would be a proper remedy for the disorders. *Influence* is no *government*. Let us have one by which our lives, liberties, and properties will be secured, or let us know the worst at once.” In brief, the fact is this, that liberty is the privilege of maturity, of self-control, of self-mastery

and a thoughtful care for righteous dealings,—that some peoples may have it, therefore, and others may not.

We look back to the great men who made our government as to a generation, not of revolutionists, but of statesmen. They fought, not to pull down, but to preserve,—not for some fair and far-off thing they wished for, but for a familiar thing they had and meant to keep. Ask any candid student of the history of English liberty, and he will tell you that these men were of the lineage of Pym and Hampden, of Pitt and Fox; that they were men who consecrated their lives to the preservation intact of what had been wrought out in blood and sweat by the countless generations of sturdy freemen who had gone before them.

Look for a moment at what self-government really meant in their time. Take English history for your test. I know not where else you may find an answer to the question. We speak, all the world speaks, of England as the mother of liberty and self-government; and the beginning of her liberty we place in the great year that saw Magna Charta signed, that immortal document whose phrases ring again in all our own Bills of Rights. Her liberty is in fact older than that signal year; but 1215 we set up as a shining mark to hold the eye. And yet we know, for all we boast the date so early, for how many a long generation after that the monarch ruled and the Commons cringed; haughty Plantagenets had their way, and indomitable Tudors played the master to all men's fear, till the fated Stuarts went their stupid way to exile and the scaffold. Kings were none the less kings because their subjects were free men.

Local self-government in England consisted until 1888 of government by almost omnipotent Justices of the Peace appointed by the Lord Chancellor. They were laymen, however. They were country gentlemen and served without pay. They were of the neighbor-

hood and used their power for its benefit as their lights served them; but no man had a vote or choice as to which of the country gentlemen of his county should be set over him; and the power of the Justices sitting in Quarter Sessions covered almost every point of justice and administration not directly undertaken by the officers of the crown itself. "Long ago," laughs an English writer, "lawyers abandoned the hope of describing the duties of a Justice in any methodic fashion, and the alphabet has become the only possible connecting thread. A Justice must have something to do with 'Railroads, Rape, Rates, Recognizances, Records, and Recreation Grounds'; with 'Perjury, Petroleum, Piracy, and Play-houses'; with 'Disorderly Houses, Dissenters, Dogs, and Drainage.' " And yet Englishmen themselves called their life under these lay masters self-government.

The English House of Commons was for many a generation, many a century even, no House of the Commons at all, but a house full of country gentlemen and rich burghers, the aristocracy of the English counties and the English towns; and yet it was from this House, and not from that reformed since 1832, that the world drew, through Montesquieu, its models of representative self-government in the days when our own Union was set up.

In America, and in America alone, did self-government mean an organization self-originated, and of the stuff of the people themselves. America had gone a step beyond her mother country. Her people were for the most part picked men: such men as have the energy and the initiative to leave old homes and old friends, and go to far frontiers to make a new life for themselves. They were men of a certain initiative, to take the world into their own hands. The king had given them their charters, but within the broad definitions of those charters they had built as they pleased, and common men were partners in the government of their little commonwealths. At home, in the old country, there

was need, no doubt, that the hand of the king's government should keep men within its reach. The countrysides were full of yokels who would have been brutes to deal with else. The counties were in fact represented very well by the country gentlemen who ruled them: for they were full of broad estates where men were tenants, not freehold farmers, and the interests of masters were generally enough the interests of their men. The towns had charters of their own. There was here no democratic community, and no one said or thought that the only self-government was democratic self-government. In America the whole constitution of society was democratic, inevitably and of course. Men lay close to their simple governments, and the new life brought to a new expression the immemorial English principle, that the intimate affairs of local administration and the common interests that were to be served in the making of laws should be committed to laymen, who would look at the government critically and from without, and not to the king's agents, who would look at it professionally and from within. England had had self-government time out of mind; but in America English self-government had become *popular* self-government.

"Almost all the civilized states derive their national unity," says a great English writer of our generation, "from common subjection, past or present, to royal power; the Americans of the United States, for example, are a nation because they once obeyed a king." That example in such a passage comes upon us with a shock: it is very unexpected,—“the Americans of the United States, for example, are a nation because they once obeyed a king!” And yet, upon reflection, can we deny the example? It is plain enough that the reason why the English in America got self-government and knew how to use it, and the French in America did not, was, that the English had had a training under the kings of England and the French under the kings of France. In the one country men did all things at

the bidding of officers of the crown; in the other, officers of the crown listened, were constrained to listen, to the counsels of laymen drawn out of the general body of the nation. And yet the kings of England were no less kings than the kings of France. Obedience is everywhere the basis of government, and the English were not ready either in their life or in their thought for a free régime under which they should choose their kings by ballot. For that régime they could be made ready only by the long drill which should make them respect above all things the law and the authority of governors. Discipline—discipline generations deep—had first to give them an ineradicable love of order, the poise of men self-commanded, the spirit of men who obey and yet speak their minds and are free, before they could be Americans.

No doubt a king did hold us together until we learned how to hold together of ourselves. No doubt our unity as a nation does come from the fact that we once obeyed a king. No one can look at the processes of English history and doubt that the throne has been its centre of poise, though not in our days its centre of force. Steadied by the throne, the effective part of the nation has, at every stage of its development, dealt with and controlled the government in the name of the whole. The king and his subjects have been partners in the great undertaking. At last, in our country, in this best trained portion of the nation, set off by itself, the whole became fit to act for itself, by veritable popular representation, without the make-weight of a throne. That is the history of our liberty. You have the spirit of English history, and of English royalty, from King Harry's mouth upon the field of Agincourt:—

“We few, we happy few, we band of brothers;
For he to-day that sheds his blood with me
Shall be my brother; be he ne'er so vile,
This day shall gentle his condition:

And gentlemen in England now a-bed
Shall think themselves accursed they were not here,
And hold their manhoods cheap whiles any speaks
That fought with us upon Saint Crispin's day."

It is thus the spirit of English life has made comrades of us all to be a nation.

This is what Burke meant by combining government with liberty,—the spirit of obedience with the spirit of free action. Liberty is not itself government. In the wrong hands,—in hands unpracticed, undisciplined,—it is incompatible with government. Discipline must precede it,—if necessary, the discipline of being under masters. Then will self-control make it a thing of life and not a thing of tumult, a tonic, not an insurgent madness in the blood. Shall we doubt, then, what the conditions precedent to liberty and self-government are, and what their invariable support and accompaniment must be, in the countries whose administration we have taken over in trust, and particularly in those far Philippine Islands whose government is our chief anxiety? We cannot give them any quittance of the debt ourselves have paid. They can have liberty no cheaper than we got it. They must first take the discipline of law, must first love order and instinctively yield to it. It is the heathen, not the free citizen of a self-governed country, who "in his blindness bows down to wood and stone, and don't obey no orders unless they is his own." We are old in this learning and must be their tutors.

But we may set them upon the way with an advantage we did not have until our hard journey was more than half made. We can see to it that the law which teaches them obedience is just law and even-handed. We can see to it that justice be free and unpurchasable among them. We can make order lovely by making it the friend of every man and not merely the shield of some. We can teach them by our fairness in administration that there may be a power in government which,

though imperative and irresistible by those who would cross or thwart it, does not act for its own aggrandizement, but is the guarantee that all shall fare alike. That will infinitely shorten their painful tutelage. Our pride, our conscience will not suffer us to give them less.

And, if we are indeed bent upon service and not mastery, we shall give them more. We shall take them into our confidence and suffer them to teach us, as our critics. No man can deem himself free from whom the government hides its action, or who is forbidden to speak his mind about affairs, as if government were a private thing which concerned the governors alone. Whatever the power of government, if it is just, there may be publicity of governmental action and freedom of opinion; and public opinion gathers head effectively only by concerted public agitation. These are the things—knowledge of what the government is doing and liberty to speak of it—that have made Englishmen feel like free men, whether they liked their governors or not: the right to know and the right to speak out,—to speak out in plain words and in open counsel. Privacy, official reticence, governors hedged about and inaccessible,—these are the marks of arbitrary government, under which spirited men grow restive and resentful. The mere right to criticise and to have matters explained to them cools men's tempers and gives them understanding in affairs. This is what we seek among our new subjects: that they shall understand us, and after free conference shall trust us: that they shall perceive that we are not afraid of criticism, and that we are ready to explain and to take suggestions from all who are ready, when the conference is over, to obey.

There will be a wrong done, not if we govern and govern as we will, govern with a strong hand that will brook no resistance, and according to principles of right gathered from our own experience, not from theirs, which has never yet touched the vital matter we are concerned with; but only if we govern in the spirit of auto-

crats and of those who serve themselves, not their subjects. The whole solution lies less in our methods than in our temper. We must govern as those who learn; and they must obey as those who are in tutelage. They are children and we are men in these deep matters of government and justice. If we have not learned the substance of these things no nation is ever likely to learn it, for it is taken from life, and not from books. But though children must be foolish, impulsive, headstrong, unreasonable, men may be arbitrary, self-opinionated, impervious, impossible, as the English were in their Oriental colonies until they learned. We should be inexcusable to repeat their blunders and wait as long as they waited to learn how to serve the peoples whom we govern. It is plain we shall have a great deal to learn; it is to be hoped we shall learn it fast.

There are, unhappily, some indications that we have ourselves yet to learn the things we would teach. You have but to think of the large number of persons of your own kith and acquaintance who have for the past two years been demanding, in print and out of it, with moderation and the air of reason and without it, that we give the Philippines independence and self-government now, at once, out of hand. It were easy enough to give them independence, if by independence you mean only disconnection with any government outside the islands, the independence of a rudderless boat adrift. But self-government? How is that "given"? *Can* it be given? Is it not gained, earned, graduated into from the hard school of life? We have reason to think so. I have just now been trying to give the reasons we have for thinking so.

There are many things, things slow and difficult to come at, which we have found to be conditions precedent to liberty,—to the liberty which can be combined with government; and we cannot, in our present situation, too often remind ourselves of these things, in order that we may look steadily and wisely upon lib-

erty, not in the uncertain light of theory, but in the broad, sunlike, disillusioning light of experience. We know, for one thing, that it rests at bottom upon a clear experimental knowledge of what are in fact the just rights of individuals, of what is the equal and profitable balance to be maintained between the right of the individual to serve himself and the duty of government to serve society. I say, not merely a *clear* knowledge of these, but a clear *experimental* knowledge of them as well. We hold it, for example, an indisputable principle of law in a free state that there should be freedom of speech, and yet we have a law of libel. No man, we say, may speak that which wounds his neighbor's reputation unless there be public need to speak it. Moreover we will judge of that need in a rough and ready fashion. Let twelve ordinary men, empanelled as a jury, say whether the wound was justly given and of necessity. "The truth of the matter is very simple when stripped of all ornaments of speech," says an eminent English judge. "It is neither more nor less than this: that a man may publish anything which twelve of his fellow countrymen think is not blamable." It is plain, therefore, that in this case at least we do not inquire curiously concerning the Rights of Man, which do not seem susceptible of being stated in terms of social obligation, but content ourselves with asking, "What are the rights of men living together, amongst whom there must be order and fair give and take?" And our law of libel is only one instance out of many. We treat all rights in like practical fashion. But a people must obviously have had experience to treat them so. You have here one image in the mirror of self-government.

Do not leave the mirror before you see another. You cannot call a miscellaneous people, unknit, scattered, diverse of race and speech and habit, a nation, a community. That, at least, we got by serving under kings: we got the feeling and the organic structure of a com-

munity. No people can form a community or be wisely subjected to common forms of government who are as diverse and as heterogeneous as the people of the Philippine Islands. They are in no wise knit together. They are of many races, of many stages of development, economically, socially, politically disintegrate, without community of feeling because without community of life, contrasted alike in experience and in habit, having nothing in common except that they have lived for hundreds of years together under a government which held them always where they were when it first arrested their development. You may imagine the problem of self-government and of growth for such a people,—if so be you have an imagination and are no doctrinaire. If there is difficulty in our own government here at home because the several sections of our own country are disparate and at different stages of development, what shall we expect, and what patience shall we not demand of ourselves, with regard to our belated wards beyond the Pacific? We have here among ourselves hardly sufficient equality of social and economic conditions to breed full community of feeling. We have learned of our own experience what the problem of self-government is in such a case.

That liberty and self-government are things of infinite difficulty and nice accommodation we above all other peoples ought to know who have had every adventure in their practice. Our very discontent with the means we have taken to keep our people clear-eyed and steady in the use of their institutions is evidence of our appreciation of what is required to sustain them. We have set up an elaborate system of popular education, and have made the maintenance of that system a function of government, upon the theory that only systematic training can give the quick intelligence, the "variety of information and excellence of discretion" needed by a self-governed people. We expect as much from school-teachers as from governors in the Phil-

ippines and in Porto Rico: we expect from them the *morale* that is to sustain our work there. And yet, when teachers have done their utmost and the school bills are paid, we doubt, and know that we have reason to doubt, the efficacy of what we have done. Books can but set the mind free, can but give it the freedom of the world of thought. The world of affairs has yet to be attempted, and the schooling of action must supplement the schooling of the written page. Men who have an actual hand in government, men who vote and sustain by their thoughts the whole movement of affairs, men who have the making or the confirming of policies, must have reasonable hopes, must act within the reasonable bounds set by hard experience.

By education, no doubt, you acquaint men, while they are yet young and quick to take impressions, with the character and spirit of the polity they live under; give them some sentiment of respect for it, put them in the air that has always lain about it, and prepare them to take the experience that awaits them. But it is from the polity itself and their own contact with it that they must get their actual usefulness in affairs, and only that contact, intelligently made use of, makes good citizens. We would not have them remain children always and act always on the preconceptions taken out of the books they have studied. Life is their real master and tutor in affairs.

And so the characters of the polity men live under has always had a deep significance in our thoughts. Our greater statesmen have been men steeped in a thoughtful philosophy of politics, men who pondered the effect of this institution and that upon morals and the life of society, and thought of character when they spoke of affairs. They have taught us that the best polity is that which most certainly produces the habit and the spirit of civic duty, and which calls with the most stirring and persuasive voice to the leading characters of the nation to come forth and give it direction. It must

be a polity which shall stimulate, which shall breed emulation, which shall make men seek honor by seeking service. These are the ideals which have formed our institutions, and which shall mend them when they need reform. We need good leaders more than an excellent mechanism of action in charters and constitutions. We need men of devotion as much as we need good laws. The two cannot be divorced and self-government survive.

It is this thought that distresses us when we look upon our cities and our states and see them ruled by bosses. Our methods of party organization have produced bosses, and they are as natural and inevitable a product of our politics, no doubt, at any rate for the time being and until we can see our way to better things, as the walking delegate and the union president are of the contest between capital and federated labor. Both the masters of strikes and the masters of caucuses are able men, too, with whom we must needs deal with our best wits about us. But they are not, if they will pardon me for saying so, the leading characters I had in mind when I said that the excellence of a polity might be judged by the success with which it calls the leading characters of a nation forth to its posts of command. The polity which breeds bosses breeds managing talents rather than leading characters,—very excellent things in themselves, but not the highest flower of politics. The power to govern and direct primaries, combine primaries for the control of conventions, and use conventions for the nomination of candidates and the formulation of platforms agreed upon beforehand is an eminently useful thing in itself, and cannot be dispensed with, it may be, in democratic countries, where men must act, not helter skelter, but in parties, and with a certain party discipline, not easily thrown off; but it is not the first product of our politics we should wish to export to Porto Rico and the Philippines.

No doubt our study of these things which lie at the front of our own lives, and which must be handled in our own progress, will teach us how to be better masters and tutors to those whom we govern. We have come to full maturity with this new century of our national existence and to full self-consciousness as a nation. And the day of our isolation is past. We shall learn much ourselves now that we stand closer to other nations and compare ourselves first with one and again with another. Moreover, the centre of gravity has shifted in the action of our federal government. It has shifted back to where it was at the opening of the last century, in that early day when we were passing from the gristle to the bone of our growth. For the first twenty-six years that we lived under our federal Constitution foreign affairs, the sentiment and policy of nations oversea, dominated our politics, and our Presidents were our leaders. And now the same thing has come about again. Once more it is our place among the nations that we think of; once more our Presidents are our leaders.

The centre of our party management shifts accordingly. We no longer stop upon questions of what this state wants or that, what this section will demand or the other, what this boss or that may do to attach his machine to the government. The scale of our thought is national again. We are sensitive to airs that come to us from off the seas. The President and his advisers stand upon our chief coign of observation, and we mark their words as we did not till this change came. And this centring of our thoughts, this looking for guidance in things which mere managing talents cannot handle, this union of our hopes, will not leave us what we were when first it came. Here is a new world for us. Here is a new life to which to adjust our ideals.

It is by the widening of vision that nations, as men, grow and are made great. We need not fear the expanding scene. It was plain destiny that we should

come to this, and if we have kept our ideals clear, unmarred, commanding through the great century and the moving scenes that made us a nation, we may keep them also through the century that shall see us a great power in the world. Let us put our leading characters at the front; let us pray that vision may come with power; let us ponder our duties like men of conscience and temper our ambitions like men who seek to serve, not to subdue, the world; let us lift our thoughts to the level of the great tasks that await us, and bring a great age in with the coming of our day of strength.

PRINCETON FOR THE NATION'S SERVICE

INAUGURAL ADDRESS AS PRESIDENT OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, OCTOBER 25, 1902. FROM THE "PRINCETON ALUMNI WEEKLY," NOVEMBER 1, 1902, VOL. III, NO. 6, PP. 89-98.

SIX years ago I had the honor of standing in this place to speak of the memories with which Princeton men heartened themselves as they looked back a century and a half to the founding of their college. To-day my task is more delicate, more difficult. Standing here in the light of those older days, we must now assess our present purposes and powers and sketch the creed by which we shall be willing to live in the days to come. We are but men of a single generation in the long life of an institution which shall still be young when we are dead, but while we live her life is in us. What we conceive she conceives. In planning for Princeton, moreover, we are planning for the country. The service of institutions of learning is not private, but public. It is plain what the nation needs as its affairs grow more and more complex and its interests begin to touch the ends of the earth. It needs efficient and enlightened men. The universities of the country must take part in supplying them.

American universities serve a free nation whose progress, whose power, whose prosperity, whose happiness, whose integrity depend upon individual initiative and the sound sense and equipment of the rank and file. Their history, moreover, has set them apart to a character and service of their own. They are not mere seminaries of scholars. They never can be. Most of them, the greatest of them and the most distin-

guished, were first of all great colleges before they became universities; and their task is two-fold: the production of a great body of informed and thoughtful men and the production of a small body of trained scholars and investigators. It is one of their functions to take large bodies of young men up to the places of outlook whence the world of thought and affairs is to be viewed; it is another of their functions to take some men, a little more mature, a little more studious, men self-selected by aptitude and industry, into the quiet libraries and laboratories where the close contacts of study are learned which yield the world new insight into the processes of nature, of reason, and of the human spirit. These two functions are not to be performed separately, but side by side, and are to be informed with one spirit, the spirit of enlightenment, a spirit of learning which is neither superficial nor pedantic, which values life more than it values the mere acquisitions of the mind.

Universities, we have learned to think, include within their scope, when complete, schools of law, of medicine, of theology, and of those more recondite mechanic arts, such as the use of electricity, upon which the skilled industry of the modern world is built up; and, though in dwelling upon such an association of schools as of the gist of the matter in our definitions of a university, we are relying upon historical accidents rather than upon essential principles for our conceptions, they are accidents which show the happy order and system with which things often come to pass. Though the university may dispense with professional schools, professional schools may not dispense with the university. Professional schools have nowhere their right atmosphere and association except where they are parts of a university and share its spirit and method. They must love learning as well as professional success in order to have their perfect usefulness. This is not the verdict of the universities merely but of the professional men

themselves, spoken out of hard experience of the facts of business. It was but the other day that the Society for the Promotion of Engineering Education endorsed the opinion of their president, Mr. Eddy, that the crying need of the engineering profession was men whose technical knowledge and proficiency rest upon a broad basis of general culture which should make them free of the wider worlds of learning and experience, which should give them largeness of view, judgment, and easy knowledge of men. The modern world nowhere shows a closeted profession shut in to a narrow round of technical functions to which no knowledge of the outside world need ever penetrate. Whatever our calling, our thoughts must often be afield among men of many kinds, amidst interests as various as the phases of modern life. The managing minds of the world, even the efficient working minds of the world, must be equipped for a mastery whose chief characteristic is adaptability, play, an initiative which transcends the bounds of mere technical training. Technical schools whose training is not built up on the foundations of a broad and general discipline cannot impart this. The stuff they work upon must be prepared for them by processes which produce fibre and elasticity, and their own methods must be shot through with the impulses of the university.

It is this that makes our age and our task so interesting: this complex interdependence and interrelation of all the processes which prepare the mind for effectual service: this necessity that the merchant and the financier should have travelled minds, the engineer a knowledge of books and men, the lawyer a wide view of affairs, the physician a familiar acquaintance with the abstract data of science, and that the closeted scholar himself should throw his windows open to the four quarters of the world. Every considerable undertaking has come to be based on knowledge, on thoughtfulness, on the masterful handling of men and facts. The university must stand in the midst, where the roads of thought

and knowledge interlace and cross, and, building upon some coign of vantage, command them all.

It has happened that throughout two long generations,—long because filled with the industrial and social transformation of the world,—the thought of studious men has been bent upon devising methods by which special aptitudes could be developed, detailed investigations carried forward, inquiry at once broadened and deepened to meet the scientific needs of the age, knowledge extended and made various and yet exact by the minute and particular researches of men who devoted all the energies of their minds to a single task. And so we have gained much, though we have also lost much that must be recovered. We have gained immensely in knowledge but we have lost system. We have acquired an admirable, sober passion for accuracy. Our pulses have been quickened, moreover, by discovery. The world of learning has been transformed. No study has stood still. Scholars have won their fame, not by erudition, but by exploration, the conquest of new territory, the addition of infinite detail to the map of knowledge. And so we have gained a splendid proficiency in investigation. We know the right methods of advanced study. We have made exhaustive record of the questions waiting to be answered, the doubts waiting to be resolved, in every domain of inquiry; thousands of problems once unsolved, apparently insoluble, we have reduced to their elements and settled, and their answers have been added to the commonplaces of knowledge. But, meanwhile, what of the preliminary training of specialists, what of the general foundations of knowledge, what of the general equipment of mind which all men must have who are to serve this busy, this sophisticated generation?

Probably no one is to blame for the neglect of the general into which we have been led by our eager pursuit of the particular. Every age has lain under the reproach of doing but one thing at a time, of having

some one signal object for the sake of which other things were slighted or ignored. But the plain fact is, that we have so spread and diversified the scheme of knowledge in our day that it has lost coherence. We have dropped the threads of system in our teaching. And system begins at the beginning. We must find the common term for college and university; and those who have great colleges at the heart of the universities they are trying to develop are under a special compulsion to find it. Learning is not divided. Its kingdom and government are centred, unitary, single. The processes of instruction which fit a large body of young men to serve their generation with powers released and fit for great tasks ought also to serve as the initial processes by which scholars and investigators are made. They ought to be but the first parts of the method by which the crude force of untrained men is reduced to the expert uses of civilization. There may come a day when general study will be no part of the function of a university, when it shall have been handed over, as some now talk of handing it over, to the secondary schools, after the German fashion; but that day will not be ours, and I, for one, do not wish to see it come. The masters who guide the youngsters who pursue general studies are very useful neighbors for those who prosecute detailed inquiries and devote themselves to special tasks. No investigator can afford to keep his doors shut against the comradeships of the wide world of letters and of thought.

To have a great body of undergraduates crowding our classrooms and setting the pace of our lives must always be a very wholesome thing. These young fellows, who do not mean to make finished scholars of themselves, but who do mean to learn from their elders, now at the outset of their lives, what the thoughts of the world have been and its processes of progress, in order that they may start with light about them, and not doubt or darkness, learning in the brief span of four

years what it would else take them half a lifetime to discover by mere contact with men, must teach us the real destiny with which knowledge came into the world. Its mission is enlightenment and edification, and these young gentlemen shall keep us in mind of this.

The age has hurried us, has shouldered us out of the old ways, has bidden us be moving and look to the cares of a practical generation; and we have suffered ourselves to be a little disconcerted. No doubt we were once pedants. It is a happy thing that the days have gone by when the texts we studied loomed bigger to our view than the human spirit that underlay them. But there are some principles of which we must not let go. We must not lose sight of that fine conception of a general training which led our fathers, in the days when men knew how to build great states, to build great colleges also to sustain them. No man who knows the world has ever supposed that a day would come when every young man would seek a college training. The college is not for the majority who carry forward the common labour of the world, nor even for those who work at the skilled handicrafts which multiply the conveniences and the luxuries of the complex modern life. It is for the minority who plan, who conceive, who superintend, who mediate between group and group and must see the wide stage as a whole. Democratic nations must be served in this wise no less than those whose leaders are chosen by birth and privilege; and the college is no less democratic because it is for those who play a special part. I know that there are men of genius who play these parts of captaincy and yet have never been in the classrooms of a college, whose only school has been the world itself. The world is an excellent school for those who have vision and self-discipline enough to use it. It works in this wise, in part, upon us all. Raw lads are made men of by the mere sweep of their lives through the various schools of experience. It is this very sweep of life that we wish to

bring to the consciousness of young men by the shorter processes of the college. We have seen the adaptation take place; we have seen crude boys made fit in four years to become men of the world.

Every man who plays a leading or conceiving part in any affair must somehow get this schooling of his spirit, this quickening and adaptation of his perceptions. He must either spread the process through his lifetime and get it by an extraordinary gift of insight and upon his own initiative, or else he must get it by the alchemy of mind practiced in college halls. We ought distinctly to set forth in our philosophy of this matter the difference between a man's preparation for the specific and definite tasks he is to perform in the world and that general enlargement of spirit and release of powers which he shall need if his task is not to crush and belittle him. When we insist that a certain general education shall precede all special training which is not merely mechanic in its scope and purpose, we mean simply that every mind needs for its highest serviceability a certain preliminary orientation, that it may get its bearings and release its perceptions for a wide and catholic view. We must deal in college with the spirits of men, not with their fortunes. Here, in history and philosophy and literature and science, are the experiences of the world summed up. These are but so many names which we give to the records of what men have done and thought and comprehended. If we be not pedants, if we be able to get at the spirit of the matter, we shall extract from them the edification and enlightenment as of those who have gone the long journey of experience with the race.

There are two ways of preparing a young man for his life work. One is to give him the skill and special knowledge which shall make a good tool, an excellent bread-winning tool, of him; and for thousands of young men that way must be followed. It is a good way. It is honorable, it is indispensable. But it is not for the

college, and it never can be. The college should seek to make the men whom it receives something more than excellent servants of a trade or skilled practitioners of a profession. It should give them elasticity of faculty and breadth of vision, so that they shall have a surplus of mind to expend, not upon their profession only, for its liberalization and enlargement, but also upon the broader interests which lie about them, in the spheres in which they are to be, not breadwinners merely, but citizens as well, and in their own hearts, where they are to grow to the stature of real nobility. It is this free capital of mind the world most stands in need of,—this free capital that awaits investment in undertakings, spiritual as well as material, which advance the race and help all men to a better life.

And are we to do this great thing by the old discipline of Greek, Latin, Mathematics, and English? The day has gone by when that is possible. The circle of liberal studies is too much enlarged, the area of general learning is too much extended, to make it any longer possible to make these few things stand for all. Science has opened a new world of learning, as great as the old. The influence of science has broadened and transformed old themes of study and created new, and all the boundaries of knowledge are altered. In the days of our grandfathers all learning was literary, was of the book; the phenomena of nature were brought together under the general terms of an encyclopædic Natural Philosophy. Now the quiet rooms where once a few students sat agaze before a long table at which, with a little apparatus before him, a lecturer discoursed of the laws of matter and of force are replaced by great laboratories, physical, chemical, biological, in which the pupil's own direct observation and experiment take the place of the conning of mere theory and generalization and men handle the immediate stuff of which nature is made. Museums of natural history, of geology, of paleontology stretch themselves amidst our lecture

rooms, for demonstration of what we say of the life and structure of the globe. The telescope, the spectro-scope, not the text-book merely, are our means of teaching the laws and movements of the sky. An age of science has transmuted speculation into knowledge and doubled the dominion of the mind. Heavens and earth swing together in a new universe of knowledge. And so it is impossible that the old discipline should stand alone, to serve us as an education. With it alone we should get no introduction into the modern world either of thought or of affairs. The mind of the modern student must be carried through a wide range of studies in which science shall have a place not less distinguished than that accorded literature, philosophy or politics.

But we must observe proportion and remember what it is that we seek. We seek in our general education, not universal knowledge, but the opening up of the mind to a catholic appreciation of the best achievements of men and the best processes of thought since days of thought set in. We seek to apprise young men of what has been settled and made sure of, of the thinking that has been carried through and made an end of. We seek to set them securely forward at the point at which the mind of the race has definitely arrived, and save them the trouble of attempting the journey over again, so that they may know from the outset what relation their own thought and effort bear to what the world has already done. We speak of the "disciplinary" studies through which a boy is put in his school days and during the period of his introduction into the full privileges of college work, having in our thought the mathematics of arithmetic, elementary algebra, and geometry, the Greek and Latin texts and grammars, the elements of English and French or German; but a better, truer name for them were to be desired. They are indeed disciplinary. The mind takes fibre, facility, strength, adaptability, certainty of touch from handling them, when the teacher knows his art and their power. But

they are disciplinary only because of their definiteness and their established method: and they take their determinateness from their age and perfection. It is their age and completeness that render them so serviceable and so suitable for the first processes of education. By their means the boy is informed of the bodies of knowledge which are not experimental but settled, definitive, fundamental. This is the stock upon which time out of mind all the thoughtful world has traded. These have been food of the mind for long generations.

It is in this view of the matter that we get an explanation of the fact that the classical languages of antiquity afford better discipline and are a more indispensable means of culture than any language of our own day except the language, the intimate language of our own thought, which is for us universal coin of exchange in the intellectual world, and must have its values determined to a nicety before we pay it out. No modern language is definite, classically made up. Modern tongues, moreover, carry the modern Babel of voices. The thoughts they utter fluctuate and change; the phrases they speak alter and are dissolved with every change of current in modern thought or impulse. They have, first or last, had the same saturations of thought that our own language has had; they carry the same atmosphere; in traversing their pleasant territory, we see only different phases of our own familiar world, the world of our own experience; and, valuable as it is to have this various view of the world we live in and send our minds upon their travels up and down the modern age, it is not fundamental, it is not an indispensable first process of training. It can be postponed. The classical literatures give us, in tones and with an authentic accent we can nowhere else hear, the thoughts of an age we cannot visit. They contain airs of a time not our own, unlike our own, and yet its foster parent. To these things was the modern thinking world first bred. In them speaks a time naïve, pagan, an early

morning day when men looked upon the earth while it was fresh, untrodden by crowding thought, an age when the mind moved as it were without prepossessions and with an unsophisticated, childlike curiosity, a season apart during which those seats upon the Mediterranean seem the first seats of thoughtful men. We shall not anywhere else get a substitute for it. The modern mind has been built upon that culture and there is no authentic equivalent.

Drill in the mathematics stands in the same category with familiar knowledge of the thought and speech of classical antiquity, because in them also we get the lifelong accepted discipline of the race, the processes of pure reasoning which lie at once at the basis of science and at the basis of philosophy, grounded upon observation and physical fact and yet abstract, and of the very stuff of the essential processes of the mind, a bridge between reason and nature. Here, too, as in the classics, is a definitive body of knowledge and of reason, a discipline which has been made test of through long generations, a method of thought which has in all ages steadied, perfected, enlarged, strengthened and given precision to the powers of the mind. Mathematical drill is an introduction of the boy's mind to the most definitely settled rational experiences of the world.

I shall attempt no proof that English also is of the fundamental group of studies. You will not require me to argue that no man has been made free of the world of thought who does not know the literature, the idiomatic flavor, and the masterful use of his own tongue.

But, if we cannot doubt that these great studies are fundamental, neither can we doubt that the circle of fundamental studies has widened in our day and that education, even general education, has been extended to new boundaries. And that chiefly because science has had its credentials accepted as of the true patriciate of learning. It is as necessary that the lad should

be inducted into the thinking of the modern time as it is that he should be carefully grounded in the old, accepted thought which has stood test from age to age; and the thought of the modern time is based upon science. It is only a question of choice in a vast field. Special developments of science, the parts which lie in controversy, the parts which are as yet but half built up by experiment and hypothesis, do not constitute the proper subject matter of general education. For that you need, in the field of science as in every other field, the bodies of knowledge which are most definitively determined and which are most fundamental. Undoubtedly the fundamental sciences are physics, chemistry and biology. Physics and chemistry afford a systematic body of knowledge as abundant for instruction, as definitive almost, as mathematics itself; and biology, young as it is, has already supplied us with a scheme of physical life which lifts its study to the place of a distinctive discipline. These great bodies of knowledge claim their place at the foundation of liberal training not merely for our information but because they afford us direct introduction into the most essential analytical and rational processes of scientific study, impart penetration, precision, candour, openness of mind, and afford the close contacts of concrete thinking. And there stand alongside of these geology and astronomy, whose part in general culture, aside from their connection with physics, mechanics and chemistry, is to apply to the mind the stimulation which comes from being brought into the presence and in some sort into the comprehension of stupendous, systematized physical fact,—from seeing nature in the mass and system of her might and structure. These, too, are essential parts of the wide scheme which the college must plot out. And when we have added to these the manifold discipline of philosophy, the indispensable instructions of history, and the enlightenments of economic and political study, and to these the modern languages which are the tools of

scholarship, we stand confused. How are we to marshal this host of studies within a common plan which shall not put the pupil out of breath?

No doubt we must make choice among them, and suffer the pupil himself to make choice. But the choice that we make must be the chief choice, the choice the pupil makes, the subordinate choice. Since he cannot in the time at his disposal go the grand tour of accepted modern knowledge, we who have studied the geography of learning and who have observed several generations of men attempt the journey must instruct him how in a brief space he may see most of the world, and he must choose only which one of several tours that we may map out he will take. Else there is no difference between young men and old, between the novice and the man of experience, in fundamental matters of choice. We must supply the synthesis and must see to it that, whatever group of studies the student selects, it shall at least represent the round whole, contain all the elements of modern knowledge, and be itself a complete circle of general subjects. Princeton can never have any uncertainty of view on that point.

And that not only because we conceive it to be our business to give a general, liberalizing, enlightening training to men who do not mean to go on to any special work by which they make men of science or scholars of themselves or skilled practitioners of a learned profession, but also because we would create a right atmosphere for special study. Critics of education have recently given themselves great concern about over-specialization. The only specialists about whom, I think, the thoughtful critic of education need give himself any serious concern are the specialists who have never had any general education in which to give their special studies wide rootage and nourishment. The true American university seems to me to get its best characteristic, its surest guarantee of sane and catholic learning, from the presence at its very heart of a college of liberal

arts. Its vital union with the college gives it, it seems to me, the true university atmosphere, a pervading sense of the unity and unbroken circle of learning,—not so much because of the presence of a great body of undergraduates in search of general training (because until these youngsters get what they seek they create ideals more by their lack than by their achievement), as because of the presence of a great body of teachers whose life work it is to find the general outlooks of knowledge and give vision of them every day from quiet rooms which, while they talk, shall seem to command all the prospects of the wide world.

I should dread to see those who guide special study and research altogether excused from undergraduate instruction, should dread to see them withdraw themselves altogether from the broad and general survey of the subjects of which they have sought to make themselves masters. I should equally despair of seeing any student made a truly serviceable specialist who had not turned to his specialty in the spirit of a broad and catholic learning,—unless, indeed, he were one of those rare spirits who once and again appear amongst us, whose peculiar, individual privilege it is to have safe vision of but a little segment of truth and yet keep their poise and reason. It is not the education that concentrates that is to be dreaded, but the education that narrows,—that is narrow from the first. I should wish to see every student made, not a man of his task, but a man of the world, whatever his world may be. If it be the world of learning, then he should be a conscious and a broad-minded citizen of it. If it be the world of letters, his thought should run free upon the whole field of it. If it be the world of affairs, he should move amidst affairs like a man of thought. What we seek in education is a full liberation of the faculties, and the man who has not some surplus of thought and energy to expend outside the narrow circle of his own task and interest is a dwarfed, uneducated man. We

judge the range and excellence of every man's abilities by their play outside the task by which he earns his livelihood. Does he merely work, or does he also look abroad and plan? Does he, at the least, enlarge the thing he handles? No task, rightly done, is truly private. It is part of the world's work. The subtle and yet universal connections of things are what the truly educated man, be he man of science, man of letters, or statesman, must keep always in his thought, if he would fit his work to the work of the world. His adjustment is as important as his energy.

We mean, so soon as our generous friends have arranged their private finances in such a way as to enable them to release for our use enough money for the purpose, to build a notable graduate college. I say "build" because it will be not only a body of teachers and students but also a college of residence, where men shall live together in the close and wholesome comradeships of learning. We shall build it, not apart, but as nearly as may be at the very heart, the geographical heart, of the university; and its comradeship shall be for young men and old, for the novice as well as for the graduate. It will constitute but a single term in the scheme of coördination which is our ideal. The windows of the graduate college must open straight upon the walks and quadrangles and lecture halls of the studium generale.

In our attempt to escape the pedantry and narrowness of the old fixed curriculum we have, no doubt, gone so far as to be in danger of losing the old ideals. Our utilitarianism has carried us so far afield that we are in a fair way to forget the real utilities of the mind. No doubt the old, purely literary training made too much of the development of mere taste, mere delicacy of perception, but our modern training makes too little. We pity the young child who, ere its physical life has come to maturity, is put to some task which will dwarf and narrow it into a mere mechanic tool. We know that

it needs first its free years in the sunlight and fresh air, its irresponsible youth. And yet we do not hesitate to deny to the young mind its irresponsible years of mere development in the free air of general studies. We have too ignorantly served the spirit of the age,—have made no bold and sanguine attempt to instruct and lead it. Its call is for efficiency, but not for narrow, purblind efficiency. Surely no other age ever had tasks which made so shrewdly for the testing of the general powers of the mind. No sort of knowledge, no sort of training of the perceptions and the facility of the mind could come amiss to the modern man of affairs or the modern student. A general awakening of the faculties, and then a close and careful adaptation to some special task is the programme of mere prudence for every man who would succeed.

And there are other things besides mere material success with which we must supply our generation. It must be supplied with men who care more for principles than for money, for the right adjustments of life than for the gross accumulations of profit. The problems that call for sober thoughtfulness and mere devotion are as pressing as those which call for practical efficiency. We are here not merely to release the faculties of men for their own use, but also to quicken their social understanding, instruct their consciences, and give them the catholic vision of those who know their just relations to their fellow men. Here in America, for every man touched with nobility, for every man touched with the spirit of our institutions, social service is the high law of duty, and every American university must square its standards by that law or lack its national title. It is serving the nation to give men the enlightenments of a general training; it is serving the nation to equip fit men for thorough scientific investigation and for the tasks of exact scholarship, for science and scholarship carry the truth forward from generation to generation and give the certain touch of knowl-

edge to the processes of life. But the whole service demanded is not rendered until something is added to the mere training of the undergraduate and the mere equipment of the investigator, something ideal and of the very spirit of all action. The final synthesis of learning is in philosophy. You shall most clearly judge the spirit of a university if you judge it by the philosophy it teaches; and the philosophy of conduct is what every wise man should wish to derive from his knowledge of the thoughts and the affairs of the generations that have gone before him. We are not put into this world to sit still and know; we are put into it to act.

It is true that in order to learn men must for a little while withdraw from action, must seek some quiet place of remove from the bustle of affairs, where their thoughts may run clear and tranquil, and the heats of business be for the time put off; but that cloistered refuge is no place to dream in. It is a place for the first conspectus of the mind, for a thoughtful poring upon the map of life; and the boundaries which should emerge to the mind's eye are not more the intellectual than the moral boundaries of thought and action. I do not see how any university can afford such an outlook if its teachings be not informed with the spirit of religion and that the religion of Christ, and with the energy of a positive faith. The argument for efficiency in education can have no permanent validity if the efficiency sought be not moral as well as intellectual. The ages of strong and definite moral impulse have been the ages of achievement; and the moral impulses which have lifted highest have come from Christian peoples,—the moving history of our own nation were proof enough of that. Moral efficiency is, in the last analysis, the fundamental argument for liberal culture. A merely literary education, got out of books and old literature, is a poor thing enough if the teacher stick at grammatical and syntactical drill; but if it be indeed an introduction into the thoughtful labors of men of all generations it may

be made the prologue to the mind's emancipation: its emancipation from narrowness,—from narrowness of sympathy, of perception, of motive, of purpose, and of hope. And the deep fountains of Christian teaching are its most refreshing springs.

I have said already, let me say again, that in such a place as this we have charge, not of men's fortunes, but of their spirits. This is not the place in which to teach men their specific tasks,—except their tasks be those of scholarship and investigation; it is the place in which to teach them the relations which all tasks bear to the work of the world. Some men there are who are condemned to learn only the technical skill by which they are to live; but these are not the men whose privilege it is to come to a university. University men ought to hold themselves bound to walk the upper roads of usefulness which run along the ridges and command views of the general fields of life. This is why I believe general training, with no particular occupation in view, to be the very heart and essence of university training, and the indispensable foundation of every special development of knowledge or of aptitude that is to lift a man to his profession or a scholar to his function of investigation.

I have studied the history of America; I have seen her grow great in the paths of liberty and of progress by following after great ideals. Every concrete thing that she has done has seemed to rise out of some abstract principle, some vision of the mind. Her greatest victories have been the victories of peace and of humanity. And in days quiet and troubled alike Princeton has stood for the nation's service, to produce men and patriots. Her national tradition began with John Witherspoon, the master, and James Madison, the pupil, and has not been broken until this day. I do not know what the friends of this sound and tested foundation may have in store to build upon it; but whatever they add shall be added in that spirit, and with that con-

ception of duty. There is no better way to build up learning and increase power. A new age is before us, in which, it would seem, we must lead the world. No doubt we shall set it an example unprecedented not only in the magnitude and telling perfection of our industries and arts but also in the splendid scale and studied detail of our university establishments: the spirit of the age will lift us to every great enterprise. But the ancient spirit of sound learning will also rule us; we shall demonstrate in our lecture rooms again and again, with increasing volume of proof, the old principles that have made us free and great; reading men shall read here the chastened thoughts that have kept us young and shall make us pure; the school of learning shall be the school of memory and of ideal hope; and the men who spring from our loins shall take their lineage from the founders of the republic.

PRINCETON IDEALS¹

DELIVERED AT PRINCETON DINNER AT THE WALDORF-ASTORIA, DECEMBER 9, 1902. FROM THE "PRINCETON ALUMNI WEEKLY," DECEMBER 13, 1902, VOL. III, PP. 199-204. REPORTED STENOGRAPHICALLY AND CORRECTED BY MR. WILSON.

I AM not vain enough to take this demonstration as an evidence of your admiration of me. I know what you have come here for. You have come here to express your gratification that a Princeton alumnus whom you know and have consorted with is now in command of the ship which we all man. (Applause.) I know that the meaning of this company is that there is a life in the body of men who have gone out from Princeton that cannot be quenched and which cannot be resisted. There are many things which Princeton needs, but she does not need life and vigor, she does not need the blood and the spirit of men to carry her standards and her cause forward.

You will readily believe me when I say that I have been deeply moved by the scene which I look upon to-night. I am ordinarily, gentlemen, a very witty man, but all wit has been subdued in me by the spirit almost of solemnity which this scene brings upon me. I do not doubt that we have entered upon a new era, not because of anything that is in me, but because of the spirit that is in you. If you feel any tithe of that combined power which you show in demonstrations like this to-night, we are sure of the future of Princeton University. I believe that the gentlemen who are with us from other institutions must have felt the pulse that is beating in this body to-night. No man can mistake

¹ Title supplied by the editors.

it and no man can sit here and not feel it; and I suppose that those who do not know us have wondered what bred this spirit amongst us. How did it happen that men so diverse in age and occupation and condition, so different in the circumstances of their lives and the antecedents of their fortunes, are bound together by this common tie, like boys and yet like men, with the feeling of boys and with the purpose of men? How did that happen? (Applause.) This is a thing bred by the spirit of a place, a place which the memory of every man here keeps as a sort of a shrine to which all his happiest thoughts return; a place in which his comradeships, the dearest comradeships of his life have begun; a place in which he remembers some of the best impulses of his life to have begun; a place where when we walk we feel that we have renewed a spirit of allegiance to the truth, to learning, to manhood, to that fair spirit of dealing man with man which makes the best part of the feeling of the American people.

And all of this has been bred by life in a place the charm of which even strangers feel. I have marked how men who never saw that place before feel the spirit of it when they walk those streets and across that campus; how they say "There is something in this place which we never felt anywhere else, some atmosphere which takes the imagination, which kindles enthusiasm, so that one can hardly leave here without feeling that he has been adopted into the Princeton family and has partaken of the Princeton allegiance." No one fails to feel it. The freshman feels it in the midst of his miseries; the sophomore feels it in the midst of his pride; the junior and the senior in the midst of their leisure have time to feel it. (Laughter.) And by a simple device we have enhanced the spirit of the place. By the very simple device of building our new buildings in the Tudor Gothic style we seem to have added to Princeton the age of Oxford and of Cambridge; we have added a thousand years to the history of Prince-

ton by merely putting those lines in our buildings which point every man's imagination to the historic traditions of learning in the English-speaking race. We have declared and acknowledged our derivation and lineage; we have said, "This is the spirit in which we have been bred," and as the imagination, as the recollection of classes yet to be graduated from Princeton are affected by the suggestions of that architecture, we shall find the past of this country married with the past of the world and shall know with what destiny we have come into the forefront of the nations, with the destiny of men who have gathered the best thinking of the world and wish to add to the politics of the world not heat, but light; the light that illuminates the path of nations and makes them know the errors as well as the wisdom of the past.

Gentlemen, we have dreamed a dream in Princeton of how the charm of that place shall be enhanced. I need not tell you of the familiar map of that beautiful place. You know how naturally in the old historic campus there is slowly forming a sort of circle and quadrangle, a great quadrangle, a little town; that little town will presently close its lines from the Brokaw Building back of Prospect to where the Infirmary now stands and up Washington Road, and in that little town, girt about with buildings in the style that is historic, there will live the College of Liberal Arts, there will dwell all the high-spirited youngsters who represent us in the ballfield, who represent us in the writing of the college periodicals, who carry the spirit and the go of the place in their veins. And there will then come in the midst of that friendly town another quadrangle, a smaller quadrangle, more beautiful than any that has yet been built, and in that quadrangle there will live a little community, a community of graduate students, touched by the life in the midst of which they live, sympathetic with it, dominated by it, and yet going in and out like men bent upon the errands of the mind,

loving sport but not following sport, sympathizers with the undergraduate life but not taking part in the undergraduate life, rather seeming to remind men as they go to and fro that there are invisible things which men seek with the mind's eye, that there is a life which no man has touched, which no man has seen, that there is something that makes free the very truth itself; and these men shall touch the spirit of the undergraduates, the youngsters shall wonder if there are not visions which are worth seeing, if there are not tasks in those closeted places that are worth doing, if there is not something immortal bred in the occupations of those men. (Applause.) Back of this little town, full of the visions of scholarship and of the diversions of sober, eager, ingenuous young men, there will stretch a fair garden open to the eye, where men shall see all the pleasant outlooks that that place commands; there shall be a girt of buildings down the avenue that leads to the woods below, and there shall run by those buildings a path which leads to the open quadrangles of the professional schools, upon which we shall look down as men look forward, look forward to their professional careers, look forward to the things in which they shall specifically serve the world, the quadrangle which shall house the men who are the students of jurisprudence, the students of law in all its scholarly outlooks, the men whose ambition it is not merely to seek their bread and butter by the practice of the law before the courts but whose ambition it is to supply the courts with the principles by which they shall develop the law of the country; men who shall know the old and abandoned rootages of the court system of jurisprudence under which they live and who will be capable in moments critical and perplexing to give guidance to the development of the jurisprudence of this country; and then beyond that there will be the quadrangle containing those men who handle the force which runs the modern world of industry, the School of Electrical Engineering.

The electrical engineer stands at the strategic center of the future industry of this country, and we cannot afford that the industry of this country should go without the touch of the Princeton spirit. (Applause.) The Princeton spirit, I think I don't deceive myself in believing, is a spirit which is touched with the ideals of service, which is touched with those ideals which elevate professions from the lower grades to the grades in which they are conspicuous, the grades from which men reach achievement. There is a difference, gentlemen, between success and achievement. Achievement comes to the man who has forgotten himself and married himself and his mind to the task to which he has set himself, but success comes to the diligent man.

And then where the woods has been closed about and all the fine outlooks are checked by the falling country, as it falls away to the lower lands below, where the soil is fertile, where it invites to cultivation, there will stand the great Museum of Natural History, a museum which Princeton needs now to relieve the groaning receptacles of Old North which holds priceless collections and which no man can even examine because they cannot be handled, because they cannot even be classified, because they cannot be visible before the student—those evidences of the life of the globe which it is indispensable that man should explore if he would understand the life of man and the progress of medical science.

These are the things which we dreamed of in our vision; and do we think of these things simply to enhance the charm of the place, simply to give ourselves new quadrangles and better and larger architecture, simply to make some man's artistic fortune by saying, "Here is a place in which you can conceive the most complete and systematic body of buildings that can be erected anywhere in the United States"? Is this merely to please ourselves by adorning the place which we love? No. I take this dream to have this at its center: That we

want to transform thoughtless boys performing tasks into thinking men. The trouble, gentlemen, with the modern undergraduate is that though a lovable boy he is a thoughtless boy. He is a boy who does his tasks sometimes because merely it is honorable for him to do his tasks; generally because it is compulsory to do his tasks; because he wants something which when he does his tasks that way really counts for nothing essential at all, he wants a paltry piece of parchment; he wants not to have the disgrace of saying that he did not graduate, but he is graduated when the end comes upon no scale of endeavor, he is graduated upon no scale of achievement, he is graduated upon a scale of residence.

We have heard a great deal about shortening the college course, and a great many persons have talked as if all that you had to judge of when you try to answer the question "When should a man graduate?" was how many times has he attended class. I have heard a great many discussions of this course which puzzled my non-mathematical head, because they said that it was necessary in order that a man should graduate that he should have in the aggregate attended sixty exercises per week. It makes you dizzy to think about it. They did not require that he should attend all sixty in any one week; he can spread these, if he has breadth enough, over three years, if he has not breadth enough for that he can spread them over four, if he chooses to be a gentleman of leisure he can spread them over five. But when he has sixty hours a week to his credit, why then he can graduate. What hours they apparently have to attend is for these gentlemen a matter of indifference; they simply want to reckon up so many Pharisaical performances of a certain definite requirement and then these self-righteous gentlemen are ready to graduate. It makes a great deal of difference, gentlemen, to a university whether it turns out thinking men or not. It does not make very much difference whether it turns out men who have attended lectures or not. (Applause.)

It would be a very nice test of university lecturers if the attendance were made optional; if a man had something to say the men would go and if he didn't have anything to say the men would not go. I believe in my heart that any man who has something to say can get an audience; it may not be the same audience every day, but if he has something to put into the thought of the campus and the talk of the campus somebody will be there to hear him lecture, and if he has not something to contribute to the talk and the thought of the campus, ought anybody to be there to hear him lecture? That is a nice question which I should not like to press too far.

Now, gentlemen, I do not believe that a man ought to work all the time. (Many voices: Right! Good!) I knew that would be a popular sentiment. I believe that the Constitution of the United States guarantees to a man a certain amount of loafing; otherwise it would come under the head of cruel and unusual punishments. I am not going to propose that we compel the undergraduates to work all the time, but I am going to propose that we make the undergraduates want to work all the time. (Applause.) And there is a way to do that. There is a way which I believe an infallible way. Mind you, there is no study in the curriculum of a university which is not of itself intrinsically interesting. There are no minds in a university to which some subjects in that university may not be made to seem interesting, and the only way I know of to make a man see that a subject is interesting is to get him on the inside of it, and the only way to get him on the inside of it is to throw him on his own resources in becoming acquainted with it. I believe that there has to come in this country a radical change in our conception of an education, and I believe that it must come in this way: That we shall give up the schoolboy idea that men are to be examined upon lectures and upon text-books, and come to the grown-up idea that men are to be ex-

amined on subjects. Let me take a concrete example, because I want to get into this thing. I want to be able to say, for example, to the undergraduates who choose that line of study, "You will at a certain date, which may turn out for you to be a fateful date, be examined on the subject of the constitutional history of the United States. Now you can get up that subject in ways which we will point out to you, or you can get up that subject in ways which you may discover for yourself, but if you don't get up that subject, we shall have the pain of parting company with you. We are not going to examine you upon what the lecturer in American constitutional history said, we are not going to examine you in the particular text-books which he put in the catalogue as associated with his lectures; you can get up your history of America in that way or in some other way, but get up the history of America you must." That makes a man of him, and it makes a man of him for this reason, that no man is a man who receives his knowledge by instruction from somebody else; that a man is a man who receives his instruction by his own efforts and inquiries.

Now there is a way to do that, gentlemen. There are different sorts of subjects in a curriculum, let me remind you; there are drill subjects, which I suppose are mild forms of torture, but to which every man must submit. So far as my own experience is concerned, the natural carnal man never desires to learn mathematics. We know by a knowledge of the history of the race that it is necessary by painful processes of drill to insert mathematics into a man's constitution; he cannot be left to get up mathematics for himself because he cannot do it. There are some drill subjects which are just as necessary as the measles in order to make a man a grown-up person; he must have gone through those things in order to qualify himself for the experiences of life; he must have crucified his will and got up things which he did not intend to get up and reluctantly was compelled to

get up. That I believe is necessary for the salvation of his soul. But there are other subjects, those subjects which are out of the field of the ordinary school curriculum and which I may perhaps be permitted to say are more characteristic in their kind of the university study. They are what I call the reading subjects, like philosophy, like literature, like law, like history. In those subjects it is futile to try to instruct men by mere classroom methods. The only way to instruct them is to provide a certain number of men sufficiently qualified as instructors, as scholars, who will be the companions and coaches and guides of the men's reading, just as if we supplied the university with a score or more, with fifty or more, reference librarians, to say "If you want to get up such and such a subject here is the central and most authoritative literature on that subject, these are the books to read. If there are hard places in them we will explain them, if you lose your compass in the journey we will find your whereabouts again. You may report to us from time to time, you may consort with us every evening, we are your companions and coaches in the business, we are at your service."

Just so soon as you do that you get men inside the subjects that they are seeking to get up, and until you do that you cannot get them inside the subjects they are trying to get up. That, you will say, is the English tutorial system. Yes, but the English make an old-fashioned mistake about it; they appoint their tutors for life and their tutors go to seed. No man can do that sort of thing for youngsters without getting tired of it. Now that is the truth of the matter. It makes it necessary that he should always be understanding the difficulties of beginners, and after awhile, ceasing to be a beginner himself, the thing becomes intolerable to him. He wants to go on about the independent research for which his beginnings have made him fit, and, therefore, I do not believe you could afford to keep an ordinary tutor for more than five years at that particular job.

I said this same thing in Chicago the other night and a newspaper reported that I said that no man ought to be a professor for more than five years. I did not say any such revolutionary thing as that. I said that no man ought to have this sort of a job for more than five years at a time.

Gentlemen, if we could get a body of such tutors at Princeton we could transform the place from a place where there are youngsters doing tasks to a place where there are men doing thinking, men who are conversing about the things of thought, men who are eager and interested in the things of thought; we know that, because we have done it on a small scale. Wherever you have a small class and they can be intimately associated with their chief in the study of an interesting subject they catch the infection of the subject; but where they are in big classes and simply hear a man lecture two or three times a week, they cannot catch the infection of anything, except it may be the voice and enthusiasm of the lecturer himself. This is the way in which to transform the place.

All of that, gentlemen, costs money. Now I am coming to business. To start that particular thing fairly and properly would need two millions and a quarter. (Whistles from the audience). I hope you will get your whistling over, because you will have to get used to this, and you may thank your stars I did not say four millions and a quarter, because we are going to get it. (Applause). I suspect there are gentlemen in this room who are going to give me two millions and a quarter to get rid of me. They will be able to get rid of me in no other way that I know of. And then, gentlemen, in order to do these other things which I have dreamed of, we shall need a great deal more than two millions and a quarter. I have not guessed at any figure that I have uttered. I have calculated upon a basis that I think in business would be recognized as a sound basis, every cent that I have estimated that Prince-

ton will need, and the total is twelve millions and a half. (Applause.) And what I want to say first of all about that sum of money is this, there is not any other university in the world that could make so small a sum go so far. There is not another university in the world that could transmute twelve millions and a half into red blood.

Now why do all of this? Why not be satisfied with the happy life at Princeton? Why not congratulate ourselves upon the comradeship of a scene like this, and say, "This is enough, what could the heart of man desire more?" Because, gentlemen, what this country needs is not more good fellowship; what this country needs now more than it ever did before, what it shall need in the years following, is knowledge and enlightenment. Civilization grows infinitely complex about us; the tasks of this country are no longer simple; men are not doing their duty who have a chance to know and do not equip themselves with knowledge in the midst of the tasks which surround us. Princeton has ever since her birthday stood for the service of the nation.

I have heard and my heart has echoed all the fine cheers of loyalty that have gone up for Princeton in this place and in other places, and no man who hears those cheers can doubt the genuineness of the impulse that is behind them. But, gentlemen, cheers and good wishes will not make the fortunes of Princeton; these things will not give Princeton reputation; nothing will give Princeton reputation except the achievements of the men whom she creates. The reputation of a university is not a matter of report. It is a matter of fact. You know that we hear a great deal of sentimental cant nowadays about cultivating our characters. God forbid that any man should spend his days thinking about his own character. What he wants to do is to get out and accomplish something, achieve something that is honorable, something that leaves the world a little nearer to the ideals that men have at their hearts,

and his character will take care of itself. Your characters, gentlemen, are by-products and the minute you set yourselves to produce them you make prigs of yourselves and render yourselves useless: I should despair of producing a character for Princeton by praising her. We are here to praise Princeton by serving our day and generation, by having some vision of the mind which we got in the comradeships of that place; and then these comradeships will mean for this country that which will assure her future. A body of men like this can in a day of crisis save the country they live in if they have purged their hearts and rectified their ways of thinking.

This is the vision which we all have and when we have completed the task that is before us, as we shall complete it, as far as any one generation can complete what must go on forever, then every man who has scholarship and public service at heart, will feel that he must go first or last to worship at the same shrine with us. (Applause.)

THE YOUNG PEOPLE AND THE CHURCH

AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE FORTIETH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE SABBATH SCHOOL ASSOCIATION, AT PITTSBURGH, OCTOBER 13, 1904. COPYRIGHT, 1904, BY THE SUNDAY SCHOOL TIMES COMPANY, PHILADELPHIA, PA.

WE bear a relationship to the rising generation whether we will or not. It is one of the principal tasks of each generation of mature persons in this world to hand on the work of the world to the next generation. We are engaged even more than we are aware in molding young people to be like ourselves. Those who have read that delightful book of Kenneth Grahame's entitled "The Golden Age," the age of childhood, will recall the indictment which he brings against the Olympians, as he calls them,—the grown-up people,—who do not understand the feelings of little folks not only, but do not seem to understand anything very clearly; who do not seem to live in the same world, who are constantly forcing upon the young ones standards and notions which they cannot understand, which they instinctively reject. They live in a world of delightful imagination; they pursue persons and objects that never existed; they make an Argosy laden with gold out of a floating butterfly,—and these stupid Olympians try to translate these things into uninteresting facts.

I suppose that nothing is more painful in the recollections of some of us than the efforts that were made to make us like grown-up people. The delightful follies that we had to eschew, the delicious nonsense that we had to disbelieve, the number of odious prudences that we had to learn, the knowledge that though the truth

was less interesting than fiction, it was more important than fiction,—the fact that what people told you could not always be relied on, and that it must be tested by the most uninteresting tests.

When you think of it, we are engaged in the somewhat questionable practise of making all the world uniform. We should be very sure that we are very handsome characters to have a full heart in the undertaking of making youngsters exactly like ourselves. There is an amount of aggregate vanity in the process which it is impossible to estimate. Moreover, you will notice that there are very whimsical standards in this world. We speak of some persons as being normal, and of others as being abnormal. By normal we mean like ourselves; by abnormal we mean unlike ourselves. The abnormal persons are in the minority, and therefore most of them are in the asylum. If they got to be in the majority, we would go to the asylum. If we departed from that law of the Medes and Persians which commands us to be like other persons, we would be in danger of the bars. The only thing that saves us is that abnormal people are not all alike. If they were, they might be shrewd enough to get the better of us, and put us where we put them.

And we are engaged in rubbing off the differences. We desire not to be supposed to be unlike other persons; we would prefer to abjure our individuality, and to say, as Dean Swift advised every man to say who desired to be considered wise, "My dear sir, I am exactly of your opinion." We try to avoid collisions of individuality, and go about to tell the younger people that they must do things as we have always done them, and as our parents made us do them, or else they will lose caste in the world.

There are two means by which we carry on this interesting work of making the next generation like the last. There is life itself, and that is the most drastic school there is. There is no school so hard in its lessons as the

school of life. You are not excused from any one of its exercises. You are not excused for mistakes in any one of its lessons. We say a great many things that are harsh, and deservedly harsh, I will admit, about college hazing; but there is a more subtle hazing than that. The world hazes the persons that will not conform. It hazes after a manner that is worse than hazing their bodies,—it hazes their spirits, and teases them with the pointed finger and the curl of the lip, and says, "That man thinks he knows the whole thing." That, I say, is a very much more refined torture than making a man do a great many ridiculous things for the purpose of realizing that he is ridiculous, and so getting out of conceit with himself. I do not believe in hazing, but I do believe that there are some things worse than hazing. And I have suffered worse things from my fellow-men since I got out of college than I suffered while I was in college.

Life is a terrible master to those who cannot escape its more trying processes. The little urchin in the slums of the city knows more of the prudences of life when he is five than most of us knew at five and twenty. He knows just how hard a school he lives in, and just how astute he must be to win any of its prizes, to win even the tolerance of the powers that conduct it, even to live from day to day. He knows how many cars of Juggernaut must be dodged on the streets for the mere leave to live, and the keenness of his senses, his shrewdness in a bargain, is such as would predict him a man successful in commerce, would mean that some day he was going to overreach his fellow-man as now life seems to be overreaching him, and imposing upon him, and snatching every coveted thing from his grasp. The process of culture, the process of civilization, and the processes that can be bought by wealth, are largely processes of exemption from the harder classes of the school of life. Some young gentlemen brought up in the lap of luxury seem to have escaped all lessons, seem

to know just as little about the world as it is possible for a person to live nineteen years and know. I have sometimes thought that if we could get a whole college of youngsters who had spent their boyhood in the slums, where they had to have wits in order to live, we would make extraordinary progress in scholarship; whereas, when in our discouraged moments,—I mean discouraged moments in our teaching,—we take some grim comfort in saying, as a Yale friend of mine said, that after teaching twenty years he had come to the conclusion that the human mind had infinite resources for resisting the introduction of knowledge. But you cannot resist the introduction of the knowledge that life brings. Life brings it and unloads it in your lap whether you want it or not.

The other means we have of indoctrinating the next generation and making the world uniform is organization. The individual process is not enough, we think, the process of working upon each other individually so that a miscellaneous set of influences prick each of us like so many currents of electricity. We think we must organize as a body to have a given, definite, predetermined effect upon others. So we take unfair advantage of a youngster in organizing a whole school so that he cannot escape having certain impressions made upon him. We tax the public in order to pay for the schools which will make it impossible for him to escape. And there are various instrumentalities which are organic. In the first place, there is the home; then there is the school; then there is the church; then there are all the political means, the means which we call social in their character, by which to mold and control the rising generation. All of these have their part in controlling the youth of the country and making them what we deem it necessary that they should be.

What do we wish that they should be? If forced to reason about it, we say they ought to be what we have found by experience it is prudent and wise to be; and

they ought to be something more,—they ought to go one stage beyond the stage we have gone. But we cannot conduct them beyond the stage we have reached. We can only point and say, “Here are the boundaries which we have reached; beyond is an undiscovered country; go out and discover it. We can furnish you with a few probabilities; we can supply you with a few tendencies; we can say to you that we think that wisdom points in this direction; but we cannot go with you; we cannot guide you; we must part with you at the opening of the door, and bid you Godspeed. But we want you to go on; we do not want you to stop where we stopped.”

What capital, after all, is it that we supply them with? I take it that knowledge is a pretty poor commodity in itself and by itself. A ship does not sail because of her cargo. There is no propulsion in that. If the captain did not know his port, if he did not know his rules of navigation, if he did not know the management of his engines, or have somebody aboard who did, if he did not know all the powers that will carry the ship to the place where her cargo will have additional value, the cargo would be nothing to him. What is his purpose? His purpose is that the cargo should be used. Used for what? For the convenience or the enlightenment, whatever it may be, of the people to whom he is carrying it.

And so with knowledge. The knowledge you supply to the little fellow in the home is not merely conveyed to him in order that he may be full; the knowledge that is supplied to him in school is not put in him as if he were merely a little vessel to be filled to the top. My father, who was a very plain-spoken man, used to use a phrase which was rough, but it expressed the meaning exactly. He said, “My son, the mind is not a prolix gut to be stuffed.” That is not the object of it. It is not a vessel made to contain something; it is a vessel made to transmute something. The process of digestion is

of the essence, and the only part of the food that is of any consequence is the part that is turned into blood and fructifies the whole frame. And so with knowledge. All the wise saws and prudent maxims and pieces of information that we supply to the generation coming on are of no consequence whatever in themselves unless they get into the blood and are transmuted.

And how are you going to get these things into the blood? You know that nothing communicates fire except fire. In order to start a fire you must originate a fire. You must have a little spark in order to have a great blaze. I have often heard it said that a speaker is dry, or that a subject is dry. Well, there isn't any subject in the world that is dry. It is the person that handles it and the person who receives it that are dry. The subject is fertile enough. But the trouble with most persons when they handle a subject is that they handle it as if it were a mere aggregate mass meant to stay where it is placed; whereas it is something to be absorbed into the pores, to have the life circulation communicated to it, and the moment you communicate that to it, it itself becomes a vehicle of life. Every one who touches a live thing knows he has touched living tissue, and not a dead hand.

So that no knowledge is of any particular consequence in this world which is not incarnate. For example, we are taught the knowledge of the laws of hygiene, but what earthly good are the laws of hygiene to us if we do not live in obedience to them? Presently disease springs upon us, and Nature says, "Thou fool. You knew these things. What profit is it to you to know them and not to regard them in your way of life? They were never yours. They were never part of you. You never possessed them." The moral of which is simply this, that the truths which are not translated into lives are dead truths, and not living truths. The only way to learn grammatical speech is to associate with those who speak grammatically.

And so of religion. Religion is communicable, I verily believe, aside from the sacred operations of the Holy Spirit, only by example. You have only to ask yourself what is the effect of a profession of religion on the part of a man who does not live a religious life. You know that the effect is not only not to communicate religion, but to delay indefinitely its influence. It is certainly true that we are not to judge religion by those who profess it but do not live it. But it is also true that if those who profess it are the only ones we live with, and they fail to live it, it cannot be communicated except by some mysterious grace of the Holy Spirit himself. So that no amount of didactic teaching in a home whose life is not Christian will ever get into the consciousness and life of the children. If you wish your children to be Christians, you must really take the trouble to be Christians yourselves. Those are the only terms upon which the home will work the gracious miracle.

And you cannot shift this thing by sending your children to Sunday-school. You may remedy many things, but you cannot shift this responsibility. If the children do not get this into their blood atmospherically, they are not going to get it into their blood at all until, it may be, they come to a period of life where the influences of Christian lives outside of the home may profoundly affect them and govern their consciences. We must realize that the first and most intimate and most important organization for the indoctrinating of the next generation is the home, is the family. This is the key to the whole situation. That is the reason that you must get hold of the whole family when you get hold of the children in your Sunday-school work; that your work will not be half done when you merely get the children there, and it may be, their mothers. You must include the fathers, and get your grip upon the home organization in such wise that

the children will have the atmospheric pressure of Christianity the week through.

We are constantly debating and hearing it debated, How will the church get hold of the young people? You cannot answer that question unless you have a philosophy of the matter. And it seems to me that the inevitable philosophy of the matter is this: There are only a certain number of things that impress young persons, only a certain number that impress old ones, or, for that matter that impress anybody. The things that impress the young person and the old are convictions and earnestness in action that looks like business, and a certain dignity and simplicity that go along with being in earnest. You will notice that when a man is going about his business he does not study his gestures, he does not consider his poses, he does not think how he looks when he is sitting at his desk in his chair. There is a directness and simplicity of approach in the thing which shows an utter lack of self-consciousness. He is not thinking about the machinery by which he is acting; he is after the thing.

When we say, therefore, that the way to get young people to the church is to make the church interesting, I am afraid we too often mean that the way to do is to make it entertaining. Did you ever know the theater to be a successful means of governing conduct? Did you ever know the most excellent concert, or series of concerts, to be the means of revolutionizing a life? Did you ever know any amount of entertainment to go further than hold for the hour that it lasted? If you mean to draw young people by entertainment, you have only one excuse for it, and that is to follow up the entertainment with something that is not entertaining, but which grips the heart like the touch of a hand. I dare say that there is some excuse for alluring persons to a place where good will be done them, but I think it would be a good deal franker not to allure them. I think it would be a great deal better simply

to let them understand that that is the place where life is dispensed, and that if they want life they must come to that place.

If they believe that you believe what you say, they will come. If they have the least suspicion that you do not believe it, if they have the least suspicion that you are simply playing a game of social organization, if they have the notion that you are simply organizing a very useful instrumentality of society for moralizing the community, but that you don't after all believe that life itself lies in the doctrine and preaching of that place and nowhere else, you cannot keep hold of them very long. The only thing that governs any of us is authority. And the reason that it is harder to govern us when we are grown up than when we are young is that we question the authority, and you have to convince our minds of the reasonableness of the authority. But the young mind yields to the authority that believes in itself. That is the reason that consistency of conduct is indispensable to the maintenance of authority. You cannot make the young person do what you do not do yourself. You cannot make him believe what you do not believe yourself.

I have known some parents who had very deep doubt about some of the deeper mysteries of revelation, but who, nevertheless, tried to communicate those deep mysteries to their children, with an absolute lack of success that was to have been expected. They did not believe them themselves. Did you never have the uneasy experience of going into the presence of a child who did not care to speak to you? There are two beings who assess character instantly by looking into the eyes,—dogs and children. If a dog not naturally possessed of the devil will not come to you after he has looked you in the face, you ought to go home and examine your conscience; and if a little child, from any other reason than mere timidity, looks you in the face, and then draws back and will not come to your

knee, go home and look deeper yet into your conscience. There is no eye so searching as the eye of simplicity. And you might as well give up the attempt of trying to wear a mask before children, particularly the mask that you are so desirous of wearing,—the mask of hypocrisy. It does not work, and it is a very fortunate thing that it does not work. If it did, we would make our children as big hypocrites as we are. You must believe the things you tell the children.

Have you not seen the flicker of the child's eye when he first asked you if there was really any Santa Claus, and you told him yes? He knows something is the matter. He may not be shrewd enough or thoughtful enough to know what is the matter, but after that he has his doubts about Santa Claus, simply because, by some electric communication that you cannot stop, your doubts about Santa Claus have been communicated to him. If you are a positivist, he will be a positivist; if you believe, he will believe.

It is all in the atmosphere. Sometimes it seems to me that nine-tenths of what we give other persons is in our personality. The value of one man contrasted with another is that some men have no electricity in them. They might be in the room or out of the room; it doesn't make any difference. Other men come into the room, and the moment they come into it something happens, either attraction or repulsion. I cannot sit in a railroad station comfortably, because men will come in whom I want to kick out, and persons will come in whom I want to go up and speak to, and make friends with, and I am restrained because when I was small I was told that was not good form, and I would not for the world be unlike my fellow-men. So I sit still and try to think about something else, and my eye constantly wanders to some person whom it would, I am sure, be such fun to go and talk to, who I know has something I would like to have. And yet, as for nine-tenths of the persons in the room, they do nothing but vitiate the

atmosphere, and you would rather have their breathing room than their presence.

And it is thus all through life. A man comes to you to press a piece of business upon you, and he goes away, and you say to yourself, "No, I won't go into that."

And some one else says, "Why not? Don't you believe in him?"

"No, I don't believe in him."

"Do you know anything wrong that he ever did?"

"No."

"Didn't he verify his statements?"

"Yes."

"Then why don't you go in with him?"

"Well, I don't know. I won't do it. I don't like his looks. There was something about him that made me think it was not all straight, and, at any rate, I will look into it, and hear about it from somebody else before going any further."

We are constantly having that feeling. And that is the feeling which illustrates my thought, though I have gone pretty far afield to illustrate it,—that it is conviction, authority, simplicity, the directness of one who is going about his business, and goes about it with genuineness, which governs young people. The moral of that is, that you are going the wrong way about accomplishing what you seek when you try to make that entertaining which, in the nature of things, though engrossing, is not entertaining in the ordinary sense of the word.

To tell a human being of the things that affect his eternal salvation I should say is decidedly undescribed if you call it entertaining. It is not entertaining in any reasonable sense of the word to tell him of the things that most profoundly affect his welfare in this world and in the next. I know that there are ways of telling men the truth which repel them; I know that too many men are tried for by efforts which merely

frighten. I believe that too much effort is made to get people to believe for fear of the consequences of unbelief. I don't believe any man was ever drawn into heaven for fear he would go to hell. Because, if I understand the Scriptures in the least, they speak a gospel of love. Except God draw you, you are not drawn. You are not brought in by whips, you are not drawn by a frowning face, you are not drawn by a threatening gesture. You are drawn by love, you are drawn by the knowledge that if you come you will be received as a son. Nothing but yearning draws you. Fear never drew you anywhere.

You must realize that it is all a question of personal relationship between man and his Maker, and a personal relationship founded upon love. For love is the only thing that I know that ever led to self-abnegation. Ambition does not lead to it; no use of power for power's sake leads to anything but self-aggrandizement. Can you name me any motive in the world that ever led a man to love another life more than his own except the motive of love? And yet what we are working for in the young people, as in the old, is to show them the perfect image of a Man who will draw all the best powers of their nature to Himself, and make them love him so that they will love him more than they love themselves, and loving him so, will love their fellow-men more than they love themselves. Everything heroic, everything that looks toward salvation, is due to this power of elevation. It is a noteworthy thing that we reserve the beautiful adjective "noble" for the men who think less of themselves than of some cause or of some person whom they serve. We elevate to the only nobility we have, the nobility of moral greatness, only those men who are governed by love.

You cannot create love by entertainment, but you can make love by the perfect exhibition of Christ-like qualities, and, with the assistance of the Holy Spirit, by the withdrawal of the veil which for most men hangs before

the face of our Lord and Saviour. Our whole object, it seems to me, in church work is simply this: to enable all to see him, to realize him, and if we devote ourselves to that purpose with singleness of heart and without thought of ourselves, we shall suddenly find the seats filling, because where there is fire thither men will carry their lamps to be lighted. Where there is power, men will go to partake of it. Every human soul instinctively feels that the only power he desires, the only power that can relieve him from the tedium of the day's work, the only thing which can put a glow upon the routine of the day's task, the only thing that can take him back to the golden age when everything had a touch of magic about it, when everything was greater than the fact, when everything had lurking behind it some mysterious power, when there was in everything a vision and a perfect image,—is this thing which he sees enthroned upon the shining countenances of those who really believe in the life and saving grace of their Lord and Master.

THE PRINCETON PRECEPTORIAL SYSTEM.

FROM THE "INDEPENDENT," VOL. LIX, PP. 239-240,
AUGUST 3, 1905.

THE system of preceptorial instruction which we are about to elaborate at Princeton is no new or novel notion of our own, but based upon almost universal experience, upon what every teacher must have found out for himself, whether by way of interpreting his failures or of interpreting his successes; he always gets his best results by direct, personal, intimate intercourse with his pupils, not as a class but as individuals.

College instructors have long observed that their teaching is rendered more effective by dividing large classes into small sections and making each section small enough to enable them to get frequently at each member of the class in the process of test and drill. But even this division of large classes into small sections has not been satisfactory. The sections were usually made up either alphabetically or according to marks or grades received by members of the class in written tests or examinations on the subjects they were studying, the best students being put in one section, the next best in the next, and so on to the dullest in the lowest section. Now, it so happens that God has not classified men's abilities either alphabetically or according to their performances in examinations. I need not urge that he has not used the alphabet; neither will it require much argument to prove to experienced teachers that he has not adjusted gifts to the processes of examination. It by no means always turns out that the men who have got themselves by examination into the first section of the class are the brightest men in the class, or that those

who allow themselves to fall into the lowest section are the dullest. The lowest division, in fact, often contains the greatest variety: very bright men, who will not use their gifts in their studies; very dull men, who have no gifts to use, and mediocre men, who are lazy. Separating the class into sections in either of the two ways most commonly employed is certainly a way of dividing it, but it is not an intelligent way of classifying the individuals who compose it. The intention of the preceptorial system is to enable the instructors to handle the men assigned them either singly or in classified groups, in which men of like training, aptitudes and needs are united.

But the system involves much more than a change of method. It is meant not only, in time, to supersede entirely the old-fashioned "recitation," but also to affect very materially the subject matter of study, to give the undergraduates their proper release from being school-boys, to introduce them to the privileges of maturity and independence by putting them in the way of doing their own reading instead of "getting up" lectures or "lessons." The subject matter of their studies is not to be the lectures of their professors or the handful of text-books, the narrow round of technical exercises set for them under the ordinary methods, but the reading which they should do for themselves in order to get a real first-hand command of the leading ideas, principles and processes of the subjects which they are studying. Their exercises with their preceptors are not to be recitations, but conferences, in which, by means of any method of report or discussion that may prove serviceable and satisfactory, the preceptors may test, guide and stimulate their reading. The governing idea is to be that they are getting up *subjects*—getting them up with the assistance of lecturers, libraries and a body of preceptors who are their guides, philosophers and friends. The process is intended to be one of reading,

comparing, reflecting; not cramming, but daily methodical study.

One great incidental advantage is expected to accrue to the study of English. The reports of the undergraduates to the preceptors on the reading they are doing will naturally very often be written reports, and it is to be expected that all such reports will be judged of as English as well as with regard to the accuracy or inaccuracy of their subject-matter. If not written in good English, they will have to be written over again, and if it turns out that any man cannot use his mother tongue correctly and with some degree of elegance, upon being so corrected and held to a standard of expression, he is to be handed over to the English department for fundamental training. The constant daily necessity to know his own language and to use it properly upon all sorts of subjects will certainly be the most vital system of "theme writing" yet devised, and may be expected to have a quality of reality about it which the formal written exercises of English departments have generally lacked. The men will be using their mother tongue in careful writing, not for the sake of the language itself, but for the sake of releasing ideas and stating facts. Style will be a means and not an end; and it should never in any kind of writing be anything else.

In brief, the system will be a method of study, a means of familiarizing the undergraduate with the chief authorities, conceptions and orders of work in his fields of study. The preceptors will not set the examinations. That would turn them into mere coaches, coaching for final tests which they themselves were to set. They are, rather, to be fellow-students, expositors, advisers, to see that the right work is done by themselves taking part in it.

They will not, however, be a body of men segregated and set apart from the general body of the faculty. The present staff of the university will also do preceptorial work; the new preceptors will take some part in the

lecture and regular class work, which will still go forward; they will be members of the faculty, indistinguishable in privilege and rank from their colleagues. The fundamental object of the system would be defeated if any sharp line of division were drawn in the faculty between the several kinds of teachers, for the fundamental object is to draw faculty and undergraduates together into a common body of students, old and young, among whom a real community of interest, pursuit and feeling will prevail. The preceptors will only have more conference work to do than their colleagues. It will be their chief, if not their distinctive, function to devote their energies to the intimate work of counsel and guidance I have tried to characterize and describe.

It is our confident hope that such changes will bring about very gratifying results: that the undergraduate will take more pleasure in his studies, derive more profit and stimulation from them, and that the instructor will find vital intercourse with his pupils give place to dull routine. There will be more work done, but it will be less burdensome both to teacher and pupil, more normal, less like a body of tasks and more like a natural enjoyment of science and letters.

THE PRECEPTORIAL SYSTEM.

ADDRESS BEFORE THE WESTERN ASSOCIATION OF PRINCETON CLUBS AT CLEVELAND, OHIO, MAY 19, 1906.
FROM THE "PRINCETON ALUMNI WEEKLY," JUNE 2, 1906, VOL. VI, PP. 651-655.

MR. TOASTMASTER and gentlemen: I am always at a loss to determine whether I would rather come at the beginning of a list of speakers, or at the end. At the beginning I have no speech to make but my own; at the end I may have gathered a number of suggestions from the speakers who have already spoken. You are at my mercy if I come first, because I can do nothing but deliver you my well-known speech.

I always feel, upon an occasion like this, that I am a responsible minister reporting to his constituents. And I think that Professor West will bear me out in saying that the report of the present year, now about concluded, is in every way very satisfactory. I do not know that it is particularly satisfactory to the eighty men who were dropped at the mid-year examinations; but I think that all of them are coming back next year, and will probably regard themselves as able to report progress at that time. I do know that the new spirit of study which has come upon Princeton would surprise some of you. (Laughter and applause.) About this table I recognize the faces of some who were ingenious in resisting the processes of learning—and if they have applied as much ingenuity to their business as they did then to their pleasure, I congratulate them upon their success. One of the undergraduates the other day said, in a tone of great condemnation, that Princeton was not the place it used to be—that men were actually talking

about their studies at the clubs. He evidently regretted that as an invasion of the privileges of undergraduate life. But the beauty of the situation is that the studies of the University are becoming, I will not be so bold as to say they have already become, a part of the life of the University, and for my part I don't care a peppercorn for studies which do not constitute a part of the life of the men who are pursuing them. (Applause.) I believe that there has been in all our universities in years past too much of the spirit of schoolboys; not because the men there were not often really interested in their studies, but because the processes of the University kept them schoolboys in their attitude toward their studies; now at Princeton they are beginning to feel that they are coming into the privileges of manhood.

You have heard a great deal, I dare say, first and last, about the Preceptorial System, and most of it has been from the old point of view, namely, that it brought the teacher into personal and intimate contact with the pupil. But the point I would dwell upon is that the relationship is not so exclusively that of pupil and teacher as it used to be; that the new thing we are introducing is the independent pursuit of certain studies by men old enough to study for themselves and accorded the privilege in their studies of having the counsel of scholars older than themselves. It is not merely that they are being led, but that they are becoming what every university student ought to be, namely, reading men.

I have sometimes said to the men I knew best in the University that it did not make so very much difference with me what a man read, but it did not seem to me that any man had the title to call himself a university man who was not a reading man, who merely gathered the transitory impressions of the day in which he lived and did not put himself into the main currents of thought that flow out of the old centuries into the

new, that constitute the pulse and life of the race. Men are in universities in order to come into contact with the vital forces that have always beat through the centuries in making civilization and in making thought (applause), and if they do not voluntarily put themselves into contact with those forces, those forces are of no avail to them. For what a man reluctantly receives he does not retain, and it does not constitute any part of his life.

The thing which has pleased me most in regard to the Preceptorial System is not only the splendid fact that the alumni have given us the money to conduct the system, but the significant fact that the undergraduates have welcomed the change and have felt that it enriched their own life. It would be a very petty life to live if we were merely schoolmasters; it would not interest me for twenty-four hours to be a taskmaster in respect to the studies of a lot of youngsters. Unless I can lead them to see the beauty of the things that have seemed beautiful to me, I have mistaken my profession. (Applause.) It is not the whip that makes men, but the lure of things that are worthy to be loved. (Applause.) And so we feel that we are entitled to be full of hope in regard to the increasing intellectual life of Princeton. For, gentlemen, I am covetous for Princeton of all the glory that there is (applause), and the chief glory of a university is always intellectual glory. The chief glory of a university is the leadership of the nation in the things that attach to the highest ambitions that nations can set themselves, those ideals which lift nations into the atmosphere of things that are permanent and do not fade from generation to generation. (Applause.) I do not see how any man can fail to perceive that scholarship, that education, in a country like ours, is a branch of statesmanship. It is a branch of that general work of enabling a great country to use its energies to the best advantage and to lift itself from

generation to generation through stages of unbroken progress.

When I look about upon the generation in which we live, I, like every man who looks with thoughtful eyes upon it, am very much sobered by what I see; not disconcerted, not robbed of hope, not cooled even in my optimism, but nevertheless very much sobered by the seriousness of the task which confronts us. Every age is compounded of things old and new, and the men of middle age are more involved in the things that are old than are the men in the generation that is coming on. And I always think of the change that must constantly be expected in a complex age as residing more with the younger generation than with the generation that is actually in charge of affairs. I see these young men drawing on all the complicated skeins that make up the pattern of our modern life, modifying that pattern, renewing the stuff where it is old, changing, confirming, doing all those things that draw on the forces of one age to be the forces of another. Because only they, when they are competent, can see the pattern as a whole. I believe that in spite of all the things which we deplore, and which bring the blood to our faces, there is a great deal that is splendid about the civilization of our day. The things that have been done in this country by way of its material advancement could not have been done without great gifts, without great powers, individual and corporate. There is a sense in which the individual in the modern industrial world is necessarily greater, if he be noticeable at all, than the individual of any other generation. For no man can do anything in his generation by and of himself. He must rule his fellow-men and draw them into coöperation with himself, if he would accomplish anything. There is a touch of statesmanship about every piece of modern business, about every piece of modern engineering. It is as if all the powers of the world were organized and the captains of industry were making their way

forward in the ranks to be generals in command of the forces of mankind. There is a great deal of planning and energy by which men have won their material supremacy—as well as the other side of the picture, which for the present I do not care to draw.

Now, young men coming with new forces into this complicated plot, have freer hands than other men in the generation, cleaner hands and freer hands than anybody else. And when one asks one's self what sort of education these men should have in order to carry what will be the young man's burden for many a day to come, it seems to me evident that the education they receive should not be such as to catch them at once in the web of the complicated interests which they must touch without prejudice and without favor. To put it in plainer, less abstract terms, if you merely train men for business, directly for business, they are immersed in the business, so far as their thoughts are concerned, throughout their education, and are committed to the prejudices of their occupations before even they enter upon them. (Applause.) You cannot train men for a particular business without filling their heads with the atmosphere of that business; and we want a great body of young men going into the active affairs of this world untouched by the atmosphere of any particular interest. We must in our processes of education, somewhere, put ourselves in a position to give young men a view of life which shall not be touched by the interests which will engross them when they seek to make their living. (Applause.)

For, gentlemen, there are many complications of human motive. When we speak of a man's making his living, we forget that he is also making somebody else's living in nine cases out of ten. Many a man would draw out of the business he is in, when he saw it was touching him with corruption, if it did not mean privation to a woman he loves, to children he loves; if it did not mean he was bringing upon others a kind of suffering and a sort of anxiety which he might be willing to bring

upon himself singly, but is not willing to bring upon them. If men acted singly and each for himself, the aspect of affairs would be very different; and many a man is debased by some of the noblest impulses of his nature, his love for those who are not concerned in the things which have involved him. Many a man would be morally independent if he were in fact independent, but he is carrying the fortunes of others.

Look, therefore, how impossible it is for him to assess any problem in a disinterested fashion, if from the first he has been taught, in college as well as elsewhere, that the chief end of man is to make a living! If the chief end of man is to make a living, why, make a living any way you can. But if it ever has been shown to him in some quiet place where he has been withdrawn from the interests of the world, that the chief end of man is to keep his soul untouched from corrupt influences, and to see to it that his fellow-men hear the truth from his lips, he will never get that out of his consciousness again. There will always come up within him with a great resurgence, some way or other, those lessons of his youth, and there will come a voice from the conscience which will arrest the very progress of a generation. But if you never teach him any ideal except the ideal of making a living, there will be no voice within him, he will know no other ideal.

I believe, therefore, that there must be some universities in this country which undertake to teach men the life that is in them, by teaching them the disinterested truths of pure science, by teaching them the truths of pure philosophy, and that literature which is the permanent voice and song of the human spirit, letting them know that they are not going a lonesome journey, but that generations of men behind them are crying them on to do better things than they could otherwise even attempt, and that generations beyond them are beckoning them on to a day of happier things. (Applause.) There must sound in the halls of the true university this

eternal voice of the human race that can never be drowned as long as men remember what the race has hoped and purposed.

And so, gentlemen, the ideals that we talk about, the ideals that we try to translate into definite programmes of study, are not things which we can take or leave as we please, unless you believe that we can take or leave life itself as we please. There is no choice in the matter. I am not daunted by the prediction that we are going to be submerged in waves of materialism, because any man who has read never so superficially the history of the race knows that there are certain things that cannot be absolutely submerged or crushed. If there remain any little band of men keeping the true university spirit alive, that band will, after a while, seem to be all that there is of a great nation, so far as the historian is concerned.

It affords me very great satisfaction sometimes to see how certain public men are misjudged, and to know that quiet gentlemen, sitting in university chairs, will, when the noise of that generation is over, readjust the balance and tell future generations who were really the great men of that generation. (Applause.) We are the jury that sits last, and future generations will know from us alone who were the great men that were our contemporaries. The noisy talk of the day will pass with the day itself, and then that eternal voice of literature will continue to sound, that voice which is purged of passion, which at any rate seeks to speak the thing which is just and true and of good repute.

And so, our ambitions for a university which retains this spirit are not hopes so much as a definite confidence that certain things must come to pass. The best thing, to my thought, about what we call the Princeton spirit is the manliness and the unselfishness and the truthfulness that there is in it. Why should any of you love Princeton? Because it is a beautiful place? Because the trees are beautiful to look upon in the spring? Be-

cause the sward is green and the buildings are handsome? Are you in love with a physical image? Are you in love with a thing the life of which is all over for you, simply because you remember the good times you had in those pleasant places? Your love would die in you to-morrow, if you did not know that you got while in Princeton the thing which made you better citizens and better comrades and more honest and just men than if you hadn't gone there. That is what gives you the Princeton spirit, that is the reason that the Class of '41 is modern; that is the reason that there is no difference whatever in the conception which Mr. Voorhees has and the conception which members of the present senior class of Princeton University have. The life is different, but the personality of the place is the same; it is the same place you have all loved, and praise God it shall always remain the same place. (Applause.)

And so, gentlemen, I feel the spirit of all the ideals which we entertain for Princeton made greater, the effort made more confident to partake of such things as can never be conquered or lessened, when I come into contact with companies like this. I don't know that I do you any good in going from gathering to gathering, but I certainly know that in coming I drink of the wine of the spirit which is the life of the place which I am entrusted to govern. (Applause.) We all intend the same thing, we all share the same thoughts, we all feel the same impulse, and that is the ground of our confidence as to the future. (Prolonged applause and cheers.)

REPORT ON THE SOCIAL COÖRDINATION OF THE UNIVERSITY

SUBMITTED TO THE TRUSTEES OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, JUNE 10, 1907. FROM THE "PRINCETON ALUMNI WEEKLY," JUNE 12, 1907.

AT the December meeting of the Board of Trustees President Wilson submitted a report on the intellectual and social organization of the University, and a committee of seven members of the Board, with the President as Chairman, was appointed to consider the matter submitted and report thereon. At the Commencement meeting of the Trustees the committee so appointed brought in the following report, which was adopted by the Board:

GENTLEMEN OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES:

Your Committee, appointed to consider the recent report of the President of the University on the social conditions now affecting the academic spirit and intellectual growth of the University, have been led to believe that a great problem of reorganization confronts us whose immediate solution is necessary to the health and progress of Princeton both as a teaching body and as a social body. Moreover, radical as the processes of solution may prove to be, they are happy to believe that there never was a time when such processes could be undertaken with less fear of serious friction or factionous opposition. The social conditions to which we shall call your attention would no doubt have disclosed themselves in any case, but they are more emphasized in existing circumstances than they would otherwise have been, because of the contrast they present to recent changes in the University in other respects and the pe-

culiar obstacles they put in the way of carrying our present plans to a satisfactory completion. Fortunately the recent innovations, because of the manifest improvement they have wrought, have put the whole university body in a wholesome humour of reform and have made all well-considered changes, devised and executed by frank common counsel, much easier of accomplishment.

We have witnessed in the last few years the creation of a new Princeton, as the result,—the astonishingly prompt result,—of our attempt to give the University a vital, spontaneous intellectual life,—not a life of pedants and grinds or of youngsters held inexorably to formal tasks, but a life of young men led by many influences to read and think for themselves along great lines of study, emancipated from school methods and stimulated to use their minds outside the class room. We realized that, for all its subtle charm and beguiling air of academic distinction, Princeton, so far as her undergraduates were concerned, had come to be merely a delightful place of residence, where young men, for the most part happily occupied by other things, were made to perform certain academic tasks; that, although we demanded at stated times a certain part of the attention of our pupils for intellectual things, their life and consciousness were for the rest wholly unacademic and detached from the interests which in theory were the all-important interests of the place. For a great majority of them residence here meant a happy life of comradeship and sport interrupted by the grind of perfunctory "lessons" and examinations, to which they attended rather because of the fear of being cut off from the life than because they were seriously engaged in getting the training which would fit their faculties and their spirits for the tasks of the world which they knew they must face after their happy freedom was over.

Undoubtedly, if we would give Princeton the highest distinction and that academic leadership in the country which she may now so easily gain, we must study at

every turn the means by which to lift her intellectual life and achievements out of mediocrity not only, but also into such an order of naturalness and energy and distinction as shall make her by reason of her way of success a conspicuous model and example. There is no true intellectual life for the undergraduate in the mere faithful performance of set tasks, no matter how eagerly or with what concentration he devote himself to them, if between tasks his mind be emptied of the interest they have created and his life run entirely free of their influence. There must somehow be brought about an interpenetration of his experience inside the class room and conference and his experience outside academic exercises, where men register their interests by what they do and say and let their minds have play upon. A college without sport and without a great deal of irresponsible boyish disengagement from serious talk and thoughtful effort no one can desire who understands the real economics and needs of the mind. The more wholesome sport and thoughtless fun the better both the work and the intimate comradeships upon which intellectual endeavor depends for energy and enlargement. But leisure and study ought not to be separated in air-tight compartments. Leisure ought to be enriched and diversified by the interests which study creates. In the midst of play there ought to be a constant consciousness of what the place means and must be made to stand for,—a place of thoughtful, manly, disinterested men, disciples of university ideals.

When we introduced the preceptorial system we made the greatest strategic move in that direction that has been made in the whole history of American universities. By it we meant to say that the intellectual life of a college did not consist of attendance upon class exercises or of preparation for recitations, but consisted, rather, of constant contact with study and the intimate association of teacher and pupil outside the class room, where the tradition of lectures and recitations was for-

gotten, rejected, and a thoroughly natural and human relationship, the relationship of fellow-students, substituted. And that meaning has at once been made evident to the whole country. The contrast with the old order of things is most marked in the case of the intercourse of undergraduates with those preceptors who invite them often to their houses or who live in the same dormitories with them. A natural and easy social relationship, an informal, frequent exchange of calls, the easy, unconstrained talks of ordinary comradeship make study itself seem a thing natural and human, a thing not so much of formal exaction under rules as of the vital contact of minds. It is, by intention and in actual fact, a widening of the atmosphere of study to seem a natural medium of life and serious enjoyment.

But the new process, vital as it is in itself, suited as it is to the object we have had in view, may be checked and even nullified by hostile or unfavorable influences. Our new methods of study require as their soil and indispensable environment a new social coördination,—a coördination which will not only make sure of a constant and natural intercourse between teacher and pupil, but also knit the student body itself together in some truly organic way which will ensure vital intellectual and academic contacts, the comradeships of a common life with common ends. Your Committee is of the opinion that this can best be done by combining the undergraduates in residential groups,—groups so made up that the forms and conditions under which each man in residence lives may so far as possible be the forms and conditions which are common to all.

Princeton has not since the earliest years of her development been in any full sense a residential college. She provides her students with lodgings, but with nothing else; and not all of them with that. And even the buildings in which she lodges them have never as yet been drawn together into such geographical relations as might be expected to bring their occupants into

natural groups of association. They form no closed units, suggesting intimate associations; there are no common rooms; lodgings are assigned by lot, and close neighbors may never know each other. Our social life for generations together has formed itself around the boarding house and club tables. Men have associated themselves with congenial groups of companions to eat together, and, when no sufficiently comfortable boarding house could be found, have rented or built quarters of their own in which they could command their own comforts and their own bill of fare in pleasing independence.

The outcome in our own day has been the development of the upper-class clubs with their attractive club houses, in each of which there are not only dining rooms and kitchens and servants' quarters, but also well-appointed common rooms, libraries, billiard rooms, smoking rooms, private dining rooms for parties, and sleeping rooms for visitors. The members of the Freshman and Sophomore classes are not admitted to membership in these clubs; but the Sophomores maintain clubs of their own upon a more simple scale in rented houses; and in providing, as we have recently provided, eating places for the Freshmen, instead of organizing a commons for the whole class, as economy and ordinary usage would have suggested, we have felt obliged to provide a large number of separate dining rooms in which they could distribute themselves in groups as inchoate clubs, and to set aside for each group which thus formed itself a separate common room in addition, to which the members of the group could resort after meals to smoke and spend a pleasant half hour of diversion together. And that is our social organization. The dormitories are mere sleeping places and places for study, or for the briefer social calls that break the busy hours of the evening.

The evident peculiarity of this life is that it severs the social from the intellectual interests of the place,

and does not, with its scattered clubs and divided classes, make us up into a community even on the social side. The vital units are the club units. They divide all four classes into segments and sharply separate the classes as wholes from one another during the two earlier years of the undergraduate course, when characters are being formed and points of view established. Their organization is entirely outside university action; has no organic connection whatever with anything academic; produces interests which absorb the attention and the energy of the best undergraduates as of all others, and yet nowhere interpenetrates the associations which arise out of study, carries no flavour with it which it might not as well have in any other town or in any other similar environment.

It absorbs the attention and all the planning faculties of the undergraduates because all social ambitions turn upon it. It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance in the life of the undergraduate of the question whether at the end of his Sophomore year he is going to be taken into one of the upper-class clubs. His thought is constantly fixed upon that object throughout the first two years of his university course with a great intensity and uneasiness whenever he thinks either of his social standing, his comradeships, or his general social consideration among his fellows. The clubs do not take in all the members of the Junior and Senior classes. About one-third are left out in the elections; and their lot is little less than deplorable. They feel that they cannot continue to associate on terms of intimacy with friends who have been elected into the clubs, for fear that they will be thought to be seeking to make favour with them and obtain a belated invitation to join; and, even when many of them as individuals are not disappointed at having been passed by, they must seek their comradeships with other classmates who are very much disappointed and who feel their isolation with a good deal of bitterness. It is difficult for them

to arrange for comfortable eating places; and the places at which they do board are only too much like caves of Adullam. They go forward to their graduation almost like men who are in the University and yet not of it. Often they are cheerful and steadfast enough; individuals here and there are sometimes quite indifferent to their comparative isolation, being absorbed in their books or in the task of earning the money necessary to pay their college expenses, but as a class their position is most trying, and most discreditable to our university democracy. It often happens that men who fail of election into one of the clubs at the end of the Sophomore year leave the University and go to some other college or abandon altogether the idea of completing their university course.

There is a great deal of admirable solidarity still in our undergraduate life. The "Princeton Spirit" of which we so often speak, and which is so strong and excellent a force in everything that affects either the life or the fortunes of the University, has impelled the leading spirits among the undergraduates to strive with the utmost loyalty to keep the upper-class clubs from becoming factional centres and dividing the undergraduate body into cliques which would prefer the interests of their clubs to the interests of the University as a whole. They have felt that the upper-class clubs differed very radically, and very much for the better, from the fraternities which have cut the undergraduate body of other colleges into segments and factions, because they include only Juniors and Seniors in their membership and leave the Sophomores and Freshmen undivided, to acquire the democratic habit and united feeling of the place. So soon as the practice threatened to grow up of seeking out attractive and especially desirable under-classmen and pledging them in advance to accept elections into particular upper-class clubs, a treaty of the most stringent character was entered into by the clubs which sought to make it an act of personal dis-

honour on the part of any upper-classman who was a member of a club even to cultivate relations of personal intimacy with under-classmen for fear such ends might be in view. That treaty has again and again been violated, and again and again renewed, in stricter and stricter form, until, in its present shape, as now pending for readoption, it practically seeks to fix an impassable gulf between the upper and lower classes in order that such attempts and suspicions may be altogether avoided.

It even goes further. It attempts to minimize the personal and social intercourse between Sophomores and Freshmen, and so segregates the Sophomores entirely. Because the Sophomores, since they cannot be sought or solicited as prospective candidates for membership in upper-class clubs, which are the natural goal of their social ambition, associate themselves in groups to seek admission—not openly or avowedly, but none the less systematically and effectively. That is the recognized object of the Sophomore clubs. It is equally well known, and indeed matter of course, that the groups of Freshmen who form their separate clubs in the several dining rooms in which the Freshmen now eat are formed with a view to being taken at the end of the year into the different Sophomore organizations or “followings” (the so-called “hat lines” described in the President’s report), and so making their way, in turn, into the upper-class clubs, where all roads of social preferment in the University end. The makers of the latest inter-club treaty endeavour, in the terms of the document they have just drawn up, to minimize and in part control that tendency also, by regulating in some degree the personal and social intercourse between Freshmen and Sophomores, over whom the clubs, the parties to the treaty, clearly have no jurisdiction whatever.

Two very significant and very undesirable, and even dangerous, things have thus come about: the two lower classes, who need above all things the forming and guid-

ing influence of the upper classes, have been almost completely segregated, and the very influences which seemed to render their segregation necessary from the point of view of the clubmen have brought about the very result their segregation was meant to prevent,—that is, they have cut them up into groups and cliques whose social ambitions give them separate and rival interests quite distinct from, plainly hostile to, the interests of the University as a whole.

No one seems to expect such treaties to be kept. A majority will always respect and obey them, as laws to which they have voluntarily submitted themselves; but a minority will always break and ignore them,—with more or less indulgent condemnation from the majority. For it is universally admitted that they are in restraint of human nature: that there is, of course, nothing intrinsically dishonourable in the desire of an upper-classman to secure some friend in the lower class for his own club, and that the natural rivalry of the upper-class clubs, at any rate for the picked men of the lower classes, will frequently lead individuals to break through the artificial restraints of the treaty, no matter what pledges are exacted of them or of their clubs as organizations. In brief, the social ambitions created by the existing system of club life are too strong for individual honour; and treaties in restraint of natural impulses, even if obeyed, do not prevent the social divisions among the Freshmen and Sophomores which it is their main purpose to prevent. And all the while, treaties notwithstanding, the several groups formed by the Freshmen and Sophomores, if not in effect detached sections of the upper-class clubs, are at any rate their satellites and attend them most observantly.

Along with the steadily increasing concentration of the attention of the undergraduates upon the social question and the centring of all social ambitions upon the upper-class clubs has gone a very noticeable, a very rapid, increase in the luxury of the upper-class club

houses. The two oldest clubs now have houses of extraordinary elegance and luxury of appointment and five other clubs are maturing plans for replacing their present comfortable structures with buildings which will rival the others in beauty, spaciousness, and comfort. The University, which gives life to these clubs and constitutes their ostensible *raison d'être*, seems in danger of becoming, if the present tendencies of undergraduate organization are allowed to work out their logical results, only an artistic setting and background for life on Prospect Avenue. That life, as it becomes more and more elaborate, will become more and more absorbing, and university interests will fall more and more into the background. The interest of the lower classes will more and more centre upon it and the energies of the upper classes will be more and more engrossed by it. The vital life of the place will be outside the University and in large part independent of it.

These tendencies have not been obvious until the last year or two. Though for a long time apparent enough on close observation, they seemed until lately to be without formidable momentum and quite controllable by the conservative influences of the place. But now the undergraduates themselves clearly perceive them and are uneasily aware that they are rapidly getting beyond their control. Before the establishment of the preceptorial system, with its necessary corollary of the intimate association of teacher and pupil,—the coördination of the undergraduate life with the teaching of the University,—these things were not so near the heart of our plans and hopes for Princeton's intellectual development and academic revitalization. But now they are of the essence of everything we are striving for, whether on the undergraduate or on the graduate side of the University's work, and we are bound to consider the means by which to effect an immediate reintegration of our academic life.

Your Committee is of the opinion that the only ade-

quate means of accomplishing this is the grouping of the undergraduates in residential quadrangles, each with its common dining hall, its common room for intercourse and diversion, and its resident master and preceptors; where members of all four of the classes shall be associated in a sort of family life, not merely as neighbors in the dormitories but also as comrades at meals and in many daily activities,—the upper classes ruling and forming the lower, and all in constant association with members of the Faculty fitted to act in sympathetic cooperation with them in the management of their common life. In brief, your Committee is of the opinion that the only way in which the social life of the undergraduates can be prevented from fatally disordering, and perhaps even strangling, the academic life of the University is by the actual absorption of the social life into the academic.

This is not the scheme of the English colleges. Those colleges have separate autonomy. Each separately undertakes the instruction of the undergraduates resident within it. The plan we propose involves only a convenient residential division of the University as a social body. It does not involve its division, or the alteration of its past academic life, in any other respect whatever. It is a plan to substitute for the present segregation of the classes a reunion of the classes, and for the present division of the University into small social segments, which constantly tend to war with one another and to cut the University into factions, larger segments, or, rather, vital groups, which could not possibly develop like rivalries and cliques and which would be permeated by their very organization and environment by the soberer influences of the place,—groups which would constitute the best possible *media* for the transmission of such impulses as we are now counting on to transform Princeton entirely. It is a choice between one sort of social transformation and another; and this is clearly the time when the choice must be made.

The effect of this plan upon the upper-class clubs would be either their abolition or their absorption. The withdrawal of the greater part of the Juniors and Seniors from the life of the proposed residential quads would of course be out of the question. A separate club life for them would rob the whole plan of its vitality, and is not to be thought of. But the history of the upper-class clubs has been most honourable and useful. They have served the University in a period of transition, when no plans were thought of for its coördination, as perhaps no other instrumentalities could have served it. Their abolition ought not to be thought of if their adaptation to the new order of things can be effected. It would be a violent breach of historical continuity and out of tone with the traditions and standards of growth which have hitherto kept Princeton intact as an organic whole. Fortunately, if we should be happy enough to secure their coöperation, it will be quite possible to develop them into smaller residential quads as part of the University itself: and this, in the opinion of your Committee, would be the happiest possible solution of the difficulty, giving to clubs which are now in danger of embarrassing and even profoundly demoralizing the life of the University a rôle of singular distinction and public spirit in its organic development, and affording the country at large a new example of Princeton's capacity to lead the way in matters of organization which are now puzzling the authorities of all our larger universities. We can lead in social example, as we are already leading in teaching example. And our alumni and undergraduates will, as usual, be our partners in the enterprise.

Your Committee, therefore, recommend that the President of the University be authorized to take such steps as may seem wisest for maturing this general plan, and for seeking the coöperation and counsel of the upper-class clubs in its elaboration; and that this Committee be continued to consult with the President from

time to time as the matter may take shape and as he may require further counsel and advice, and to mature detailed plans for the future consideration of this Board so soon as such plans can be perfected by common counsel among all concerned.

Respectfully submitted,
WOODROW WILSON, Chairman.

PRESIDENT WILSON'S ADDRESS TO THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES

In presenting the above report, as chairman of the committee, President Wilson spoke, in substance, as follows:

GENTLEMEN OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES: I have never had occasion, I probably never shall have occasion, to lay a more important matter before you than the proposals contained in this report; and, full as that report is, I feel justified in detaining you to add some explanatory matter of my own.

The plan outlined in the report is not of hasty or recent conception, and its object is not primarily a social reorganization of the University. It is but part,—an indispensable part,—of the purpose we have steadfastly set ourselves to accomplish, namely, the reorganization and revitalization of the University as an academic body, whose objects are not primarily social but intellectual, and whose characteristic work can be accomplished only in organic fashion, without confusion of aims or of methods, and without regard to things which are immaterial to the main end in view. I have long foreseen the necessity of thus drawing the undergraduates together in genuinely residential groups in direct association with members of the Faculty, as an indispensable accompaniment and completion of the preceptorial system and of all the other measures we have taken to quicken and mature the intellectual life of the University.

The upper-class clubs seem, in the report, to occupy the foreground of the entire picture, and to be somehow at the heart of the circumstances which render a social recoördination of the University necessary; but that is only an accident of our development. What the report proposes would in any case be necessary. It is in itself the best and most thoroughly tested means of drawing the social and intellectual life of any college together which desired to do the things it is our purpose and duty to do for Princeton. The clubs simply happen to stand in the way. They are not consciously doing anything to the detriment of the University. Their spirit, on the contrary, has, throughout the greater part of their existence, been singularly fine. The thoughtful men in them have done everything in their power to prevent factional feeling in the University and a too keen rivalry between the clubs; and the clubs have always been centres of the most loyal feeling for the University. But, in spite of their admirable spirit and of every watchful effort they have made to the contrary, and by a process which neither they nor we could successfully control, a system of social life has grown up in the University by reason of their existence which divides classes, creates artificial groups for social purposes, and renders a wholesome university spirit impossible. Circumstances created, not by design, but by the inevitable operation of human nature, render a radical reorganization of our life imperative, if the main ends for which that life is meant are to be attained.

Intellectual and spiritual development, in the broadest sense of those terms, are the chief and, indeed, the only legitimate aims of university life. Not that sport and social pleasure are to be excluded: they ought, on the contrary, to be given the keener zest by being made parts, the natural accompaniments, of a life that is deeply stimulating and interesting. But a university is first of all a place of study, a place in which to acquire a certain mastery in the use of the mind, in which

to throw off crudities and gain a habit of thoughtful comprehension which is very different from a knowledge of set "lessons" and a mastery of allotted tasks. This is our chief thought and ideal for Princeton; and if we can in any considerable degree realize it every other good thing will come in its train,—the companionships which stimulate and reward, the fun that clears the head and lightens the spirits, the zest of youth that is the true seed of real manhood. These things come only when a university is made a real community; its companionships academic and steeped in the atmosphere of a life so constituted as to feel all the deeper impulses of the place: a life in which teacher and pupil alike take a natural part on terms of spontaneous intimacy, and in which there is constant matter-of-course contact between men young and old. Contacts of mind become the common accompaniment of social pleasure in such a community. Such is the purpose of the residential quads; and there is the abundant proof of long experience that they will accomplish it.

Under our present social organization there is a constant, even an increasing, disconnection between the life and the work of the University, between its companionships and its duties: there is an almost entire disconnection of consciousness between its hours and its ideals of pleasure and its hours and ideals of work. The social activities of the place not only have no necessary connection with any of its serious tasks, but are, besides, exceedingly complex and absorbing; do in fact absorb the energies of the most active undergraduates in purely unacademic things. It has become common for Sophomores, as the end of the academic year approaches, to ask the advice of their instructors (now that there is some intimacy of counsel between them) as to which career they shall choose for the remainder of their course, the studious or the social, the life of the student or the life of the clubman,—and that not because there is in the clubs any cynical indifference to study but be-

cause the social activities into which their members are naturally and inevitably drawn are very many and very delightful and very engrossing, and study has to take its chance in competition with them.

The last two years have seen influences of this kind increase in strength at an extraordinary rate, and gain a momentum which makes this the imperative time of action. It is clearly evident to anyone who lives in Princeton and intimately touches the life of the place that these influences are now cutting at the root of a thing upon which we depend for the maintenance of some of the best things in our custom and tradition. They are splitting classes into factions, and endangering that class spirit upon which we depend for our self-government and for the transmission of most of the loyal impulses of the University. The "politics" of candidacy for membership in the upper-class clubs not only produce a constant and very demoralizing distraction from university duties in Freshman and Sophomore years and enforce all sorts of questionable customs, putting the sanction of habit upon many understandings which seriously hamper the freedom and the personal development of lads who have good stuff of initiative in them: they cut deeper even than that. Group rivalries break the solidarity of the classes. The younger classes are at no point made conscious of the interests of the University: their whole thought is concentrated upon individual ambitions, upon means of preference, upon combinations to obtain selfish individual ends, and the welfare of the University, as against any particular bad custom which will serve that purpose, is ignored, labour as the upper classmen may to point it out and enforce it. Not only do men in all classes feel that too great absorption in study will involve a virtual disqualification for social preferment; they also feel that the chief objects of their happiness and their ambition are connected with their social affiliations, not with the general interests of the University. They strive

against this, when they become Juniors and Seniors, but they do not strive against it successfully; and when they are Freshmen and Sophomores they do not strive against it at all. Men who enter the University after Freshman year are generally thrown out of the running altogether and find themselves in the upper years isolated and lonely, to the still further weakening of the old-time class solidarity. If for nothing else than to keep the classes undivided in spirit, the new quad divisions would be preferable to the present club divisions. The present system of our life is artificial and unwholesome. Individuals and classes alike must be restored to that feeling of intimate and constant connection with the University *as the University*, as an organic, indivisible thing, their home and their atmosphere, upon which Princeton's strength and prestige depend.

The facts are disputed by no one who knows our undergraduate life as it is now constituted. It is by common consent threatened with the loss of college feeling and of class feeling and it is entirely disconnected from the intellectual purposes of the place in its aims and organization. Debate turns, not upon the facts, but only upon the means and methods of reorganization. The finest evidence of the spirit of Princeton seems to me to lie in the fact that the undergraduates themselves have, during the past year, come to recognize the situation in all its significance and to wish for an entire emancipation from it, by no matter how radical a remedy. The things they have foreseen and dreaded and tried to stave off have come upon them, and they are ready to accept any thoroughgoing reform.

The remedy proposed by the committee whose report I have read is radical, indeed, but not wholly out of line with the organization it is meant to replace. The associations formed in the quads will be like the associations formed in the clubs; with the elective principle left out, indeed, but with all the opportunities for a natural selection of chums and companions that the

larger number in residence will afford; and with an added dignity of association, under resident members of the Faculty, fitted for the association and for the function of leadership and example which will naturally fall to them. The elective principle in the clubs at present amounts to little more than the right to choose groups of men (artificially enough formed, as everybody knows) rather than individuals. And, whether the new plan is like the old or not, it is not the social side that our thought is dwelling on. We are not seeking to form better clubs, but academic communities. We are making a university, not devising a method of social pleasure. The social life of the quads will be all-inclusive, and it will serve as the medium for things intellectual.

The question, How the transition from our present social organization to the new organization is to be effected,—with what adjustments, accommodations, measures of transformation,—is now our main subject of debate; and we can enter on that debate with a frankness and confidence in each other which I believe no other university in the world could hope for in an undertaking of such delicacy and magnitude. We have a body of alumni for whom the interests of the University as a whole, as they may be made to see those interests at any moment of action, take precedence over every other consideration, and over every rival sentiment. They are ready to be partners with the undergraduates and ourselves in accomplishing anything that may be necessary to give free and wholesome vigour to the life of the University and to secure to her the fame which she covets and must win,—the fame of distinct intellectual purpose and a clear knowledge of the means by which she proposes to attain them.

I take leave to say that Princeton is the only university in the country which has found itself, which has formulated a clear ideal and deliberately set about the synthesis of plan necessary to realize it. She has set

the country an example in the methods of teaching necessary to give a great university the intimacy of contact and the direct efficiency of instruction hitherto supposed to belong only to the small college, and suited to create, besides, something which the small college has seldom known how to create,—a habit and freedom of independent reading which makes a “course” something more than the instruction of a single classroom or a single instructor; and now she must take the next step. She must organize her life in such a way that these contacts between the university and the student shall be stuff of daily habit, and not merely matters of formal appointment; not a thing of the classroom and conference merely, but a thing which may touch every hour, any hour, of the day, and fill seasons of leisure and enjoyment with a consciousness of what it is that vitalizes a university and makes it a force in the life of a great nation. Common counsel shall bring us to this consummation,—not without trouble, but without serious conflict of opinion or purpose, as a new exhibition of what love of Princeton can do for her regeneration when her sons set themselves to the task. The labour will be pleasant, and the abiding fame of it will belong to all of us in common.

In order to complete the record of Commencement with regard to this important matter, we add the memorandum which Dr. Wilson sent to the presidents of the several upper-class clubs, in order to afford them an opportunity to discuss the project at their annual banquets, if they chose to do so, in a form which would be exact and not made up out of oral report. This memorandum, he gave it to be understood, emanated only from him individually and did not when it was issued rest upon any action of the Board of Trustees. Since he sent it out the Trustees have adopted the essential idea and purpose of the plan. The details em-

bodied in the memorandum remain President Wilson's individual suggestions.

MEMORANDUM CONCERNING RESIDENTIAL QUADS.

I am very glad indeed to have an opportunity to explain a plan which, though certainly radical in character, can easily be so misunderstood as to seem much more radical than it is. It is a scheme I have long had in mind as a necessary means of giving Princeton not only social but also academic coördination and of making her new methods of study a vital part of her undergraduate life.

The plan in its briefest terms is this: to draw the undergraduates together into residential quads in which they shall eat as well as lodge together, and in which they shall, under the presidency of a resident member of the Faculty, regulate their own corporate life by some simple method of self-government. For this purpose it would be necessary to place all future dormitories in such relation to those already erected as to form close geographical units, and to erect in connection with each group a building which should contain a dining room, kitchens and serving rooms, a handsome common room for social purposes, and rooms for the member of the Faculty who shall preside in the quad. Every undergraduate would be required actually to live in his quad—that is, to take his meals there as well as lodge there; and the residents of each quad would be made up as nearly as might be of equal numbers of Seniors, Juniors, Sophomores, and Freshmen: because it is clear to every one that the life of the University can be best regulated and developed only when the under-classmen are in constant association with upper-classmen upon such terms as to be formed and guided by them. The self-government of each group would naturally be vested in the Seniors, or in the Seniors and Juniors, who were members of the quad.

The objects of this arrangement would be: (1) To place unmarried members of the Faculty in residence in the quads in order to bring them into close, habitual, natural association with the undergraduates and so intimately tie the intellectual and social life of the place into one another; (2) to associate the four classes in a genuinely organic manner and make of the University a real social body, to the exclusion of cliques and separate class social organizations; (3) to give to the University the kind of common consciousness which apparently comes from the closer sorts of social contact, to be had only outside the classroom, and most easily to be got about a common table, and in the contacts of a common life.

This plan directly affects the upper-class clubs because, under it, it would be necessary to keep the most influential and efficient Seniors and Juniors in residence in the quads for their government and direction. It would be clearly out of the question to let them eat elsewhere and find their chief interests elsewhere, leaving the quads to Freshmen and Sophomores and a minority of upper-classmen who would be too few to play any true part of influence or control. The adoption of the plan would obviously make it necessary that the clubs should allow themselves to be absorbed into the University, by the natural process of becoming themselves residential quads, and so retaining their historical identity at the same time that they showed their devotion to the University by an act of supreme self-sacrifice. I cannot imagine a service to the University which would bring more distinction, more *éclat* throughout the entire university world, or which would give to our present clubs a position of greater interest and importance in the history of academic life in America.

The details of the adjustments which would be necessary I have in large part thought out; but I do not wish to dwell upon them now, simply because I wish them to be subject to change in my own mind. These

complicated things cannot be wisely planned or executed except by the slow processes of common counsel; and I should wish the details of such a scheme of transformation to be worked out by the frank conference of all concerned.

But some things seem to me clear. I should hope that, in effecting the transition, each club would vest its property in the hands of a small board of trustees of its own choice who should be charged with administering it for the benefit of the University in association with the present university authorities; and that that board should have important powers of advice or confirmation in respect of the appointment of resident members of the Faculty and the regulations governing the assignment of students to the quad under its supervision, and with regard to all matters upon which they could retain a hold without embarrassing the uniform government of the University as a whole or the supreme authority of the Trustees of the University itself. And I see no reason why the graduate members of the several clubs might not retain all the privileges they now enjoy in respect of the use of the club property and meals at the club tables on their visits to Princeton. I see no reason why they should ever feel their relations to the clubs at all radically altered because the clubs had in effect become residential colleges.

Moreover, I should hope that it would be borne in mind that this scheme of social and academic coördination, which present conditions in the University seem to render imperatively necessary, is not a plan to prevent club life in Princeton. Club life is based upon social instincts and principles which it would be impossible to eradicate. But these natural instincts and tendencies would, under the new order of things, undoubtedly express themselves in a different way, a much better way than at present,—as they express themselves wherever men of congenial tastes find themselves in need of relaxation. Probably clubs of an entirely different char-

acter, not residential, but purely social organizations, would from time to time spring up; and I do not think that the university authorities would be jealous of that, provided such associations were sharply separated both in form and in tradition from the processes which have given us our present social strifes, perplexities, and divisions. No one can now predict just how the new developments would come or just what shapes they would take.

END OF VOLUME ONE

Date Due

FACULTY
FACULTY

JAN 1964

JAN 1964

©

E660 .W75 v.1
College and state; educational,

Princeton Theological Seminary-Speer Library



1 1012 00053 6815